Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
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- Identifies the book as Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.
- Places the volume in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series, edited by Karl Ameriks and Desmond M. Clarke.
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CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
Beyond Good and Evil
CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Series editors
KARL AMERIKS
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame
DESMOND M. CLARKE
Professor of Philosophy at University College Cork
The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the
range, variety , and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available inEnglish. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) andalso by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete andunabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volumecontains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessaryglossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergrad-uate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy , butalso to a wider audience of reader s in the history of science, the history of theology and
the history of ideas.
For a list of titles published in the series , please see end of book.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
Beyond Good and Evil
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
EDITED BY
ROLF-PETER HORSTMANN
Humboldt-Universit¨ at, Berlin
JUDITH NORMAN
Trinity University, Texas
TRANSLATED BY
JUDITH NORMAN
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São PauloCambridge University PressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom
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Contents
Introductio n pagevii
Chronolo gy xxix
Furtherreadin g xxxii
Noteonthetext xxx iv
Introduction to Nietzsche's Masterwork
- Beyond Good and Evil is widely regarded as one of Nietzsche's most significant and comprehensive works.
- The book provides a detached and accessible account of Nietzsche's lifelong philosophical concerns.
- Nietzsche expresses deep suspicion toward traditional concepts of knowledge, truth, morality, and religion.
- The text argues that conventional human development has led to disastrous cultural and psychological consequences.
- Nietzsche introduces constructive concepts such as perspectivism, the will to power, and human nobility.
- The work outlines a vision for a life liberated from the constraints of oppressive traditions.
Nietzsche was suspicious of almost everything addressed in this book – whether it be knowledge, truth, philosophy, or morality and religion.
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
Preface
PartOntheprejudice sofphilosophe rs
PartThefreespiri t
PartThereligiou scharacte r
PartEpi gramsandentr’acte s
PartOnthenaturalhistor yofmorals
PartWeschola rs
PartOurvirtues
PartPeople sandfatherland s
PartWh atisnoble?
Fromhighmountains :Afte rsong
Glossa ryofname s
Index
v
Introduction
I
Beyond Good and Evil (BGE ) is often considered to be one of Friedrich
Nietzsche’s greatest books.Though it is by no means clear what criteria
this assessment is based on, it is easy to understand how it comes about. Itseems to be an expression of the feeling that in this book Nietzsche givesthe most comprehensible and detached account of the major themes thatconcerned him throughout his life. Nietzsche was suspicious of almosteverything addressed in this book – whether it be knowledge, truth, phi-
losophy , or morality and religion. He regarded them as the source, or atleast the effect, of a misguided tendency in the development of humannature: one that has led to disastrous cultural, social, and psychologicalconsequences. At the same time he lets us share his more constructiveviews as well, mainly his views on how he wants us to perceive the worldand to change our lives in order to live up to this new perception. He speaksof perspectivism, the will to power, of human nobility ( Vornehmheit ) and
of the conditions of a life liberated from the constraints of oppressivetradition. In the middle of the book, he even adds a number of short
I thank Dartmouth College and especially Sally Sedgwick and Margaret Robinson, whose generous
hospitality gave me the opportunity to write this text. Special thanks to Karl Ameriks and GaryHatfield for transforming my “English” into English and to Andreas Kemmerling for helpful
suggestions. V ery special thanks to Dina Emundts for all sorts of comments. The version printed
here owes much to careful editing by Hilary Gaskin.
See, for example, the Introductions to BGE by Walter Kaufmann (Vintage: New Y ork, )a n d
Michael Tanner (Penguin: Harmondsworth, ; translation R. Hollingdale), and also Kauf-
mann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Meridian Books: New Y ork, ), and
Tanner, Nietzsche (Oxford University Press: Oxford/New Y ork, ). References for all quota-
tions from BGE are to section numbers.
vii
Introduction
The Duality of Nietzsche
- Beyond Good and Evil is often viewed as a masterpiece that unites Nietzsche's insights on modern decadence and human potential.
- Critics argue the work is fundamentally flawed, dismissing it as irrational, contentless, or the product of a mind approaching madness.
- The debate over the book's greatness often hinges on whether one views it as a profound philosophical synthesis or a disturbing document of mental decline.
- An individual's evaluation of the text is heavily influenced by their personal tolerance for Nietzsche's personality and 19th-century German bourgeois culture.
- The most critical factor in judging the work is the reader's own confidence in the 'normal' outlook on reality; those secure in their worldview will likely find Nietzsche a nuisance.
- For those skeptical of conventional truths, the book serves as an illuminating tool for re-evaluating the framework of human existence.
To call any of his works great would therefore amount to a categorical mistake.
aphorisms, and he ends the book with a poem that hints at the artistic
background to his concern with decadence and the means for overcomingit. Thus it would seem that the whole range of Nietzsche’s interests, hisprejudices and his preferences, his loathings and his hopes, and above all
his deep insights into our situation in the modern world, are united in anexemplary way in BGE , and for this reason it is a great book.
Although there is something to be said for this view , it is not the only
view that is possible. There are quite a number of thinkers who would in-sist that it makes no sense at all to attribute greatness to any of Nietzsche’sworks. For these readers, all of Nietzsche’s writings are flawed by serious
shortcomings that justify fundamental complaints, ranging from accusa-tions that they are utterly irrational, or devoid of informative content, tothe conviction that they contain nothing but silly proclamations based onunwarranted generalizations – or a mixture of both. According to pro-
ponents of this view , the best way to think of Nietzsche’s works is as thedisturbing documents of the creative process of someone who was on theverge of madness. To call any of his works great would therefore amountto a categorical mistake. Interestingly enough, this bleak evaluation is notbased on any disagreement with what the work’s admirers tell us we willfind in it, or even any disagreement with the claim that it gives us thequintessential Nietzsche.
It is a perplexing fact that it is by no means easy to decide which of these
two conflicting attitudes towards BGE should prevail, and in the end it
may be a rather personal matter. Nevertheless it is possible to identify someconditions that will influence how we are likely to think about the meritsof this work. Three main factors should be taken into consideration. First,much depends on how we interpret the aims pursued by Nietzsche’s workin general and BGE in particular. Second, our evaluation will depend on
the amount of tolerance and sympathy that we are prepared to mobilizetowards Nietzsche the person, and also towards certain tendencies inbourgeois culture in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century .The third and most important factor, however, is the way that we feel aboutthe very framework in which all our dealings with what we take to be realityare embedded: if we are confident that our normal outlook on whateverconcerns us has been proven to be ultimately right, or at least on the righttrack, then chances are high that we will end up thinking of NietzscheandBGE as a nuisance. If we are not convinced of the soundness of our
normal views, then we might have second thoughts about things, and in
viii
Introduction
that case a book like BGE might be considered illuminating and even
helpful.
II
Nietzsche's Personal Philosophy
- While many intellectual works are best judged independently of their authors, Nietzsche's texts are intrinsically tied to his personal perspective and biography.
- Nietzsche viewed his writings similarly to diaries or personal notes rather than objective, non-personal academic products.
- His life was characterized by physical misery, including chronic nervous ailments and severe eye problems that left him nearly blind.
- He experienced profound social isolation, finding his family oppressive and his friends insensitive to his intellectual contributions.
- His inability to establish satisfying emotional relationships was exacerbated by his own controversial views on femininity.
- The author suggests that understanding Nietzsche's 'sad story of misery and failure' is essential for assessing his philosophical work.
He was plagued by ill health, a psychosomatic wreck, suffering from all sorts of diseases ranging from chronic nervous ailments and severe eye problems, which left him almost blind, to extremely exhausting states of prolonged migraine.
Let us start with Nietzsche the person. In the history of art, science,philosophy , and even literature one very often finds that in order to ap-preciate or to evaluate a work it is not much of an advantage to be familiarwith its author and his life: an intellectual or artistic product is betterjudged on its own merits than on the basis of uncertain knowledge aboutthe idiosyncratic features and muddled purposes of its author. Moreover,in some cases authors intentionally withdraw from their products in anattempt to become invisible and to let the work speak for itself, and thusleave us very few personal clues in their works. Rousseau could serve asan example of the first kind of case and Kant of the second; Kant goes sofar as to use the phrase de nobis ipsis silemus (“of our own person we will
say nothing”) as a motto for his main work. W e therefore tend to believethat a distinction can be drawn between the private views of the authorand the meaning of the work which the author produces.
Y et there are some works with respect to which such a consideration
does not so easily apply . These are works whose very meaning is tiedintrinsically to the person of their author, as is the case with diaries,letters, personal notes, or autobiographies. Here our knowledge about theauthor, or perhaps an understanding of the situation the author is in, arenecessary ingredients for an appreciation of the text. There are manyreasons to presume that Nietzsche thought of many of his texts as beinglike diaries or personal notes that tell us something about himself andabout his perspective on the matters they address, rather than as productsthat aim at objective, non-personal results. Hence, his biography may beof interest in any attempt to assess his work.
Nietzsche’s life is surely not a success story; on the contrary , it is a
rather sad story of misery and failure. It is the story of a man who fromthe beginning of his adult life, until the sudden and catastrophic end ofhis productive period, was confronted with embarrassing and humiliatingexperiences. This is true of his private life as well as of his relations withthe intellectual community of his time. He was plagued by ill health, apsychosomatic wreck, suffering from all sorts of diseases ranging fromchronic nervous ailments and severe eye problems, which left him almost
ix
Introduction
blind, to extremely exhausting states of prolonged migraine. These con-
ditions made life tolerable for him only in a few places in northern Italy(in the winter) and the Swiss Engadine (in the summer), and it is in theseplaces that he spent most of his time in the s. His social relations
were always, to put it mildly , somewhat complicated. Those who appar-ently cared most about him, his mother and his sister, he found oppressiveand distasteful because they represented a type of personality he deeplydespised.
Though he prided himself on being comfortable with women,
he does not seem to have been very successful in establishing emotionallysatisfying relationships with them, which is hardly surprising given hisviews on women and on femininity ( Weiblichkeit ) in general.
Things did
not go much better with his friends. The people whom he called “friends”he quite often spoke of with great resentment: he charged all of them witha lack of sensitivity toward him, he complained that none of them everbothered to study his works, and he accused them of failing to defend himagainst public neglect.
In short, he suffered deeply from a sense of soli-
tude and isolation, from not being appropriately acknowledged becauseof the supposed imperfections of the people around him.
To make things even worse, Nietzsche was not given the opportunity
Nietzsche's Academic and Literary Failure
- Nietzsche's early academic promise as a young professor at Basle quickly disintegrated due to chronic poor health and a growing distaste for teaching duties.
- His debut work, The Birth of Tragedy, was met with either emphatic negativity from fellow classicists or limited interest from the Wagnerian circle.
- The general public showed a dismal lack of interest in his philosophical inquiries into truth, morality, and the fundamental problems of modernity.
- Nietzsche suffered from the realization that his few readers were the 'wrong' ones who were unable or unwilling to understand his true intentions.
- He deeply craved a sense of intellectual kinship and recognition from an elite audience that he felt was worthy of his work.
- His personal life was marked by deep resentment toward his mother and sister, whom he described as his 'deepest objection' to his own philosophy.
I confess that the deepest objection to the Eternal Recurrence, my real idea from the abyss, is always my mother and my sister.
to compensate for the shortcomings of his private life by enjoying insti-tutional and public success in his roles as a university teacher and author.Although he made a very promising start – he was appointed professor of
classics at Basle university at the early age of twenty-four – his academiccareer disintegrated rapidly , in part because of his poor health and in partbecause he became annoyed with his teaching duties. As for his fortunesas an author, not much can be said that is positive. His first book, thenow highly acclaimed treatise The Birth of Tragedy , did at least attract
the attention of classicists (though their reaction to it was for the most
See the annihilating remark aimed at both of them in Ecce Homo which culminates in Nietzsche’s
pronouncement: “I confess that the deepest objection to the Eternal Recurrence, my real idea fromthe abyss, is always my mother and my sister” ( KSA VI,§ , translation from Tanner, Nietzsche ,
p.).KSA refers to S¨amtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe , ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari,
vols. (de Gruyter: Berlin, ); this edition is based on the critical edition of Nietzsche’s works,
Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vols. to date (de Gruyter:
Berlin, –).
Though Nietzsche addresses this topic in BGE as well ( §et seq .), the general tendency of his
outlook on women is documented most succinctly in the relevant passage of Ecce Homo (“Why I
write such good books,” §).
A good example of this assessment of his friends is again to be found in Ecce Homo (“The case of
Wagner,” §).
x
Introduction
part emphatically negative) and of members of the Wagnerian community
(including Wagner himself).But soon he had to realize that there was
only a marginal interest among the public in his way of dealing with issues,whether they were philosophical topics such as truth and the metaphysi-cal foundations of knowledge, topics concerning the history and value ofreligion and morality , or topics such as the critical assessment of modernculture and ideas about how to overcome what he considered to be thefundamental problems of modernity . This lack of interest showed in thedismal number of copies sold of his books.
The most discouraging experience for Nietzsche, however, may not
have been this failure to gain a wider recognition. If he could have believedthat his few readers represented some sort of elite, perhaps a group ofdistinguished intellectuals, then their taking notice of his writings wouldhave been of importance to him and this might have counterbalanced hislack of public success. Unfortunately he could not entertain even thatbelief. From the very few reactions he became aware of – mostly reviewsof his books in more or less obscure journals – he had to conclude that
he was read by only a few readers – and the wrong ones. In his view ,his readership consisted of people either unable or unwilling (or both)to understand him adequately . He blamed his readers for not being inthe least prepared to give credit to his intentions and for being attentiveonly to those points which conveniently confirmed them in their ownnegative preconceptions. What he was missing on a fundamental levelwas a readiness on the part of readers to explore things his way , a feelingof intellectual kinship between author and audience, or, to put it anotherway , he deeply craved recognition from an audience that he thought fitting.This is touchingly expressed in two short remarks from Ecce Homo . The
first relates explicitly only to his Zarathustra, though it is quite likely
Nietzsche's Isolation and Conviction
- Nietzsche's major works, including Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, suffered from abysmal sales and public neglect during his lifetime.
- The philosopher believed that understanding his work required being 'conditioned' like him, with 'one foot beyond life.'
- He defined his ideal reader as a 'monster of courage and curiosity'—a born adventurer and discoverer.
- To cope with failure, Nietzsche maintained a psychological barrier between his personal worth and his lack of professional success.
- He rejected all contemporary criticism as irrelevant, operating under the defiant maxim of 'so much the worse for the critic.'
- This isolation fostered a total lack of self-doubt regarding the potential triviality or exaggeration of his philosophical insights.
When I call up the image of a perfect reader, what emerges is a monster of courage and curiosity, who is also supple, clever, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer.
that Nietzsche thought it true of his other writings as well: “In order to
See the Introduction by Raymond Geuss to the edition of The Birth of Tragedy in this series
(Cambridge University Press, ).
Of the book Nietzsche valued most, Zarathustra , whose first three parts were published separately
in and , only about sixty to seventy copies each were sold within the first three years
after their appearance (see letter to Franz Overbeck, summer :KSB VII, pp. –). The
fourth part of the Zarathustra was published in in a private edition of only forty copies and
was not accessible to a wider public before .BGE did not fare much better: copies were
sold within a year (see letter to Peter Gast, June :KSB VIII, pp. –). Nietzsche comments
(in the same letter to Gast): “Instructive! Namely , they simply don’t want my literature.” It seems
that most of his other books had the same fate – they too were utterly neglected during the periodin his life when he would still have cared about their success.
xi
Introduction
understand anything at all from my Zarathustra , you might need to be
conditioned as I am – with one foot beyond life.”The second remark
delineates what he takes to be his ideal reader, and there is no doubt thathe meant what he says: “When I call up the image of a perfect reader,what emerges is a monster of courage and curiosity , who is also supple,clever, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer.”
What emerges is a picture of a totally isolated, highly neurotic man who
had to try hard to avoid thinking of himself as a complete failure. His wayof dealing with this situation seems to have been simply not to accept theidea that all these annoying circumstances might have been brought aboutpartly by particularities or deficiencies that could be traced back to hisown person, so he managed to combine a perfectly clear and even realisticassessment of what was happening to him with an unshakeable convictionthat all this had nothing to do with him and revealed nothing about him.It is this ability which, in my view , accounts for two dominant traits thatappear in his published works. The first is that he never even came closeto considering the possibility that – given the general intellectual climateof his time – his lack of success as an author might have something to do
with his pursuing the “wrong” topics in a “wrong” way . It never crossedhis mind that what he thought to be an interesting, novel, and valuableinsight might indeed have been exactly what it seemed to be to almost allof his contemporaries – an overstated triviality , an extremely one-sidedexaggeration or an embarrassing piece of bad reasoning. He simply stuckto the points he felt he had to make, deeply convinced of being on the righttrack, and fending off all signs of criticism or neglect with the maxim “somuch the worse for the critic.”
Nietzsche's Solitary Truths
- Nietzsche argues that readers can only extract from a book what they have already experienced, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding of his work.
- He views the lack of comprehension from his audience not as a personal failure, but as an 'acoustic illusion' where the reader hears nothing and assumes nothing is there.
- In his late writings, Nietzsche adopts a persona of world-historical significance, famously declaring himself to be 'dynamite' and the 'Antichrist.'
- He rejects the 'social game' of competitive discourse, refusing to provide traditional arguments or reasons to convince those with 'normal' thinking.
- By labeling his insights as 'his truths' rather than universal Truth, he dismisses the need for external validation or tenability according to alien standards.
I know my fate. One day, my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous – a crisis the like of which the world has never seen... I am not a man. I am dynamite.
Ecce Homo (“Why I am so wise,” end of §).
Ibid. (“Why I write such good books,” end of §). In the same text he mentions explicitly the
reactions to BGE as an example of how severely it was misunderstood or, to use his terminology ,
how gravely this book was sinned against because its readers were not up to its challenge (“Why
I write such good books,” end of §).
InEcce Homo Nietzsche even presents an explanation as to why he believes this stance to be
perfectly reasonable: “Ultimately , nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he
already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear. Now let us
imagine an extreme case: that a book speaks of nothing but events that lie altogether beyond thepossibility of any frequent or even rare experience – that it is the first language for a new series
of experiences. In that case, simply nothing will be heard, but there will be the acoustic illusion
that where nothing is heard, nothing is there ...Whoever thought he had understood something
of me, had made up something out of me after his own image ...and whoever had understood
nothing of me, denied that I need to be considered at all.” “Why I write such good books,” §,
xii
Introduction
This attitude becomes increasingly visible in his writings after
Zarathustra and culminates in his late texts of , especially in Ecce
Homo . Here we find brilliant and witty remarks which rightly became
notorious (though Nietzsche himself might not have found them veryamusing, because they can also be read as documents of despair). I quotetwo of them: “W e all know , several of us even know from experience,what it is to have long ears. W ell then, I will dare to claim that I havethe smallest ears. This is of no little interest to women – it seems theythink I understand them better? ...I am the anti-ass par excellence and
this makes me a world-historical monster – I am, in Greek, but not onlyin Greek, the Antichrist .”
The other is: “I know my fate. One day , my
name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous – acrisis the like of which the world has never seen, the most profound col-lision of conscience, of a decision brought about against everything that
has ever been believed, demanded, or held holy so far. I am not a man. Iam dynamite.”
The second trait which we find in Nietzsche’s writings is closely con-
nected to his inability to assess himself in the light of others’ reactions.It consists in his total unconcern about the tenability of his views whenjudged according to standards that he thinks are alien to his approach.Starting from the conviction that there is no common ground betweenhim and his reader, that what he has to say is most likely incomprehensi-ble to almost everybody else, he does not feel obliged to enter the socialgame of competitive discourse. He refuses to try to convince people bysomehow connecting to their way of thinking; he does not refute possi-ble arguments against the points he wants to make by giving reasons intheir favor. Instead, he makes abundantly clear his contempt for “nor-mal” thinking and his impatience with the evaluations of others. It is thisstance which gives so many readers the impression of an overwhelmingpolemical element in Nietzsche’s literary presentation of his views. Hereinforces it by insisting over and over again that what he has to tell usare above all histruths. The claim to exclusivity is meant to imply both
that his main concern is not whether we find these truths convincing, and
translation from W . Kaufmann, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo (Vintage: New Y ork,
), p. .
Ecce Homo , “Why I write such good books,” end of §, translation Kaufmann, p. .
Ibid ., “Why I am a destiny ,” beginning of §, translation Kaufmann, p. .
xiii
Introduction
that he does not pretend to have found the Truth, for he thinks this is a
metaphysical illusion anyway .
Nietzsche's Narrative Perspectivism
- Nietzsche presents his philosophy as personal narratives rather than objectively valid or context-free metaphysical truths.
- His writings are intended to become the standard versions of human assessment because they will eventually align with the 'real meaning of life' for future readers.
- Readers are warned that Nietzsche's views are intentionally partial, apodictic, and designed to maintain a distance from the 'insensitive' academic audience.
- The author's stylistic eccentricities and generalities reflect a resolute disdain for common sense and conventional modesty.
- Nietzsche viewed his post-Zarathustra works as the 'no-saying' or critical phase of his task, serving as elaborations on his central opus.
- There is a scholarly tension between Nietzsche's claim that all his ideas are in Zarathustra and the distinct literary form of his later books.
Listen to me [the emphasis is on the ‘me’]. For I am thus and thus. Do not, above all, confound me.
Thus we find embedded in Nietzsche’s basic view of himself the rec-
ommendation not that we read his texts as aiming at “objectively valid”judgments, at judgments that are (metaphysically) true irrespective of thecultural and psychological context in which they are made (whatever thatmay be), but that we think of them as narratives that he invites us to listento, without really obliging us to believe them if we are not the right kindof person. This does not mean that the stories he has to tell us about,say , truth, morality , the will to power, or culture are, in his view , on apar with fictions, pleasant or otherwise. On the contrary , he believed hisstories to be the ultimate stories, the stories that are destined to becomethe standard versions of our assessment of these phenomena. This is notbecause his narratives are objectively , or in a context-free sense, the mostfitting; rather, they will succeed because eventually people will change toa condition where they appreciate the fact that these narratives are bestsuited to capture their sense of the right perspective on phenomena ifthey are considered against the background of what for them is the realmeaning of life.
Before looking more closely at some aspects of BGE itself, let me sum-
marize what I take to be the lessons for approaching Nietzsche’s writingsthat can be learned from his personal situation and his way of dealing withit. They take the form of three warnings: ( ) do not expect these writings
to express impartial views on whatever subject they address – they ex-press, in an emphatic sense, Nietzsche’s own views; ( ) do not be annoyed
by his obsession with apodictic statements whose immense generalityvery often contradicts both normal expectations of modesty and the mostobvious requirements of common sense – these stylistic eccentricities re-flect his resolute disdain for what most people cherish, especially peoplewho he suspects are not willing to listen to him; ( ) never forget that the
author does not want to get mixed up with “us,” his normal insensitive“academic” readers. He does not want to be “one of us” – instead he
insists on what he calls “distance,” in order to uphold his view of himselfand to remind us of his uniqueness. A last quotation from Ecce Homo may
highlight these points: “ Listen to me [the emphasis is on the ‘me’]. For I
am thus and thus. Do not, above all, confound me. ”
Ibid ., Preface, §.
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Introduction
III
BGE is the first book Nietzsche published after Thus Spoke Zarathustra .
He never gave up on the notion that all he really wanted to say is containedinZarathustra , and this led him to claim that the works he wrote after
Zarathustra are essentially nothing but elaborations and explications of
ideas already present in his opus magnum . This claim has been disputed
by quite a number of his commentators, firstly because many of the most
central ideas in Zarathustra cease to play an important role in his later
writings, and secondly because the literary form of the later writingsconnects them much more closely to his books prior to Zarathustra than
toZarathustra itself.
However that may be, Nietzsche himself was of
the opinion that Zarathustra set the stage for everything he had to do
subsequently . He writes: “The task for the years that followed [i.e. theyears after Zarathustra ] was mapped out as clearly as possible. Once the
yes-saying part of my task had been solved [by means of Zarathustra ], it
was time for the no-saying, no-doing part.”
This seems to imply that
he regarded his post- Zarathustra writings as consisting of predominantly
Nietzsche's Psychological Critique of Modernity
- Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) is famous for its provocative maxims, including controversial statements on Christianity, gender, and herd morality.
- The text distinguishes itself from Nietzsche's other works through its intense focus on the psychological aspects of human belief and conviction.
- Nietzsche uses a psychological stance to cast doubt on received convictions by tracing their origins and exposing the shakiness of fundamental beliefs.
- The author describes BGE as a critique of modernity across science, art, and politics, while proposing an 'opposing type' that is noble and 'yes-saying.'
- Despite Nietzsche's own summary, the book's most disturbing and central reflections often revolve around the themes of morality and religion.
- Nietzsche's philosophical project is driven by the existential question of how to endure a life that he views as a chaotic process devoid of inherent meaning.
This integration of what he calls a psychological point of view into his general practice of casting doubts on received convictions by tracing their origins, of throwing into question our most fundamental beliefs by pointing out their shakiness, and of scrutinizing available alternatives in the light of a new vision of the value of life – this I take to be the most distinctive feature of BGE.
critical essays.
BGE is best known to a wider public for its proverbs. Indeed, some of
Nietzsche’s best-known maxims are assembled in this text, ranging fromperspicuous insights to highly controversial statements. Starting with thePreface, where we find his much used and misused saying, “Christianityis Platonism for the ‘people,’” almost every one of the nine parts ofthe book contains lines that have entered the repertoire of educated orpolemical discourse: “life as such is will to power” (
§); “humans are
the still undetermined [nicht festgestellte ]animals ”(§); “When a woman
has scholarly inclinations, there is usually something wrong with hersexuality” (
§ ); “Morality in Europe these days is the morality of herd
animals ”(§ ); and (slightly paraphrased here): “saintliness – the highest
spiritualization of the instinct of cleanliness” ( § ).
These proverbs are in a way the least of what BGE has to offer. Its
primary fascination lies on a deeper level: this book introduces us into aworld of remarkable conjectures, suspicions, and implications. Thoughone might say this is true of most of Nietzsche’s other published works aswell, with the exception of Zarathustra , there is nevertheless a difference
See, e.g., M. Tanner, Introduction to BGE andNietzsche ,p ..
Ecce Homo ,‘Beyond Good and Evil ’,§, translation Kaufmann, p. .
xv
Introduction
in emphasis between BGE and the other writings. Whereas the other
texts pursue their subjects from many different angles, BGE (like The
Genealogy of Morals , which Nietzsche announced on the back of its title
page as “a sequel to my last book, Beyond Good and Evil , which it is
meant to supplement and clarify”) is highly focused on the psychologicalaspects of its topics. In BGE Nietzsche confronts us primarily (though
not exclusively) with a dimension of his thought that he was particularlyproud of – his psychological stance. This integration of what he calls apsychological point of view into his general practice of casting doubts onreceived convictions by tracing their origins, of throwing into questionour most fundamental beliefs by pointing out their shakiness, and ofscrutinizing available alternatives in the light of a new vision of the valueof life – this I take to be the most distinctive feature of BGE .
Nietzsche himself gives the following account of what he is doing in
BGE : “This book ( ) is in every essential a critique of modernity ; mod-
ern sciences, modern arts, even modern politics are not excluded. Besidesthis, it is an indication of an opposing type, which is as un-modern as pos-sible, a noble, yes-saying type.”
Though this characterization is accurate
and confirms the view that Nietzsche considers his task to be mainly acritical one, it is by no means complete. Interestingly enough, it does notmention two topics which some readers take to be the subject of the mostdisturbing reflections in the book: morality and religion. This is surpris-ing because these are the topics which seem to emerge most strongly inany consideration of its main message.
In order to appreciate the distinctive approach which Nietzsche favors
inBGE in his dealings with what he calls “modernity ,” it might be worth-
while to say a few words about his more general outlook. The starting pointfor almost everything Nietzsche is interested in throughout his entire in-tellectual career can be nicely summarized in the form of the question“how are we to live?” or, more poignantly , “how are we to endure life?”
He considered this question to be of the utmost importance, because ofthree interconnected convictions that he treated virtually as facts. Hisfirst conviction was that life is best conceived of as a chaotic dynamicprocess without any stability or direction. The second is articulated inthe claim that we have no reason whatsoever to believe in any such thingas the “sense” or the “value” of life, insofar as these terms imply the idea
Ibid .
xvi
Introduction
The Origin of Values
- Nietzsche posits that human life is inherently value-oriented, making adherence to a value system a psychological necessity.
- He rejects the existence of 'objective' or 'natural' purposes, suggesting values do not exist 'out there' like physical objects.
- Because values are necessary but not objective, they must be generated by an internal human capacity for creation.
- True value creation is a rare prerogative reserved for 'real' philosophers, unique artists, and foundational institutions rather than the masses.
- Nietzsche's work, specifically Beyond Good and Evil, serves as a methodological departure point for investigating how these values are forged.
To create such constitutive values seems to be, according to Nietzsche, the prerogative of real philosophers (not philosophy professors), of unique artists (if there are any), of even rarer founders of religions.
of an “objective” or “natural” purpose of life. The third is that human
life is value-oriented in its very essence – that is, without adherence tosome set of values or other, human life would be virtually impossible.Whereas the first conviction is supposed to state an ontological fact, thesecond is meant to be an application of the ontological point to the nor-mative aspects of human life in particular. The third conviction, thoughsomewhat at odds with the other two, is taken by Nietzsche to reveal apsychological necessity . (How Nietzsche came to hold these convictions,and whether they can be supported, there is not space to examine here,although a closer look would no doubt lead back to his use of some ofSchopenhauer’s ideas and to his picture of what constituted the culturallife of pre-Socratic ancient Greece.)
Against the background of these convictions, Nietzsche became inter-
ested in the question of the origin of values, a question that eventuallyled him to a whole array of unorthodox and original answers. All his an-swers ultimately follow from a pattern of reasoning which in its mostbasic structure is quite simple and straightforward: if there are no values“out there,” in the sense in which we believe stars and other physical
objects to be “out there” and if, at the same time, we cannot do withoutvalues, then there must be some value-creating capacity within ourselveswhich is responsible for the values we cherish and which organizes ourlives. Though presumably we are all endowed with this capacity ,
there
are very few of us who manage to create values powerful enough to forcepeople into acceptance and to constitute cultural and social profiles. Tocreate such constitutive values seems to be, according to Nietzsche, theprerogative of real philosophers (not philosophy professors), of uniqueartists (if there are any), of even rarer founders of religions, and, aboveall, of institutions that develop out of the teaching of creative individuals,i.e., of science, philosophy , and theology . Thus, anyone interested in thefunction and the origin of values should scrutinize the processes whichenabled these persons and institutions to create values.
At this point Nietzsche’s more detailed investigations tend to start
spreading out in a remarkable number of different directions. It is here,too, that in one sense we should take BGE to have its point of depar-
ture. That the detailed analysis of all the phenomena connected with the
For, after all, there seems to be no reason to think that Nietzsche would not allow in principle
that each of us could be transformed into a “free spirit,” i.e., a person who has the capacity and
strength to create and stick to the “right” values.
xvii
Introduction
concept of value is a very tricky task methodologically is documented
Nietzsche's Genealogical Method
- Nietzsche employs a multi-perspectival 'genealogical method' that combines psychology, history, and linguistics to analyze value formation.
- The text identifies three core questions in Beyond Good and Evil: the necessity of values, the degeneration of modern values, and the ideal perspective on values.
- Nietzsche's work is deeply rooted in the cultural and historical context of late nineteenth-century Europe, which explains some of his idiosyncratic views.
- Standard philosophical analysis focusing on logical arguments is often insufficient for understanding Nietzsche's non-traditional approach.
- He advocates for 'new philosophers' who prioritize intellectual experiments, intuition, and a rapid 'presto' pace of thought over rigid argumentation.
- The text suggests that Beyond Good and Evil is designed as an existential experiment rather than a collection of formal proofs.
There are few arguments to be found in BGE, and those which can be extracted are seldom of the most convincing kind.
not only in BGE but also in almost all of Nietzsche’s other writings.
Acknowledging the fact that the different features of the value-creatingprocesses are much too complex to be accessible by means of a singleexplanatory scheme, Nietzsche tentatively pursues several different ap-proaches. He merges psychological hypotheses with causal explanations,and combines them with historical observations and linguistic consid-erations into a multi-perspectival technique that he fondly refers to ashis “genealogical method.” In BGE , where he is occupied mainly with
the psychological dimension of the process of value formation, he appliesthis method primarily in an attempt to come to an understanding of thoseaspects of the value problem that pertain to its normative elements, thatis, to the question of good and bad.
At the risk of oversimplification one can say the bulk of this work
addresses three topics, each one of which can be expressed best in termsof a question. The first is this: why is it impossible for us to live withoutvalues, why do we need values at all, or, more in line with Nietzsche’sterminology , what is the value of values? The second is this: how does ithappen that the values we and the overwhelming majority of the membersof our culture subscribe to have either been bad from the beginning orhave degenerated into bad values? The third topic is this: what is theright perspective on values; what should we expect values to be? Thoughthese three questions are in a certain sense perennial, Nietzsche relatesthem directly to what he saw as the manifest historical situation of hisage and the prevailing conditions of the cultural tradition he lived in,so much of what he has to say is deeply rooted in his response to latenineteenth-century central European conceptions. This is something weshould never forget when we confront his texts. Nietzsche speaks to usfrom the past, and this fact alone might account for some features of hiswriting that we would now consider idiosyncratic – for example, his wayof talking about women and about national characteristics.
IV
At this point we face a problem that I take to be crucial for any adequateassessment of Nietzsche’s project. It concerns the manner in which weare to comprehend his approach to the topics under examination. Nowthat we have identified a number of central questions that he discusses in
xviii
Introduction
BGE, it is tempting to proceed in the way normally used in dealing with
philosophical texts: stating the questions addressed, and then trying toline up the arguments that the advocate of a position puts forward in favorof the answers he comes up with. However, in the case of Nietzsche andBGE it is by no means evident that such a procedure would capture what
Nietzsche is doing and what BGE is all about. There are few arguments
to be found in BGE, and those which can be extracted are seldom of
the most convincing kind. Following the normal procedure would alsoencourage the illusion that Nietzsche designed BGE to be understood
simply in terms of arguments, whether good or bad, and I cannot findanything in BGE which would encourage such an illusion.
There is considerable evidence that we should try a different approach,
and the clue lies in Nietzsche’s numerous allusions to the practices of whathe calls the “new philosophers.” To be the type of philosopher Nietzschevalues is to follow hunches, to think at a “presto” pace (
§ ), to embark on
experiments both intellectual and existential ( §§ , ),to transform
Nietzsche's New Philosophical Method
- Nietzsche rejects the traditional philosophical reliance on 'good arguments' and logical compulsion in favor of risky hypotheses and 'dangerous perhapses'.
- The new philosopher operates through 'what if' scenarios, starting with bold observations rather than seeking defensive results or solutions.
- Reason-giving is viewed as a post hoc activity used to justify personal wishes rather than a path to objective truth.
- Nietzsche's style in 'Beyond Good and Evil' is an intentional performance of this experimental method, prioritizing innovative perspectives over rock-hard truths.
- Traditional academic interpretations often fail by trying to force Nietzsche's playful, experimental insights into the mold of standard argumentative philosophy.
This 'having to follow' and 'being compelled' I read as a reference to the procedure of establishing results via sound arguments.
and to create values ( §§ , ), to put forward hypotheses that are risky:
in short, to be interested in what he calls “dangerous perhapses” ( §). One
would not expect a person with this conception of philosophy to hold theidea that what counts most in the endeavor to reach highly unorthodoxand sometimes even shocking insights is to be in possession of a “goodargument,” and that one could or should present one’s views in compliancewith this idea. Rather, one would expect such a person to pursue a verydifferent path in expressing his views, which would involve starting with abold claim or striking observation and then using it in a variety of differentways. It might form the basis for an analysis of something in terms of thatclaim or observation, or it might point to a symptom, presupposition, orconsequence of a very general or a very particular state of affairs. It evenmight be related tentatively to topics which at first sight have nothing
There are passages that make it very hard to believe in this illusion. See, e.g., remarks in §
that the activity of reason-giving is a post hoc affair intended to justify “some fervent wish that
they have sifted through and made properly abstract,” or (in the same section) his making fun ofSpinoza’s mos geometricus as a masquerade. In my eyes, the most striking passage for discouraging
this illusion is to be found in § , where Nietzsche talks about what he calls philosophical states
or moods. Here he compares the “right” way of doing philosophy with the “normal” attitude and
writes concerning the latter: “Y ou [‘normal’ philosophers] imagine every necessity is a need, a
painful having to follow and being compelled.” This “having to follow” and “being compelled” I
read as a reference to the procedure of establishing results via sound arguments.
Nietzsche uses the German word Versuch (attempt, experiment) in a broad way which makes that
term cover the connotations of Versuchung (temptation) and Versucher (tempter) as well. Cf. §.
xix
Introduction
to do with what the original claim or the first observation was about. In
short, one could envision a philosopher under the spell of Nietzschean“new philosophy” as someone whose methodology is deeply entangled inand in thrall to what could be called “what if ” scenarios.
If this is how a “new philosopher” approaches problems, it seems beside
the point to treat Nietzsche’s proclaimed insights as based on arguments.The concept of a “result” or a “solution” also becomes obsolete, since this
type of philosophy is obviously not oriented towards results and solutionsunderstood in the sense of statements which can be defended againstthorough critical resistance. Its aim consists instead in the uncoveringof surprising possibilities and the playful presentation of innovative per-spectives that do not aspire to the status of rock-hard “truths” but aremeant to be offerings or propositions for a like-minded spirit.
Nietzsche obviously intended BGE to exemplify as clearly as possible all
the characteristics he attributes to the style, the method, and the intentionsof the “new philosophers” – and yet it is remarkable how often this factis not sufficiently acknowledged by his interpreters. This oversight isremarkable not only because it seems to be in part responsible for awkwardattempts to integrate Nietzsche’s intellectual products into traditionalacademic philosophy ,
but above all because it tends to miss what might be
Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Academic Boredom
- The author explores the 'socio-hermeneutical' dimension of Nietzsche's perspectivism beyond simple epistemological claims.
- Nietzsche suggests that an obsession with 'good arguments' as an overriding methodological value can be seen as a sign of bad taste.
- The 'new philosophers' present ideas intimately tied to personal experience and suffering, making them impossible to force upon those without a shared basis.
- Academic interpretations often strip away the personal and perspectival features essential to Nietzsche's work to fit within institutional frameworks.
- This 'academization' results in a stark contrast between the excitement of reading Nietzsche's original texts and the boredom of scholarly literature about him.
- Perspectivism is often misread as a trivial version of Kantian or Berkeleyan skepticism rather than a more original and promising doctrine.
It is revealed in the difference between the excitement and fun that one can have in reading Nietzsche and the boredom that one sometimes experiences when reading the literature on him.
called, for want of a better term, the “socio-hermeneutical” dimension ofwhat has become known as his doctrine of “perspectivism.” This doctrine
It should go without saying that this imagined scenario does not exclude “good arguments.” Rather,
the scenario is meant to show that if one deals with topics in the way outlined above, the guiding
intention is not to give or tofind “good arguments.” In Nietzsche’s terminology , this amounts
to the claim that a “good argument” is not an overriding methodological “value.” Invoking his
polemical inventory , one could say , in his spirit: to be obsessed by “the will to a good argument”
indicates bad taste.
Again, this characterization is not meant to suggest that what these “new philosophers” areproclaiming is something they are not serious about or do not want us to take seriously . It is onlymeant to emphasize that what they put forward is connected very intimately with their personal
point of view , and hence it is nothing that they can force on someone if there is no shared basis of
experience, of resentment ( ressentiment ), or suffering. See BGE §, where Nietzsche expresses
this point in an especially belligerent fashion.
These attempts do not necessarily result in uninformative or misleading accounts of aspects ofNietzsche’s thought. On the contrary , many of them shed considerable light on the historical
background of his ideas and on the impact they could have on various discussions that happento take place within the framework of academic philosophy . They are, however, operating under
the unavoidable (and, perhaps, reasonable) restrictions of that framework. This puts them in the
position of having to abstract from the personal or “perspectival” features essential to Nietzsche’sconceptions. That there is a price to be paid for this “academization” is obvious. It is revealed in
the difference between the excitement and fun that one can have in reading Nietzsche and theboredom that one sometimes experiences when reading the literature on him.
xx
Introduction
in its most trivial reading amounts to the claim that our view of the
world and, consequently , the statements we take to be true, depend onour situation, on our “perspective” on the world. Perspectivism thusunderstood gives rise to the epistemological thesis that our knowledgeclaims can never be true in an absolute or an objective sense, partly becauseof the necessary spatial and temporal differences between the viewpointsthat each knower is bound to occupy when relating to an object, andalso because of the fact that we can never be certain that what appearsto us to be the case really is the case. Though it is true that in someof his more conventional moods Nietzsche seems to have thought aboutperspectivism along these lines, this reading gives no hint whatsoever ofwhy he should have been attracted to such a doctrine in his more inspiredmoments. In this epistemological version the doctrine is neither originalnor interesting, but merely a version of skeptical or idealist claims thatused to be connected in popular writings with names like Berkeley andKant.
However, perspectivism takes on a much more promising dimension
The Socio-Hermeneutical Perspectivism
- The author proposes a 'socio-hermeneutical' reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism as an alternative to traditional epistemological interpretations.
- Understanding a truth claim requires acquaintance with the specific personal attitudes and subjective experiences from which the claim originated.
- Judging the correctness of a view necessitates that the observer possesses an experiential or existential background similar to the original claimant.
- This interpretation avoids the common logical paradox where Nietzsche is accused of claiming it is 'true that there is no truth.'
- Nietzsche's theory of truth is reframed as the rejection of context-free truths rather than a total endorsement of skepticism or self-refuting fictions.
It should be noted that the “German form of skepticism” discussed approvingly in § has nothing to do with epistemological skepticism.
if it is put into the broader context of the problem of justifying or atleast of making plausible an insistence on integrating a personal or sub-jective element into the expression of one’s views as a condition of theirmaking sense at all. By looking at this doctrine in this context, we canappreciate it as stating conditions for understanding an expression thatpurports to express something true, be it a text, a statement, or a con-fession. These conditions can be summarized in terms of two essentialconvictions. ( ) In order to understand a claim for truth embodied in
an expression, one has to have an understanding of the situation fromwhich that claim originates, and this presupposes being acquainted withand involved in the personal attitudes, subjective experiences, and pri-vate evaluations which form the basis of the view expressed. ( )I no r d e r
Here I have to confess that this sketch of the epistemological interpretation of Nietzsche’s per-
spectivism may not be the most sympathetic one, and no doubt one can find in the literature muchmore sophisticated versions of this doctrine. However, this does not affect the main point I want
to make, which consists in the claim that the epistemological reading misses the central feature
of Nietzsche’s doctrine. There are some other misgivings concerning the reading that deservemention. The first consists in the fact that Nietzsche – especially in BGE – is not in sympathy
with skepticism (see § ). Hence, why should he be interested in putting forward a doctrine
containing skeptical implications? A further reservation about the feasibility of the epistemologi-
cal reading can be seen in the annoying consequence of having to credit Nietzsche with all sorts
of paradoxical and self-refuting claims such as “If perspectivism is true we cannot know it to betrue.” It should be noted that the “German form of skepticism” discussed approvingly in §
has nothing to do with epistemological skepticism.
xxi
Introduction
to judge the correctness, or perhaps merely the plausibility , of such a
claim, one has to have an experiential or existential background similarto that of the person who made the claim. It is because of this insis-tence on integrating subjective aspects into the process of understanding,and because of the idea that judging the truth of a view presupposesshared experiences, that I call this the “socio-hermeneutical” reading ofperspectivism.
If perspectivism is understood in these terms, then much of what is
going on in BGE and other texts by Nietzsche begins to look considerably
less arbitrary and idiosyncratic than has been claimed. For example, hisso-called “theory of truth” which he alludes to quite often in the first twobooks of BGE , seems less absurd than many commentators have taken
it to be. According to these critics Nietzsche’s perspectival conceptionof truth endorses the following three statements: ( ) there is no absolute
or objective truth; ( ) what is taken to be truth is nothing but a fiction,
that is, a perspectival counterfeit or forgery ( F¨alschung ) of what really
is the case; and ( ) claims ( ) and ( ) are true. These three statements
together seem to imply the paradoxical claim that it is true that thereis no truth. So the critic argues.
However, when read in the light of
the preceding remarks a much less extravagant interpretation of Niet-zsche’s theory of truth suggests itself which is completely independentof the issue of whether he really subscribes to these three statements. Onthis interpretation, Nietzsche’s theory claims only ( ) that there are no
context-free truths, where a context is to be defined as the set of subjectiveconditions that the utterer of a truth is governed by and that anyone whowishes correctly to judge it is able to apprehend.
It also claims ( ) that
Perspectivism and Aphoristic Method
- Human understanding is inherently limited because we can never fully grasp the entire context or all conditions defining a truth.
- Every truth is necessarily a partial truth or a 'perspectival fiction' because it is defined by an incomplete context.
- The concept of 'absolute truth' is argued to be empty when contrasted with the reality of perspectival truth.
- Nietzsche's use of the aphoristic form is a deliberate methodological choice designed to reflect the subjective and existential contexts of his claims.
- The seemingly random organization of Nietzsche's writings is actually a calculated attempt to provide a wide array of subjective stances.
- Approaching Nietzsche's work as literature helps reveal how his stylistic idiosyncrasies serve his philosophical goal of conveying perspectivism.
In Nietzsche’s writings, as in life, randomness can turn out to be an applied method in disguise.
as an utterer or judger of a truth we are never in a position to be familiarwith a context in its entirety , that is, with all the conditions that defineit, and therefore we have to settle for an incomplete version of a con-text where the degree of incompleteness depends on differences betweenour capacities to understand ourselves and others. From this it follows() that, given our situation, every truth is defined by this necessarily
That there are many epistemological and logical problems connected with holding such a para-
doxical claim is not difficult to point out. The most comprehensive discussion of these problems
with reference to Nietzsche that I know of is by M. Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, ).
Put a bit more bluntly , this claim amounts to the assertion that the concept “objective or absolute
truth” is an empty concept when understood in contraposition to “perspectival truth.”
xxii
Introduction
incomplete context. Thus every truth is a partial truth or a perspectival
fiction.
This “socio-hermeneutical” reading of perspectivism points to a more
commonsensical understanding of Nietzsche’s claims regarding truth. Italso suggests that some of the stylistic peculiarities of BGE and other texts
had a methodological function. BGE , like most of Nietzsche’s other texts,
has an aphoristic form.
It looks like a collection of impromptu remarks,
each of which explores to a different degree of depth some aspect or otherof a particular observation, specific claim, or surprising phenomenon.These remarks are numbered and loosely organized into topic-relatedgroups, each one of which carries a short descriptive phrase that functionsas its title. The impression is of an apparently arbitrary compilation ofnotes which are actually presented in an artful, though idiosyncratic way .Thus it has been maintained that we should approach BGE as we would
a work of literature rather than strictly in terms of philosophical text.Though this impression is by no means misleading, it fails to be sensitive tothe intentions guiding the architectonic of this text. If a claim is fully com-prehensible only when placed in its appropriate subjective and existentialcontext, then it is incumbent on an author to convey as much informationabout this context as possible. One way of doing this consists in presentinga whole array of thoughts which are designed primarily to inform us aboutthe various subjective stances characteristic of the individual making theclaim. The resulting collection may seem random because it can includealmost any conceivable digression under the pretense of being informativeabout the subjective context. However, if the socio-hermeneutical inter-pretation is correct, the seeming randomness of Nietzsche’s aphorismscan equally well be taken as a calculated and methodologically appropri-ate consequence of his perspectivism. In Nietzsche’s writings, as in life,randomness can turn out to be an applied method in disguise.
It should be noticed that this reading is compatible with some of the most disturbing features of
Nietzsche’s talk about truth. It allows us to make sense of his insistence that there are degrees of
truth, which is exhibited most clearly in BGE in his reflection on how much “truth” one can take
(§). It also makes understandable the idea, very important to him, that truth is just a special
case of error. And it allows for the use of personal pronouns in connection with truth, a habit
Nietzsche is very fond of (cf. §§,, ).
Though there is some question as to the applicability of terms such as “aphorism” or “aphoristic
form” to Nietzsche’s texts, he himself does not seem to have problems with such a characterization.His own use of these terms in reference to his writings is documented in On the Genealogy of
Morals , Preface §(KSA V, p. )a n d §(KSA V, p. )a n di n Twilight of Idols ,§§,
(KSA VI, p. ).
xxiii
Introduction
V
Nietzsche's Psychological Critique of Values
- Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) investigates the psychological origins and meanings of philosophical, religious, and moral values.
- The text argues that modern values like democracy and equality are symptoms of cultural decay and human weakness.
- Nietzsche claims that fundamental judgments of 'good' and 'bad' are often rooted in fear, wishful thinking, and self-betrayal.
- While BGE shares themes with Nietzsche's other works, it is unique in its psychological emphasis and its exploration of the 'will to power.'
- The 'will to power' is presented as a rare 'positive' doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophy, though it remains somewhat elusive in its definition.
- Nietzsche uses self-referential architectonic devices to link BGE to his previous critiques of metaphysics and objective truth.
At the base of the most deeply habitualized normative evaluations that modern people take for granted... there ultimately lies a mixture of appalling character traits, ranging from weakness and fear to wishful thinking and self-betrayal.
BGE deals with questions of how values arise psychologically and how we
should evaluate them. It discusses the origin and the meaning of philo-sophical values such as truth, the religious practice of establishing andenforcing specific values such as faith, piety , and love of man, and themotives and mechanisms involved in our cultivation of moral values suchas pity , fairness, and willingness to help each other. It also treats suchpolitical and social values as democracy , equality , and progress, seeingthem as means of oppression and as indicators of decay and degeneration.Most of this is done with the aim of finding out what brought about themodern way of life, and what made modern culture such a doomed en-terprise. The general tendency of the book is to claim that at the base ofthe most deeply habitualized normative evaluations that modern peopletake for granted, their most fundamental judgments about what has tobe considered “good” or “bad” in almost every sphere of human activity ,
there ultimately lies a mixture of appalling character traits, ranging fromweakness and fear to wishful thinking and self-betrayal, and all these findtheir symptomatic expression in the modern condition.
Neither this critical message nor the material Nietzsche relies upon in
order to substantiate his assessment of modernity is peculiar to BGE .I n
almost all his other writings,
he discusses the shortcomings of philoso-
phy , the dangers of religion, the built-in biases of science, and the dam-aging consequences of institutionalized moral and cultural values, and hearrives at similar bleak conclusions. Thus, the message of BGE is just an-
other version of Nietzsche’s general project. However, BGE is distinctive
not only in its emphasis on a psychological explanation of the rise to domi-nance of specific values, but also in two further respects. The first relates tothe doctrine of the “will to power,” the second to his views on what might
be called “good” or “adequate” ways of confronting reality . Both topics be-long to his relatively rare excursions into the world of “positive” thinking.
Obviously this overlap is intended by Nietzsche. It seems to be an architectonic device, for he
frequently quotes from and alludes to his other texts. The best example of this practice is to be foundright at the beginning ( §)o fBGE where he cites almost verbatim from the beginning of Human, All
Too Human . This quotation refers to his diagnosis of the most fundamental mistake of traditional
metaphysicians, i.e., their conception of the origin of oppositions. Cf. B. Glatzeder: ‘Perspektiven
der W¨ unschbarkeit’. Nietzsches Metaphysikkritik in Menschliches Allzumenschliches (Philo V erlag:
Berlin, ). In quoting this appraisal, which forms the basis of his far reaching criticism of
metaphysics and its notion of “objective” truth, he can treat it like a result whose justification isalready given elsewhere.
xxiv
Introduction
The “will to power” makes its first public appearance in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra . There it is introduced as one of the three major teachings
Zarathustra has to offer, the other two being his advocacy of the over-man ( ¨Ubermensch ) and the conception of the Eternal Recurrence. It is
somewhat surprising that in Zarathustra Nietzsche has little to say about
what the “will to power” means. Fortunately he is a bit more explicit inBGE , although here too the doctrine receives what is by no means an
exhaustive treatment.
There is, however, some evidence that he wants
Nietzsche's Will to Power
- Nietzsche proposes that organic life is a dynamic, chaotic process of creation, decay, and power struggles rather than a static condition.
- The 'will to power' serves as a defining metric for a living particle's ability to develop, survive, and 'become what it is.'
- Nietzsche attempts to expand this concept from a biological principle into a universal ontological axiom that explains the essence of all nature.
- Inorganic matter is reimagined as 'will to power' in a paralyzed or potential state, allowing for a unified account of the world's totality.
- This ontological shift aims to collapse the metaphysical distinction between being and becoming, suggesting that stability is merely a degenerative form of change.
- Scholars note that Nietzsche's published treatment of this doctrine remains vague, leading to contradictory interpretations based on his unpublished notes.
Matter would then have to be conceived as “will to power” paralyzed, as “will to power” in a state of potentiality.
us to think of this doctrine as advancing or at least implying an ontologicalhypothesis. Focusing on the hints he gives in BGE , the following picture
emerges: if we look at the phenomenon of organic life as an integral partof reality , we find that it consists not in a static condition but in a dynamicand chaotic process of creation and decay , of overpowering and becomingoverpowered, of suppressing and being suppressed. This suggests thatwhat governs these processes is some sort of power struggle where everysingle form of life has a tendency to overpower every other form. However,to think of life in this way we have to assume that each living particle isendowed with a certain amount of power that it has a will to realize. Thisamount is supposed to define its “will to power” and thus is ultimately
decisive for its ability to develop itself and to survive, or, to use a famousNietzschean phrase, for its potential to become what it is. It is this line ofthought which led Nietzsche to the assertion that life is “will to power”(
§§, ).
But this is merely one part of the story . In BGE Nietzsche tentatively
tries to pursue the conception of a “will to power” in a further direction.He aims at a broader application of the conception by transforming itfrom a principle of organic life into a much broader axiom pertaining tothe essence of nature in general. It is here that it acquires an ontologicalmeaning. The main motive for his attempt to conceive of the “will topower” as a general ontological principle seems to be that there is no
It is because of the relatively superficial and vague treatment of this doctrine in his published
writings that many interpretations of the meaning and function of “will to power” rely heavily on
Nietzsche’s Nachlass , the voluminous collection of his unpublished notes. However, though the
Nachlass indeed contains a considerable amount of material pertaining to that conception, it has
the disadvantage of giving support to widely divergent, if not contradictory , interpretations. This
is due to the fact that Nietzsche seems to have been experimenting with different meanings of this
concept without reaching a definite position. To appreciate the whole range of readings possible
see, for example, G. Abel, Nietzsche: Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr
(de Gruyter: Berlin, ,nd edn), and V . Gerhardt, Vom Willen zur Macht: Anthropologie und
Metaphysik der Macht am exemplarischen Fall Friedrich Nietzsches (de Gruyter: Berlin, ).
xxv
Introduction
reason to restrict the explanatory force of that concept to organic life.
Why not think of inorganic matter, of the material world, in terms of“will to power” as well? Matter would then have to be conceived as “will
to power” paralyzed, as “will to power” in a state of potentiality . According
to Nietzsche this view would allow for a unified account of the world in itstotality: “The world seen from inside, the world determined and describedwith respect to its ‘intelligible character’ – would be just this will to
power and nothing else” (
§). This view would also have the advantage
of overcoming the basic bias of traditional metaphysics that there is adifference in kind between being and becoming, because it implies thatbeing static and stable is in the end nothing but a degenerative form ofbecoming, or nothing but an unactualized power process. It goes withoutsaying that Nietzsche is very much in favor of this claim.
Even if it is conceded that Nietzsche never really elaborated his concept
of the “will to power” sufficiently , it does not appear to be one of his moreattractive ideas. The reason for this is that it purports to give us insight intothe essence of nature, what nature is “in itself,” but this does not square
well with his emphatic criticism, put forward in BGE and elsewhere,
Nietzsche's Pathos of Distance
- Nietzsche rejects the concept of an 'in itself' or fixed essence, viewing such beliefs as metaphysical illusions.
- The doctrine of the 'will to power' potentially suffers from the same metaphysical vices Nietzsche critiques in others.
- Productive thinking is defined as the psychological capacity to endure an unbiased assessment of reality.
- Nobility is characterized by the 'pathos of distance,' a socially inherited sense of rank and distinction.
- This internal distance allows for the 'self-overcoming of man' and the development of rare, comprehensive states of soul.
- Nietzsche argues that these superior psychological states are necessary conditions for gaining and living with profound insights.
Without the pathos of distance ...that other more mysterious pathos could not have grown at all, that demand for new expansions of distance within the soul itself.
of the very notion of an “in itself.” According to Nietzsche there is no“in itself,” no essence, no fixed nature of things, and all beliefs to thecontrary are founded on deep and far-reaching metaphysical illusions.It seems therefore that one cannot avoid the unsettling conclusion thatthe doctrine of a “will to power” shares all the vices which Nietzsche
attributes to metaphysical thinking in general.
There are no such untoward consequences of the second piece of “posi-
tive” thinking in BGE , but this is because it scarcely qualifies as thinking at
all, consisting instead of fantasies about what the ideal conditions would befor a person to be able to participate in productive thinking. Here produc-tive thinking seems to mean the capacity to live up to the task of enduringan unbiased assessment of reality . Nietzsche summarizes these fantasiesin the picture he gives of the “new philosophers” and in remarks on what
it means to be noble. Nobility , for him, has to do with putting oneself at adistance from people and things. It is rooted in and is the product of the“pathos of distance,” to use his influential formula (
§ ). This pathos
has to be conceived as the socially inherited ability ( ) to have a sense
for differences in rank between persons, ( ) to accept these differences
as pointing to differences in distinction (defined as a positive quality ofworthiness), and ( ) to strive for higher distinction. A person possessing
xxvi
Introduction
this ability is able to strive for unique states of awareness: “Without the
pathos of distance ...that other more mysterious pathos could not have
grown at all, that demand for new expansions of distance within the soulitself, the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant,tautly drawn and comprehensive, and, in short, the enhancement of thetype ‘man,’ the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’ (to use a moral formulain a supra-moral sense)” (
§ ). The ability to achieve such states seems
to function as a condition of gaining important insights and havingthe psychological resources needed to live with them, and it indicates a cer-tain stance towards reality superior to “normal” or “common” attitudes(cf.
§ ).
With this plea for nobility Nietzsche states again his conviction that
Knowledge as Lived Experience
- Nietzsche argues that knowledge is not an objective possession but must be intimately connected to and lived by the individual subject.
- The capacity to handle truth is determined by personal constitution, character traits, and intellectual robustness rather than abstract logic.
- The concept of nobility serves a positive function by increasing a subject's strength to endure uncommon or difficult truths.
- Nietzsche's enduring appeal lies not in the correctness of his views, but in his role as a 'mental tonic' for confronting fundamental doubts.
- His work addresses the modern discomfort of living by social and moral conceptions that lack absolute or understood justifications.
- By questioning the objectivity of the 'normal' world view, Nietzsche provides a framework for accepting the lack of absolute certainty.
Knowledge thus becomes associated with the question of how much truth one can endure.
what ultimately counts in our epistemic dealings with reality is not knowl-edge per se , that is, knowledge detached from the knower. What deserves
the title of knowledge has to be intimately connected with the specialand unique situation a knowing subject is in. This is so not only becauseaccording to Nietzsche knowledge is not an “objective” or impersonalaffair, something one can have like a detached thing that one possesses,but above all because the knowing subject has to live his knowledge. The
extent to which a subject can do this depends on personal constitution,character traits, and intellectual robustness. Knowledge thus becomes as-sociated with the question of how much truth one can endure (cf.
§).
It is in this context that the concept of nobility reveals itself to be part ofa “positive” teaching: nobility that is the product of the social pathos of
distance increases the potential of a subject for enduring “uncommon”knowledge because it promotes more comprehensive states, and these inturn indicate a growing strength in the subject’s character that enables itto cope with more of “the truth.” This at least seems to be Nietzsche’smessage.
What is it that makes reading BGE and other writings of Nietzsche such
an attractive and stimulating experience? The main reason, I believe, haslittle to do with the plausibility , let alone the correctness, of his views. Onthe contrary , we like many of his ideas precisely because of their pointedone-sidedness, their extravagance, and their eccentricity . Nor, I suspect,are we now especially preoccupied with the topics which he obviouslytook to be decisive for an evaluation of our way of living under modernconditions. Many of his themes we now consider rather obsolete, andto some of them we no longer have any immediate access because they
xxvii
Introduction
are deeply rooted in their nineteenth-century contexts. The fascination
his works still have must therefore originate from somewhere else. If onewants to account for the appeal of his writings, it is perhaps advisablenot to look too closely at his actual teachings, but to think of his texts asa kind of mental tonic designed to encourage his readers to continue toconfront their doubts and suspicions about the well-foundedness of manyof their most fundamental ideas about themselves and their world. Thiswould suggest that Nietzsche’s works may still be captivating because theyconfront a concern that is not restricted to modern times. They addressour uncomfortable feeling that our awareness of ourselves and of theworld depends on conceptions that we ultimately do not understand. W econceive of ourselves as subjects trying to live a decent life, guided in ourdoings by aims that fit the normal expectations of our social and culturalenvironment; we believe certain things to be true beyond any doubt, andwe hold others and ourselves to many moral obligations. Although all thisis constitutive of a normal way of life, we have only a vague idea of whywe have to deal with things in this way; we do not really know what inthe end justifies these practices. In questioning not the normality but theobjectivity or truth of such a normal world view , Nietzsche’s writings canhave the effect of making us feel less worried about our inability to accountfor some of our central convictions in an “absolute” way . It is up to eachof us to decide whether to be grateful for this reminder or to loathe it.
Rolf-Peter Horstmann
xxviii
Chronology
Born in R ¨ocken, a small village in the Prussian province of
Saxony , on October.
Birth of his sister Elisabeth.
Birth of his brother Joseph.
His father, a Lutheran minister, dies at age thirty-six of
“softening of the brain.”
Brother dies; family moves to Naumburg to live with father’s
mother and her sisters.
Begins studies at Pforta, Germany’s most famous school for
Chronology of Friedrich Nietzsche
- Nietzsche's early career was marked by a rapid ascent, becoming a professor of classical philology at age twenty-four before even completing his doctorate.
- His intellectual journey was deeply influenced by his initial devotion to and subsequent break from the composer Richard Wagner.
- The publication of 'The Birth of Tragedy' established his view of art as life's highest metaphysical activity, though it was met with devastating reviews.
- Chronic health problems forced his early retirement from academia in 1879, leading to a nomadic life in boarding-houses where he produced his most famous works.
- His final productive year, 1888, was an extraordinary period of output including 'Twilight of Idols' and 'The Antichrist' just before his total mental collapse.
- Following his 1889 collapse in Turin, he remained an invalid under the care of his family until his death in 1900, while his sister took control of his literary estate.
Collapses physically and mentally in Turin on 3 January; writes a few lucid notes but never recovers sanity.
education in the classics.
Graduates from Pforta with a thesis in Latin on the Greek poet
Theogonis; enters the University of Bonn as a theology student.
Transfers from Bonn, following the classical philologist
Friedrich Ritschl to Leipzig where he registers as a philologystudent; reads Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and
Representation .
Reads Friedrich Lange’s History of Materialism .
Meets Richard Wagner.
On Ritschl’s recommendation is appointed professor of classical
philology at Basle at the age of twenty-four before completinghis doctorate (which is then conferred without a dissertation);begins frequent visits to the Wagner residence at Tribschen.
Serves as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian war;
contracts a serious illness and so serves only two months.Writes “The Dionysiac W orld View .”
xxix
Chronology
Publishes his first book, The Birth of Tragedy ; its dedicatory
preface to Richard Wagner claims for art the role of “the highesttask and truly metaphysical activity of this life”; devastatingreviews follow .
Publishes “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” the
first of his Untimely Meditations ; begins taking books on natural
science out of the Basle library , whereas he had previouslyconfined himself largely to books on philological matters. Writes“On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.”
Publishes two more Meditations , “The Uses and Disadvantages
of History for Life” and “Schopenhauer as Educator.”
Publishes the fourth Meditation , “Richard Wagner in
Bayreuth,” which already bears subtle signs of his movementaway from Wagner.
Publishes Human, All Too Human (dedicated to the memory of
V oltaire); it praises science over art as the mark of high cultureand thus marks a decisive turn away from Wagner.
Terrible health problems force him to resign his chair at Basle
(with a small pension); publishes “ Assorted Opinions andMaxims,” the first part of vol. II of Human, All Too Human ;
begins living alone in Swiss and Italian boarding-houses.
Publishes “The Wanderer and His Shadow ,” which becomes
the second part of vol. II of Human, All Too Human .
Publishes Daybreak .
Publishes Idylls of Messina (eight poems) in a monthly magazine;
publishes The Gay Science ; friendship with Paul Ree and
Lou Andreas-Salom ´e ends badly , leaving Nietzsche devastated.
Publishes the first two parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra ; learns
of Wagner’s death just after mailing part one to the publisher.
Publishes the third part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra .
Publishes the fourth part of Zarathustra for private circulation
only .
Publishes Beyond Good and Evil ; writes prefaces for new releases
of:The Birth of Tragedy, Human, All Too Human , vols. I and II,
andDaybreak .
xxx
Chronology
Publishes expanded edition of The Gay Science with a new
preface, a fifth part, and an appendix of poems; publishes Hymn
to Life , a musical work for chorus and orchestra; publishes On
the Genealogy of Morality .
Publishes The Case of Wagner , composes a collection of poems,
Dionysian Dithyrambs , and four short books: Twilight of Idols ,
The Antichrist ,Ecce Homo , and Nietzsche contra Wagner .
Collapses physically and mentally in Turin on January; writes
a few lucid notes but never recovers sanity; is briefly
institutionalized; spends remainder of his life as an invalid,living with his mother and then his sister, who also gains controlof his literary estate.
Dies in W eimar on August.
xxxi
Further reading
There is a good deal of material in Nietzsche’s unpublished notes that
Nietzsche Scholarship and Interpretations
- The text identifies critical editions of Nietzsche's works, including earlier and more extensive versions of aphorisms found in Beyond Good and Evil.
- Nietzsche's own perspective on the aims of Beyond Good and Evil is documented in his late autobiographical work, Ecce Homo.
- Despite Nietzsche's massive influence, there are surprisingly few academic works that focus exclusively on Beyond Good and Evil as a standalone text.
- Interpretations of Nietzsche are divided into distinct 'regional' schools—German, French, and Anglo-American—each with a unique philosophical lens.
- The German school, led by Heidegger, focuses on metaphysics, while the French school emphasizes deconstruction and the Anglo-American school seeks to align Nietzsche with rational standards.
These schools are best characterized in geographical terms as ‘German,’ ‘French,’ and ‘Anglo-American.’
makes interesting supplementary reading for the study of BGE . It can be
found in vols. VII/ and VII/ ofWerke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe , ed.
G. Colli and M. Montinari (de Gruyter: Berlin, ). Also very useful
is vol. XIV of S¨amtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe , ed. G. Colli and
M. Montinari (de Gruyter: Berlin and Deutscher Taschenbuch V erlag:Munich, ), pp. –, which contains earlier and often much more
extensive versions of many of the aphorisms collected in BGE . This ma-
terial is not yet available in the Kritische Gesamtausgabe . Nietzsche’s own
assessment of the aims and merits of BGE can be found in his late auto-
biographical work Ecce Homo , written in and published in .
The literature on Nietzsche is immense, though there are almost no
books and very few articles dealing directly and exclusively with BGE .
Titles worth mentioning would be: A. Nehemas, “Will to Knowledge,Will to Ignorance, and Will to Power in ‘Beyond Good and Evil,’” inY . Y ovel, ed., Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker (Reidel Publishing Com-
pany: Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster, ), pp. – ;P .J .v a n
Tongeren, Die Moral von Nietzsche’s Moralkritik. Beitrag zu einem
Kommentar von Nietzsches “Jenseits von Gut und B¨ ose” (Bouvier V erlag:
Bonn, ); and D . B. Allison, “ A Diet of W orms: Aposiopetic Rhetoric
in ‘Beyond Good and Evil,’” Nietzsche Studien ( ), pp. –.
Some people might find it rewarding to approach Nietzsche’s thought
before reading about its biographical background. There are quite anumber of interesting and well-researched (German) biographies, ofwhich the best known are C. P . Janz, Friedrich Nietzsche. Biographie ,
vols. (Hanser V erlag: Munich, –), W . Ross, Der ¨angstliche Adler
xxxii
Further reading
(Deutsche V erlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart, ), and R. Safranski, Nietzsche.
Biographie seines Denkens (Hanser V erlag: Munich, ). All of these
works discuss aspects of BGE as well.
Nietzsche, his themes, and his topics have been subject to some very dif-
ferent interpretations, depending on the philosophical tradition in whichthe interpreter is located. This has led to quite interesting “regional”schools of interpretation, especially with respect to the will-to-powerdoctrine and to Nietzsche’s epistemological views, topics which surfaceprominently in BGE . These schools are best characterized in geographical
terms as “German,” “French,” and “ Anglo-American.” The best-known
and most influential representative of the “German,” metaphysically ori-ented school is Martin Heidegger, whose two-volume study Nietzsche
(Neske: Pfullingen, ; English translation: Harper and Row: New
Y ork, ) had an enormous impact on the discussion about Nietzsche
and his role in the history of metaphysics, at least in parts of Europe.The “French” school, which tends to be more interested in the destruc-
tive or “deconstructive” motives in Nietzsche’s thought, is impressivelyrepresented in the works of Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie
(Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, ), and Nietzsche (Presses
Universitaires de France: Paris, ), P . Klossovski, Nietzsche et le cercle
vicieux (Mercure de France: Paris, ), and S. Kofman, Nietzsche et la
metaphore (Editions Payot: Paris, ). Their books have led to lively con-
troversies not only about specific Nietzschean views but also about how toread Nietzsche at all. The “ Anglo-American” school seems to be mainlyinterested in integrating Nietzsche into the gallery of “serious” thinkers,committed to what their emissaries take to be the normal standards ofrationality . Convincing examples of this approach are A. Nehemas,Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, ),
and M. Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, ). All of these schools and all the books mentioned
Truth and Dogmatic Masks
- The text outlines the editorial and translational foundations of this edition of Beyond Good and Evil, citing the Colli and Montinari critical edition.
- Nietzsche introduces a provocative metaphor, suggesting that truth should be viewed as a woman whom dogmatic philosophers have failed to woo.
- The author critiques the 'grotesque seriousness' and 'clumsy advances' of past dogmatists, arguing their methods are unsuitable for uncovering truth.
- Nietzsche suggests that the foundations of great philosophical systems are often mere folk superstitions, word-play, or grammatical seductions.
- He compares the history of dogmatic philosophy to astrology, noting that both required immense human effort and served as 'monstrous masks' for future greatness.
Suppose that truth is a woman – and why not? Aren’t there reasons for suspecting that all philosophers, to the extent that they have been dogmatists, have not really understood women?
have interesting things to say on many aspects of Nietzsche’s views thatare expressed in BGE .
xxxiii
Note on the text
The translation follows the German text as printed in the critical edition
of Nietzsche’s works edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari (de Gruyter:Berlin, –). The footnotes are not meant to provide a commentary
to Nietzsche’s text. They are restricted to ( ) translations of phrases
and terms from foreign languages, ( ) explanations of peculiarities of
Nietzsche’s German terminology , and ( ) some comments on material
used or alluded to by Nietzsche. The glossary of names on pp. –
contains short descriptions of all persons mentioned in the text. Thenotes and the glossary make use of information supplied by vols. XIVand XV of S¨amtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe , ed. G. Colli and
M. Montinari, vols. (de Gruyter: Berlin and Deutscher Taschenbuch
V erlag: Munich, ). They are the joint product of Dina Emundts,
Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Judith Norman.
The translator would like to thank all the people whose advice and sug-
gestions have helped with the project. In particular, Alistair W elchman,Thomas Sebastian, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Karl Ameriks have pro-vided considerable assistance with the translation, and Richard, Caroline,and Sara Norman, and Alistair W elchman have given invaluable encour-agement and support. Their contribution to the project is gratefullyacknowledged.
xxxiv
Beyond Good and Evil
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
Preface
Suppose that truth is a woman – and why not? Aren’t there reasons for
suspecting that all philosophers, to the extent that they have been dogma-tists, have not really understood women? That the grotesque seriousnessof their approach towards the truth and the clumsy advances they havemade so far are unsuitable ways of pressing their suit with a woman? Whatis certain is that she has spurned them – leaving dogmatism of all typesstanding sad and discouraged. Ifit is even left standing! Because there are
those who make fun of dogmatism, claiming that it has fallen over, thatit is lying flat on its face, or more, that dogmatism is in its last gasps. Butseriously , there are good reasons for hoping that all dogmatizing in philos-ophy was just noble (though childish) ambling and preambling, howeversolemn, settled and decisive it might have seemed. And perhaps the timeis very near when we will realize again and again just what actually served
as the cornerstone of those sublime and unconditional philosophicaledifices that the dogmatists used to build – some piece of folk super-stition from time immemorial (like the soul-superstition that still causestrouble as the superstition of the subject or I), some word-play perhaps, aseduction of grammar or an over-eager generalization from facts that arereally very local, very personal, very human-all-too-human. Let us hopethat the dogmatists’ philosophy was only a promise over the millennia, aswas the case even earlier with astrology , in whose service perhaps more la-bor, money , ingenuity , and patience was expended than for any real scienceso far. W e owe the great style of architecture in Asia and Egypt to astrol-ogy and its “supernatural” claims. It seems that all great things, in orderto inscribe eternal demands in the heart of humanity , must first wanderthe earth under monstrous and terrifying masks; dogmatic philosophy
Beyond Good and Evil
The Tension of Spirit
- Plato's invention of 'pure spirit' and 'the Good in itself' is characterized as a dangerous dogmatic error that stood truth on its head.
- Christianity is described as 'Platonism for the people,' a system that maintained a long-term pressure on the European mind.
- The historical struggle against these dogmas has created a magnificent 'tension of spirit' in Europe, likened to a tightly drawn bow.
- Modern movements like Jesuitism and the democratic Enlightenment are viewed as attempts to slacken this productive tension and ease the 'need' of spirit.
- The author challenges the inherent value of the 'will to truth,' questioning why we seek truth rather than untruth, uncertainty, or ignorance.
- This radical questioning of the value of truth is presented as a high-risk philosophical task that has never been truly attempted before.
But the struggle against Plato, or, to use a clear and “popular” idiom, the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia – since Christianity is Platonism for the “people” – has created a magnificent tension of spirit in Europe, the likes of which the earth has never known: with such atension in our bow we can now shoot at the furthest goals.
was this sort of a mask: the V edanta doctrine in Asia, for example, or
Platonism in Europe. W e should not be ungrateful towards dogmatism,but it must nonetheless be said that the worst, most prolonged, and mostdangerous of all errors to this day was a dogmatist’s error, namely Plato’sinvention of pure spirit and the Good in itself. But now that it has beenovercome, and Europe breathes a sigh of relief after this nightmare, andat least can enjoy a healthier – well – sleep, we, whose task is wakefulness
itself , are the heirs to all the force cultivated through the struggle against
this error. Of course: talking about spirit and the Good like Plato didmeant standing truth on its head and disowning even perspectivism , which
is the fundamental condition of all life. In fact, as physicians we could ask:“How could such a disease infect Plato, the most beautiful outgrowth of
antiquity? Did the evil Socrates corrupt him after all? was Socrates in fact
the corrupter of youth? did he deserve his hemlock?” – But the struggleagainst Plato, or, to use a clear and “popular” idiom, the struggle againstthe Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia – since Christianity isPlatonism for the “people” – has created a magnificent tension of spiritin Europe, the likes of which the earth has never known: with such atension in our bow we can now shoot at the furthest goals. Granted, theEuropean experiences this tension as a crisis or state of need; and twicealready there have been attempts, in a grand fashion, to unbend the bow ,once through Jesuitism, and the second time through the democraticEnlightenment: – which, with the help of freedom of the press and circu-lation of newspapers, might really insure that spirit does not experienceitself so readily as “need”! (Germans invented gunpowder – all honorsdue! But they made up for it – they invented the press.) But we, whoare neither Jesuits nor democrats, nor even German enough, we good
Europeans and free, very free spirits – we still have it, the whole need of
spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps the arrow too, thetask, and – who knows? the goal...
Sils-Maria , Upper Engadine,
June,
Part On the prejudices of philosophers
The will to truth that still seduces us into taking so many risks, this famous
truthfulness that all philosophers so far have talked about with veneration:what questions this will to truth has already laid before us! What strange,terrible, questionable questions! That is already a long story – and yetit seems to have hardly begun? Is it any wonder if we finally becomesuspicious, lose patience, turn impatiently away? That we ourselves are
also learning from this Sphinx to pose questions? Who is it really that
questions us here? What in us really wills the truth? In fact, we paused
for a long time before the question of the cause of this will – until wefinally came to a complete standstill in front of an even more fundamentalquestion. W e asked about the value of this will. Granted, we will truth:
why not untruth instead? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem
of the value of truth came before us, – or was it we who came before theproblem? Which of us is Oedipus? Which one is the Sphinx? It seemswe have a rendezvous of questions and question-marks. – And, believe itor not, it ultimately looks to us as if the problem has never been raiseduntil now , – as if we were the first to ever see it, fix our gaze on it, risk it .
Because this involves risk and perhaps no risk has ever been greater.
“How could anything originate out of its opposite? Truth from error, for
instance? Or the will to truth from the will to deception? Or selfless ac-tion from self-interest? Or the pure, sun-bright gaze of wisdom from acovetous leer? Such origins are impossible, and people who dream about
Beyond Good and Evil
The Prejudices of Metaphysicians
- Metaphysicians traditionally believe that things of high value must originate from a separate, divine realm rather than the ephemeral world.
- The core prejudice of philosophy is the belief in absolute value oppositions, such as truth versus deception.
- Nietzsche suggests that 'evil' traits like self-interest and appearance might actually be more fundamental to life than their 'good' counterparts.
- Most conscious philosophical thought is actually an instinctive activity driven by physiological requirements for survival.
- Logic and truth-seeking are often just 'foreground appraisals' used to preserve a specific type of human existence.
- A new breed of philosophers is needed to explore the 'dangerous perhaps'—the possibility that good and evil are essentially linked.
It could even be possible that whatever gives value to those good and honorable things has an incriminating link, bond, or tie to the very things that look like their evil opposites; perhaps they are even essentially the same.
such things are fools – at best. Things of the highest value must have
another, separate origin of their own , – they cannot be derived from this
ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of con-fusion and desire. Look instead to the lap of being, the everlasting, thehidden God, the ‘thing-in-itself ’ – this is where their ground must be, and
nowhere else!”
– This way of judging typifies the prejudices by which
metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: this type of valuation lies be-hind all their logical procedures. From these “beliefs” they try to acquiretheir “knowledge,” to acquire something that will end up being solemnly
christened as “the truth.” The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is
thebelief in oppositions of values . It has not occurred to even the most
cautious of them to start doubting right here at the threshold, where it isactually needed the most – even though they had vowed to themselves “ de
omnibus dubitandum .”
But we can doubt, first, whether opposites even
exist and, second, whether the popular valuations and value oppositionsthat have earned the metaphysicians’ seal of approval might not only beforeground appraisals. Perhaps they are merely provisional perspectives,perhaps they are not even viewed head-on; perhaps they are even viewedfrom below , like a frog-perspective, to borrow an expression that painterswill recognize. Whatever value might be attributed to truth, truthfulness,and selflessness, it could be possible that appearance, the will to deception,and craven self-interest should be accorded a higher and more fundamen-tal value for all life. It could even be possible that whatever gives valueto those good and honorable things has an incriminating link, bond, ortie to the very things that look like their evil opposites; perhaps they areeven essentially the same. Perhaps! – But who is willing to take chargeof such a dangerous Perhaps! For this we must await the arrival of a newbreed of philosophers, ones whose taste and inclination are somehow thereverse of those we have seen so far – philosophers of the dangerous Per-haps in every sense. – And in all seriousness: I see these new philosophersapproaching.
I have kept a close eye on the philosophers and read between their linesfor long enough to say to myself: the greatest part of conscious thought
Cf.Human, All too Human ,I , §.
Everything is to be doubted.
On the prejudices of philosophers
must still be attributed to instinctive activity , and this is even the case for
philosophical thought. This issue needs re-examination in the same waythat heredity and “innate characteristics” have been re-examined. Justas the act of birth makes no difference to the overall course of heredity ,neither is “consciousness” opposed to instinct in any decisive sense – most
of a philosopher’s conscious thought is secretly directed and forced intodeterminate channels by the instincts. Even behind all logic and its au-tocratic posturings stand valuations or, stated more clearly , physiologicalrequirements for the preservation of a particular type of life. For example,that the determinate is worth more than the indeterminate, appearanceworth less than the “truth”: despite all their regulative importance forus, these sorts of appraisals could still be just foreground appraisals, a
particular type of niaiserie ,
precisely what is needed for the preservation
of beings like us. But this assumes that it is not man who is the “measureof things” ...
Untruth as Life's Condition
- The falsity of a judgment is not necessarily an objection; the true measure of a concept is how effectively it promotes and preserves life.
- Human existence depends on the constant falsification of the world through logic, numbers, and the fiction of the unconditioned.
- Philosophers lack genuine honesty, pretending their convictions arise from pure dialectic when they are actually defending personal prejudices with post-hoc rationalizations.
- Every great philosophy is essentially an involuntary memoir and a confession of faith rooted in the author's moral intentions.
- The 'drive for knowledge' is rarely the true origin of philosophy; instead, other underlying drives use knowledge as a mere instrument to achieve specific moral ends.
To acknowledge untruth as a condition of life: this clearly means resisting the usual value feelings in a dangerous manner; and a philosophy that risks such a thing would by that gesture alone place itself beyond good and evil.
W e do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an objection to a judg-
ment; this is perhaps where our new language will sound most foreign. Thequestion is how far the judgment promotes and preserves life, how well itpreserves, and perhaps even cultivates, the type. And we are fundamen-tally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include syntheticjudgments a priori ) are the most indispensable to us, and that without ac-
cepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the whollyinvented world of the unconditioned and self-identical, without a constantfalsification of the world through numbers, people could not live – that a
renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life, a negationof life. To acknowledge untruth as a condition of life: this clearly meansresisting the usual value feelings in a dangerous manner; and a philoso-phy that risks such a thing would by that gesture alone place itself beyondgood and evil.
What goads us into regarding all philosophers with an equal measure ofmistrust and mockery is not that we are struck repeatedly by how innocent
Silliness.
Beyond Good and Evil
they are – how often and easily they err and stray , in short, their childish
childlikeness – but rather that there is not enough genuine honesty aboutthem: even though they all make a huge, virtuous racket as soon as theproblem of truthfulness is even remotely touched upon. They all act as ifthey had discovered and arrived at their genuine convictions through theself-development of a cold, pure, divinely insouciant dialectic (in contrastto the mystics of every rank, who are more honest than the philosophersand also sillier – they talk about “inspiration” –): while what essentially
happens is that they take a conjecture, a whim, an “inspiration” or, moretypically , they take some fervent wish that they have sifted through andmade properly abstract – and they defend it with rationalizations afterthe fact. They are all advocates who do not want to be seen as such; for
the most part, in fact, they are sly spokesmen for prejudices that they
christen as “truths” – and very far indeed from the courage of conscience
that confesses to this fact, this very fact; and very far from having the goodtaste of courage that also lets this be known, perhaps to warn a friend orfoe, or out of a high-spirited attempt at self-satire. The stiff yet demuretartuffery used by the old Kant to lure us along the clandestine, dialecticalpath that leads the way (or rather: astray) to his “categorical imperative” –this spectacle provides no small amusement for discriminating spectatorslike us, who keep a close eye on the cunning tricks of the old moralists andpreachers of morals. Or even that hocus pocus of a mathematical formused by Spinoza to arm and outfit his philosophy (a term which, when allis said and done, really means “ hislove of wisdom”) and thus, from the
very start, to strike terror into the heart of the attacker who would dare tocast a glance at the unconquerable maiden and Pallas Athena: – how muchpersonal timidity and vulnerability this sick hermit’s masquerade reveals!
I have gradually come to realize what every great philosophy so far hasbeen: a confession of faith on the part of its author, and a type of involun-tary and unself-conscious memoir; in short, that the moral (or immoral)intentions in every philosophy constitute the true living seed from whichthe whole plant has always grown. Actually , to explain how the strangestmetaphysical claims of a philosopher really come about, it is always good(and wise) to begin by asking: what morality is it (is he–) getting at? Con-
sequently , I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is the father of
On the prejudices of philosophers
philosophy , but rather that another drive, here as elsewhere, used knowl-
Drives and Philosophical Conviction
- Every basic human drive seeks mastery and attempts to justify itself as the ultimate purpose of existence through philosophy.
- Scholars differ from philosophers in that their drive for knowledge functions like an impersonal clockwork mechanism, detached from their core personality.
- A philosopher's work is never impersonal; their moral claims reveal the internal hierarchy and ranking of their deepest drives.
- Epicurus's critique of Plato as an 'actor' highlights the tension between different philosophical styles and the underlying ambitions of their creators.
- Every philosophical system eventually reaches a point where the author's personal conviction or 'ass' arrives on the stage, signaling the end of pure reason.
In contrast, there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philosopher; and in particular his morals bear decided and decisive witness to who he is.
edge (and mis-knowledge!) merely as a tool. But anyone who looks atpeople’s basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little gameright here as inspiring geniuses (or daemons or sprites –), will find that
they all practiced philosophy at some point, – and that every single one
of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the ultimate pur-
pose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives. Because
every drive craves mastery , and this leads it to try philosophizing. – Of
course: with scholars, the truly scientific people, things might be differ-ent – “better” if you will –, with them, there might really be something
like a drive for knowledge, some independent little clockwork mechanism
that, once well wound, ticks bravely away without essentially involving the
rest of the scholar’s drives. For this reason, the scholar’s real “interests”usually lie somewhere else entirely , with the family , or earning money ,or in politics; in fact, it is almost a matter of indifference whether hislittle engine is put to work in this or that field of research, and whetherthe “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist orfungus expert or chemist: – it doesn’t signify anything about him that he
becomes one thing or the other. In contrast, there is absolutely nothingimpersonal about the philosopher; and in particular his morals bear de-cided and decisive witness to w h oh ei s – which means, in what order of
rank the innermost drives of his nature stand with respect to each other.
How malicious philosophers can be! I do not know anything more ven-omous than the joke Epicurus allowed himself against Plato and thePlatonists: he called them Dionysiokolakes.
Literally , the foreground
meaning of this term is “sycophants of Dionysus” and therefore acces-sories of the tyrant and brown-nosers; but it also wants to say “they’reallactors , there’s nothing genuine about them” (since Dionysokolax was a
popular term for an actor). And this second meaning is really the malicethat Epicurus hurled against Plato: he was annoyed by the magnificentstyle, the mise-en-sc` ene that Plato and his students were so good at, – that
Epicurus was not so good at! He, the old schoolmaster from Samos, whosat hidden in his little garden in Athens and wrote three hundred books,
Epicurus, Fragment .
Beyond Good and Evil
who knows? perhaps out of anger and ambition against Plato? – It took a
hundred years for Greece to find out who this garden god Epicurus hadbeen. – Did it find out?
In every philosophy there is a point where the philosopher’s “conviction”
steps onto the stage: or, to use the language of an ancient Mystery:
adventavit asinus
pulcher et fortissimus.
The Tyranny of Philosophy
- Nietzsche critiques the Stoic ideal of 'living according to nature' as a fraudulent concept, arguing that nature is actually indifferent, measureless, and devoid of justice.
- Living is defined as the act of preferring, being limited, and wanting to be different, which is fundamentally opposed to the indifference of nature.
- Philosophy is described as a 'tyrannical drive' and a 'spiritual will to power' that seeks to recreate the world in its own image rather than discovering objective truth.
- The modern obsession with the 'real' versus 'apparent' world often masks a hidden nihilism or a desperate desire to cling to 'assured nothing' over 'uncertain something.'
- Skeptical thinkers who reject the reality of the body may be unconsciously trying to reclaim lost metaphysical comforts like the 'immortal soul' or 'the old God.'
Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world,' to the causa prima.
So you want to live “according to nature?” Oh, you noble Stoics, what a
fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate with-out measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard,without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the sametime, think of indifference itself as power – how could you live according to
this indifference? Living – isn’t that wanting specifically to be somethingother than this nature? Isn’t living assessing, preferring, being unfair,being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperativeto “live according to nature” basically amounts to “living according tolife” – well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you
yourselves are and must be? – But in fact, something quite different isgoing on: while pretending with delight to read the canon of your law innature, you want the opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Y ourpride wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto nature – yes,nature itself –, you demand that it be nature “according to Stoa” andyou want to make all existence exist in your own image alone – as a hugeeternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism! For all your love oftruth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently , and with suchhypnotic rigidity to have a false , namely Stoic, view of nature, that you
can no longer see it any other way , – and some abysmal piece of arro-gance finally gives you the madhouse hope that because you know how
to tyrannize yourselves – Stoicism is self-tyranny –, nature lets itself be
“In came the ass / beautiful and very strong.” According to KSA these lines could be taken from
G. C. Lichtenberg’s Vermischte Schriften (Miscellaneous Writings )( ), V , p. .
On the prejudices of philosophers
tyrannized as well: because isn’t the Stoic a piece of nature? ... But this
is an old, eternal story: what happened back then with the Stoics stillhappens today , just as soon as a philosophy begins believing in itself. Italways creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philos-ophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the“creation of the world,” to the causa prima .
All over Europe these days, the problem “of the real and the apparent
world” gets taken up so eagerly and with such acuit y–Iw ould even say:
shrewdness – that you really start to think and listen; and anyone who
hears only a “will to truth” in the background here certainly does not havethe sharpest of ears. In rare and unusual cases, some sort of will to truthmight actually be at issue, some wild and adventurous streak of courage,a metaphysician’s ambition to hold on to a lost cause, that, in the end,will still prefer a handful of “certainty” to an entire wagonload of prettypossibilities. There might even be puritanical fanatics of conscience whowould rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something.But this is nihilism, and symptomatic of a desperate soul in a state ofdeadly exhaustion, however brave such virtuous posturing may appear.With stronger, livelier thinkers, however, thinkers who still have a thirst forlife, things look different. By taking sides against appearance and speaking
about “perspective” in a newly arrogant tone, by granting their own bodiesabout as little credibility as they grant the visual evidence that says “theearth stands still,” and so, with seemingly good spirits, relinquishing theirmost secure possession (since what do people believe in more securelythese days than their bodies?), who knows whether they are not basically
trying to re-appropriate something that was once possessed even more
securely , something from the old estate of a bygone faith, perhaps “the
immortal soul” or perhaps “the old God,” in short, ideas that helped
The Honeymoon of German Philosophy
- A profound mistrust exists toward 'modern ideas' and the eclectic, superficial concepts of contemporary positivism.
- Skeptical anti-realists are driven by a valid instinct to escape modern reality, though they lack the artistic strength to move forward rather than backward.
- Kant's primary pride lay in his table of categories and the supposed discovery of the faculty of synthetic judgments a priori.
- The rapid expansion of German philosophy was fueled by a competitive zeal to discover even more 'new faculties' within the human mind.
- Kant’s explanation for how these judgments are possible—'by virtue of a faculty'—is criticized as a circular and comical German silliness.
- The era of Romanticism blurred the lines between genuine discovery and mere invention, leading to a frantic search for 'supersensible' faculties.
The honeymoon of German philosophy had arrived; all the young theologians of the Tübingen seminary ran off into the bushes – they were all looking for 'faculties.'
make life a bit better, which is to say stronger and more cheerful than“modern ideas” can do? There is a mistrust of these modern ideas here,
there is a disbelief in everything built yesterday and today; perhaps it ismixed with a bit of antipathy and contempt that can no longer stand thebric-a-brac of concepts from the most heterogeneous sources, which is
First cause.
Beyond Good and Evil
how so-called positivism puts itself on the market these days, a disgust felt
by the more discriminating taste at the fun-fair colors and flimsy scraps ofall these reality-philosophasters who have nothing new and genuine aboutthem except these colors. Here, I think, we should give these skepticalanti-realists and epistemo-microscopists their just due: the instinct thatdrives them away from modern reality is unassailable, – what do we care
for their retrograde shortcut! The essential thing about them is not thatthey want to go “back”: but rather, that they want to get – away . A bit
more strength, flight, courage, artistry: and they would want to get up and
out, – and not go back! –
It seems to me that people everywhere these days are at pains to divert
attention away from the real influence Kant exerted over German phi-losophy , and, in particular, wisely to overlook the value he attributed tohimself. First and foremost, Kant was proud of his table of categories,
and he said with this table in his hands: “This is the hardest thing thatever could have been undertaken on behalf of metaphysics.” – But let usbe clear about this “could have been”! He was proud of having discovered
a new faculty in humans, the faculty of synthetic judgments a priori .O f
course he was deceiving himself here, but the development and rapidblossoming of German philosophy depended on this pride, and on thecompetitive zeal of the younger generation who wanted, if possible, to dis-cover something even prouder – and in any event “new faculties”! – But
the time has come for us to think this over. How are synthetic judgmentsa priori possible ? Kant asked himself, – and what really was his answer? By
virtue of a faculty , which is to say: enabled by an ability :
unfortunately ,
though, not in these few words, but rather so laboriously , reverentially ,and with such an extravagance of German frills and profundity that peo-ple failed to hear the comical niaiserie allemande
in such an answer. In
fact, people were beside themselves with joy over this new faculty , andthe jubilation reached its peak when Kant discovered yet another faculty ,a moral faculty: – because the Germans were still moral back then, and
The reference in this section is to Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason )( ,
).
In German: Verm ¨ oge eines Verm¨ ogens .
German silliness.
On the prejudices of philosophers
very remote from Realpolitik . – The honeymoon of German philosophy
had arrived; all the young theologians of the T ¨ubingen seminaryran off
into the bushes – they were all looking for “faculties.” And what didn’t
they find – in that innocent, abundant, still youthful age of the Germanspirit, when Romanticism, that malicious fairy , whispered, whistled, andsang, when people did not know how to tell the difference between “dis-covering” and “inventing”!
Above all, a faculty of the “supersensible”:
The German Dormative Virtue
- Schelling's 'intellectual intuition' is characterized as a youthful, high-spirited movement that should not be taken with undue moral seriousness.
- Kant's explanation of human faculties is critiqued as a circular tautology, comparable to Molière's doctor claiming opium causes sleep via a 'dormative virtue.'
- The focus shifts from how synthetic a priori judgments are possible to why the belief in them is a biological or perspectival necessity for human life.
- These fundamental judgments may be entirely false, serving only as necessary 'foreground beliefs' within the optics of human existence.
- German philosophy gained European popularity by acting as a 'virtus dormitiva,' providing a mystical antidote to the era's overpowering sensualism.
But answers like this belong in comedy, and the time has finally come to replace the Kantian question 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' with another question, 'Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?'
Schelling christened it intellectual intuition, and thus gratified the heart’sdesire of his basically piety-craving Germans. W e can do no greater in-justice to this whole high-spirited and enthusiastic movement (which wasjust youthfulness, however boldly it might have clothed itself in gray andhoary concepts) than to take it seriously or especially to treat it with moral
indignation. Enough, we grew up, – the dream faded away . There camea time when people scratched their heads: some still scratch them to-day . There had been dreamers: first and foremost – the old Kant. “By
virtue of a faculty” – he had said, or at least meant. But is that really – ananswer? An explanation? Or instead just a repetition of the question? Sohow does opium cause sleep? “By virtue of a faculty ,” namely the virtus
dormitiva – replies the doctor in Moli `ere,
quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
cujus est natura sensus assoupire .
But answers like this belong in comedy , and the time has finally come
to replace the Kantian question “How are synthetic judgments a priori
possible?” with another question, “Why is the belief in such judgmentsnecessary ?” – to realize, in other words, that such judgments must be
believed true for the purpose of preserving beings of our type; which
is why these judgments could of course still be false ! Or, to be blunt,
basic and clearer still: synthetic judgments a priori do not have “to be
possible” at all: we have no right to them, and in our mouths they arenothing but false judgments. It is only the belief in their truth that isnecessary as a foreground belief and piece of visual evidence, belongingto the perspectival optics of life. – And, finally , to recall the enormouseffect that “the German philosophy” – its right to these quotation marks
A reference to Hegel, H ¨olderlin, and Schelling.
In German: “‘ finden’ und ‘erfinden .’”
“Because there is a dormative virtue in it / whose nature is to put the senses to sleep.” From
Moli `ere’s Le Malade imaginaire (The Hypochondriac )( ).
Beyond Good and Evil
is, I hope, understood? – has had all over Europe, a certain virtus dormitiva
has undoubtedly had a role: the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics,artists, three-quarter-Christians, and political obscurantists of all nationswere all delighted to have, thanks to German philosophy , an antidote tothe still overpowering sensualism that was spilling over into this centuryfrom the previous one, in short – “ sensus assoupire ”...
As far as materialistic atomism goes: this is one of the most well-refuted
Beyond the Material Soul
- Boscovich and Copernicus are credited with the greatest triumphs over the senses by dismantling the belief in the stability of matter and the atom.
- The author calls for a ruthless war against 'soul atomism,' the Christian-derived belief that the soul is an indivisible, eternal monad.
- Science should not discard the soul entirely but instead redefine it as a 'subject-multiplicity' or a 'society constructed out of drives and affects.'
- The drive for self-preservation is rejected as the primary biological instinct in favor of the 'will to power,' which seeks to discharge strength.
- Physics is identified as a mere interpretation of the world based on sensualism rather than an objective explanation of reality.
But the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and concepts like the 'mortal soul' and the 'soul as subject-multiplicity' and the 'soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects' want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science.
things in existence. In Europe these days, nobody in the scholarly com-munity is likely to be so unscholarly as to attach any real significance toit, except as a handy household tool (that is, as an abbreviated figure of
speech). For this, we can thank that Pole, Boscovich, who, together withthe Pole, Copernicus, was the greatest, most successful opponent of thevisual evidence. While Copernicus convinced us to believe, contrary toall our senses, that the earth does not stand still, Boscovich taught us to
renounce belief in the last bit of earth that did “stand still,” the belief in
“matter,” in the “material,” in the residual piece of earth and clump of an
atom: it was the greatest triumph over the senses that the world had everknown. – But we must go further still and declare wa r–ar uthless fight
to the finish – on the “atomistic need” that, like the more famous “meta-physical need,” still leads a dangerous afterlife in regions where nobodywould think to look. First of all, we must also put an end to that otherand more disastrous atomism, the one Christianity has taught best andlongest, the atomism of the soul . Let this expression signify the belief that
the soul is something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, that it is a monad,anatomon :this belief must be thrown out of science! Between you and
me, there is absolutely no need to give up “the soul” itself, and relinquishone of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses – as often happens with
naturalists: given their clumsiness, they barely need to touch “the soul”
to lose it. But the path lies open for new versions and sophistications ofthe soul hypothesis – and concepts like the “mortal soul” and the “soul assubject-multiplicity” and the “soul as a society constructed out of drives
and affects” want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science.By putting an end to the superstition that until now has grown around theidea of the soul with an almost tropical luxuriance, the new psychologist
clearly thrusts himself into a new wasteland and a new suspicion. The
On the prejudices of philosophers
old psychologists might have found things easier and more enjoyable –:
but, in the end, the new psychologist knows by this very token that he iscondemned to invention – and, who knows? perhaps to discovery .
–
Physiologists should think twice before positioning the drive for self-
preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living
thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power –: self-
preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of
this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous teleological
principles! – such as the drive for preservation (which we owe to Spinoza’s
inconsistency –). This is demanded by method, which must essentiallybe the economy of principles.
Now it is beginning to dawn on maybe five or six brains that physicstoo is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world (according toourselves! if I may say so) and not an explanation of the world. But to the
extent that physics rests on belief in the senses, it passes for more, and willcontinue to pass for more, namely for an explanation, for a long time tocome. It has our eyes and our fingers as its allies, it has visual evidence andtangibility as its allies. This helped it to enchant, persuade, convince an
age with a basically plebeian taste – indeed, it instinctively follows thecanon of truth of the eternally popular sensualism. What is plain, what“explains”? Only what can be seen and felt, – this is as far as any problemhas to be pursued. Conversely: the strong attraction of the Platonic wayof thinking consisted in its opposition to precisely this empiricism. It was
anoble way of thinking, suitable perhaps for people who enjoyed even
The Seduction of Words
- Plato and his contemporaries found triumph in mastering the senses by imposing conceptual frameworks over sensory chaos.
- Modern scientific imperatives, such as those of Darwinians and physicists, prioritize empirical visibility over Platonic interpretation.
- Physiology must treat sense organs as real causes rather than mere appearances to avoid the logical absurdity of the body creating itself.
- The concept of 'immediate certainty' is a philosophical superstition and a contradiction in terms.
- Philosophers must resist the seduction of words and the belief that 'knowing' can ever reach an absolute end or a 'thing-in-itself'.
- Nietzsche critiques the 'causa sui' as a fundamental absurdity within the context of how we perceive the external world.
But then our body, as a piece of this external world, would really be the product of our organs! But then our organs themselves would really be – the product of our organs!
stronger and more discriminating senses than our contemporaries, butwho knew how to find a higher triumph in staying master over thesesenses. And they did this by throwing drab, cold, gray nets of conceptsover the brightly colored whirlwind of the senses – the rabble of thesenses, as Plato said.
There was a type of enjoyment in overpowering
Nietzsche is again making a pun by contrasting the terms Erfinden (invention) and Finden
(discovery).
Cf.Nomoi (Laws) a–b.
Beyond Good and Evil
and interpreting the world in the manner of Plato, different from the
enjoyment offered by today’s physicists, or by the Darwinians and anti-teleologists who work in physiology , with their principle of the “smallestpossible force” and greatest possible stupidity . “Where man has nothing
more to see and grasp, he has nothing more to do” – this imperative is
certainly different from the Platonic one, but for a sturdy , industriousrace of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, people with tough
work to do, it just might be the right imperative for the job.
To study physiology with a good conscience, we must insist that the senseorgans are not appearances in the way idealist philosophy uses that term:
as such, they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at leastas a regulative principle, if not as a heuristic principle. – What? and otherpeople even say that the external world is the product of our organs? Butthen our body , as a piece of this external world, would really be the product
of our organs! But then our organs themselves would really be – the prod-
uct of our organs! This looks to me like a thorough reductio ad absurdum :
given that the concept of a causa suiis something thoroughly absurd. So
does it follow that the external world is not the product of our organs –?
There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of
“immediate certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Scho-
penhauer’s superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object hereto seize, stark naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took placefrom either the side of the subject or the side of the object. But I will saythis a hundred times: “immediate certainty ,” like “absolute knowledge”
and the “thing in itself ” contains a contradictio in adjecto.
For once and
for all, we should free ourselves from the seduction of words! Let thepeople believe that knowing means knowing to the very end; the philoso-pher has to say: “When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition
Reduction to an absurdity (contradiction).
Cause of itself.
Contradiction in terms.
On the prejudices of philosophers
The Superstitions of Logicians
- The phrase 'I think' relies on unproven metaphysical assumptions, such as the existence of a stable 'I' that acts as a cause.
- Immediate certainty is impossible because identifying a state as 'thinking' requires a retrospective comparison with previous knowledge.
- Thoughts do not occur at the will of the subject; rather, a thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want.
- The grammatical structure of subject and predicate misleads us into assuming an active agent must exist behind every activity.
- The concept of the 'I' is an interpretation of the thinking process rather than a factual component of the process itself.
- The endurance of certain theories, like free will, often stems from the intellectual charm of being repeatedly refutable.
I will not stop emphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to admit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want.
‘I think,’ I get a whole set of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impos-
sible, to establish, – for instance, that Iam the one who is thinking, that
there must be something that is thinking in the first place, that thinking isan activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, that thereis an ‘I,’ and finally , that it has already been determined what is meant
by thinking, – that I know what thinking is. Because if I had not already
made up my mind what thinking is, how could I tell whether what hadjust happened was not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? Enough: this ‘I think’presupposes that I compare my present state with other states that I have
seen in myself, in order to determine what it is: and because of this retro-spective comparison with other types of ‘knowing,’ this present state has
absolutely no ‘immediate certainty’ for me.” – In place of that “imme-diate certainty” which may , in this case, win the faith of the people, the
philosopher gets handed a whole assortment of metaphysical questions,genuinely probing intellectual questions of conscience, such as: “Wheredo I get the concept of thinking from? Why do I believe in causes andeffects? What gives me the right to speak about an I, and, for that mat-ter, about an I as cause, and, finally , about an I as the cause of thoughts?”Whoever dares to answer these metaphysical questions right away with anappeal to a sort of intuitive knowledge, like the person who says: “I think
and know that at least this is true, real, certain” – he will find the philoso-pher of today ready with a smile and two question-marks. “My dear sir,”the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, “it is improbablethat you are not mistaken: but why insist on the truth?” –
As far as the superstitions of the logicians are concerned: I will not stopemphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath toadmit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want.
It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is
the condition of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” isjust that famous old “I” – well that is just an assumption or opinion, toput it mildly , and by no means an “immediate certainty .” In fact, thereis already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” containsaninterpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself.
People are following grammatical habits here in drawing conclusions,reasoning that “thinking is an activity , behind every activity something is
Beyond Good and Evil
active, therefore –.” Following the same basic scheme, the older atomism
looked behind every “force” that produces effects for that little lumpof matter in which the force resides, and out of which the effects areproduced, which is to say: the atom. More rigorous minds finally learnedhow to make do without that bit of “residual earth,” and perhaps one
day even logicians will get used to making do without this little “it” (intowhich the honest old I has disappeared).
That a theory is refutable is, frankly , not the least of its charms: thisis precisely how it attracts the more refined intellects. The theory of“free will,” which has been refuted a hundred times, appears to owe its
endurance to this charm alone –: somebody will always come along andfeel strong enough to refute it.
The Complexity of Willing
- Nietzsche critiques the philosophical tendency, exemplified by Schopenhauer, to treat the 'will' as a simple and familiar unity.
- Willing is described as a complex phenomenon that is only unified by a single linguistic label or 'popular prejudice.'
- Every act of will involves a plurality of feelings, including the sensation of moving away from one state and toward another.
- The will includes a physiological component, specifically the habitual feeling of muscles coming into play even without physical movement.
- Thought is an inseparable ingredient of the will, specifically a 'commandeering thought' that cannot be divorced from the act itself.
- Beyond feeling and thinking, the will is fundamentally defined as an affect, specifically the affect of command.
Willing strikes me as, above all, something complicated, something unified only in a word – and this single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whatever minimal precautions philosophers might take.
Philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most familiarthing in the world. In fact, Schopenhauer would have us believe that thewill is the only thing that is really familiar, familiar through and through,familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have always thought that, heretoo, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers always tend to do:adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice . Willing strikes me as, above
all, something complicated , something unified only in a word – and this
single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whateverminimal precautions philosophers might take. So let us be more cautious,for once – let us be “unphilosophical.” Let us say: in every act of willing
there is, to begin with, a plurality of feelings, namely: the feeling of thestate away from which , the feeling of the state towards which , and the feeling
of this “away from” and “towards” themselves. But this is accompanied
by a feeling of the muscles that comes into play through a sort of habitas soon as we “will,” even without our putting “arms and legs” intomotion. Just as feeling – and indeed many feelings – must be recognizedas ingredients of the will, thought must be as well. In every act of willthere is a commandeering thought, – and we really should not believethis thought can be divorced from the “willing,” as if some will wouldthen be left over! Third, the will is not just a complex of feeling and
On the prejudices of philosophers
thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect : and specifically the affect
The Psychology of Willing
- Willing is fundamentally an affect of superiority where one part of the self commands and another part obeys.
- The concept of the 'I' serves as a synthetic mask that hides the complex duality of the commander and the obedient subject.
- We mistakenly attribute the success of an action to the will alone, ignoring the mechanical resistance and execution involved.
- The feeling of 'freedom of the will' is actually a state of pleasure derived from identifying with the successful completion of a command.
- The human body is described as a social structure composed of many 'under-souls' or 'under-wills' functioning as a community.
- Willing should be understood through the lens of morality, defined as the doctrine of power relations that allow life to arise.
L’effet c’est moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy community: the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the community.
of the command. What is called “freedom of the will” is essentially the
affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey: “I amfree, ‘it’ must obey” – this consciousness lies in every will, along with
a certain straining of attention, a straight look that fixes on one thingand one thing only , an unconditional evaluation “now this is necessaryand nothing else,” an inner certainty that it will be obeyed, and whateverelse comes with the position of the commander. A person who wills –,
commands something inside himself that obeys, or that he believes toobey . But now we notice the strangest thing about the will – about thismultifarious thing that people have only one word for. On the one hand,we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and the
one who obeys, and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelingsof compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and motion that generally startright after the act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in thehabit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about this duality by means ofthe synthetic concept of the “I.” As a result, a whole chain of erroneousconclusions, and, consequently , false evaluations have become attachedto the will, – to such an extent that the one who wills believes, in goodfaith, that willing suffices for action. Since it is almost always the case that
there is will only where the effect of command, and therefore obedience,and therefore action, may be expected , the appearance translates into the
feeling, as if there were a necessity of effect . In short, the one who wills
believes with a reasonable degree of certainty that will and action aresomehow one; he attributes the success, the performance of the willingto the will itself, and consequently enjoys an increase in the feeling ofpower that accompanies all success. “Freedom of the will” – that is theword for the multi-faceted state of pleasure of one who commands and, atthe same time, identifies himself with the accomplished act of willing. Assuch, he enjoys the triumph over resistances, but thinks to himself that itwas his will alone that truly overcame the resistance. Accordingly , the onewho wills takes his feeling of pleasure as the commander, and adds to itthe feelings of pleasure from the successful instruments that carry out thetask, as well as from the useful “under-wills” or under-souls – our bodyis, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls –. L’effet c’est
moi:
what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and
The effect is I.
Beyond Good and Evil
happy community: the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of
the community . All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying,on the groundwork, as I have said, of a society constructed out of many“souls”: from which a philosopher should claim the right to understandwilling itself within the framework of morality: morality understood asa doctrine of the power relations under which the phenomenon of “life”arises. –
The Grammar of Thought
- Philosophical concepts are not arbitrary developments but belong to an interconnected system analogous to the fauna of a continent.
- Thinking is less a process of discovery and more a recognition or homecoming into a primordial economy of the soul.
- Linguistic structures and grammatical functions act as an invisible spell that directs philosophers toward specific interpretations of the world.
- The concept of 'free will' is a metaphysical superlative used by individuals to claim ultimate responsibility, akin to pulling oneself out of a swamp by one's own hair.
- Both 'free' and 'un-free' will are misconceptions based on the erroneous objectification of cause and effect as physical forces rather than descriptive fictions.
- In the 'in-itself' of reality, there are no causal laws or psychological necessities, only conventional fictions used for communication.
The longing for 'freedom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense... means nothing less than being that very causa sui and, with a courage greater than Münchhausen’s, pulling yourself by the hair from the swamp of nothingness up into existence.
That individual philosophical concepts are not arbitrary and do not growup on their own, but rather grow in reference and relation to each other;
that however suddenly and randomly they seem to emerge in the historyof thought, they still belong to a system just as much as all the membersof the fauna of a continent do: this is ultimately revealed by the certaintywith which the most diverse philosophers will always fill out a definitebasic scheme of possible philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they will
each start out anew , only to end up revolving in the same orbit once again.However independent of each other they might feel themselves to be, withtheir critical or systematic wills, something inside of them drives themon, something leads them into a particular order, one after the other, andthis something is precisely the innate systematicity and relationship ofconcepts. In fact, their thinking is not nearly as much a discovery as it isa recognition, remembrance, a returning and homecoming into a distant,primordial, total economy of the soul, from which each concept oncegrew: – to this extent, philosophizing is a type of atavism of the highest
order. The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and Germanphilosophizing speaks for itself clearly enough. Where there are linguistic
affinities, then because of the common philosophy of grammar (I mean:
due to the unconscious domination and direction through similar gram-matical functions), it is obvious that everything lies ready from the verystart for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems;on the other hand, the way seems as good as blocked for certain otherpossibilities of interpreting the world. Philosophers of the Ural-Altaiclanguage group (where the concept of the subject is the most poorly de-veloped) are more likely to “see the world” differently , and to be found onpaths different from those taken by the Indo-Germans or Muslims: thespell of particular grammatical functions is in the last analysis the spell of
On the prejudices of philosophers
physiological value judgments and racial conditioning. – So much towards
a rejection of Locke’s superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas.
The causa suiis the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived,
a type of logical rape and abomination. But humanity’s excessive pride has
got itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece ofnonsense. The longing for “freedom of the will” in the superlative meta-physical sense (which, unfortunately , still rules in the heads of the half-educated), the longing to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility foryour actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance, and so-ciety of the burden – all this means nothing less than being that very causa
suiand, with a courage greater than M ¨unchhausen’s, pulling yourself by
the hair from the swamp of nothingness up into existence. Suppose some-one sees through the boorish naivet ´e of this famous concept of “free will”
and manages to get it out of his mind; I would then ask him to carry his“enlightenment” a step further and to rid his mind of the reversal of thismisconceived concept of “free will”: I mean the “un-free will,” which is
basically an abuse of cause and effect. W e should not erroneously objectify
“cause” and “effect” like the natural scientists do (and whoever else thinksnaturalistically these days –) in accordance with the dominant mechanis-tic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it “effects”something; we should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts ,
which is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description andcommunication, not explanation. In the “in-itself ” there is nothing like
“causal association,” “necessity ,” or “psychological un-freedom.” There,
the “effect” does not follow “from the cause,” there is no rule of “law .”
Interpretation and Will to Power
- Human concepts like causation, law, and freedom are a 'symbol world' projected onto reality rather than inherent truths.
- The concept of 'un-free will' is a mythological construct; in reality, there are only strong and weak wills.
- Belief in the lack of free will often stems from a desire to avoid personal responsibility or a sense of self-contempt.
- Scientific 'laws of nature' are interpreted through a democratic bias that seeks equality and rejects privilege even in physics.
- An alternative interpretation of nature reveals a ruthless execution of power claims where laws are absent and power simply acts.
- Psychology must move beyond moral prejudices to understand itself as the development of the will to power.
But, as I have said, this is interpretation, not text; and somebody with an opposite intention and mode of interpretation could come along and be able to read from the same nature, and with reference to the same set of appearances, a tyrannically ruthless and pitiless execution of power claims.
We are the ones who invented causation, succession, for-each-other, rel-
ativity , compulsion, numbers, law , freedom, grounds, purpose; and if weproject and inscribe this symbol world onto things as an “in-itself,” thenthis is the way we have always done things, namely mythologically . The
“un-free will” is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and
weak wills. It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in a thinker
when he senses some compulsion, need, having-to-follow , pressure, un-freedom in every “causal connection” and “psychological necessity .” It is
Cause of itself.
Beyond Good and Evil
very telling to feel this way – the person tells on himself. And in general,
if I have observed correctly , “un-freedom of the will” is regarded as a
problem by two completely opposed parties, but always in a profoundlypersonal manner. The one party would never dream of relinquishing their
“responsibility ,” a belief in themselves , a personal right to their own merit
(the vain races belong to this group –). Those in the other party , on thecontrary , do not want to be responsible for anything or to be guilty ofanything; driven by an inner self-contempt, they long to be able to shift
the blame for themselves to something else. When they write books these
days, this latter group tends to side with the criminal; a type of socialistpity is their most attractive disguise. And, in fact, the fatalism of the weakof will starts to look surprisingly attractive when it can present itself as
“la religion de la souffrance humaine ”:
this is its“good taste.”
Y ou must forgive an old philologist like me who cannot help maliciously
putting his finger on bad tricks of interpretation: but this “conformity ofnature to law ,” which you physicists are so proud of, just as if – – exists
only because of your interpretation and bad “philology .” It is not a matterof fact, not a “text,” but instead only a naive humanitarian correction and
a distortion of meaning that you use in order to comfortably accommodatethe democratic instincts of the modern soul! “Everywhere, equality beforethe law , – in this respect, nature is no different and no better off than
we are”: a lovely case of ulterior motivation; and it serves once moreto disguise the plebeian antagonism against all privilege and autocracytogether with a second and more refined atheism. “ Ni dieu, ni maˆ ıtre”
–
you want this too: and therefore “hurray for the laws of nature!” – right?But, as I have said, this is interpretation, not text; and somebody with anopposite intention and mode of interpretation could come along and beable to read from the same nature, and with reference to the same set ofappearances, a tyrannically ruthless and pitiless execution of power claims.This sort of interpreter would show the unequivocal and unconditionalnature of all “will to power” so vividly and graphically that almost every
word, and even the word “tyranny ,” would ultimately seem useless orlike weakening and mollifying metaphors – and too humanizing. Y et this
The religion of human suffering.
Neither God nor master.
On the prejudices of philosophers
interpreter might nevertheless end up claiming the same thing about
this world as you, namely that it follows a “necessary” and “calculable”course, although not because laws are dominant in it, but rather because
laws are totally absent , and every power draws its final consequences at
every moment. Granted, this is only an interpretation too – and you willbe eager enough to make this objection? – well then, so much the better.
All psychology so far has been stuck in moral prejudices and fears: it hasnot ventured into the depths. To grasp psychology as morphology andthedoctrine of the development of the will to power , which is what I have
Psychology as Queen of Science
- Moral prejudice has historically distorted the most spiritual and intellectual pursuits, acting as a blinding force for researchers.
- A true physio-psychology must overcome the 'unconscious resistances' of the heart, as it often suggests that good drives derive from bad ones.
- The idea that hatred, envy, and greed are essential to the 'total economy of life' causes a physical aversion similar to sea-sickness in most thinkers.
- Daring to explore this 'dangerous knowledge' requires the destruction of one's own moral remnants to reach deeper insights.
- Psychology should be reinstated as the 'queen of the sciences' to which all other disciplines must serve and prepare.
- The psychologist who makes these intellectual sacrifices opens up a profound world of insight into the fundamental problems of existence.
On the other hand, if you are ever cast loose here with your ship, well now! come on! clench your teeth! open your eyes! and grab hold of the helm! – we are sailing straight over and away from morality.
done – nobody has ever come close to this, not even in thought: this,
of course, to the extent that we are permitted to regard what has been
written so far as a symptom of what has not been said until now . Thepower of moral prejudice has deeply affected the most spiritual world,which seems like the coldest world, the one most likely to be devoidof any presuppositions – and the effect has been manifestly harmful,
hindering, dazzling, and distorting. A genuine physio-psychology has tocontend with unconscious resistances in the heart of the researcher, ithas “the heart” against it. Even a doctrine of the reciprocal dependence
of the “good” and the “bad” drives will (as a refined immorality) causedistress and aversion in a strong and sturdy conscience – as will, to an evengreater extent, a doctrine of the derivation of all the good drives from thebad. But suppose somebody considers even the affects of hatred, envy ,greed, and power-lust as the conditioning affects of life, as elements thatfundamentally and essentially need to be present in the total economy oflife, and consequently need to be enhanced where life is enhanced, – thisperson will suffer from such a train of thought as if from sea-sickness.And yet even this hypothesis is far from being the most uncomfortable andunfamiliar in this enormous, practically untouched realm of dangerousknowledge: – and there are hundreds of good reasons for people to keepout of it, if they – can! On the other hand, if you are ever cast loose
here with your ship, well now! come on! clench your teeth! open youreyes! and grab hold of the helm! – we are sailing straight over and away
from morality; we are crushing and perhaps destroying the remnants of
our own morality by daring to travel there – but what do wematter!
Never before have intrepid voyagers and adventurers opened up a more
Beyond Good and Evil
profound world of insight: and the psychologist who “makes sacrifices”
(they are not thesacrifizio dell’intelletto– to the contrary!) can at least
demand in return that psychology again be recognized as queen of thesciences,
and that the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for
it. Because, from now on, psychology is again the path to the fundamentalproblems.
Sacrifice of the intellect.
In German: Wissenschaften .Wissenschaft has generally been translated as “science” throughout the
text, but the German term is broader than the English, and includes the humanities as well as the
natural and social sciences.
Part The free spirit
O sancta simplicitas !What a strange simplification and falsification people
The Foundation of Ignorance
- Humanity has cultivated a 'holy simplicity' by prioritizing superficiality and ignorance to ensure a sense of freedom and joy.
- Science does not exist in opposition to ignorance but is actually a refinement of the more powerful human will to not know.
- Language and morality often obscure the truth by framing reality in binary opposites rather than subtle gradations of degree.
- Science ultimately serves to maintain a simplified and well-falsified world because it is driven by a love for life and its necessary errors.
- Philosophers are warned against the trap of martyrdom, as defending 'the Truth' leads to a loss of objectivity and intellectual stubbornness.
- The pursuit of truth should not be a defensive or solemn crusade, as truth itself does not require such clumsy protection.
And, until now, science could arise only on this solidified, granite foundation of ignorance, the will to know rising up on the foundation of a much more powerful will, the will to not know, to uncertainty, to untruth!
live in! The wonders never cease, for those who devote their eyes to suchwondering. How we have made everything around us so bright and easyand free and simple! How we have given our senses a carte blanche for ev-
erything superficial, given our thoughts a divine craving for high-spiritedleaps and false inferences! – How we have known from the start to holdon to our ignorance in order to enjoy a barely comprehensible freedom,thoughtlessness, recklessness, bravery , and joy in life; to delight in lifeitself ! And, until now , science could arise only on this solidified, granitefoundation of ignorance, the will to know rising up on the foundation of amuch more powerful will, the will to not know , to uncertainty , to untruth!Not as its opposite, but rather – as its refinement! Even when language ,
here as elsewhere, cannot get over its crassness and keeps talking aboutopposites where there are only degrees and multiple, subtle shades ofgradation; even when the ingrained tartuffery of morals (which is nowpart of our “flesh and blood,” and cannot be overcome) twists the wordsin our mouths (we who should know better); now and then we still realize
what is happening, and laugh about how it is precisely the best science
that will best know how to keep us in this simplified , utterly artificial,
In German: der freie Geist . I have generally rendered Geist and words using Geist (such as geistig ,
Geistigkeit ) as “spirit” and words using spirit (so: spiritual and spirituality). However, Geist is a
broader term than spirit, meaning mind or intellect as well.
O holy simplicity .
Beyond Good and Evil
well-invented, well-falsified world, how unwillingly willing science loves
error because, being alive, – it loves life!
After such a joyful entrance, there is a serious word that I want heard;it is intended for those who are most serious. Stand tall, you philoso-
phers and friends of knowledge, and beware of martyrdom! Of suffering“for the sake of truth”! Even of defending yourselves! Y ou will ruin the
innocence and fine objectivity of your conscience, you will be stubborn to-wards objections and red rags, you will become stupid, brutish, bullish if,while fighting against danger, viciousness, suspicion, ostracism, and evennastier consequences of animosity , you also have to pose as the world-wide defenders of truth. As if “the Truth” were such a harmless andbungling little thing that she needed defenders! And you of all people,her Knights of the Most Sorrowful Countenance,
my Lord Slacker and
The Philosopher's Mask
- Philosophers must embrace the uncertainty of their doctrines, recognizing that a single question mark holds more truth than dogmatic certainty.
- The necessity of masks and 'finesse' is emphasized to protect the philosopher's spirit from being misunderstood or corrupted by the public eye.
- Prolonged, hidden conflict and fear turn the spirit poisonous and personal, leading to a subtle desire for vengeance rather than objective truth.
- Moral indignation and martyrdom are viewed as signs of degeneration, transforming the philosopher into a mere actor or agitator.
- True solitude should be light-hearted and free, serving as a 'citadel' that prevents the philosopher from becoming an outcast driven by resentment.
- Every philosophy begins as a tragedy, but its public defense often ends as a satirical 'satyr-play' that lacks genuine philosophical humor.
Choose the good solitude, the free, high-spirited, light-hearted solitude that, in some sense, gives you the right to stay good yourself!
Lord W ebweaver of the Spirit! In the end, you know very well that itdoes not matter whether you, of all people, are proved right, and fur-
thermore, that no philosopher so far has ever been proved right. Y ou also
know that every little question-mark you put after your special slogansand favorite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) might containmore truth than all the solemn gestures and trump cards laid before ac-cusers and courts of law! So step aside instead! Run away and hide! Andbe sure to have your masks and your finesse so people will mistake you forsomething else, or be a bit scared of you! And do not forget the garden,the garden with golden trelliswork! And have people around you whoare like a garden, – or like music over the waters when evening sets andthe day is just a memory . Choose the good solitude, the free, high-spirited,
light-hearted solitude that, in some sense, gives you the right to stay goodyourself ! How poisonous, how cunning, how bad you become in everylong war that cannot be waged out in the open! How personal you become
when you have been afraid for a long time, keeping your eye on enemies,on possible enemies! These outcasts of society (the long-persecuted, thebadly harassed, as well as those forced to become hermits, the Spinozas orGiordano Brunos): they may work under a spiritual guise, and might noteven know what they are doing, but they will always end up subtly seeking
A reference to Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote ( ).
The free spirit
vengeance and mixing their poisons ( just try digging up the foundation
of Spinoza’s ethics and theology!). Not to mention the absurd spectacle ofmoral indignation, which is an unmistakable sign that a philosopher haslost his philosophical sense of humor. The philosopher’s martyrdom, his
“self-sacrifice for the truth,” brings to light the agitator and actor in him;and since we have only ever regarded him with artistic curiosity , it is easyto understand the dangerous wish to see many of these philosophers intheir degeneration for once (degenerated into “martyrs” or loud-mouthson their stage or soap-box). It’s just that, with this sort of wish we have tobe clear about what we will be seeing: – only a satyr-play , only a satirical
epilogue, only the continuing proof that the long, real tragedy has come to
an end (assuming that every philosophy was originally a long tragedy – ).
Every choice human being strives instinctively for a citadel and secrecy
The Philosopher and the Norm
- A true seeker of knowledge must eventually leave their 'citadel' of solitude to study the average human norm.
- The study of the common man is a foul-smelling but necessary part of a philosopher's life, requiring self-overcoming and the endurance of 'bad company.'
- Cynics serve as valuable shortcuts for the philosopher because they represent the only form of honesty available to base souls.
- The philosopher should listen most attentively to those who speak 'badly' of humanity without bitterness or anger, as anger often masks the truth with lies.
- Higher taste involves experiencing disgust and weariness toward the masses, yet choosing to descend into their study for the sake of profound insight.
Cynicism is the only form in which base souls touch upon that thing which is genuine honesty.
where he is rescued from the crowds, the many , the vast majority; where,
as the exception, he can forget the human norm. The only exception iswhen he is driven straight towards this norm by an even stronger instinct,in search of knowledge in the great and exceptional sense. Anybody who,in dealing with people, does not occasionally glisten in all the shades ofdistress, green and gray with disgust, weariness, pity , gloominess, andloneliness – he is certainly not a person of higher taste. But if he does not
freely take on all this effort and pain, if he keeps avoiding it and remains,as I said, placid and proud and hidden in his citadel, well then one thingis certain: he is not made for knowledge, not predestined for it. Becauseif he were, he would eventually have to say to himself: “To hell withgood taste! The norm is more interesting than the exception – than me,the exception!” – and he would wend his way downwards , and, above all,
“inwards.” The long and serious study of the average man requires a great
deal of disguise, self-overcoming, confidentiality , bad company (all com-pany is bad company except with your equals); still, this is all a necessarypart of the life story of every philosopher, perhaps the least pleasant, mostfoul-smelling part and the one richest in disappointments. But if he islucky , as befits knowledge’s child of fortune, the philosopher will find real
shortcuts and aids to make his work easier. I mean he will find so-calledcynics – people who easily recognize the animal, the commonplace, the
“norm” within themselves, and yet still have a degree of spiritedness and
Beyond Good and Evil
an urge to talk about themselves and their peers in front of witnesses :–
sometimes they even wallow in books as if in their own filth. Cynicism isthe only form in which base souls touch upon that thing which is genuinehonesty . And the higher man needs to open his ears to all cynicism, crudeor refined, and congratulate himself every time the buffoon speaks upwithout shame, or the scientific satyr is heard right in front of him. Thereare even cases where enchantment mixes with disgust: namely , wheregenius, by a whim of nature, is tied to some indiscreet billy-goat andape, like the Abb ´e Galiani, the most profound, discerning, and perhaps
also the filthiest man of his century . He was much more profound thanV oltaire, and consequently a lot quieter. But, as I have already suggested,what happens more often is that the scientific head is placed on an ape’sbody , a more subtle and exceptional understanding is put in a base soul.This is not a rare phenomenon, particularly among physicians and phys-iologists of morals. And wherever even one person is speaking about manwithout any bitterness but instead quite innocuously , describing him as astomach with dual needs and a head with one; wherever someone sees andseeks and wants to see only hunger, sex-drive and vanity , as if these were
the sole and genuine motivating forces of human action; in short, whereversomebody is speaking “badly” of people – and not even wickedly – this is
where the lover of knowledge should listen with subtle and studious atten-tion. He should keep his ears open wherever people are speaking withoutanger. Because the angry man, and anyone who is constantly tearing andshredding himself with his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, orGod, or society), may very well stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied satyr, considered morally . But considered in any other way , heis the more ordinary , more indifferent, less instructive case. And nobodylies as much as the angry man. –
It is hard to be understood, particularly when you think and live gangasro-
togatiamong people who think and live differently , namely kurmagatior
at best “walking like frogs,” mandeikagati (am I doing everything I can to
be hard to understand myself ?), and you should give heartfelt thanks for
Sanskrit for “as the current of the [river] Ganges moves.”
The Tempo of Thought
- The most difficult element to translate between languages is 'tempo,' which is rooted in a culture's physiological metabolism.
- German prose is characterized as ponderous and lumbering, making it incapable of the 'presto' required for free-spirited thought.
- Authors like Machiavelli and Petronius utilize a galloping, mischievous tempo to present dangerous ideas with a sense of liberating scorn.
- Lessing is noted as a rare German exception who escaped cultural stiffness through an affinity for French and Roman comedic styles.
- The presence of Aristophanes' works under Plato's deathbed pillow suggests that even the most serious philosophers require the 'transfiguring spirit' of comedy to endure life.
How would even a Plato have endured life – a Greek life that he said No to – without an Aristophanes!
Sanskrit for “as the tortoise moves.”
The free spirit
the goodwill apparent in any subtlety of interpretation. But as far as “good
friends” are concerned, they are always too easy-going and think that theyhave a right to be easy-going, just because they are friends. So it is best togrant them some leeway from the very start, and leave some latitude formisunderstandings: – and then you can even laugh. Or, alternatively , getrid of them altogether, these good friends, – and then laugh some more!
The hardest thing to translate from one language into another is thetempo of its style, which is grounded in the character of the race, or – tobe more physiological – in the average tempo of its “metabolism.” There
are well-meaning interpretations that are practically falsifications; theyinvoluntarily debase the original, simply because it has a tempo that cannotbe translate d – a tempo that is brave and cheerful and leaps over and out
of every danger in things and in words. Germans are almost incapable ofapresto in their language: and so it is easy to see that they are incapable
of many of the most delightful and daring nuances of free, free-spiritedthought. Since the buffo and the satyr are alien to the German in body and
in conscience, Aristophanes and Petronius are as good as untranslatable.Everything ponderous, lumbering, solemnly awkward, every long-windedand boring type of style is developed by the Germans in over-abundantdiversity . Forgive me for pointing out that even Goethe’s prose, with itsmixture of the stiff and the delicate, is no exception; it is both a reflectionof the “good old days” to which it belonged and an expression of the
German taste back when there still was a “German taste”: it was a Rococo
taste, in moribus et artibus .
Lessing is an exception, thanks to his actor’s
nature that understood and excelled at so much. He was not the translatorof Bayle for nothing; he gladly took refuge in the company of Diderot andV oltaire, and still more gladly among the Roman writers of comedy . Evenin tempo, Lessing loved free-thinking
and the escape from Germany .
But how could the German language – even in the prose of a Lessing –imitate Machiavelli’s tempo – Machiavelli who, in his Principe ,
lets us
breathe the fine, dry air of Florence? He cannot help presenting the mostserious concerns in a boisterous allegrissimo , and is, perhaps, not without
In customs and arts.
In German: Freigeisterei .
Il Principe (The Prince )( ).
Beyond Good and Evil
a malicious, artistic sense for the contrast he is risking: thoughts that are
long, hard, tough, and dangerous, and a galloping tempo and the verybest and most mischievous mood. Who, finally , would dare to translatePetronius into German, a man who, more than any great musician so far,
was the master of the presto in inventions, ideas, and words. What do all the
swamps of the sick and wicked world – even the “ancient world” – matter
in the end for someone like him, with feet of wind, with the breath andthe force and the liberating scorn of a wind that makes everything healthyby making everything run! And as for Aristophanes, that transfiguring,
complementary spirit for whose sake we can forgive the whole Greek world
for existing (as long as we have realized in full depth and profundity what
needs to be forgiven and transfigured here): – nothing I know has givenme a better vision of Plato’s secrecy and Sphinx nature than that happily
preserved petit fait :
under the pillow of his deathbed they did not find
a “Bible” or anything Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic – but instead,
Aristophanes. How would even a Plato have endured life – a Greek lifethat he said No to – without an Aristophanes! –
Independence is an issue that concerns very few people: – it is a prerogative
The Labyrinth of the Strong
- Independence is a dangerous labyrinth where the strong risk being destroyed by internal conflicts that others cannot perceive or pity.
- A fundamental hierarchy exists between 'exoteric' and 'esoteric' perspectives, defined by whether one views life from below or from above.
- Higher insights often appear as crimes or stupidities to those whose natures are not predestined to understand them.
- What nourishes a higher type of man can be poisonous to a lesser type, just as a philosopher's virtues might be seen as vices by the base.
- Public spaces and popular literature carry a 'stench' of mediocrity that stifles the clean air required by higher souls.
- Youthful judgment lacks the nuance of maturity, often suffering from a 'taste for the unconditional' that leads to later regret.
He enters a labyrinth, he multiplies by a thousand the dangers already inherent in the very act of living, not the least of which is the fact that no one with eyes will see how and where he gets lost and lonely and is torn limb from limb by some cave-Minotaur of conscience.
of the strong. And even when somebody has every right to be independent,if he attempts such a thing without having to do so, he proves that he is
probably not only strong, but brave to the point of madness. He entersa labyrinth, he multiplies by a thousand the dangers already inherent inthe very act of living, not the least of which is the fact that no one witheyes will see how and where he gets lost and lonely and is torn limb fromlimb by some cave-Minotaur of conscience. And assuming a man like thisis destroyed, it is an event so far from human comprehension that peopledo not feel it or feel for him: – and he cannot go back again! He cannotgo back to their pity again! – –
Our highest insights must – and should! – sound like stupidities, or possi-bly crimes, when they come without permission to people whose ears have
Little fact.
The free spirit
no affinityfor them and were not predestined for them. The distinc-
tion between the exoteric and the esoteric, once made by philosophers,was found among the Indians as well as among Greeks, Persians, andMuslims. Basically , it was found everywhere that people believed in anorder of rank and not in equality and equal rights. The difference be-
tween these terms is not that the exoteric stands outside and sees, values,measures, and judges from this external position rather than from someinternal one. What is more essential is that the exoteric sees things up frombelow – while the esoteric sees them down from above! There are heights
of the soul from whose vantage point even tragedy stops having tragiceffects; and who would dare to decide whether the collective sight of theworld’s many woes would necessarily compel and seduce us into a feeling
of pity , a feeling that would only serve to double these woes? ...What
helps feed or nourish the higher type of man must be almost poisonous toa very different and lesser type. The virtues of a base man could indicatevices and weaknesses in a philosopher. If a higher type of man were todegenerate
and be destroyed, this very destruction could give him the
qualities needed to make people honor him as a saint down in the lowerrealm where he has sunk. There are books that have inverse values forsoul and for health, depending on whether they are used by the lowersouls and lowlier life-forces, or by the higher and more powerful ones.In the first case, these books are dangerous and cause deterioration anddissolution; in the second case, they are the heralds’ calls that summonthe most courageous to their courage. Books for the general public always
smell foul: the stench of petty people clings to them. It usually stinksin places where the people eat and drink, even where they worship. Y oushould not go to church if you want to breath clean air. – –
When people are young, they admire and despise without any of that art
of nuance which is life’s greatest reward; so it is only fair that they willcome to pay dearly for having assaulted people and things like this, witha Y es and a No. Everything is set up so that the worst possible taste, the
In German: nicht daf ¨ ur geartet . The term geartet is related to the German word Art (type), which
appears frequently in this section as well as throughout the text.
In German: dass er entartete .
Beyond Good and Evil
taste for the unconditional, gets cruelly and foolishly abused until people
The Evolution of Moral Value
- Youth is characterized by an intrinsic tendency to falsify reality and people to satisfy its own intense wrath and reverence.
- The transition out of youth involves a violent self-suspicion where the individual punishes themselves for their previous blindness.
- In the prehistoric 'pre-moral' period, the value of an action was judged solely by its retroactive consequences rather than its origin.
- The 'moral' period shifted focus to the origin of an action, specifically identifying value with the conscious intention of the actor.
- We are entering an 'extra-moral' period where the decisive value of an action is suspected to lie in its unintentional elements.
- The belief that intention exhausts the value of an action is now viewed as a narrow superstition that requires a fundamental displacement.
How furious it is with itself now, how impatiently it tears itself apart, what revenge it exacts for having blinded itself for so long, as if its blindness had been voluntary!
learn to put some art into their feelings, and prefer the risk they runwith artifice, just like real artists of life do. It seems as if the wrath andreverence that characterize youth will not rest easy until they have falsified
people and things thoroughly enough to be able to vent themselves onthese targets. Y outh is itself intrinsically falsifying and deceitful. Later,after the young soul has been tortured by constant disappointments, itends up turning suspiciously on itself, still raging and wild, even in theforce of its suspicion and the pangs of its conscience. How furious itis with itself now , how impatiently it tears itself apart, what revenge itexacts for having blinded itself for so long, as if its blindness had beenvoluntary! In this transitional state, we punish ourselves by distrusting
our feelings, we torture our enthusiasm with doubts, we experience even
a good conscience as a danger, as if it were a veil wrapped around us,something marking the depletion of a more subtle, genuine honesty . And,above all, we become partisan, partisan on principle against “youth.” – A
decade later, we realize that all this – was youthfulness too!
During the longest epoch of human history (which is called the prehistoricage) an action’s value or lack of value was derived from its consequences;the action itself was taken as little into account as its origin. Instead,the situation was something like that of present-day China, where thehonor or dishonor of a child reflects back on the parents. In the sameway , it was the retroactive force of success or failure that showed peo-ple whether to think of an action as good or bad. W e can call this pe-riod the pre-moral period of humanity . At that point, the imperative
“know thyself !” was still unknown. By contrast, over the course of the lastten millennia, people across a large part of the earth have gradually comefar enough to see the origin, not the consequence, as decisive for thevalue of an action. By and large, this was a great event, a consider-able refinement of outlook and criterion, an unconscious after-effect of thedominance of aristocratic values and the belief in “origin,” and the sign
of a period that we can signify as moral in a narrow sense. This marks the
first attempt at self-knowledge. Origin rather than consequence: what areversal of perspective! And, certainly , this reversal was only accomplishedafter long struggles and fluctuations! Granted: this meant that a disastrous
The free spirit
new superstition, a distinctive narrowness of interpretation gained domi-
nance. The origin of the action was interpreted in the most determinatesense possible, as origin out of an intention . People were united in the be-
lief that the value of an action was exhausted by the value of its intention.Intention as the entire origin and prehistory of an action: under this pre-judice people have issued moral praise, censure, judgment, and philoso-phy almost to this day . – But today , thanks to a renewed self-contemplationand deepening of humanity , shouldn’t we be facing a renewed necessityto effect a reversal and fundamental displacement of values? Shouldn’twe be standing on the threshold of a period that would be designated,negatively at first, as extra-moral ? Today , when we immoralists, at least,
suspect that the decisive value is conferred by what is specifically unin-
tentional about an action, and that all its intentionality , everything about
The Overcoming of Morality
- The intention behind an action is merely a surface symptom that conceals more than it reveals about its true origin.
- Traditional morality based on intentions is dismissed as a preliminary prejudice, comparable to the pseudo-sciences of astrology and alchemy.
- The 'self-overcoming of morality' is described as a secret labor for the most honest and malicious consciences of the modern age.
- Altruistic feelings like self-sacrifice and devotion are viewed with suspicion as potential 'seductions' that require merciless interrogation.
- The perceived world is fundamentally erroneous, leading to a profound skepticism regarding the reliability of thinking and consciousness.
- The belief in 'immediate certainties' is criticized as a form of moral naivety that philosophers must finally move beyond.
The overcoming of morality – even the self-overcoming of morality, in a certain sense: let this be the name for that long and secret labor which is reserved for the most subtle, genuinely honest, and also the most malicious consciences of the day.
it that can be seen, known, or raised to “conscious awareness,” only be-
longs to its surface and skin – which, like every skin, reveals somethingbutconceals even more? In short, we believe that the intention is only a
sign and symptom that first needs to be interpreted, and that, moreover,it is a sign that means too many things and consequently means almostnothing by itself. W e believe that morality in the sense it has had up to now(the morality of intentions) was a prejudice, a precipitousness, perhapsa preliminary , a thing on about the same level as astrology and alchemy ,but in any case something that must be overcome. The overcoming ofmorality – even the self-overcoming of morality , in a certain sense: let this
be the name for that long and secret labor which is reserved for the mostsubtle, genuinely honest, and also the most malicious consciences of theday , who are living touchstones of the soul. –
There is nothing else to be done: the feelings of utter devotion, of sacrificefor your neighbor, and the entire morality of self-abnegation have tobe mercilessly taken to court and made to account for themselves. Andthe same holds for the aesthetic of “disinterested contemplation,” theseductive guise under which the castration of art is presently trying tocreate a good conscience for itself. These feelings of “for others,” of“not for myself,” contain far too much sugar and sorcery for us not to
need to become doubly suspicious here and ask: “ Aren’t these perhaps –seductions ?” To say that these feelings are pleasing (for the one who has
Beyond Good and Evil
them, for the one who enjoys their fruits, and even for the mere onlooker)
is not yet an argument in their favor , but rather constitutes a demand for
caution. So let us be cautious!
It does not matter what philosophical standpoint you might take thesedays: any way you look at it, the erroneousness of the world we think we
live in is the most certain and solid fact that our eyes can still grab hold of.W e find reason after reason for it, reasons that might lure us into specu-lations about a deceptive principle in “the essence of things.” But anyonewho makes thinking itself (and therefore “the spirit”) responsible for thefalseness of the world (an honorable way out, taken by every conscious orunconscious advocatus dei
), anyone who considers this world, together
with space, time, form, and motion, to be falsely inferred – such a person
would at the very least have ample cause to grow suspicious of think-ing altogether. Hasn’t it played the biggest joke on us to date? And whatguarantee would there be that it wouldn’t keep doing what it has alwaysdone? In all seriousness, there is something touching and awe-inspiringabout the innocence that, to this day , lets a thinker place himself in frontof consciousness with the request that it please give him honest answers:
for example, whether or not it is “real,” and why it so resolutely keepsthe external world at arm’s length, and other questions like that. Thebelief in “immediate certainties” is a moral naivet ´e that does credit to us
philosophers: but – we should stop being “merely moral,” for once! Aside
The Fiction of Truth
- The philosopher has a duty to embrace suspicion and 'bad character' to avoid being a dupe to immediate certainties.
- The hierarchy of truth over appearance is a moral prejudice; life fundamentally relies on perspectival valuations and appearances.
- Truth and falsehood should not be viewed as opposites, but rather as different shades or 'valeurs' of appearance.
- The concept of the 'subject' or 'author' may itself be a grammatical fiction that philosophers must learn to transcend.
- A search for truth motivated solely by the desire to do good is destined to fail because it is too 'humane.'
- The material world might be best understood as a primitive form of the world of affects and drives rather than a separate reality.
It is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance; in fact, it is the world’s most poorly proven assumption.
from morality , the belief in immediate certainties is a stupidity that doesus little credit! In bourgeois life, a suspicious disposition might be a sign of“bad character” and consequently considered unwise. But here with us,beyond the bourgeois sphere with its Y eses and Noes, – what is to stop us
from being unwise and saying: “ As the creature who has been the biggestdupe the earth has ever seen, the philosopher pretty much has a right to
a ‘bad character.’ It is his duty to be suspicious these days, to squint as
maliciously as possible out of every abyss of mistrust.” – Forgive me forplaying jokes with this gloomy grimace and expression: because when itcomes to betrayal and being betrayed, I myself learned a long time ago tothink differently and evaluate differently; and my elbow is ready with at
Advocate of God (as opposed to the devil’s advocate).
The free spirit
least a couple of nudges for the blind rage of philosophers as they struggle
not to be betrayed. Why not? It is no more than a moral prejudice that
the truth is worth more than appearance; in fact, it is the world’s mostpoorly proven assumption. Let us admit this much: that life could not ex-ist except on the basis of perspectival valuations and appearances; and if,with the virtuous enthusiasm and inanity of many philosophers, someonewanted to completely abolish the “world of appearances,” – well, assum-
ingyou could do that, – at least there would not be any of your “truth”
left either! Actually , why do we even assume that “true” and “false” are
intrinsically opposed? Isn’t it enough to assume that there are levels ofappearance and, as it were, lighter and darker shades and tones of appear-ance – different valeurs ,
to use the language of painters? Why shouldn’t
the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? And if someone asks: “But
doesn’t fiction belong with an author?” – couldn’t we shoot back: “ Why?
Doesn’t this ‘belonging’ belong, perhaps, to fiction as well? Aren’t weallowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicateand object? Shouldn’t philosophers rise above the belief in grammar?With all due respect to governesses, isn’t it about time philosophy re-nounced governess-beliefs?” –
O V oltaire! O humanity! O nonsense! There is something to “truth,” tothesearch for truth; and when a human being is too humane about it –
when “ il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien ”
– I bet he won’t find
anything!
Assuming that our world of desires and passions is the only thing “given”as real, that we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality ofour drives (since thinking is only a relation between these drives) – aren’t
we allowed to make the attempt and pose the question as to whethersomething like this “given” isn’t enough to render the so-called mecha-
nistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as well? I do not meancomprehensible as a deception, a “mere appearance,” a “representation”
Values.
“He looks for truth only to do good.”
Beyond Good and Evil
(in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer); I mean it might allow us
to understand the mechanistic world as belonging to the same plane ofreality as our affects themselves –, as a primitive form of the world ofaffect, where everything is contained in a powerful unity before branch-ing off and organizing itself in the organic process (and, of course, beingsoftened and weakened –). W e would be able to understand the mecha-nistic world as a kind of life of the drives, where all the organic functions(self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, excretion, and metabolism) arestill synthetically bound together – as a pre-form of life? – In the end, we
are not only allowed to make such an attempt: the conscience of method
demands it. Multiple varieties of causation should not be postulated until
the attempt to make do with a single one has been taken as far as it willgo (– ad absurdum , if you will). This is a moral of method that cannot be
Will to Power and Truth
- The author proposes a hypothesis that all causality is ultimately the causality of the will, specifically the 'will to power.'
- If all organic functions like nutrition and procreation can be traced back to this single drive, then the world's 'intelligible character' is nothing but will to power.
- The French Revolution is described as a 'pointless farce' that has been obscured by the passionate interpretations of spectators who projected their own ideals onto it.
- The validity of a doctrine is independent of its ability to produce happiness or virtue; truth may in fact be harmful, dangerous, or even fatal.
- A spirit's strength is measured by how much 'truth' it can endure without needing it to be thinned out, sweetened, or lied about.
- Harshness, cunning, and even 'evil' may provide more favorable conditions for the development of a true philosopher than gentle good nature.
Something could be true even if it is harmful and dangerous to the highest degree.
escaped these days; – it follows “from the definition,” as a mathematician
would say . The question is ultimately whether we recognize the will as, ineffect, efficacious , whether we believe in the causality of the will. If we do
(and this belief is really just our belief in causality itself –), then we must
make the attempt to hypothetically posit the causality of the will as theonly type of causality there is. “Will” can naturally have effects only on“will” – and not on “matter” (not on “nerves” for instance –). Enough:
we must venture the hypothesis that everywhere “effects” are recognized,will is effecting will – and that every mechanistic event in which a forceis active is really a force and effect of the will. – Assuming, finally , thatwe succeeded in explaining our entire life of drives as the organizationand outgrowth of one basic form of will (namely , of the will to power,which is myclaim); assuming we could trace all organic functions back to
this will to power and find that it even solved the problem of procreationand nutrition (which is a single problem); then we will have earned theright to clearly designate allefficacious force as: will to power . The world
seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its“intelligible character” – would be just this “will to power” and nothingelse. –
“What? Doesn’t that mean, to use a popular idiom: God is refuted butthe devil is not – ?” On the contrary! On the contrary , my friends! And
who the devil is forcing you to use popular idioms! –
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This is what has finally happened, in the bright light of more recent times,
to the French Revolution, that gruesome and (on close consideration)pointless farce: noble and enthusiastic spectators across Europe have,from a distance, interpreted their own indignations and enthusiasms intoit, and for so long and with such passion that the text has finally disappeared
under the interpretation . In the same way , a noble posterity could again
misunderstand the entire past, and in so doing, perhaps, begin to makeit tolerable to look at. – Or rather: hasn’t this happened already? weren’twe ourselves this “noble posterity”? And right now , since we’re realizingthis to be the case – hasn’t it stopped being so?
No one would consider a doctrine to be true just because it makes peoplehappy or virtuous, with the possible exception of the darling “Idealists,”who wax enthusiastic over the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, and letall sorts of colorful, clumsy , and good-natured desiderata swim through
their pond in utter confusion. Happiness and virtue are not arguments.But we like to forget (even thoughtful spirits like to forget) that being madeunhappy and evil are not counter-arguments either. Something could betrue even if it is harmful and dangerous to the highest degree. It couldeven be part of the fundamental character of existence that people withcomplete knowledge get destroyed, – so that the strength of a spirit wouldbe proportionate to how much of the “truth” he could withstand – or, toput it more clearly , to what extent he needs it to be thinned out, veiled
over, sweetened up, dumbed down, and lied about. But there is no doubtthat when it comes to discovering certain aspects of the truth, people who
are evil and unhappy are more fortunate and have a greater probabilityof success (not to mention those who are both evil and happy – a species
that the moralists don’t discuss). Perhaps harshness and cunning providemore favorable conditions for the origin of the strong, independent spiritand philosopher than that gentle, fine, yielding good nature and art oftaking things lightly that people value, and value rightly , in a scholar.Assuming first of all that we do not limit our notion of the “philosopher”
to the philosophers who write books – or put their own philosophy into
books! – One last feature for the picture of the free-spirited philosopher
Beyond Good and Evil
The Necessity of Masks
- Stendhal suggests that a good philosopher must be dry, clear, and without illusions, possessing the pragmatic clarity of a successful banker.
- Profound spirits instinctively use masks and disguises to protect their most delicate and vulnerable truths from public view.
- Shame is a resourceful force that leads individuals to obscure their acts of generosity or love with outward coarseness.
- A hidden person often uses speech as a tool for silence, intentionally encouraging a false image of themselves to circulate among friends.
- The world's shallow interpretations naturally create a mask around profound spirits, regardless of their own efforts to hide.
- Cunning and masks are not merely tools of malice but are often used to protect goodness and precious internal states.
Every profound spirit needs a mask: what’s more, a mask is constantly growing around every profound spirit, thanks to the consistently false (which is to say shallow) interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life he displays.
is provided by Stendhal; and for the sake of the German taste, I will not
overlook the chance to underscore this character – since it goes against the
German taste. “ Pour ˆ etre bon philosophe ,” says this last, great psychologist,
“il faut ˆ etre sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait fortune, a une partie
du caract` ere requis pour faire des d´ ecouvertes en philosophie, c’est-` a-dire pour
voir clair dans ce qui est .”
Everything profound loves masks; the most profound things go so far as to
hate images and likenesses. W ouldn’t just the opposite be a proper disguise
for the shame of a god? A questionable questio n: it would be odd if some
mystic hadn’t already risked something similar himself. There are events
that are so delicate that it is best to cover them up with some coarsenessand make them unrecognizable. There are acts of love and extravagantgenerosity in whose aftermath nothing is more advisable than to take astick and give the eye-witnesses a good beating: this will obscure anymemory traces. Many people are excellent at obscuring and abusing theirown memory , so they can take revenge on at least this one accessory: –shame is highly resourceful. It is not the worst things that we are the mostashamed of. Malicious cunning is not the only thing behind a mask –there is so much goodness in cunning. I could imagine that a man withsomething precious and vulnerable to hide would roll through life, roughand round like an old, green, heavy-hooped wine cask; the subtlety of hisshame will want it this way . A man with something profound in his shameencounters even his fate and delicate decisions along paths that few peoplehave ever found, paths whose existence must be concealed from his closestand most trusted friends. His mortal danger is hidden from their eyes,and so is his regained sense of confidence in life. Somebody hidden in thisway – who instinctively needs speech in order to be silent and concealed,
and is tireless in evading communication – wants and encourages a mask
of himself to wander around, in his place, through the hearts and heads ofhis friends. And even if this is not what he wants, he will eventually realizethat a mask of him has been there all the same, – and that this is for the best.
“To be a good philosopher you have to be dry , clear, and without illusions. A banker who has made
a fortune has to a certain degree the right sort of character for making philosophical discoveries,
i.e. for seeing clearly into what is.” From Stendhal’s Correspondance in´ edite (Unedited Correspon-
dence )( ).
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Every profound spirit needs a mask: what’s more, a mask is constantly
growing around every profound spirit, thanks to the consistently false(which is to say shallow ) interpretation of every word, every step, every
sign of life he displays. –
The Independence of Rare Souls
- True independence requires a constant testing of oneself to ensure one is destined for command and self-governance.
- One must avoid becoming 'stuck' to anything, including loved ones, homelands, pity, specific fields of study, or even one's own virtues.
- A new breed of philosophers is emerging, characterized as 'attempters' or 'experimenters' who embrace danger and riddles.
- These future philosophers reject dogmatism and the desire for their personal truths to be accepted or understood by the masses.
- The concept of a 'common good' is dismissed as a contradiction, as anything shared by the majority loses its inherent value.
- The highest achievements and insights are reserved exclusively for the rare and profound individuals capable of reaching them.
“Good” is no longer good when it comes from your neighbor’s mouth. And how could there ever be a “common good”! The term is self-contradictory: whatever can be common will never have much value.
W e have to test ourselves to see whether we are destined for independenceand command, and we have to do it at the right time. W e should notsidestep our tests, even though they may well be the most dangerousgame we can play , and, in the last analysis, can be witnessed by no judgeother than ourselves. Not to be stuck to any person, not even somebodywe love best – every person is a prison and a corner. Not to be stuck in
any homeland, even the neediest and most oppressed – it is not as hardto tear your heart away from a victorious homeland. Not to be stuck insome pity: even for higher men, whose rare torture and helplessness weourselves have accidentally glimpsed. Not to be stuck in some field ofstudy: however much it tempts us with priceless discoveries, reserved, itseems, for us alone. Not to be stuck in our own detachment, in the ecstasyof those foreign vistas where birds keep flying higher so that they can keepseeing more below them: – the danger of those who fly . Not to be stuck toour own virtues and let our whole self be sacrificed for some one of ourdetails, our “hospitality ,” for instance: this is the danger of dangers for
rich souls of a higher type, who spend themselves extravagantly , almostindifferently , pushing the virtue of liberality to the point of vice. W e mustknow to conserve ourselves : the greatest test of independence.
A new breed of philosophers is approaching. I will risk christening them
with a name not lacking in dangers. From what I can guess about them,from what they allow to be guessed (since it is typical of them to want to
remain riddles in some respect), these philosophers of the future mighthave the right (and perhaps also the wrong) to be described as those who
attempt .
Ultimately , this name is itself only an attempt, and, if you will,
a temptation.
In German: Versucher . Nietzsche frequently uses the terms Versuch (attempt or experiment) and
Versuchung (temptation), and plays on their similarity .
Beyond Good and Evil
Are they new friends of “truth,” these upcoming philosophers? Probably ,
since all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they certainlywill not be dogmatists. It would offend their pride, as well as their taste, iftheir truth were a truth for everyone (which has been the secret wish andhidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations so far). “My judgment is my
judgment: other people don’t have an obvious right to it too” – perhapsthis is what such a philosopher of the future will say . W e must do away withthe bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with the majority . “Good”is no longer good when it comes from your neighbor’s mouth. And howcould there ever be a “common good”! The term is self-contradictory:whatever can be common will never have much value. In the end, it has tobe as it is and has always been: great things are left for the great, abyssesfor the profound, delicacy and trembling for the subtle, and, all in all,everything rare for those who are rare themselves. –
The Philosophers of the Future
- Nietzsche distinguishes between true 'free spirits' and the 'levelers' who currently misappropriate the name in Europe and America.
- The levelers are described as slaves to democratic taste who seek universal security, safety, and the 'green pasture happiness' of the herd.
- Modern ideologies mistakenly view suffering as an evil to be abolished, whereas Nietzsche argues suffering is essential for human growth.
- Human excellence has historically flourished under conditions of danger, pressure, and harshness rather than comfort.
- The 'spirit' develops its power to invent and dissimulate only when the life-will is intensified into an unconditional power-will.
- The formula 'beyond good and evil' serves as a protective barrier to prevent these new philosophers from being confused with common freethinkers.
We think that the danger of the human condition has first had to grow to terrible heights, its power to invent and dissimulate (its “spirit” –) has had to develop under prolonged pressure and compulsion into something refined and daring.
After all this, do I really need to add that they will be free, very free
spirits, these philosophers of the future – and that they certainly will notjust be free spirits, but rather something more, higher, greater, and funda-
mentally different, something that does not want to be misunderstoodor mistaken for anything else? But, in saying this, I feel – towards themalmost as much as towards ourselves (who are their heralds and precursors,we free spirits!) – an obligation to sweep away a stupid old prejudice
and misunderstanding about all of us that has hung like a fog aroundthe concept of the “free spirit” for far too long, leaving it completely
opaque. In all the countries of Europe, and in America as well, there isnow something that abuses this name: a very narrow , restricted, chained-up type of spirit whose inclinations are pretty much the opposite of ourown intentions and instincts (not to mention the fact that this restrictedtype will be a fully shut window and bolted door with respect to theseapproaching new philosophers). In a word (but a bad one): they belong to
thelevelers , these misnamed “free spirits” – as eloquent and prolifically
scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its “modern ideas.” Theyare all people without solitude, without their own solitude, clumsy , solidfolks whose courage and honest decency cannot be denied – it’s just thatthey are un-free and ridiculously superficial, particularly given their basic
The free spirit
tendency to think that allhuman misery and wrongdoing is caused by
traditional social structures: which lands truth happily on its head! Whatthey want to strive for with all their might is the universal, green pasturehappiness of the herd, with security , safety , contentment, and an easier lifefor all. Their two most well-sung songs and doctrines are called: “equalrights” and “sympathy for all that suffers” – and they view suffering itself
as something that needs to be abolished . W e, who are quite the reverse,
have kept an eye and a conscience open to the question of where and how
the plant “man” has grown the strongest, and we think that this has alwayshappened under conditions that are quite the reverse. W e think that thedanger of the human condition has first had to grow to terrible heights,its power to invent and dissimulate (its “spirit” –) has had to developunder prolonged pressure and compulsion into something refined anddaring, its life-will has had to be intensified to an unconditional power-will. W e think that harshness, violence, slavery , danger in the streets andin the heart, concealment, Stoicism, the art of experiment,
and devilry
of every sort; that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory , andsnakelike in humanity serves just as well as its opposite to enhance thespecies “humanity .” But to say this much is to not say enough, and,in any event, this is the point we have reached with our speaking andour silence, at the other end of all modern ideology and herd desires:
perhaps as their antipodes? Is it any wonder that we “free spirits” arenot exactly the most communicative spirits? That we do not want to fullyreveal what a spirit might free himself from and what he will then perhaps
be driven towards ? And as to the dangerous formula “beyond good and
evil,” it serves to protect us, at least from being mistaken for somethingelse. W e are something different from “ libres-penseurs ,” “liberi pensatori ,”
“Freidenker ”
and whatever else all these sturdy advocates of “modern
The Hunt for Human Soul
- The 'free spirit' is defined by a restless intellectual nomadism, rejecting the comfort of prejudice, honors, and social duties to remain unattached.
- True philosophers embrace solitude and a 'cruel' curiosity, treating even their own physical ailments as tools to break free from conventional rules.
- The human soul is described as a vast, unexhausted primeval forest that serves as the 'great hunting ground' for the born psychologist.
- Scholars and traditional researchers often fail in this 'great hunt' because they lack the courage and keen instincts required when the search becomes dangerous.
- To map the history of religious conscience, one must possess both the 'monstrous' depth of a Pascal and a malicious, elevated spirituality to order such painful experiences.
- The pursuit of truth is a lonely, exhaustive labor where the seeker must eventually do everything themselves, driven by a curiosity that is both a vice and a reward.
But how often does he have to turn to himself in despair and say: 'Only one! only a single one! and this huge forest, this primeval forest!'
ideas” like to call themselves. At home in many countries of the spirit,at least as guests; repeatedly slipping away from the musty , comfortablecorners where preference and prejudice, youth, origin, accidents of peopleand books, and even the fatigue of traveling seem to have driven us; fullof malice at the lures of dependency that lie hidden in honors, or money ,or duties, or enthusiasms of the senses; grateful even for difficulties andinconstant health, because they have always freed us from some rule and
In German: Versucherkunst (see note above).
These are terms meaning “free thinker” in French, Italian, and German.
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its “prejudice,” grateful to the god, devil, sheep, and maggot in us, curious
to a fault, researchers to the point of cruelty , with unmindful fingers forthe incomprehensible, with teeth and stomachs for the indigestible, readyfor any trade that requires a quick wit and sharp senses, ready for any risk,thanks to an excess of “free will,” with front and back souls whose ultimateaim is clear to nobody , with fore- and backgrounds that no foot can fullytraverse, hidden under the cloak of light, conquerors, even if we look likeheirs and prodigals, collectors and gatherers from morning until evening,miserly with our riches and our cabinets filled to the brim, economicalwith what we learn and forget, inventive in schemata, sometimes proudof tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night owls at work,
even in bright daylight; yes, even scarecrows when the need arises – and
today the need has arisen: inasmuch as we are born, sworn, jealous friendsofsolitude , our own deepest, most midnightly , noon-likely solitude. This
is the type of people we are, we free spirits! and perhaps you are something
of this yourselves, you who are approaching? you new philosophers? –
Part The religious character
The human soul and its limits, the scope of human inner experience to
date, the heights, depths, and range of these experiences, the entire historyof the soul so far and its still unexhausted possibilities: these are the
predestined hunting grounds for a born psychologist and lover of the“great hunt.” But how often does he have to turn to himself in despairand say: “Only one! only a single one! and this huge forest, this primevalforest!” And then he wishes he had a few hundred hunting aides and well-trained bloodhounds he could drive into the history of the human soul toround up hisgame. To no avail: time and again he gets an ample and bitter
reminder of how hard it is to find hounds and helpers for the very thingsthat prick his curiosity . The problem with sending scholars into new anddangerous hunting grounds, where courage, intelligence, and subtlety inevery sense are needed, is that they stop being useful the very moment the“great hunt” (but also the great danger) begins: – this is just when they lose
their sharp eye and keen nose. For instance, it might take somebody whois himself as deep, as wounded, and as monstrous as Pascal’s intellectualconscience to figure out the sort of history that the problem of science
and conscience has had in the soul of homines religiosi
so far. And, even
then, such a person would still need that vaulting sky of bright, maliciousspirituality from whose heights this throng of dangerous and painfulexperiences could be surveyed, ordered, and forced into formulas. – Butwho would do me this service! But who would have the time to waitfor such servants! – it is clear that they grow too rarely; they are so
Religious people.
Beyond Good and Evil
unlikely in every age! In the end, you have to do everything yourself if
you want to know anything: which means you have a lot to do! – But
a curiosity like mine is still the most pleasant vice of all; – oh sorry! Imeant to say: the love of truth finds its reward in heaven and even onearth. –
The Sacrifice of Reason
- Early Christian faith was not a simple belief but a complex, 'protracted suicide of reason' that emerged in contrast to the skeptical, tolerant Roman world.
- The core of this faith is defined as a sacrifice of all freedom, pride, and self-confidence, functioning as a form of spiritual self-mutilation.
- The concept of 'god on the cross' represented a horrific paradox and a total revaluation of the values held by classical antiquity.
- Christianity served as the 'revenge of the Orient,' where the enslaved classes revolted against the noble, smiling nonchalance of their Roman masters.
- The slave mentality demands the unconditional and understands only tyranny, harboring a deep resentment toward the aristocratic skepticism of suffering.
- This historical tension between slave morality and noble taste connects the origins of Christianity to modern political upheavals like the French Revolution.
It is much closer to Pascal’s faith, which has the gruesome appearance of a protracted suicide of reason – a tough, long-lived, worm-like reason that cannot be killed all at once and with a single stroke.
The sort of faith demanded (and often achieved) by early Christianityin the middle of a skeptical, southern, free-spirited world, a world thathad century-long struggles between schools of philosophy behind andinside it, not to mention the education in tolerance given by the imperium
Romanum
– this faith is not the simple, rude, peon’s faith with which a
Luther or a Cromwell or some other northern barbarian of the spirit clungto its God and its Christianity . It is much closer to Pascal’s faith, which hasthe gruesome appearance of a protracted suicide of reason – a tough, long-lived, worm-like reason that cannot be killed all at once and with a singlestroke. From the beginning, Christian faith has been sacrifice: sacrifice ofall freedom, of all pride, of all self-confidence of the spirit; it is simultane-ously enslavement and self-derision, self-mutilation. There is cruelty andreligious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is expected of a worn-down,many-sided, badly spoiled conscience. Its presupposition is that the subju-gation of spirit causes indescribable pain , and that the entire past and all the
habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum
presented to it as “faith.”
Obtuse to all Christian terminology , modern people can no longer relateto the hideous superlative found by an ancient taste in the paradoxicalformula “god on the cross.” Nowhere to date has there been such a boldinversion or anything quite as horrible, questioning, and questionable asthis formula. It promised a revaluation of all the values of antiquity . –This was the revenge of the Orient, the deep Orient, this was the revenge
of the oriental slave on Rome with its noble and frivolous tolerance, onRoman “Catholicity” of faith. And what infuriated the slaves about andagainst their masters was never faith itself, but rather the freedom fromfaith, that half-stoic and smiling nonchalance when it came to the serious-ness of faith. Enlightenment is infuriating. Slaves want the unconditional;
Roman Empire.
Height of absurdity .
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they understand only tyranny , even in morality . They love as they hate,
without nuance, into the depths, to the point of pain and sickness – theircopious, hidden suffering makes them furious at the noble taste that seems
todeny suffering. Skepticism about suffering (which is basically just an
affectation of aristocratic morality) played no small role in the genesis ofthe last great slave revolt, which began with the French Revolution.
The Religious Neurosis
- The religious neurosis is historically linked to the dietary prescriptions of solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence.
- A recurring symptom of this condition is the violent oscillation between extreme voluptuousness and spasms of repentance.
- Schopenhauer and Wagner were both deeply preoccupied with the 'saint' as a manifestation of the negation of the will.
- The modern 'Salvation Army' is identified as a contemporary epidemic outbreak of this same religious character.
- The fascination with the saint stems from the perceived miracle of a 'bad man' suddenly transforming into a 'good man.'
- Traditional psychology fails to explain these phenomena because it is blinded by a belief in absolute moral opposites.
What? So “miracles” are just errors of interpretation? A lack of philology?
Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared so far, we find it connectedwith three dangerous dietary prescriptions: solitude, fasting, and sexualabstinence, – but without being able to say for sure which is the cause and
which is the effect and whether in fact there is a causal relation at all. This
last doubt seems justified by the fact that another one of the most regularsymptoms of the religious neurosis, in both wild and tame peoples, is themost sudden and dissipated display of voluptuousness, which then turnsjust as suddenly into spasms of repentance and negations of the worldand will: perhaps both can be interpreted as epilepsy in disguise? Buthere is where interpretation must be resisted the most: no type to datehas been surrounded by such an overgrowth of inanity and superstition;and none so far has seemed to hold more interest for people, or even forphilosophers. It might be time to calm down a bit, as far as this topic goes,to learn some caution, or even better: to look away , to go away . – This
gruesome question-mark of religious crisis and awakening still standsin the background of the newest arrival in philosophy (which is to say:the Schopenhauerian philosophy), almost as the problem in itself. How isnegation of the will possible ? How is the saint possible? This really seems to
have been the question that started Schopenhauer off and made him intoa philosopher. And so it was a true Schopenhauerian consequence that hismost devoted follower (and perhaps also his last, as far as Germany wasconcerned –), namely Richard Wagner, finished his own life’s work at thisvery point, and finally brought to the stage the life and times of that awfuland eternal type in the character of Kundry , type v´ ecu.
And, at the same
time, psychiatrists in almost every European country had the opportunityto study this type up close, wherever the religious neurosis – or, as I callit, “the religious character” – was having its latest epidemic outbreak and
A type that has lived. Kundry is a character from Wagner’s last opera, Parsifal .
Beyond Good and Evil
pageant as the “Salvation Army .” – But if someone asks what it really was
in the whole phenomenon of the saint that caused such inordinate interestamong people of all kinds in all ages, and even among philosophers, itwas undoubtedly the aura of a miracle that clung to it; it displayed theimmediate succession of opposites , of antithetically valorized moral states
of soul. It seemed palpable that here was a “bad man” turning suddenly
into a good man, a “saint.” Psychology to date has been shipwreckedon this spot. Wasn’t this primarily because it had put itself under thedominance of morality , because it actually believed in opposing moral
values, and saw , read, and interpreted these opposites into texts and into
facts? – What? So “miracles” are just errors of interpretation? A lack of
philology? –
Racial Instincts and Religious Passion
- The author contrasts the innate affinity for Catholicism in Latin races with the 'meager talent' for religion found in northern barbarian lineages.
- Skepticism in Catholic cultures is viewed as a rebellion against the racial spirit, whereas in Protestant cultures, it represents a return to a more primitive, secular state.
- French thinkers like Renan and Comte are described as possessing a refined, 'voluptuous' religious sensibility that remains alien and even offensive to the harsher German soul.
- The author critiques Protestantism as lacking 'delicatezza,' characterizing it as a naive, peasant-like passion or an oriental ecstasy of a pardoned slave.
- Ancient Greek religiosity is praised for its noble gratitude toward life, which was later corrupted by fear as the 'rabble' gained prominence and Christianity approached.
It is so elegant, so distinguished, to have your own antipodes!
The Latin races seem to have much more of an affinity to their Catholi-cism than we northerners do to Christianity in general. Consequently ,a lack of belief means something very different in Catholic countriesthan in Protestant ones. In Catholic countries it is a sort of anger against
the spirit of the race, while with us it is more like a return tothe spirit
(or un-spirit –) of the race. There is no doubt that we northerners aredescended from barbarian races, even as far as our talent for religiong o e s–i ti sa meager talent. The Celts are an exception, which is why they
also furnished the best soil for the spread of the Christian infection to thenorth: – the Christian ideal came into bloom in France, at least as far as thepale northern sun would allow . Even these recent French skeptics, howstrangely pious they strike our tastes, to the extent that there is some Celticblood in their lineage! How Catholic, how un-German Auguste Comte’s
sociology smells to us, with its Roman logic of the instincts! How Jesuit-ical Sainte-Beuve is, that amiable and intelligent cicerone of Port-Royal,in spite of all his hostility towards the Jesuits! And especially Ernest Renan:how inaccessible the language of such as Renan sounds to us northern-ers, this man with a soul that is voluptuous (in a more refined sense) andinclined to rest quite comfortably , but is always being thrown off balanceby some nothingness of religious tension! Let us repeat these beautifulsentences after him, – along with the sort of malice and arrogance thatstirs in our souls in immediate reply , souls that are probably harsher andnot nearly as beautiful, being German souls! – “ disons donc hardiment que
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la religion est un produit de l’homme normal, que l’homme est le plus dans le
vrai quand il est le plus religieux et le plus assur´ e d’une destin´ ee infinie ...C’est
quand il est bon qu’il veut que la vertu corresponde ` a un ordre ´ eternel, c’est
quand il contemple les choses d’une mani` ere d´ esint´eress´ee qu’il trouve la mort
r´evoltante et absurde. Comment ne pas supposer que c’est dans ces moments-l` a,
que l’homme voit le mieux ?...”These sentences are so utterly antipodal
to my ears and habits that when I found them, my initial rage wrote “ la
niaiserie religieuse par excellence !”next to them – until my final rage ac-
tually started to like them, these sentences whose truth is standing on itshead! It is so elegant, so distinguished, to have your own antipodes!
What is amazing about the religiosity of ancient Greeks is the excessiveamount of gratitude that flows out from it: – it takes a very noble type ofperson to face nature and life like this! – Later, when the rabble gained
prominence in Greece, religion became overgrown with fear as well, and
Christianity was on the horizon. –
The passion for God: there is the peasant type, naive and presumptu-ous – like Luther. The whole of Protestantism is devoid of any southerndelicatezza .
It has a certain oriental ecstasy , as when an undeserving slave
has been pardoned or promoted – in Augustine, for example, who is of-fensively lacking any nobility of demeanor and desire. It has a certainwomanly tenderness and lustfulness that pushes coyly and unsuspect-ingly towards a unio mystica et physica :
like Madame de Guyon. It often
appears, strangely enough, as a disguise for the puberty of some girl orboy; now and then it even appears as the hysteria of an old maid, and her
“So we strongly affirm that religion is a product of the normal man, that man is most in the right
when he is most religious and most assured of an infinite destiny ...It is when he is good that he
wants virtue to correspond to an eternal order, it is when he contemplates things in a disinterested
manner that he finds death revolting and absurd. How could we fail to suppose that these are themoments when man sees best?”
Religious silliness par excellence .
Delicacy .
Mystical and physical union.
The Saint and the Scripture
- Powerful individuals revere the saint because they recognize a shared 'will to power' reflected in the saint's extreme self-conquest and renunciation.
- The ascetic's negation of nature suggests to the powerful that he possesses secret knowledge of a great danger or a superior, alien force.
- The Old Testament is praised as a monument of 'grand style' and divine justice that surpasses the literary achievements of Greece and India.
- Nietzsche criticizes the pairing of the Old and New Testaments as a 'sin against the spirit,' contrasting the former's grandeur with the latter's 'small souls.'
- Modern atheism arises because the traditional roles of God as father, judge, and communicator have been intellectually refuted and rendered unintelligible.
- While the religious instinct remains vigorous in humanity, it now views specific theistic gratifications with profound distrust.
In front of the saint, the powerful of the world learned a new fear, they sensed a new power, an alien, still unconquered enemy: – it was the 'will to power' that made them stop in front of the saint.
Beyond Good and Evil
final ambition: – in such cases, the church often declares the woman to
be a saint.
To this day , the most powerful people have still bowed down in venera-tion before the saint, as the riddle of self-conquest and deliberate, finalrenunciation: why have they bowed down like this? They sensed a supe-rior force in the saint and, as it were, behind the question-mark of hisfrail and pathetic appearance, a force that wants to test itself through
this sort of conquest. They sensed a strength of will in which theycould recognize and honor their own strength and pleasure in domi-
nation. When they honored the saint, they honored something in them-selves. Furthermore, the sight of the saint made them suspicious: “Noone would desire such a monstrosity of negation, of anti-nature, fornothing,” they said to (and asked of) themselves. “Perhaps there is areason for it, perhaps the ascetic has inside information about some verygreat danger, thanks to his secret counselors and visitors?” Enough: infront of the saint, the powerful of the world learned a new fear, theysensed a new power, an alien, still unconquered enemy: – it was the
“will to power” that made them stop in front of the saint. They had to askhim – –
The Jewish “Old Testament,” the book of divine justice, has people,things, and speeches in such grand style that it is without parallel in thewritten works of Greece and India. W e stand in horror and awe beforethis monstrous vestige of what humanity once was, and then reflect sadlyon old Asia and its protruding little peninsula of Europe that desperatelywants (over and against Asia) to stand for the “progress of humanity .” Of
course: there will be nothing in these ruins to astonish or distress anyonewho is just a dull, tame, house pet himself, and understands only house petneeds (like educated people today , including the Christians of “educated”Christianity) – the taste for the Old Testament is a touchstone for the
“great” and the “small.” Perhaps he will still find the New Testament,
the book of mercy , more to his liking (it is full of the proper, tender,musty stench of true believers and small souls). The fact that this New
The religious character
Testament (which is a type of Rococo of taste in every respect) gets pasted
together with the Old Testament to make a single book, a “Bible,” a “bookin itself ”: this is probably the greatest piece of temerity and “sin againstthe spirit” that literary Europe has on its conscience.
Why atheism today? God “the Father” has been thoroughly refuted;and so has “the Judge” and “the Reward-giver.” The same for God’s
“free will”: he doesn’t listen, – and even if he did, he wouldn’t know how
to help anyway . The worst part of it is: he seems unable to communicatein an intelligible manner: is he unclear? – After hearing, questioning, dis-
cussing many things, these are the causes I have found for the decline ofEuropean theism. It seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed grow-ing vigorously – but that it rejects any specifically theistic gratificationwith profound distrust.
The Evolution of Religious Cruelty
- Modern philosophy acts as a covert anti-Christian movement by attempting to dismantle the concept of the soul through linguistic and epistemological critique.
- The traditional view of the 'I' as the cause of thought is being inverted, suggesting the subject is merely a synthesis produced by the activity of thinking.
- Religious history is defined by a 'ladder of cruelty' that began with the physical sacrifice of loved ones to a deity.
- The second stage of religious cruelty involved the moral sacrifice of human nature and natural instincts through asceticism.
- The final stage of this cruelty is the sacrifice of God himself, leading to the worship of nothingness, gravity, and fate.
- A truly world-affirming individual transcends Schopenhauerian pessimism by desiring the eternal recurrence of life exactly as it is.
To sacrifice God for nothingness – that paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty has been reserved for the race that is now approaching: by now we all know something about this.
So what is really going on with the whole of modern philosophy? SinceDescartes (and, in fact, in spite of him more than because of him) allthe philosophers have been out to assassinate the old concept of the soul,under the guise of critiquing the concepts of subject and predicate. In otherwords, they have been out to assassinate the fundamental presuppositionof the Christian doctrine. As a sort of epistemological skepticism, modernphilosophy is, covertly or overtly , anti-Christian (although, to state the
point for more subtle ears, by no means anti-religious). People used tobelieve in “the soul” as they believed in grammar and the grammatical
subject: people said that “I” was a condition and “think” was a predicateand conditioned – thinking is an activity , and a subject must be thought
of as its cause. Now , with admirable tenacity and cunning, people arewondering whether they can get out of this net – wondering whether the
reverse might be true: that “think” is the condition and “I” is conditioned,
in which case “I” would be a synthesis that only gets produced through
thought itself. Kant essentially wanted to prove that the subject cannot
be proven on the basis of the subject – and neither can the object. Thepossibility that the subject (and therefore “the soul”) has a merely apparent
existence might not always have been foreign to him, this thought that,
Beyond Good and Evil
in the form of the V edanta philosophy , has already arisen on earth once
before and with enormous power.
There is a great ladder of religious cruelty , and, of its many rungs, threeare the most important. People used to make human sacrifices to theirgod, perhaps even sacrificing those they loved the best – this sort of phe-nomenon can be found in the sacrifice of the firstborn (a practice sharedby all prehistoric religions), as well as in Emperor Tiberius ’ sacrifice in
the Mithras grotto on the Isle of Capri, that most gruesome of all Romananachronisms. Then, during the moral epoch of humanity , people sacri-ficed the strongest instincts they had, their “nature,” to their god; the joyofthis particular festival shines in the cruel eyes of the ascetic, that enthu-
siastic piece of “anti-nature.” Finally: what was left to be sacrificed? In theend, didn’t people have to sacrifice all comfort and hope, everything holyor healing, any faith in a hidden harmony or a future filled with justiceand bliss? Didn’t people have to sacrifice God himself and worship rocks,stupidity , gravity , fate, or nothingness out of sheer cruelty to themselves?To sacrifice God for nothingness – that paradoxical mystery of the finalcruelty has been reserved for the race that is now approaching: by nowwe all know something about this. –
Anyone like me, who has tried for a long time and with some enigmaticdesire, to think pessimism through to its depths and to deliver it fromthe half-Christian, half-German narrowness and naivet ´e with which it
has finally presented itself to this century , namely in the form of theSchopenhauerian philosophy; anyone who has ever really looked with anAsiatic and supra-Asiatic eye into and down at the most world-negatingof all possible ways of thinking – beyond good and evil, and no longer, likeSchopenhauer and the Buddha, under the spell and delusion of morality –;anyone who has done these things (and perhaps precisely bydoing these
things) will have inadvertently opened his eyes to the inverse ideal: to theideal of the most high-spirited, vital, world-affirming individual, who haslearned not just to accept and go along with what was and what is, but whowants it again just as it was and is through all eternity , insatiably shouting
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The Evolution of Religious Spirit
- The concept of 'circulus vitiosus deus' suggests a divine cycle where the individual eternally necessitates their own performance and existence.
- As human insight deepens, the world expands into a more profound space filled with new riddles, rendering previous spiritual certainties as mere practice.
- The solemn concepts of 'God' and 'sin' may eventually be viewed as trivial toys or childhood pains from the perspective of a more evolved humanity.
- A genuinely religious life requires a state of 'aristocratic idleness' and composure that is fundamentally at odds with modern industriousness.
- Modern society's pride in constant, noisy work serves as a primary education in 'un-belief' by destroying the capacity for microscopic self-examination.
Perhaps the day will come when the concepts of “God” and “sin,” which are the most solemn concepts of all and have caused the most fighting and suffering, will seem no more important to us than a child’s toy and a child’s pain seem to an old man.
da caponot just to himself but to the whole play and performance, and
not just to a performance, but rather, fundamentally , to the one who needsprecisely this performance – and makes it necessary: because again and
again he needs himself – and makes himself necessary . – – What? andthat wouldn’t be – circulus vitiosus deus ?
As humanity’s spiritual vision and insight grows stronger, the distance
and, as it were, the space that surrounds us increases as well; our worldgets more profound, and new stars, new riddles and images are constantlycoming into view . Perhaps everything the mind’s eye has used to quickenits wit and deepen its understanding was really just a chance to practice,a piece of fun, something for children and childish people. Perhaps theday will come when the concepts of “God” and “sin,” which are the most
solemn concepts of all and have caused the most fighting and suffering,will seem no more important to us than a child’s toy and a child’s painseem to an old man, – and perhaps “the old man” will then need anothertoy and another pain, – still enough of a child, an eternal child!
Has anyone really noticed the extent to which being outwardly idle orhalf-idle is necessary for a genuinely religious life (and for its favorite jobof microscopic self-examination just as much as for that tender state ofcomposure which calls itself “prayer” and is a constant readiness for the“coming of God”) ?–Im e a na n idleness with a good conscience, passed
down over the ages, through the bloodline, an idleness that is not entirelyalien to the aristocratic feeling that work is disgraceful , which is to say it
makes the soul and the body into something base. And has anyone noticedthat, consequently , it is the modern, noisy , time-consuming, self-satisfied,stupidly proud industriousness which, more than anything else, givespeople an education and preparation in “un-belief ”? For example, amongthose in Germany today who have distanced themselves from religion,
From the beginning. In musical scores, this directs the performer to return to an earlier point in
the piece and repeat what has already been played.
God as a vicious circle.
Beyond Good and Evil
I find representatives of various types and extractions of “free-thinking”;
The Modern Scholar's Indifference
- Modern industriousness has dissolved religious instinct, leaving the majority to view religion with a sense of dull amazement rather than hostility.
- The middle class and scholars prioritize business, pleasure, and civic duties, seeing no practical room for religion unless it is a state requirement.
- Scholars often view religious devotion with a sense of superior, gracious amusement, considering it a form of spiritual 'uncleanliness' they have surpassed.
- Even when history allows a scholar to feel gratitude for religion's role, they remain personally alienated from actual piety or church life.
- The scholar's tolerance is often a mask for a deep-seated naivety that treats the religious person as an inferior, lesser type of human.
- This secular indifference is characterized as a 'modern conscience' that values the busywork of ideas over the spiritual crises of the past.
Every age has its own, divine type of naiveté that other ages may envy; and how much naiveté – admirable, childish, boundlessly foolish naiveté – lies in the scholar’s belief in his own superiority.
but, above all, a majority whose industriousness has, over generations,dissolved any religious instinct, so that they no longer know what religionis good for, and only register its presence in the world with a type of dullamazement. They feel they are already busy enough, these good people,whether it is with their businesses or their pleasures, not to mention the“fatherland” and the newspapers and “familial obligations.” They do not
seem to have any time to spare for religion, particularly when it is unclearto them whether it would be a new business or a new pleasure – “sincepeople can’t possibly be going to church just to spoil a good mood,” theytell themselves. They are not enemies of religious customs; if circumstance
(or the state) requires them to take part in such customs, they do whatis required, like people tend to do –, and they do it with a patient and
unassuming earnestness, without much in the way of curiosity or unease:they just live too far apart and outside to even think they need a For orAgainst in such matters. Today , most middle-class German Protestantsare also among the ranks of the indifferent, particularly in the industriouslarge trade and transportation centers; the same is true for the majority ofindustrious scholars, and the whole university apparatus (except for thetheologians, whose presence and possibility here gives the psychologistincreasingly many and increasingly subtle riddles to resolve). People whoare devout or even just church-goers will rarely imagine how much goodwill
(or may be “whimsical will”) is required for a German scholar to take the
problem of religion seriously . On the basis of his whole craft (and, asmentioned before, on the basis of the craftsman-like industriousness hismodern conscience commits him to), he tends to regard religion with an airof superior, almost gracious amusement, which is sometimes mixed with aslight contempt for what he assumes to be an “uncleanliness” of spirit thatexists wherever anyone still supports the church. Only with the help ofhistory (and therefore noton the basis of his personal experience) does the
scholar succeed in approaching religion with a reverential seriousness anda certain cautious consideration. But even if he reaches the point wherehe feels grateful for religion, he does not come a single step closer to whatstill passes for church or piety: possibly even the reverse. The practicalindifference towards religious matters with which he was born and raisedtends, in his case, to be sublimated into a caution and cleanliness that shunscontact with religious people and religious affairs; and it can be the verydepth of his tolerance and humanity that urges him to evade the subtle
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crises intrinsic to toleration itself. – Every age has its own, divine type
of naivet ´e that other ages may envy; and how much naivet ´e – admirable,
childish, boundlessly foolish naivet ´e – lies in the scholar’s belief in his
own superiority , in the good conscience he has of his tolerance, in theclueless, simple certainty with which he instinctively treats the religiousman as an inferior, lesser type, something that he himself has grown outof, away from, and above , – he, who is himself a presumptuous little dwarf
and rabble-man, a brisk and busy brain- and handiworker of “ideas,” of“modern ideas”!
The Wisdom of Superficiality
- Human superficiality and the worship of pure forms are often self-preservation instincts developed by those who have suffered from looking too deeply into the truth.
- Piety and religious life are described as subtle falsifications of reality, serving as a defense mechanism against an incurable pessimism.
- The love of humanity for the sake of God is viewed as the most noble yet bizarre achievement of human feeling, providing a 'sanctifying motive' for existence.
- Philosophers and 'free spirits' can utilize religion as a tool for the breeding, education, and governance of humanity.
- For the strong and predestined rulers, religion serves as a means to bind the consciences of the ruled and overcome resistance to authority.
- Religion provides a sanctuary for noble, contemplative spirits to remain pure and calm amidst the 'necessary dirt' of politics and cruder governance.
Perhaps there is even an order of rank for these wounded children, the born artists, who find pleasure in life only by intending to falsify its image, in a sort of prolonged revenge against life –.
Anyone who has looked deeply into the world will probably guess thewisdom that lies in human superficiality . An instinct of preservation hastaught people to be flighty , light, and false. W e occasionally find bothphilosophers and artists engaging in a passionate and exaggerated worshipof “pure forms.” Let there be no doubt that anyone who needs the cult
of the surface this badly has at some point reached beneath the surface
with disastrous results. Perhaps there is even an order of rank for thesewounded children, the born artists, who find pleasure in life only byintending to falsify its image, in a sort of prolonged revenge against life –.
W e can infer the degree to which life has been spoiled for them fromthe extent to which they want to see its image distorted, diluted, deified,and cast into the beyond – considered as artists, the homines religiosi
would belong to the highest rank. Entire millennia sink their teeth into a
religious interpretation of existence, driven by a deep, suspicious fear ofan incurable pessimism; this fear comes from an instinct which senses thatwe could get hold of the truth too soon , before people have become strong
enough, hard enough, artistic enough ...Seen in this light, piety – the
“life in God” – appears as the last and most subtle monstrosity producedbyfear of the truth; it appears as the artists’ worship and intoxication
before the most consistent of all falsifications, as the will to invert thetruth, the will to untruth at any price. Perhaps piety has been the mostpotent method yet for the beautification of humanity: it can turn peopleinto art, surface, plays of colors, benevolence, and to such an extent thatwe can finally look at them without suffering. –
Religious people.
Beyond Good and Evil
To love humanity for the sake of God – that has been the noblest and most
bizarre feeling people have attained so far. That the love of humanity , inthe absence of any sanctifying ulterior motive, is one more stupidity and
abomination; that the tendency to love humanity like this can only getits standard, its subtlety , its grain of salt and pinch of ambergris from a
higher tendency: – whoever it was that first felt and “experienced” allthis, however much his tongue might have stumbled as it tried to expresssuch a tenderness, let him be forever holy and admirable to us as the manwho has flown the highest so far and has got the most beautifully lost!
The philosopher as weunderstand him, we free spirits –, as the man
with the most comprehensive respo nsibility , whose conscience bears the
weight of the overall development of humanity , this philosopher will make
use of religion for his breeding and education work, just as he will make useof the prevailing political and economic situation. The influence that canbe exerted over selection and breeding with the help of religions (and thisinfluence is always just as destructive as it is creative and formative) variesaccording to the type of person who falls under their spell and protec-tion. For people who are strong, independent, prepared, and predestinedfor command, people who come to embody the reason and art of a gov-erning race, religion is an additional means of overcoming resistances,of being able to rule. It binds the ruler together with the ruled, givingand handing the consciences of the ruled over to the rulers – which is tosay: handing over their hidden and most interior aspect, and one whichwould very much like to escape obedience. And if individuals from sucha noble lineage are inclined, by their high spirituality , towards a retiringand contemplative life, reserving for themselves only the finest sorts ofrule (over exceptional young men or monks), then religion can even beused as a means of securing calm in the face of the turmoil and tribu-lations of the cruder forms of government, and purity in the face of the
necessary dirt of politics. This is how the Brahmins, for instance, un-
The Utility of Religion
- Religion serves as a tool for the ruling class to appoint kings while maintaining a position of 'over-kingly' spiritual authority.
- For the ascending class, religious practices like asceticism and Puritanism provide the self-control and discipline necessary to rise above their origins.
- For the common majority, religion offers a sense of contentment and justification for their lowly status and 'half-bestial' existence.
- Christianity and Buddhism are noted for their ability to make the suffering of the lowliest bearable by placing them in an 'illusory higher order.'
- A significant danger arises when religion becomes sovereign and an end in itself, rather than a tool for breeding and education used by philosophers.
- The text notes that in the human species, failures and degenerates are the norm, while successful or 'nobly bred' types are rare exceptions.
Religion, and the meaning religion gives to life, spreads sunshine over such eternally tormented people and makes them bearable even to themselves.
derstood the matter. With the help of a religious organization, they as-sumed the power to appoint kings for the people, while they themselveskept and felt removed and outside, a people of higher, over-kingly tasks.
The religious character
Meanwhile, religion also gives some fraction of the ruled the instruction
and opportunity they need to prepare for eventual rule and command.This is particularly true for that slowly ascending class and station inwhich, through fortunate marriage practices, the strength and joy of thewill, the will to self-control is always on the rise. Religion tempts and urgesthem to take the path to higher spirituality and try out feelings of greatself-overcoming, of silence, and of solitude. Asceticism and Puritanismare almost indispensable means of educating and ennobling a race thatwants to gain control over its origins among the rabble, and work its wayup to eventual rule. Finally , as for the common people, the great majority ,who exist and are only allowed to exist to serve and to be of general
utility , religion gives them an invaluable sense of contentment with theirsituation and type; it puts their hearts greatly at ease, it glorifies theirobedience, it gives them (and those like them) one more happiness and onemore sorrow , it transfigures and improves them, it provides somethingof a justification for everything commonplace, for all the lowliness, forthe whole half-bestial poverty of their souls. Religion, and the meaningreligion gives to life, spreads sunshine over such eternally tormentedpeople and makes them bearable even to themselves. It has the sameeffect that an Epicurean philosophy usually has on the suffering of higherranks: it refreshes, refines, and makes the most of suffering, as it were.
In the end it even sanctifies and justifies. Perhaps there is nothing morevenerable about Christianity and Buddhism than their art of teachingeven the lowliest to use piety in order to situate themselves in an illusoryhigher order of things, and in so doing stay satisfied with the actual order,in which their lives are hard enough (in which precisely this hardness isnecessary!).
Finally , to show the downside of these religions as well and throw lighton their uncanny dangers: there is a high and horrible price to pay whenreligions do notserve as means for breeding and education in the hands of
a philosopher, but instead serve themselves and become sovereign , when
they want to be the ultimate goal instead of a means alongside other means.With humans as with every other type of animal, there is a surplus of fail-ures and degenerates, of the diseased and infirm, of those who necessarilysuffer. Even with humans, successful cases are always the exception and,
Beyond Good and Evil
since humans are the still undetermined animals , the infrequent exception.
But it gets worse: people who represent more nobly bred types are lesslikely to turn out well . Chance, that law of nonsense in the overall economy
The Deterioration of Man
- Religions of suffering preserve the weak and the failures at the expense of the higher types of humanity.
- By granting rights to those who 'suffer life like a disease,' religion makes all other healthy instincts seem wrong.
- Christianity has historically inverted natural values, turning strength, beauty, and earthly dominion into sources of guilt.
- The preservation of the sick and suffering is viewed as a systematic deterioration of the European race.
- The church's ultimate goal was to merge the concept of 'higher man' with the 'unworldly' and 'unsensuous' ascetic.
- The author views the Christian transformation of humanity as a 'sublime abortion' and a disastrous form of arrogance.
Doesn’t it seem as if, for eighteen centuries, Europe was dominated by the single will to turn humanity into a sublime abortion?
of mankind, is most terribly apparent in its destructive effect on the highermen, whose conditions of life are subtle, multiple, and difficult to calcu-late. So how is this surplus of failures treated by the two greatest religions,
those mentioned above? They try to preserve, to keep everything livingthat can be kept in any way alive. In fact, they take sides with the failuresas a matter of principle, as religions of the suffering . They give rights to
all those who suffer life like a disease, and they want to make every otherfeeling for life seem wrong and become impossible. Whatever merit wemight find in this indulgent, preserving care, which was and is meant for
the highest types of people (since these are the ones that, historically , have
almost always suffered the most), along with everyone else – nevertheless,in the final analysis, the religions that have existed so far (which have allbeen sovereign ) have played a principal role in keeping the type “man” on
a lower level. They have preserved too much of what should be destroyed .
They have done invaluable service, these religions, and who is so richlyendowed with gratitude not to grow poor in the face of everything that, forinstance, the “spiritual men” of Christianity have done for Europe so far!
And yet, after they gave comfort to the suffering, courage to the oppressedand despairing, a staff and support to the dependent, after they found peo-ple who were inwardly destroyed or had grown wild and lured them awayfrom society , into cloisters and spiritual prisons: what else did they haveto do, to work in good conscience and conviction for the preservationof all the sick and suffering, which really means working in word andin deed for the deterioration of the European race ? Stand all valuations on
their head –that is what they had to do! And crush the strong, strike down
the great hopes, throw suspicion on the delight in beauty , skew every-thing self-satisfied, manly , conquering, domineering, every instinct thatbelongs to the highest and best-turned-out type of “human,” twist theminto uncertainty , crisis of conscience, self-destruction; at the limit, invertthe whole love of the earth and of earthly dominion into hatred againstearth and the earthly – that is the task the church set and needed to set
for itself until, in its estimation, “unworldly ,” “unsensuous,” and “higherman” finally melted together into a single feeling. If you could survey thestrangely painful, crude yet subtle comedy of European Christianity withthe mocking and disinterested eye of an Epicurean god, I think you would
The religious character
find it to be a constant source of amazement and laughter. Doesn’t it seem
as if, for eighteen centuries, Europe was dominated by the single will toturn humanity into a sublime abortion? But if somebody with opposite
needs were to approach the almost willful degeneration and atrophy ofhumanity that the Christian European (Pascal for instance) has become,somebody whose manner is no longer Epicurean, but has instead somedivine hammer in hand; wouldn’t he have to yell out in rage, in pity , inhorror: “Oh you fools, you presumptuous, pitying fools, what have youdone here! Was that work meant for your hands! Look how you’ve wreckedand ruined my most beautiful stone! Who gave you the right to do such
a thing!” – What I mean is: Christianity has been the most disastrousform of arrogance so far. People who were not high and hard enough togive human beings artistic form; people who were not strong or far-sighted
enough, who lacked the sublime self-discipline to give free reign to the
Epigrams and Entr’actes
- Nietzsche critiques the 'herd animal' mentality of modern Europeans, arguing that egalitarian religious values have bred a mediocre and sickly population.
- The pursuit of knowledge is framed as a moral snare and a process of overcoming shame rather than a purely objective or charming endeavor.
- Human psychology is explored through the tension between memory and pride, where pride often forces memory to yield to a more favorable self-image.
- The author suggests that character dictates the repetition of experiences and that the duration, rather than the intensity, of high feelings defines greatness.
- Gender dynamics are characterized by fundamental misunderstandings caused by differing emotional tempos and the interplay between charm and hatred.
- Internal conflict is highlighted by the observation that warlike individuals in peaceful times will inevitably turn their aggression upon themselves.
“I did that” says my memory. I couldn’t have done that – says my pride, and stands its ground. Finally, memory gives in.
foreground law of ruin and failure by the thousands; people who were notnoble enough to see the abysmally different orders of rank and chasmsin rank between different people. People like this, with their “equality
before God” have prevailed over the fate of Europe so far, until a stunted,
almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something well-meaning, sickly ,and mediocre has finally been bred: the European of today ...
Part Epigrams and entr’actes
Genuine teachers only take things seriously where their students are con-
cerned – even themselves.
“Knowledge for its own sake” – this is the final snare morality has laid;with it, we become completely entangled in morals once again.
Knowledge would have little charm if there were not so much shame tobe overcome in order to reach it.
a
People are at their least honest when it comes to their God: he is not
allowed to sin!
The tendency to let oneself be debased, robbed, lied to, and exploited
could be the shame of a god among men.
It is barbaric to love one thing alone, since this one love will be pursuedat the expense of all others. This includes love of God.
Epigrams and entr’actes
“I did that” says my memory . I couldn’t have done that – says my pride,
and stands its ground. Finally , memory gives in.
Y ou have been a poor observer of life if you have not also seen the handthat, ever so gently – kills.
If you have character, you also have a typical experience that always comesback.
The sage as astronomer. – If you still experience the stars as something“over you,” you still don’t have the eyes of a knower.
It is not the strength but the duration of high feelings that makes for highmen.
Precisely by attaining an ideal, we surpass it.
a
Many peacocks hide their peacock tails – and call that their pride.
A man with genius is insufferable if he doesn’t have at least two more
things: gratitude and cleanliness.
Beyond Good and Evil
The degree and type of a person’s sexuality reaches up into the further-
most peaks of their spirit.
In peaceful conditions, the warlike man will attack himself.
People use their principles to try to tyrannize or justify or honor or insultor conceal their habits: – two people with the same principles will probablywant utterly different things from them.
Anyone who despises himself will still respect himself as a despiser.
A soul that knows it is loved but does not itself love exposes its sediment: –its bottom-most aspect rises to the top.
An issue that has been resolved stops mattering to us. – What did that
godwho counseled “Know yourself !” really mean? Was it perhaps: “Stop
letting anything matter to you! Become objective!” – And Socrates? – Andthe “scientific man”? –
It is terrible to die of thirst in the ocean. So do you have to salt your truthto the point where it doesn’t quench thirst anymore?
“Pity for all” – would be harshness and tyranny for you, my dear
neighbor! –
Apollo.
Epigrams and entr’actes
Instinct . – When your house is on fire, you even forget about lunch. – Y es,
but you pick it out from the ashes.
W omen learn how to hate in the same proportion that they unlearn how
to charm.
The same affects have different tempos in men and in women: that is whymen and women do not stop misunderstanding each other.
Behind all their personal vanity , women always have an impersonal con-tempt – for “woman.”
Bound heart, free spirit . – If someone binds up his heart and takes it captive,
he can give his spirit considerable freedom: I have said this once already .But nobody will believe me if they do not already know ...
Y ou start to mistrust very clever people when they get embarrassed.
Terrible experiences make you wonder if the people who have experienced
them are not terrible themselves.
Epigrams and Entr’actes
- Nietzsche redefines human maturity as the recovery of the intense seriousness a child applies to play.
- He argues that there are no moral phenomena in themselves, only moral interpretations of various phenomena.
- The text explores the paradoxes of character, suggesting that a strong character requires an occasional 'will to stupidity' to ignore objections once a decision is made.
- He critiques the nature of love and vanity, noting that requited love can diminish the beloved's value and that wounded pride often intensifies vanity.
- The author suggests that personal growth involves the courage to reconceive one's 'evils' as their best qualities.
- He observes that the will to overcome a specific emotion is merely the expression of a different, competing emotion.
Human maturity: this means rediscovering the seriousness we had towards play when we were children.
Love and hate, the very things that weigh other people down, will makeheavy , heavy-hearted people lighter and momentarily superficial.
Beyond Good and Evil
So icy cold you burn your finger on him! Every hand that touches him
gets a shock! – and that is why many people think he glows.
Who, for the sake of his good name, has never – sacrificed himself ? –
There is no hatred for mankind in affability which, for that very reason,contains all too great a contempt for mankind.
Human maturity: this means rediscovering the seriousness we had towardsplay when we were children.
To be ashamed of your immorality: that is a step on the stairway thatultimately leads you to be ashamed of your morality as well.
People should leave life like Odysseus left Nausicaa – with more blessingsthan ardor.
What? A great man? I can only see an actor of his own ideal.
When we discipline our conscience, it kisses us while it bites.
Disappointment speaks. – “I listened for an echo and heard only praise – ”
Epigrams and entr’actes
W e all pretend to ourselves that we are more naive than we are: this is how
we relax from other people.
Today , someone with knowledge might well feel like God becominganimal.
When somebody discovers their love is requited, it really should tempertheir feelings for their beloved. “What? This person is unassuming enoughto love even you? Or stupid enough? Or – or – ”
Danger in happiness. – “Now everything is at its best, now I love everyfate: – who wants to be my fate?”
It is not their love for humanity but rather the impotence of their love forhumanity that keeps today’s Christian from – burning us.
For free spirits, for the “pious men of knowledge” – the pia frausoffends
taste (offends their “piety”) more than the impia fraus .This explains
their profound failure to understand the church, which is typical of “freespirits” – as their un-freedom.
Music allows the passions to enjoy themselves.
Pious fraud.
Impious fraud.
Beyond Good and Evil
Whenever you reach a decision, close your ears to even the best objections:
this is the sign of a strong character. Which means: an occasional will tostupidity .
There are absolutely no moral phenomena, only a moral interpreta tion of
the phenomena ...
Often enough the criminal is no match for his deed: he cheapens and
slanders it.
Defenders of criminals are rarely artistic enough to use the beautifulhorror of the deed to the advantage of the doer.
Our vanity is at its strongest precisely when our pride has been wounded.
Whoever feels himself predestined for seeing and not believing will findall believers too noisy and pushy: he will fend them off.
“Y ou want him for yourself ? Stand in front of him looking embarrassed – ”
Any sense of perspective is ruined for women from the very start by enor-mous expectations about sexual love and by the shame these expectationsbring.
Epigrams and entr’actes
Where neither love nor hate are in play , woman is a mediocre player.
The great epochs of our lives come when we gather the courage to recon-
ceive our evils as what is best in us.
The will to overcome an affect is, in the end, itself only the will of another,or several other, affects.
There is an innocence in admiration: it is found in people who do notrealize that they themselves might also be admired some day .
Disgust at filth can be so great that it prevents us from cleaning ourselves –
from “justifying” ourselves.
Sensuality often hurries the growth of love so that the root stays weak andis easy to tear up.
It is subtle that God learned Greek when he wanted to become a writer –and that he did not learn it better.
Taking pleasure in praise is, for many , only a courtesy of the heart – which
is quite the reverse of a vanity of the spirit.
Beyond Good and Evil
Epigrams on Human Nature
- Nietzsche explores the deceptive nature of talent and virtue, suggesting that talent often serves as a 'hiding place' for a person's true character.
- The text posits that human perception is inherently creative and subjective, claiming we 'invent' the people we interact with much like we do in dreams.
- A cynical view of gender relations is presented, arguing that the sexes primarily love their own ideals rather than the reality of the other.
- The author suggests that truth and credibility are rooted in the senses, and that abstract truths require sensory seduction to be understood.
- The passage contains famous psychological warnings, most notably regarding the corrupting influence of fighting 'monsters' and the reciprocal nature of the 'abyss.'
- Social and moral structures are framed as biological or instinctual outcomes, where even vanity and physical needs dictate the limits of human divinity.
Whoever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not become one himself. And when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you.
Even concubinage gets corrupted: – by marriage.
If someone rejoices while burning at the stake it is not because he has
triumphed over his pain, but rather over not feeling any pain when heexpected to. A parable.
When we are forced to change our mind about somebody , we count againsthim the trouble he has put us to.
A people is nature’s roundabout way of getting six or seven great men. –Y es: and then of getting around them.
All proper women find something shameful about science. They think itis too forward, as if it would let people peek under their skin – or worse!under their dress and finery .
The more abstract the truth you want to teach, the more you have toseduce the senses to it.
The devil has the broadest perspective on God, which is why he keepsso far away from God: – the devil, that is, as the oldest friend of know-
ledge.
Epigrams and entr’actes
What someone isbegins to reveal itself when his talent diminishes – when
he stops showing what he can do. So talent is also a piece of finery; and
finery is also a hiding place.
The sexes deceive themselves about each other: which means they basi-cally only love and honor themselves (or their own ideal, to say it morenicely – ). So men would have it that women are placid – but women
above all are essentially not placid, just like cats, however much they have
rehearsed the appearance of placidity .
W e are best punished for our virtues.
Someone who does not know how to find the path to hisideal lives more
carelessly and impudently than someone without an ideal.
All credibility , good conscience, and evidence of truth first come from thesenses.
Pharisaism is not a degeneration in good people: rather, a good part of itis the condition of any being good.
The first one looks for a midwife for his thoughts – the other, for someone
he can help: this is how a good conversation begins.
Beyond Good and Evil
In dealing with scholars and artists, people are easily led in the wrong
direction: behind a remarkable scholar you will not infrequently find amediocre person, and behind a mediocre artist quite often – someone
really remarkable.
When we are awake we do the same thing as when we are dreaming: wefirst invent and create the people we are dealing with – and then forget itimmediately .
In revenge and in love, woman is more barbaric than man.
Advice as riddle . “ – If the bond does not split, – then it first must be bit.”
The abdomen is the reason why people are not so quick to consider
themselves gods.
The chastest saying I ever have heard: “ Dans le v´ eritable amour c’est l’ˆ ame
qui enveloppe le corps .”
Our vanity would have it that the things we do best are the very things
that are most difficult for us. On the origin of many morals.
“In true love, it is the soul that envelops the body .”
Epigrams and entr’actes
When a woman has scholarly inclinations, there is usually something
wrong with her sexuality . Even sterility makes her prone to a certainmasculinity of taste; man is, if you will, “the sterile animal.”
Comparing man and woman overall, you could say: woman would not
have a genius for finery if she did not have an instinct for the secondary
role.
Whoever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not becomeone himself. And when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyssstares back into you.
From old Florentine novellas: but also – from life: buona femmina e mala
femmina vuol bastone .Sacchetti, Nov . .
To seduce those nearest to you into a good opinion, and then credit the
credibility of this opinion: who can equal women in this piece of art? –
Epigrams and Entr’actes
- Nietzsche explores the psychological underpinnings of morality, suggesting that actions performed out of love exist outside the traditional binary of good and evil.
- He posits that madness is an anomaly in individuals but a standard characteristic of collective groups, parties, and historical eras.
- The text critiques the 'unconditional' as a form of pathology, championing mockery, mistrust, and skepticism as indicators of intellectual health.
- Human relationships and social dynamics are analyzed through the lens of vanity, where we only find the vanity of others offensive when it clashes with our own.
- He suggests that Christianity corrupted natural desire by treating it as a vice, and that we ultimately love our own desires rather than the objects of those desires.
- The concept of truth is challenged by the observation that the face often reveals the truth that the mouth attempts to hide through lies.
Madness is rare in the individual – but with groups, parties, peoples, and ages it is the rule.
What an age perceives as evil is usually an untimely after-effect ofsomething that used to be perceived as good – the atavism of an olderideal.
“Both good and bad women need the stick.” From Franco Sacchetti, Novelle (written in the late
fourteenth century , but published in ).
Beyond Good and Evil
Around the hero everything turns into tragedy; around the demigod
everything turns into a satyr play; and around God everything turnsinto – what? Perhaps “world”? –
It is not enough to have a talent: we also need to have your permission forit, – right? my friends?
“Paradise is wherever the tree of knowledge stands”: that is what the
oldest and youngest serpents say .
Whatever is done out of love takes place beyond good and evil.
Objections, minor infidelities, cheerful mistrust, a delight in mockery –
these are symptoms of health. Everything unconditional belongs topathology .
A sense for the tragic grows and declines along with sensuousness.
Madness is rare in the individual – but with groups, parties, peoples, and
ages it is the rule.
The thought of suicide is a strong means of comfort: it helps get usthrough many an evil night.
Epigrams and entr’actes
Our strongest drives, the tyrants in us, subjugate not only our reason but
our conscience as well.
Wehave to repay good and bad: but why do we have to repay precisely
those people who did us the good or bad?
Y ou do not love your knowledge enough anymore, as soon as you com-municate it.
Poets are shameless with their experiences: they exploit them.
“Our ‘neighbors’are not the ones next door to us, but rather the ones
next door to them ” – this is what all peoples believe.
Love brings to light the high and the hidden qualities of the lover – what is
rare and exceptional about him: to this extent, love easily misleads abouthis ordinary traits.
Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for servants, – love God as I do, ashis son! Why should we care about morals, we sons of God?” –
In German: Unser N¨ achster . This means “neighbor” in the Biblical sense, which Nietzsche is
contrasting with Nachbar (the ones next door), a more general term for “neighbor.”
Beyond Good and Evil
Regarding all parties . – A shepherd always needs another bellwether, – or
sometimes he has to be the wether himself.
Lies come through our mouths – but the face that accompanies them tellsthe truth.
With hard people, intimacy is a source of shame – and something precious.
Christianity gave Eros poison to drink: – he did not die from it, butdegenerated into a vice.
Talking frequently about yourself can also be a way of hiding.
There is more intrusiveness in praise than in censure.
Pity is almost laughable in a man of knowledge, like tender hands on aCyclops.
Every once in a while, a love of humanity will inspire us to embracesome arbitrary person (because we cannot embrace everyone): but that isprecisely what we cannot let the arbitrary person know ...
Epigrams and entr’actes
W e do not hate what we accord little value, but only what we consider
equal or superior.
Y ou utilitarians, even you love everything utileonly as a vehicle for your
inclinations, – and even you really cannot stand the noise of its wheels?
In the end, we love our desires and not the thing desired.
Other people’s vanity offends our taste only when it offends our vanity .
Perhaps nobody has ever been truthful enough about what “truthfulness”
is.
No one believes in the stupidities of clever people: what a loss of humanrights!
The consequences of our acts grab us by the hair, regardless of the factthat we have “improved” ourselves in the meantime.
There is an innocence in lying that is the sign of good faith in a cause.
Useful.
Beyond Good and Evil
It is inhuman to bless where you are cursed.
The Problem of Morality
- Nietzsche argues that the 'science of morals' is currently crude and clumsy compared to the refined and subtle nature of moral sentiment itself.
- Philosophers have historically failed by attempting to 'ground' morality rather than treating it as a subject for description and typology.
- The 'grounding of morals' is often just a sophisticated way of expressing faith in the dominant morality of one's own time and place.
- A true science of morals requires the collection and comparison of many different moralities across history and cultures.
- By assuming morality is 'given,' philosophers have missed the actual problem of morality, which requires dissection and interrogation rather than justification.
- Schopenhauer is cited as an example of the 'admirable innocence' of philosophers who believe there is a universal moral principle to be discovered.
As strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been missing from every “science of morals” so far: there was no suspicion that anything was really a problem.
The confidences of our superiors enrage us because they cannot be recip-
rocated. –
“I’m not upset because you lied to me, I’m upset because I don’t believe
you any more.” –
Goodness has a high-spiritedness that looks like malice.
“I dislike him.” – Why? – “I’m no match for him.” – Has anyone evergiven this sort of an answer?
Part On the natural history of morals
In Europe these days, moral sentiment is just as refined, late, multiple,
sensitive, and subtle as the “science of morals” (which belongs with it)is young, neophyte, clumsy , and crude: – an attractive contrast, and onethat occasionally becomes visible, embodied in the person of the moralisthimself. Considering what it signifies, the very phrase “science of morals”is much too arrogant and offends good taste, which always tends to prefer
more modest terms. W e should admit to ourselves with all due sever-ity exactly what will be necessary for a long time to come and what is
provisionally correct, namely: collecting material, formulating concepts,and putting into order the tremendous realm of tender value feelings andvalue distinctions that live, grow , reproduce, and are destroyed, – and,perhaps, attempting to illustrate the recurring and more frequent shapesof this living crystallization, – all of which would be a preparation for atypology of morals. Of course, people have not generally been this modest.
Philosophers have all demanded (with ridiculously stubborn seriousness)something much more exalted, ambitious, and solemn as soon as theytook up morality as a science: they wanted morality to be grounded ,–
and every philosopher so far has thought that he has provided a groundfor morality . Morality itself, however, was thought to be “given.” Whata distance between this sort of crass pride and that supposedly modestlittle descriptive project, left in rot and ruin, even though the subtlesthands and senses could hardly be subtle enough for it. Precisely becausemoral philosophers had only a crude knowledge of moral facta , selected
arbitrarily and abbreviated at random – for instance, as the morality of
Beyond Good and Evil
their surroundings, their class, their church, their Zeitgeist ,their climate
and region, – precisely because they were poorly informed (and not par-ticularly eager to learn more) about peoples, ages, and histories, theycompletely missed out on the genuine problems involved in morality ,problems that only emerge from a comparison of many different morali-
ties. As strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has beenmissing from every “science of morals” so far: there was no suspicion
that anything was really a problem. Viewed properly , the “grounding ofmorals” (as philosophers called it, as they demanded it of themselves) wasonly an erudite form of good faith in the dominant morality , a new way
ofexpressing it; as such, it was itself already situated within the terms of
a certain morality . In the last analysis, it even constitutes a type of denialthat these morals can be regarded as a problem. But, in any event, it is the
opposite of an examination, dissection, interrogation, vivisection of pre-cisely this article of faith. For example, let us listen to the almost admirableinnocence with which even Schopenhauer describes his own project, andthen we can draw our conclusions as to how scientific a “science” could
be when its ultimate masters are still talking like children or old women.“The principle,” he says (p. of the Grundprobleme der Moral ), “the
fundamental claim, on whose content all ethicists actually agree: neminem
laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva
– this is actually the claim that
all moralists attempt to ground ...theactual foundation of ethics that
people have sought for millennia, just as they have looked for the philoso-phers’ stone.”
– The difficulty involved in grounding the claim just cited
Morality as Sign Language
- Nietzsche critiques Schopenhauer's supposed pessimism, pointing out the contradiction between negating the world and affirming a 'harm no one' morality.
- Moral systems are interpreted as a 'sign language of the affects,' revealing the psychological needs, desires for revenge, or self-justifications of their creators.
- Every morality acts as a form of tyranny against nature and reason, functioning through long-term compulsion rather than 'laisser-aller' or letting go.
- The constraints of morality are compared to the rigid rules of meter and rhyme in poetry, which paradoxically enable the development of strength and freedom.
- True mastery in thinking, ruling, or art only emerges through the 'tyranny of arbitrary laws' rather than through anarchic freedom.
- The value of a moral claim lies not in its objective truth, but in what it reveals about the person who feels compelled to make it.
In short, even morality is just a sign language of the affects!
might be great indeed – Schopenhauer himself came up famously shortin this regard. And anyone who has ever truly felt how inanely false andsentimental this claim is in a world whose essence is will to power –,
they might recall that Schopenhauer, pessimism notwithstanding, actu-
ally – played the flute ...every day , after dinner. Y ou can read it in his
biography . And just out of curiosity: a pessimist who negates both Godand world but stops before morality , – who affirms morality and plays
his flute, affirms laede neminem morality: excuse me? is this really – a
pessimist?
Spirit of the age.
“Harm no one, but rather help everyone as much as you can.”
Schopenhauer’s “Preisschrift ¨uber die Grundlage der Moral” (Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals),
part two of Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics )( ).
The emphases are Nietzsche’s.
On the natural history of morals
Apart from the value of claims like “there is a categorical imperative in
us,” the question remains: what do claims like this tell us about the peoplewho make them? There are moralities that are supposed to justify theircreator in the eyes of others, and other moralities that are supposed to calmhim down and allow him to be content with himself; still other moralitiesallow him to crucify and humiliate himself. He can use some moralitiesto take revenge, others to hide, and still others to transfigure himself andplace himself far and away . There are moralities that help their creator toforget, and others that let him – or something about him – be forgotten.Many moralists would like to wield power and impose their creative whimson humanity; many others (perhaps even Kant himself) want to make itclear through their morality that “the worthy thing about me is that I canobey – and it should be the same for you as it is for me!” – in short, even
morality is just a sign language of the affects !
Every morality , as opposed to laisser-aller ,is a piece of tyranny against
both “nature” and “reason.” But this in itself is no objection; for that,we would have to issue yet another decree based on some other moral-ity forbidding every sort of tyranny and unreason. What is essential andinvaluable about every morality is that it is a long compulsion. In orderto understand Stoicism or Port-Royal or Puritanism, just remember thecompulsion under which every language so far has developed strengthand freedom: the compulsion of meter, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm.Look at how much trouble the poets and the orators of every countryhave to go through! (including some of today’s prose writers, who havean inexorable conscience in their ear) – and all “for the sake of some stu-pidity ,” as utilitarian fools say (and think they are clever for saying it) – or“in obsequious submission to arbitrary laws,” as anarchists say (and thenimagine themselves “free,” even free-spirited). But the strange fact isthat everything there is, or was, of freedom, subtlety , boldness, dance, ormasterly assurance on earth, whether in thinking itself, or in ruling, or inspeaking and persuading, in artistic just as in ethical practices, has onlydeveloped by virtue of the “tyranny of such arbitrary laws.” And, in all
Letting go.
Beyond Good and Evil
The Discipline of Spirit
- True artistic inspiration and 'natural' states are governed by strict, subtle laws rather than a total letting go or laisser-aller.
- The essential value in life—virtue, art, and reason—is produced by long-term obedience in a single direction.
- Historical constraints like church dogma and Aristotelian logic served as a necessary 'tyranny' that bred strength and agility into the European spirit.
- Morality acts as a narrowing of perspective, teaching a 'grandiose stupidity' and limited horizons as conditions for growth.
- Nature's moral imperative is not individualistic but collective, demanding long-term obedience to prevent the deterioration of the human animal.
- The English Sunday is cited as a 'stroke of genius' that uses boredom to make industriousness more tolerable.
Slavery, in both the crude and refined senses of the term, seems to be the indispensable means of disciplining and breeding even the spirit.
seriousness, it is not at all improbable that this is what is “nature” and
“natural” – and not that laisser-aller ! Every artist knows how far removed
this feeling of letting go is from his “most natural” state, the free order-
ing, placing, disposing and shaping in the moment of “inspiration” – heknows how strictly and subtly he obeys thousands of laws at this verymoment, laws that defy conceptual formulation precisely because of theirhardness and determinateness (compared with these laws, there is some-thing floundering, multiple, and ambiguous about even the most solidconcept –). I will say it again: what seems to be essential “in heaven andon earth” is that there be obedience in one direction for a long time. In
the long term, this always brings and has brought about something that
makes life on earth worth living – for instance: virtue, art, music, dance,reason, intellect – something that transfigures, something refined, fantas-
tic, and divine. The long un-freedom of spirit, the mistrustful constraintin the communicability of thought, the discipline that thinkers imposedon themselves, thinking within certain guidelines imposed by the churchor court or Aristotelian presuppositions, the long, spiritual will to in-terpret every event according to a Christian scheme and to rediscoverand justify the Christian God in every chance event, – all this violence,arbitrariness, harshness, terror, and anti-reason has shown itself to bethe means through which strength, reckless curiosity , and subtle agilityhave been bred into the European spirit. Admittedly , this also entailedan irreplaceable loss of force and spirit, which have had to be crushed,stifled, and ruined (since here, just like everywhere else, “nature,” showsitself in its utterly wasteful and indifferent glory , which is outrageous but
noble). The fact that, for thousands of years, European thinkers havebeen thinking only in order to prove something (these days it is the otherway around: we are suspicious of any thinker who “has something toprove”) – the fact that the results which were supposed to emerge from
their most intense contemplations were in fact already firmly established(somewhat like earlier Asian astrology or even the present-day innocuousChristian-moral interpretation of the most personal events “to the gloryof god” and “to save the soul”): – this tyranny , this arbitrariness, this stern
and grandiose stupidity has trained the spirit. Slavery , in both the crude
and refined senses of the term, seems to be the indispensable means ofdisciplining and breeding even the spirit. W e can look at every moralityin the following way: whatever “nature” it contains teaches us to hatethelaisser-aller , the all-too-great freedom, and plants in us the need for
On the natural history of morals
limited horizons and the closest tasks. It teaches a narrowing ofperspective
and so, in a certain sense, stupidity as a condition for life and growth.“Y ou should obey someone, anyone, and for a long time: or else you
will deteriorate and lose all respect for yourself ” – this seems to me tobe the moral imperative of nature, which is clearly neither “categorical,”as the old Kant demanded it to be (hence the “or else” –), nor directed tothe individual (what does nature care about the individual!), but rather topeoples, races, ages, classes, and above all to the whole “human” animal,tothehuman.
The industrious races find it extremely difficult to tolerate idleness: it was
a stroke of genius on the part of the English instinct to spend Sundays in
tedium with a te deum so that the English people would unconsciously
Instinct, Reason, and Moral Fasting
- The author argues that periods of 'moral fasting' or compulsion are necessary to sharpen human drives and prevent them from becoming dull through constant indulgence.
- Christianity is presented as a period of forced restraint that paradoxically allowed the sex drive to sublimate into the refined concept of romantic love.
- Plato's adoption of Socratism is viewed as a mismatch, where a noble mind attempted to elevate a 'rabble' philosophy based on utility and the avoidance of harm.
- The core of utilitarian morality is traced back to the simplistic assumption that 'bad' is merely 'stupid' or 'unpleasant' rather than a matter of character.
- The tension between instinct and reason is identified as the fundamental moral problem, personified by Socrates' struggle to justify his own intuitive actions through dialectic.
Plato at the front, Plato at the back, Chimaera in the middle.
lust for their week- and workdays. It is the same type of cleverly invented,cleverly interpolated period of fasting that you find all over the ancient
world (although there, as is often the case with southern peoples, it is notexactly associated with work –). There need to be many types of fasts;and wherever powerful drives and habits rule, the law-makers have to besure to put in leap days when these drives are chained up and made torelearn what hunger feels like. Entire generations or epochs, emergingin the grips of some moral fanaticism or another, seem (from a higherviewpoint) to be just such interposed periods of compulsion and fasting,the times when a drive learns to cower and submit, but also to keep itselfclean andsharp . Some philosophical sects can be interpreted in this way
as well (like the Stoa in the midst of a Hellenistic culture whose air hadbecome heavy and lascivious with the fragrance of aphrodisiacs). – Thisalso suggests an explanation for the paradox of why it was precisely duringEurope’s Christian period and only under the pressure of Christian valuejudgments that the sex drive sublimated itself into love ( amour-passion
).
There is something in Plato’s moral philosophy that does not really belong
to him, but is there in spite of him, as it were: namely , the Socratism that
Love as passion.
Beyond Good and Evil
he was really too noble for. “Nobody wants to harm himself, and there-
fore everything bad happens involuntarily . The bad man brings harm tohimself, and he would not do so if he knew badness was bad. Accordingly ,people are bad only through error; if the error is removed, they will nec-
essarily become – good.” – This type of inference stinks of the rabble , who
see only the disagreeable effects of bad actions and are in fact judging:“it is stupid to act badly ,” while assuming that “good” is identical with
“useful and pleasant.” If you start off with the assumption that this is theorigin of every utilitarian morality and then follow your nose, you willrarely go wrong. – Plato did everything he could to interpret somethingrefined and noble into his teacher’s claim: above all, himself –, him, themost daring of all interpreters, who treated the whole of Socrates just
like someone might treat a popular theme or folksong from the streets,
varying it to the point of infinity and impossibility , into all his own masksand multitudes. As a joke (and a Homeric one at that), what is the PlatonicSocrates if not:
π/rho1´oσϑε/Pi1λ ´ατων ’
/primeoπιϑ ´εν τε /Pi1λ ´ατων µ ´εσσητε X´ιµαι/rho1α .
The old theological problem of “faith” and “knowledge” – or, to be more
precise, of instinct and reason – and so, the question of whether, withrespect to the value of things, the instincts deserve more authority thanreason (reason wants some ground or “what for?”, some purpose or utilitybehind our values and actions) – this is the same old moral problemthat first emerged in the person of Socrates and divided opinions longbefore Christianity came along. Socrates of course had initially sided withreason, given the taste of his talent – that of a superior dialectician. And, inpoint of fact, didn’t he spend his whole life laughing at the shortcomingsof his clumsy , noble Athenians, who, like all noble people, were menof instinct and could never really account for why they acted the waythey did? But in the end, silently and secretly , he laughed at himselfas well; with his acute conscience and self-scrutiny , he discovered thesame difficulty and shortcoming in himself. “Why free ourselves fromthe instincts?” he asked himself; “W e should give them their fair dues,
“Plato at the front, Plato at the back, Chimaera in the middle.”
On the natural history of morals
The Artistry of Self-Deceit
- Socrates and Plato attempted to reconcile reason with instinct, creating a legacy where morality is driven by 'the herd' under the guise of rationality.
- Human cognition is fundamentally lazy, preferring to reproduce familiar images and sounds rather than exert the effort required to process new information.
- Our senses do not act as objective mirrors but as filters that greet novelty with hostility, fear, and laziness.
- Reading and perception are acts of 'guessing' where we invent the majority of our experiences based on a few arbitrary data points.
- The human condition is defined by a deep-seated habit of lying, which can be framed more 'virtuously' as an innate artistic capacity for invention.
- Social interactions are often hallucinatory, as we project complex emotions and thoughts onto the faces of others that they likely never expressed.
What all this amounts to is: we are, from the bottom up and across the ages, used to lying. Or, to put the point more virtuously, more hypocritically and, in short, more pleasantly: people are much more artistic than they think.
along with reason – we have to follow our instincts but persuade reason
to come to their aid with good motives.” This was the genuine falseness of
that great, secretive ironist; he made his conscience seem satisfied with atype of self-deceit. Basically , he had seen through to the irrationality ofmoral judgments. – Plato, who was more innocent in such matters andlacked Socrates’ plebeian craftiness, wanted to use all his strength (the
greatest strength a philosopher had ever had at his disposal!) to prove tohimself that reason and the instincts converge independently on a singlegoal, on the Good, or “God”; and, ever since Plato, all theologians andphilosophers have been on the same track. Which is to say: in mattersof morality , it has been instinct, or (as the Christians say) “faith,” or (as
I say) “the herd” that has had the upper hand so far. Descartes was anexception, as the father of rationalism (and consequently grandfather ofthe Revolution) who granted authority to reason alone. But reason is onlya tool and Descartes was superficial.
Anyone who investigates the history of a particular science will find in itsdevelopment a clue to understanding the oldest and most secret processesof all “knowledge and cognition”: there as here, rash hypotheses, fictions,
the dumb good will to “believe,” and a lack of mistrust and patiencedevelop first – our senses learn late and never fully learn to be refined,trusty , careful organs of knowledge. Given some stimulus, our eyes findit more convenient to reproduce an image that they have often producedbefore than to register what is different and new about an impression:the latter requires more strength, more “morality .” It is awkward anddifficult for the ear to hear something new; we are bad at listening tounfamiliar music. When we hear another language, we involuntarily tryto form the sounds we hear into words that sound more comfortableand familiar to us: so, for instance, German people at one point heard“arcubalista ” and made it into the word “ Armbrust .”
Even our senses greet
everything novel with reluctance and hostility; and affects like fear, love,and hate, as well as passive affects of laziness, will be dominant during
even the “simplest” processes of sensibility . – Just as little as today’s
Both words mean “crossbow .” The German term Armbrust literally means “arm-breast” and so
mimics the sound but not the sense of the Latin.
Beyond Good and Evil
reader takes in all the individual words (or especially syllables) on a page
(he catches maybe five out of twenty words and “guesses” what thesefive arbitrary words might possibly mean) – just as little do we see a tree
precisely and completely , with respect to leaves, branches, colors, andshape. W e find it so much easier to imagine an approximate tree instead.Even in the middle of the strangest experiences we do the same thing:we invent most of the experience and can barely be made not to regard
ourselves as the “inventor” of some process. – What all this amounts tois: we are, from the bottom up and across the ages, used to lying .O r ,t o
put the point more virtuously , more hypocritically and, in short, morepleasantly: people are much more artistic than they think. – In the middleof a lively conversation I will often see the other person’s face expressing
his thoughts (or the thoughts I attribute to him) with a degree of clarityand detail that far exceeds the power of my visual ability: – such subtletyof muscle movement and ocular expression must have come from my
own imagination. In all likelihood the person had an entirely differentexpression, or none at all.
Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit :but vice versa too. What we experience
The Psychology of Possession
- Our dream experiences integrate into the soul's economy, fundamentally altering our waking definitions of concepts like happiness.
- A person who dreams of effortless flight will find the poetic descriptions of 'soaring' to be too muscular, heavy, and terrestrial.
- Human diversity is defined not just by what people value, but by their specific criteria for what constitutes true ownership.
- Possession of another person ranges from mere physical access to a demand for total transparency where one is loved for their 'devilishness' as much as their goodness.
- The desire to possess a people or a person often involves a conflict between using a deceptive mask or demanding to be known for who one truly is.
- Charitable individuals often engage in a subtle deceit by reframing the recipient of their help as someone uniquely deserving or eternally grateful.
Suppose someone frequently dreams that he is flying... how could his demands for happiness not be different?
in dreams, as long as we experience it often enough, ends up belonging tothe total economy of our soul just as much as anything we have “really”experienced. Such experiences make us richer or poorer, we have oneneed more or less, and finally , in the bright light of day and even in theclearest moments when minds are wide awake, we are coddled a littleby the habits of our dreams. Suppose someone frequently dreams thathe is flying, and as soon as he starts dreaming he becomes aware of theart and ability of flight as his privilege as well as his most particular,most enviable happiness – someone like this, who thinks he can negotiateevery type of curve and corner with the slightest impulse, who knows thefeeling of an assured, divine ease, an “upwards” without tension or force, a“downwards” without condescension or abasement – without heaviness !–
how could someone with dream experiences and dream habits like thesenotsee that the word “happiness” is colored and determined differently in
his waking day too! how could his demands for happiness not be different ?
“What happened in the light goes on in the dark.”
On the natural history of morals
Compared to this “flying,” the “soaring upwards” that the poets describe
will have to be too terrestrial, muscular, violent, even too “heavy” for
him.
Human diversity is apparent not only in the variety of people’s tablesof goods – which is to say the fact that they consider different goodsworthwhile and that they disagree with each other as to the more or lessof values, the rank order of commo nly acknowledged goods: – diversity
is much more evident in what they think counts as actually owning and
possessing a good. When it comes to a woman, for instance, a more modest
person might consider disposal over her body and sexual usage as suf-ficient and satisfactory signs of possession, of ownership. Someone elsewith a more suspicious and demanding thirst for possession will see the“question-mark” here, the fact that this is only the appearance of pos-session; such a person will want to examine more closely in order to beparticularly clear as to whether the woman will give not only herself tohim, but also give up what she has or wants for the sake of him –: onlythis will count as “possession” for him. But even this would not satisfy
the mistrust and possessive desires of a third person, who asks himselfwhether the woman who gives up everything for his sake is not doing thisfor some sort of a fantasized version of him. He wants to be thoroughly(even meticulously) well known before he is able to be loved at all; hedoes not dare to let anyone figure him out –. He will not feel that he pos-sesses his beloved fully until she harbors no illusions about him, until sheloves him just as much for his devilishness and hidden inexhaustibilityas for his goodness, patience, and spirituality . Someone might want topossess a people, and he finds all the higher arts of the Cagliostro andCatilina suited to this goal. Someone else with a more subtle thirst forpossession will say to himself “one should not deceive where one wantsto possess” –. He becomes irritated and impatient at the thought that a
mask of himself rules the hearts of the people: “which is why I have toletmyself be known, and above all know myself !” Among helpful and
charitable people you typically discover that clumsy piece of deceit thatmakes somebody ready before helping him: for instance, acting as if he“deserves” help, requires precisely their help, and will prove to be deeply
grateful, devoted, and obsequious for any help they give him, – with
Beyond Good and Evil
Possession and Moral Inversion
- Charity and parenting are often driven by a desire for property and the subjection of others to one's own values.
- Institutions like the church and state view every new individual as an opportunity for a new possession.
- The Jewish people initiated a 'slave revolt in morality' by inverting traditional values, equating the poor with the holy.
- This moral inversion transformed 'the world' and sensuality into insults, creating a new and dangerous charm for life.
- Moralists often pathologize 'men of prey' and 'tropical' natures out of a timid preference for the mediocre and temperate.
- Psychology of morals functions like a language of signs, where much of the truth remains hidden or silent.
The significance of the Jewish people lies in this inversion of values (which includes using the word for “poor” as a synonym for “holy” and “friend”): the slave revolt in morality begins with the Jews.
these fantasies they treat the needy like their own property , since they
are helpful and charitable out of a desire for property . Y ou will find themjealous if you cross them while they are being charitable, or beat them to it.Parents involuntarily make children into something similar to themselves
and call it “bringing them up.” No mother doubts at the bottom of herheart that, in the child, she has given birth to a piece of property; nofather questions his right to subject the child to his own ideas and valua-
tions. In fact, there was a time (among the ancient Germans, for instance)when it seemed fair that the father should dispose of the life and deathof the newborn as he saw fit. And now it is the teacher, the social class,the priest, and the prince who, like the father, see every new person as anincontrovertible opportunity for a new possession. And it follows from
this...
The Jews – a people “born for slavery” as Tacitusand the entire ancient
world say , “the people chosen of all peoples” as they themselves say andthink – the Jews have achieved that miraculous thing, an inversion of
values, thanks to which life on earth has had a new and dangerous charmfor several millennia: – their prophets melted together “rich,” “godless,”“evil,” “violent,” “sensual” and for the first time coined an insult out of theword “world.” The significance of the Jewish people lies in this inversionof values (which includes using the word for “poor” as a synonym for“holy” and “friend”): the slave revolt in morality begins with the Jews.
Weinfer the existence of innumerable dark bodies lying close to the sun, –
ones that we will never see. Between you and me, this is a parable; anda psychologist of morals will read the entire book of the stars only as alanguage of signs and parables in which much is left silent.
Y ou utterly fail to understand beasts of prey and men of prey (like CesareBorgia), you fail to understand “nature” if you are still looking for a
Tacitus, Historiae ,V ,.
On the natural history of morals
“disease” at the heart of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and
growths, or particularly if you are looking for some innate “hell” in them –:as almost all moralists so far have done. Does it seem that moralists har-bor a hatred against tropics and primeval forests? And that they need to
discredit the “tropical man” at all cost, whether as a disease or degenera-
tion of man, or as his own hell and self-martyrdom? But why? In favor of“temperate zones?” In favor of temperate men? Of “moralists”? Of the
mediocre? – This for the chapter: “Morality as Timidity .” –
Morality as Timidity
- Individualistic morals are often just defensive recommendations for constraint based on a person's perceived level of danger.
- These moral systems act as cures or suppressants for the 'will to power' inherent in human passions and tendencies.
- The author criticizes moralities for being 'unreasonable' because they attempt to apply unconditional, generalized rules to everyone.
- Various philosophical approaches, from Stoic coldness to Spinozistic analysis, are viewed as mere cleverness mixed with stupidity.
- Religious and artistic spiritualization of affects allows passions to regain 'civil rights' only by watering them down or making them 'other-worldly'.
- The surrender to affects seen in figures like Goethe is dismissed as a luxury permitted only when there is no longer any perceived danger.
They are all baroque in form and unreasonable (because they are directed at “everyone,” because they generalize what should not be generalized); they all speak unconditionally, consider themselves unconditional.
All these morals directed at the individual person to promote what peo-ple call his “happiness” – are they anything other than recommendations
for constraint, in proportion to the degree of danger in which the in-
dividual person lives his life? or cures for his passions, his good andbad tendencies to the extent that they have will to power and want toplay master? or large or small acts of cleverness and artifice, tainted withthe stale smell of old folk-remedies and old wives’ wisdom? They areall baroque in form and unreasonable (because they are directed at “ev-eryone,” because they generalize what should not be generalized); theyall speak unconditionally , consider themselves unconditional; they areall seasoned with more than just one grain of salt – in fact, they onlybecome tolerable, and occasionally even seductive, when they learn tosmell over-spiced, dangerous, and, above all, “other-worldly .” – On anintellectual scale, all this is of little value and not even remotely “sci-entific” let alone “wise”; instead, to say it again (and again and again),it is clever, clever, clever mixed with stupid, stupid, stupid, – whetherwe are talking about that indifference and stone column coldness whichthe Stoics prescribed and applied as a cure for the feverish idiocy ofthe affects; or that no-more-laughter, no-more-tears of Spinoza, who sonaively champions the destruction of the affects through analysis andvivisection; or that method of tuning down the affects to a harmless meanwhere they might be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; or evenmorality as the enjoyment of affects, intentionally watered down andspiritualized through the symbolism of art, like music, for instance, or thelove of God and the love of men for the sake of God – since in religionthe passions regain their civil rights, provided that ...; and finally , even
that easy and high-spirited surrender to the affects taught by Hafiz and
Beyond Good and Evil
Goethe, that bold slackening of the reins, that spiritual-physical licentia
morumin the special cases of smart old eccentrics and drunks, where
there “isn’t much danger anymore.” This also for the chapter: “Moralityas Timidity .”
The Instinct of Obedience
- Human history is defined by a vast majority who obey and a small minority who command, leading to an innate, inherited need for obedience.
- This 'herd instinct' is so powerful that individuals indiscriminately accept commands from parents, laws, or public opinion to satisfy their internal drive.
- The development of humanity is hindered because the art of commanding has been sacrificed in favor of the more easily inherited instinct to follow.
- Modern European leaders suffer from a 'moral hypocrisy,' pretending they are merely servants of higher laws or the common good to soothe their guilty consciences.
- The herd man glorifies 'tame' virtues like modesty and pity, attempting to replace true commanders with representative constitutions and collective governance.
- The appearance of an absolute commander like Napoleon provides a profound sense of relief and happiness to a society burdened by the pressure of self-governance.
This need tries to satisfy itself and give its form a content, so, like a crude appetite, it indiscriminately grabs hold and accepts whatever gets screamed into its ear by some commander or another.
For as long as there have been people, there have been herds of peo-ple as well (racial groups, communities, tribes, folk, states, churches),
and a very large number of people who obey compared to relativelyfew who command. So, considering the fact that humanity has been
the best and most long-standing breeding ground for the cultivationof obedience so far, it is reasonable to suppose that the average per-son has an innate need to obey as a type of formal conscience that com-
mands: “Thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally notdo something,” in short: “Thou shalt.” This need tries to satisfy itself
and give its form a content, so, like a crude appetite, it indiscriminatelygrabs hold and accepts whatever gets screamed into its ear by some com-mander or another – a parent, teacher, the law , class prejudice, publicopinion – according to its strength, impatience, and tension. The oddly
limited character of human development – its hesitancy and lengthi-ness, its frequent regressions and reversals – is due to the fact that theherd instinct of obedience is inherited the best and at the cost of theart of commanding. If we imagine this instinct ever advancing to its fur-thest excesses, in the end there will be nobody with independence orthe ability to command; or, such people will suffer inwardly from badconsciences and need to fool themselves into thinking that they too areonly obeying before they are able to command. This is in fact the sit-uation in Europe today; I call it the moral hypocrisy of the comman-ders. They do not know how to protect themselves from their bad con-sciences except by acting like executors of older or higher commands(from their ancestors, constitution, justice system, laws, or God him-self) or even by borrowing herd maxims from the herd mentality , suchas the “first servants of the people,” or the “instruments of the common-weal.” For his part, the herd man of today’s Europe gives himself theappearance of being the only permissible type of man and glorifies those
Moral license.
On the natural history of morals
characteristics that make him tame, easy-going and useful to the herd as
the true human virtues, namely: public spirit, goodwill, consideration, in-dustry , moderation, modesty , clemency , and pity . But in those cases wherepeople think they cannot do without a leader and bellwether, they keeptrying to replace the commander with an agglomeration of clever herdmen: this is the origin of all representative constitutions, for example.What a relief it is for these European herd animals, what a deliverancefrom an increasingly intolerable pressure, when, in spite of everything,someone appears who can issue unconditional commands; the impact ofNapoleon’s appearance is the last major piece of evidence for this: – thehistory of Napoleon’s impact is practically the history of the higher hap-piness attained by this whole century in its most worthwhile people and
moments.
The Internal War of Man
- Modern individuals often possess conflicting lineages and value standards, leading to an internal state of psychological warfare.
- The 'weak' type of person seeks happiness through pacification, rest, and an end to internal conflict, often adopting Epicurean or Christian ideals.
- A 'strong' type emerges when internal conflict serves as a stimulus, resulting in masterful individuals like Caesar, Leonardo da Vinci, and Frederick II.
- In early societies, moral judgments are based solely on 'herd utility' and the preservation of the community rather than individual virtue.
- Qualities like pity and gentleness were originally considered 'extra-moral' and were often viewed with disdain if they did not serve the public good.
A man like this, of late cultures and refracted lights, will typically be a weaker person: his most basic desire is for an end to the war that he is.
In an age of disintegration where the races are mixed together, a person
will have the legacy of multiple lineages in his body , which means con-flicting (and often not merely conflicting) drives and value standards that
fight with each other and rarely leave each other alone. A man like this,of late cultures and refracted lights, will typically be a weaker person: hismost basic desire is for an end to the war that he is. His notion of happi-
ness corresponds to that of a medicine and mentality of pacification (forinstance the Epicurean or Christian); it is a notion of happiness as primar-ily rest, lack of disturbance, repletion, unity at last and the “Sabbath ofSabbaths,” to speak with the holy rhetorician Augustine, who was himselfthis sort of person. – But if conflict and war affect such a nature as onemore stimulus and goad to life –, and if genuine proficiency and finesse in
waging war with himself (which is to say: the ability to control and outwithimself) are inherited and cultivated along with his most powerful andirreconcilable drives, then what emerge are those amazing, incomprehen-sible, and unthinkable ones, those human riddles destined for victory andfor seduction; Alcibiades and Caesar are the most exquisite expressionsof this type (– and I will gladly set by their side that first European af-
ter my taste, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II), and among artists perhapsLeonardo da Vinci. They appear in exactly those ages when that weakertype, with his longing for peace, comes to the fore. These types belongtogether and derive from the same set of causes.
Beyond Good and Evil
As long as herd utility is the only utility governing moral value judgments,
as long as the preservation of the community is the only thing in view andquestions concerning immorality are limited to those things that seemto threaten the survival of the community; as long as this is the case,there cannot yet be a “morality of neighbor love.” Suppose that even
here, consideration, pity , propriety , gentleness, and reciprocity of aid arealready practiced in a small but steady way; suppose that even in this
state of society , all the drives that would later come to be called by thehonorable name of “virtues” (and, in the end, basically coincide with the
concept of “morality”) – suppose that they are already active: at this pointthey still do not belong to the realm of moral valuations at all – they arestillextra-moral . During the best days of Rome, for instance, an act done
out of pity was not called either good or evil, moral or immoral; and if itwere praised on its own, the praise would be perfectly compatible with atype of reluctant disdain as soon as it was held up against any action thatserved to promote the common good, the res publica .
Ultimately , the
Fear as Mother of Morality
- Nietzsche argues that moral valuations shift from honoring strong, dangerous drives to condemning them once a society is secure.
- Drives like daring and vindictiveness, once cultivated for group survival, are rebranded as immoral when they no longer have external outlets.
- The 'herd instinct' becomes the primary moral perspective, valuing mediocrity and the 'equalizing attitude' over individual excellence.
- High spiritedness and independence are perceived as threats to the community's self-esteem and are subsequently labeled as 'evil.'
- A society in its final stage of 'enervation' begins to sympathize with criminals, viewing the concept of punishment itself as frightening and unjust.
- Modern 'progress' is defined as the collective will to reach a state where there is absolutely nothing left to fear.
Everything that raises the individual over the herd and frightens the neighbor will henceforth be called evil; the proper, modest, unobtrusive, equalizing attitude and the mediocrity of desires acquire moral names and honors.
“love of the neighbor” is always somewhat conventional, willfully feignedand beside the point compared to fear of the neighbor . After the structure of
society seems on the whole to be established and secured against externaldangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives ofmoral valuation. Until now , in the spirit of common utility , certain strongand dangerous drives such as enterprise, daring, vindictiveness, cunning,rapacity , and a domineering spirit must have been not only honored (underdifferent names than these of course), but nurtured and cultivated (since,given the threats to the group, they were constantly needed against thecommon enemies). Now , however, since there are no more escape valvesfor these drives, they are seen as twice as dangerous and, one by one, theyare denounced as immoral and abandoned to slander. Now the oppositedrives and inclinations come into moral favor; step by step, the herdinstinct draws its conclusion. How much or how little danger there is tothe community or to equality in an opinion, in a condition or affect, in awill, in a talent, this is now the moral perspective: and fear is once againthe mother of morality . When the highest and strongest drives erupt inpassion, driving the individual up and out and far above the average, overthe depths of the herd conscience, the self-esteem of the community is
Commonwealth.
On the natural history of morals
destroyed – its faith in itself, its backbone, as it were, is broken: as a result,
these are the very drives that will be denounced and slandered the most.A high, independent spiritedness, a will to stand alone, even an excellentfaculty of reason, will be perceived as a threat. Everything that raisesthe individual over the herd and frightens the neighbor will henceforthbe called evil; the proper, modest, unobtrusive, equalizing attitude and
themediocrity of desires acquire moral names and honors. Finally , in
very peaceable circumstances there are fewer and fewer opportunitiesand less and less need to nurture an instinct for severity or hardness; andnow every severity starts disturbing the conscience, even where justice isconcerned. A high and hard nobility and self-reliance is almost offensive,
and provokes suspicion; “the lamb,” and “the sheep” even more, gainsrespect. – There is a point in the history of a society when it becomes
pathologically enervated and tenderized and it takes sides, quite honestlyand earnestly , with those who do it harm, with criminals . Punishment: that
seems somehow unjust to this society , – it certainly finds the thoughts of“punishment” and “needing to punish” both painful and frightening.“Isn’t it enough to render him unthreatening ? Why punish him as well?
Punishment is itself fearful!” – with these questions, the herd morality ,the morality of timidity , draws its final consequences. If the threat, thereason for the fear, could be totally abolished, this morality would beabolished as well: it would not be necessary any more, it would not consider
itself necessary any more! Anyone who probes the conscience of today’s
European will have to extract the very same imperative from a thousandmoral folds and hiding places, the imperative of herd timidity: “we wantthe day to come when there is nothing more to fear !” The day to come – the
will and way to that day is now called “progress” everywhere in Europe.
Let us immediately repeat what we have already said a hundred times
before, since there are no ready ears for such truths – for our truths –
these days. W e know all too well how offensive it sounds when someoneclassifies human beings as animals, without disguises or allegory; and weare considered almost sinful for constantly using expressions like “herd,”
and “herd instinct” with direct reference to people of “modern ideas.”
So what? W e cannot help ourselves, since this is where our new insightshappen to lie. Europe, we have found, has become unanimous in all major
The Morality of the Herd
- Modern European morality is defined by the dominance of the 'herd animal' instinct, which falsely claims to be the only valid form of morality.
- The democratic movement is identified as the political heir to Christianity, both serving to flatter and institutionalize herd desires.
- Anarchists, socialists, and democrats are fundamentally united by an instinctive hostility toward any social structure that recognizes special rights or hierarchies.
- This collective movement is characterized by a 'religion of pity' and an almost feminine inability to endure or witness suffering in any form.
- The obsession with communal pity and equality threatens to cast Europe into a state of 'new Buddhism,' characterized by a pervasive sensitivity and gloom.
- These groups view the community as the ultimate 'Redeemer,' seeking to abolish the concepts of master and slave in favor of an autonomous herd.
Morality in Europe these days is the morality of herd animals: – and therefore, as we understand things, it is only one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other (and especially higher) moralities are or should be possible.
Beyond Good and Evil
moral judgments; and this includes the countries under Europe’s influ-
ence. People in Europe clearly know what Socrates claimed not to know ,
and what that famous old snake once promised to teach, – people thesedays “know” what is good and evil. Now it must sound harsh and strikethe ear quite badly when we keep insisting on the following point: whatit is that claims to know here, what glorifies itself with its praise andreproach and calls itself good is the instinct of the herd animal man,which has come to the fore, gaining and continuing to gain predominanceand supremacy over the other instincts, in accordance with the growingphysiological approach and approximation whose symptom it is. Moral-
ity in Europe these days is the morality of herd animals : – and therefore,
as we understand things, it is only one type of human morality besidewhich, before which, and after which many other (and especially higher )
moralities are or should be possible. But this morality fights tooth andnail against such a “possibility” and such a “should”: it stubbornly and
ruthlessly declares “I am morality itself and nothing else is moral!” And infact, with the aid of a religion that indulged and flattered the loftiest herddesires, things have reached the point where this morality is increasinglyapparent in even political and social institutions: the democratic move-
ment is the heir to Christianity . But there are indications that the tempoof this morality is still much too slow and lethargic for those who have lesspatience, those who are sick or addicted to the above-mentioned instinct.This is attested to by the increasingly frantic howling, the increasinglyundisguised snarling of the anarchist dogs that now wander the alleywaysof European culture, in apparent opposition to the peaceable and indus-trious democrats and ideologists of revolution, and still more to the sillyphilosophasters and brotherhood enthusiasts who call themselves social-ists and want a “free society .” But, in fact, they are one and all united
in thorough and instinctive hostility towards all forms of society besidesthat of the autonomous herd (even to the point of rejecting the concepts of
“master” and “slave” – ni dieu ni maˆ ıtre
reads a socialist formula –); they
are united in their dogged opposition to any special claims, special rights,or privileges (which means, in the last analysis, that they are opposedtoany rights: since when everyone is equal, no one will need “rights”
anymore –); they are united in their mistrust of punitive justice (as if itwere a violation of those who are weaker, a wrong against the necessary
Neither God nor master.
On the natural history of morals
result of all earlier societies –); but they are likewise united in the religion
of pity , in sympathy for whatever feels, lives, suffers (down to the animaland up to “God”: – the excessive notion of “pity for God” belongs in a
democratic age –); they are all united in the cries and the impatience ofpity , in deadly hatred against suffering in general, in the almost feminineinability to sit watching, to letsuffering happen; they are united in the
way they involuntarily raise the general level of sensitivity and gloom un-der whose spell Europe seems threatened with a new Buddhism; they areunited in their faith in the morality of communal pity , as if it were morality
in itself, the height, the achieved height of humanity , the sole hope for the
future, the solace of the present, the great redemptio n of all guilt from
the past: – they are all united in their faith in the community as Redeemer ,
which is to say: in the herd, in “themselves” ...
The Revaluation of Humanity
- The author views the democratic movement as a 'mediocritization' and a diminished form of humanity rather than just a political shift.
- A new class of philosophers and commanders is required to seize the human will and redirect history away from the rule of chance and nonsense.
- The 'greatest number' and modern socialist ideals are criticized as a process of turning humans into 'stunted little animals' or perfect herd animals.
- There is a profound danger that extraordinary individuals will fail to appear or will degenerate, leading to the total stagnation of the human species.
- The author calls for a 'revaluation of values' to steel the conscience of future leaders who must bear the weight of guiding humanity's evolution.
Anyone who has ever thought this possibility through to the end knows one more disgust than other men, – and perhaps a new task as well!
W e who have a different faith –, we who consider the democratic move-
ment to be not merely an abased form of political organization, but ratheran abased (more specifically a diminished) form of humanity , a medioc-ritization and depreciation of humanity in value: where do weneed to
reach with our hopes? – Towards new philosophers , there is no alterna-
tive; towards spirits who are strong and original enough to give impetusto opposed valuations and initiate a revaluation and reversal of “eternalvalues”; towards those sent out ahead; towards the men of the future whoin the present tie the knots and gather the force that compels the will ofmillennia into new channels. To teach humanity its future as its will ,a s
dependent on a human will, to prepare for the great risk and wholesaleattempt at breeding and cultivation and so to put an end to the grue-some rule of chance and nonsense that has passed for “history” so far
(the nonsense of the “greatest number” is only its latest form): a newtype of philosopher and commander will be needed for this some day , andwhatever hidden, dreadful, or benevolent spirits have existed on earth willpale into insignificance beside the image of this type. The image of suchleaders hovers before our eyes: – may I say this out loud, you free spirits?
The conditions that would have to be partly created and partly exploitedfor them to come into being; the probable paths and trials that wouldenable a soul to grow tall and strong enough to feel the compulsion for
these tasks; a revaluation of values whose new pressure and hammer will
Beyond Good and Evil
steel a conscience and transform a heart into bronze to bear the weight
of a responsibility like this; and, on the other hand, the necessity of suchleaders, the terrible danger that they could fail to appear or simply failand degenerate – these are our real worries and dark clouds, do you know
this, you free spirits? These are the heavy , distant thoughts and stormsthat traverse the sky of our lives. There are few pains as intense as ever
having seen, guessed, or sympathized while an extraordinary person ranoff course and degenerated: but someone with an uncommon eye for theoverall danger that “humanity” itself will degenerate , someone like us, who
has recognized the outrageous contingency that has been playing gameswith the future of humanity so far – games in which no hand and not even
a “finger of God” has taken part! – someone who has sensed the disas-
ter that lies hidden in the idiotic guilelessness and credulity of “modern
ideas,” and still more in the whole of Christian-European morality: some-one like this will suffer from an unparalleled sense of alarm. In a singleglance he will comprehend everything that could be bred from humanity ,
given a favorable accumulation and intensification of forces and tasks; hewill know with all the prescience of his conscience how humanity has stillnot exhausted its greatest possibilities, and how often the type man hasalready faced mysterious decisions and new paths: – he will know evenbetter, from his most painful memories, the sorts of miserable things thatgenerally shatter, crush, sink, and turn a development of the highest rankinto a miserable affair. The total degeneration of humanity down to what
today’s socialist fools and nitwits see as their “man of the future” – as their
ideal! – this degeneration and diminution of humanity into the perfectherd animal (or, as they say , into man in a “free society”), this brutal-izing process of turning humanity into stunted little animals with equalrights and equal claims is no doubt possible ! Anyone who has ever thought
this possibility through to the end knows one more disgust than othermen, – and perhaps a new task as well! ...
Part W e scholars
The Scholar's Democratic Revolt
- The author critiques a harmful shift in the hierarchy between science and philosophy that has largely gone unnoticed.
- The scientific man's 'declaration of independence' from philosophy is framed as a subtle consequence of democratic social trends.
- Science, having recently escaped its role as the 'handmaiden' of theology, now seeks to dominate and dictate laws to philosophy.
- Specialists and 'pigeon-hole dwellers' often resist the synthetic and holistic tasks inherent to philosophical work.
- The scholar's self-glorification is described as a 'rabble instinct' that rejects all masters in favor of a naive and arrogant autonomy.
- Diligent scientific workers often resent the perceived leisure and 'noble opulence' of the philosopher's inner life.
The scientific man’s declaration of independence, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the more subtle effects of the democratic way of life (and death).
At the risk that moralizing will prove once again to be what it always was
(namely , an undismayed montrer ses plaies ,in the words of Balzac), I will
dare to speak out against an inappropriate and harmful shift in the rankorder between science and philosophy; this shift has gone completely un-noticed and now threatens to settle in with what looks like the clearest ofconsciences. I mean: people need to speak from experience (and experience
always seems to mean bad experience, doesn’t it?) when it comes to suchlofty questions of rank, or else they are like blind people talking aboutcolors or like women and artists speaking out against science (“Oh, this
awful science,” their instincts and shame will sigh, “it always gets to thebottom of things!” –). The scientific man’s declaration of independence,
his emancipation from philosophy , is one of the more subtle effects of thedemocratic way of life (and death): this self-glorification and presumptu-ousness of the scholar is in the full bloom of spring, flowering everywhereyou look, – which isn’t to say that this self-importance has a pleasant smell.“ Away with all masters!” – that’s what the rabble instinct wants, even here.And now that science has been so utterly successful in fending off theol-ogy , after having been its “handmaiden” for far too long, it is so high inspirits and low on sense that it wants to lay down laws for philosophy and,for once, play at being “master” – what am I saying! play at being philoso-
pher . My memory (the memory of a scientific man, if you will!) is teeming
with the arrogantly naive comments about philosophy and philosophersthat I have heard from young natural scientists and old physicians (not to
“Showing one’s wounds.”
Beyond Good and Evil
mention from the most erudite and conceited scholars of all, the philol-
ogists and schoolmen, who are both by profession –). Sometimes it wasthe specialists and the pigeon-hole dwellers who instinctively resistedall synthetic tasks and skills; at other times it was the diligent workerswho smelled the otium
and the noble opulence of the philosopher’s psy-
The Decline of Philosophy
- Young scholars often devalue philosophy due to a utilitarian mindset that views it as a wasteful expenditure of effort.
- Arrogant dismissals of the field frequently stem from the lingering influence of a single philosopher's personal grudges against others.
- Schopenhauer's 'unintelligent ranting' against Hegel is cited as a primary cause for a generation of Germans breaking ties with their own cultural heritage.
- The rise of 'philosophers of reality' and positivists has damaged the field's reputation, as these figures are seen as mere specialists who have surrendered to the dominance of science.
- Modern philosophy has shrunk into a timid 'epistemology' or doctrine of abstinence that lacks the authority to lead or dominate.
- The thriving 'good conscience' of science stands in stark contrast to the agony and exhaustion of contemporary philosophical thought.
A philosophy reduced to 'epistemology,' which is really no more than a timid epochism and doctrine of abstinence; a philosophy that does not even get over the threshold and scrupulously denies itself the right of entry – that is a philosophy in its last gasps, an end, an agony, something to be pitied.
chic economy and consequently felt themselves restricted and belittled.Sometimes it was that color-blindness of utilitarian-minded people whoconsidered philosophy to be just a series of refuted systems and a waste-
ful expenditure that never did anybody “any good.” Sometimes a fear ofdisguised mysticism and changes to the limits of knowledge sprang up; atother times, there was disdain for particular philosophers that had unwit-tingly become a disdain for philosophy in general. In the end, I have foundthat what usually lies behind young scholars’ arrogant devalorizations ofphilosophy is the nasty after-effect of some philosopher himself. Thesescholars had, for the most part, stopped listening to this philosopher, butwithout having emerged from under the spell of his dismissive valuationsof other philosophers: – and this resulted in a generalized ill will againstall philosophy . (The after-affects of Schopenhauer on Germany in themost recent past seem to me an example of this sort of thing: – with hisunintelligent ranting against Hegel, he has caused the whole of the lastgeneration of Germans to break off its ties to German culture, a culturethat, all things considered, represented a supreme and divinatory refine-ment of the historical sense . But Schopenhauer was himself impoverished,
insensitive, un-German to the point of genius on precisely this point.)Looking at the overall picture, the damage done to the respectability ofphilosophy might be primarily due to the human, all-too-human, and,in short, miserable condition of more recent philosophy itself, which has
held open the door to the rabble instinct. W e have to admit the degreeto which our modern world has departed from the whole Heraclitean,Platonic, Empedoclean type (or whatever names all these princely andmagnificent hermits of the spirit might have had); and with what justicea worthy man of science can feel that he is of a better type and a bet-
ter lineage, given the sort of representatives of philosophy who, thanksto current fashions, are just as much talked up these days as they arewashed up (in Germany , for instance, the two lions of Berlin: the anar-chist Eugen D ¨uhring and the amalgamist Eduard von Hartmann). And
Leisure.
We scholars
especially those hodgepodge philosophers who call themselves “philoso-
phers of reality” or “positivists” – just the sight of them is enough to
instill a dangerous mistrust in the soul of an ambitious young scholar.They are, at best, scholars and specialists themselves – you can just feelit! They have all been defeated but then brought back under the domi-
nation of science; they had wanted something more of themselves at one
time (without any right to this “more” and its responsibility) – and now ,in word and in deed, they respectably , wrathfully , vengefully represent askepticism concerning philosophy’s master task and authority . In the end:
how could it be any other way! Science is thriving these days, its goodconscience shines in its face; meanwhile whatever state recent philosophyhas gradually sunk to, whatever is left of philosophy today , inspires mis-trust and displeasure, if not ridicule and pity . A philosophy reduced to“epistemology ,” which is really no more than a timid epochism and doc-trine of abstinence; a philosophy that does not even get over the thresholdand scrupulously denies itself the right of entry – that is a philosophy in
its last gasps, an end, an agony , something to be pitied. How could such aphilosophy – dominate ?
There are so many different kinds of dangers involved in the development
The Philosopher vs The Scholar
- The modern expansion of scientific knowledge has become so vast that potential philosophers often exhaust themselves in specialization before reaching intellectual maturity.
- A true philosopher must reach a vantage point to look down upon life, yet many arrive too late, with faded strength or a degenerate perspective.
- The philosopher's unique burden is the requirement to pass judgment on the value of life itself, rather than merely collecting scientific data.
- Public perception often confuses the philosopher with the 'wise' man who avoids conflict, whereas the real philosopher constantly risks himself in the 'rough game' of existence.
- Nietzsche distinguishes the 'scientific man' or scholar as an industrious, ignoble type who lacks the creative, procreative power of the genius.
- The scholar is compared to an 'old maid,' respectable and moderate but fundamentally incapable of the authoritative and self-sufficient acts that define higher humanity.
But the real philosopher lives 'unphilosophically,' 'unwisely,' in a manner which is above all not clever, and feels the weight and duty of a hundred experiments and temptations of life: – he constantly puts himself at risk, he plays the rough game ...
of a philosopher these days that it can be doubted whether this fruit is stillcapable of ripening at all. The height and width of the tower of science havegrown to be so monstrously vast that the philosopher is that much morelikely to become exhausted before he has even finished his education, orto let himself grab hold of something and “specialize.” And so he is never
at his best, never reaches a high point in his development from which hewould be able to look over, look around, and look down . Or he gets there
too late, when he is already past his prime and his strength has startedto fade; or he gets there disabled, having become coarse and degenerate,so that his gaze, his overall value judgment is largely meaningless. Per-haps the very refinement of his intellectual conscience lets him hesitateand be slowed down while underway; he is afraid of being seduced intobecoming a dilettante, a millipede with a thousand feet and a thousandfeelers; he knows too well that someone who has lost his self-respect willno longer command or lead , even in the field of knowledge: unless he wants
to become a great actor, a philosophical Cagliostro and rabble-rouser of
Beyond Good and Evil
spirits, in short, a seducer. In the end, this is a question of taste, even if
it is not a question of conscience. And just to double the philosopher’sdifficulties again, there is the additional fact that he demands a judgmentof himself, a Y es or a No, not about science but about life and the valueof life. It is only with reluctance that he comes to believe he has a rightor even a duty to render this sort of a judgment, and he has to draw onthe most wide-ranging (and perhaps the most disturbing and destructive)experiences so that he can look – hesitantly , skeptically , silently – for apath to this right and this belief. In fact, the masses have misjudged andmistaken the philosopher for a long time, sometimes confusing him withthe scientific man and ideal scholar, and sometimes with the religiously
elevated, desensualized, desecularized enthusiasts and intoxicated men
of God. If you hear anyone praised these days for living “wisely” or “like
a philosopher” it basically just means he is “clever and keeps out of the
way .” To the rabble, wisdom seems like a kind of escape, a device or trickfor pulling yourself out of the game when things get rough. But the realphilosopher (and isn’t this how it seems to us, my friends?) lives “un-
philosophically ,” “unwisely ,” in a manner which is above all not clever ,
and feels the weight and duty of a hundred experiments and temptations
of life: – he constantly puts himself at risk, he plays therough game ...
Compared to a genius, which is to say: compared to a being that either
begets orgives birth (taking both words in their widest scope –), the scholar,
the average man of science, is somewhat like an old maid. Like her, he hasno expertise in the two most valuable acts performed by humanity . And,as a sort of compensation, both the scholar and the old maid are admittedto be respectable – respectability is always emphasized – although in both
cases we are annoyed by the obligatory nature of this admission. Letus look more closely: what is the scientific man? In the first place, heis an ignoble type of person with the virtues that an ignoble type willhave: this type is not dominant, authoritative, or self-sufficient. He isindustrious, he is patiently lined up in an orderly array , he is regularand moderate in his abilities and needs, he has an instinct for his ownkind and for the needs of his kind. These needs include: that piece of
In German: Versuchen und Versuchungen (see note ,p .above).
We scholars
independence and green pasture without which there is no quiet for him
The Scholar as Mirror
- The scholar relies on external recognition and a good reputation to overcome an inherent inner mistrust common to dependent types.
- A scholar's instinct for mediocrity often manifests as a 'Jesuitism of mediocrity' that seeks to unbend and neutralize exceptional individuals through pity.
- The objective man is characterized as a tool or a mirror rather than an end in himself, existing solely to reflect what is placed before him.
- This process of 'desubjectivization' leads to a loss of personality, where the individual becomes a mere passageway for external events and shapes.
- The objective spirit is often unable to address its own suffering or basic needs because it has lost the capacity for serious self-engagement.
- Nietzsche warns against celebrating the depersonification of the spirit as a form of redemption, viewing it instead as a functional but limited state.
The worst and most dangerous thing that a scholar is capable of doing comes from his type’s instinct for mediocrity: from that Jesuitism of mediocrity that instinctively works towards the annihilation of the exceptional man and tries to break every taut bow.
to work in, that claim to honor and acknowledgment (whose first andforemost presupposition is recognition and being recognizable –), thatsunshine of a good name, that constant seal on his value and his utilitywhich is needed, time and again, in order to overcome the inner mistrust
that lies at the bottom of the heart of all dependent men and herd animals.It is only fair that the scholar has the diseases and bad habits of an ignobletype as well. He is full of petty jealousies and has eyes like a hawk for thebase aspects of natures whose heights he cannot attain. He is friendly , butonly like someone who lets himself go without letting himself really flow
out; and just when he is standing in front of people who really do flow
out, he will act all the more cold and reserved, – at times like this, his
eye is like a smooth and unwilling lake that will no longer allow a singleripple of joy or sympathy . The worst and most dangerous thing that ascholar is capable of doing comes from his type’s instinct for mediocrity:from that Jesuitism of mediocrity that instinctively works towards theannihilation of the exceptional man and tries to break every taut bowor – even better! – to unbend it. Unbending it with consideration, and, of
course, a gentle hand –, unbending it with friendly pity: that is the true art
of Jesuitism, which has always known how to introduce itself as a religionof pity . –
However gratefully we might approach the objective spirit – and who hasn’t
been sick to death at least once of everything subjective, with its damnedipsissimosity !
– nevertheless, in the end we even have to be cautious of our
gratitude, and put an end to the exaggerated terms in which people haverecently been celebrating the desubjectivization and depersonification ofspirit, as if this were some sort of goal in itself, some sort of redemption ortransfiguration. This kind of thing tends to happen within the pessimistschool, which has reasons of its own for regarding “disinterested know-ing” with the greatest respect. The objective man who no longer swearsor complains like the pessimist does, the ideal scholar who expresses the
scientific instinct as it finally blossoms and blooms all the way (after thingshave gone partly or wholly wrong a thousand times over) – he is certainly
Nietzsche’s coinage from the Latin “ ipsissima ” meaning “very own.”
Beyond Good and Evil
one of the most expensive tools there is: but he belongs in the hands of
someone more powerful. He is only a tool, we will say: he is a mirror ,–h e
is not an “end in himself.” The objective man is really a mirror: he is usedto subordinating himself in front of anything that wants to be known,without any other pleasure than that of knowing, of “mirroring forth.”He waits until something comes along and then spreads himself gentlytowards it, so that even light footsteps and the passing by of a ghostlybeing are not lost on his surface and skin. He has so thoroughly becomea passageway and reflection of strange shapes and events, that whateveris left in him of a “person” strikes him as accidental, often arbitrary , andstill more often as disruptive. It takes an effort for him to think back on“himself,” and he is not infrequently mistaken when he does. He easily
confuses himself with others, he is wrong about his own basic needs, and
this is the only respect in which he is crude and careless. Maybe his healthis making him suffer, or the pettiness and provincial airs of a wife or afriend, or the lack of companions and company , – all right then, he makeshimself think about his sufferings: but to no avail! His thoughts have al-ready wandered off, towards more general issues, and by the next day he
does not know how to help himself any more than he knew the day before.He has lost any serious engagement with the issue as well as the time tospend on it: he is cheerful, not for lack of needs but for lack of hands to
grasp hisneediness. The obliging manner in which he typically approaches
The Objective Scholar's Limits
- The objective person acts as a mirror, smoothing themselves out to reflect everything without the capacity to truly affirm or negate.
- While the scholar possesses a 'thoughtless goodwill,' their attempts at deep passion like love or hate often appear artificial, fragile, and forced.
- The objective spirit is defined as a tool or a sublime 'piece of slave' rather than a goal, a beginning, or a self-supporting force of nature.
- Lacking internal substance or the desire to dominate, the objective man is a 'pot of forms' waiting for external content to give him shape.
- Modern society views the rejection of skepticism with fear, treating it as a dangerous 'dynamite of the spirit' or a violent negation of life.
- Skepticism is currently utilized as a sedative or 'poppy flower' to soothe the anxiety caused by those who would actually act on their will.
The objective person is a tool, an expensive measuring instrument and piece of mirror art that is easily injured and spoiled and should be honored and protected; but he is not a goal, not a departure or a fresh start.
things and experiences, the sunny and natural hospitality with which heaccepts everything that comes at him, his type of thoughtless goodwill,of dangerous lack of concern for Y eses and Noes: oh, there are plenty oftimes when he has to pay for these virtues of his! – and being human, he
all too easily becomes the caput mortuum
of these virtues. If you want him
to love or hate (I mean love and hate as a god, woman, or animal wouldunderstand the terms –) he will do what he can and give what he can. Butdo not be surprised if it is not much, – if this is where he comes across
as fake, fragile, questionable, and brittle. His love is forced, his hatredartificial and more like un tour de force , a little piece of vanity and exagger-
ation. He is sincere only to the extent that he is allowed to be objective:he is “nature” and “natural” only in his cheerful totality . His mirror-like
soul is forever smoothing itself out; it does not know how to affirm ornegate any more. He does not command; and neither does he destroy .
W orthless residue.
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“Je ne m´ eprise presque rien ,”he says with Leibniz: that presque should not
be overlooked or underestimated! He is no paragon of humanity; he doesnot go in front of anyone or behind. In general, he puts himself at toogreat a distance to have any basis for choosing between good or evil. Ifpeople have mistaken him for a philosopher for so long, for a Caesar-like
man who cultivates and breeds, for the brutal man of culture – then theyhave paid him much too high an honor and overlooked what is mostessential about him, – he is a tool, a piece of slave (although, without adoubt, the most sublime type of slave) but nothing in himself, – presque
rien ! The objective person is a tool, an expensive measuring instrument
and piece of mirror art that is easily injured and spoiled and should behonored and protected; but he is not a goal, not a departure or a fresh start,he is not the sort of complementary person in which the rest of existence
justifies itself. He is not a conclusion – and still less a beginning, begetteror first cause; there is nothing tough, powerful or self-supporting thatwants to dominate. Rather, he is only a gentle, brushed-off, refined, agilepot of forms, who first has to wait for some sort of content or substancein order “to shape” himself accordingly , – he is generally a man without
substance or content, a “selfless” man. And consequently , in parenthesi ,
nothing for women. –
When a philosopher these days makes it known that he is not a skep-tic, – and I hope that this could be detected in the account of the objective
spirit just given – everyone gets upset. People look at him apprehensively ,they have so many questions, questions ...in fact, frightened eavesdrop-
pers (and there are crowds of them these days) will begin to considerhim dangerous. It is as if they could hear, in his rejection of skepticism,some sort of evil and ominous sound in the distance, as if a new explosivewere being tested somewhere, a dynamite of the spirit, perhaps a newlydiscovered Russian nihiline ,
a pessimism bonae voluntatisthat does not
justsay No or will No, but – the very thought is terrible! – does N o .I ti s
generally acknowledged nowadays that no tranquilizer or sedative works
“I despise almost nothing.” In lines that follow , presque means “almost” and presque rien means
“almost nothing.”
A neologism coined from “nihilism.”
Of goodwill.
Beyond Good and Evil
better against this type of “goodwill ” – a will to the actual, violent nega-
tion of life – than skepticism, the soft, sweet, soothing, poppy flower of
skepticism; and even Hamlet is prescribed by physicians today as a pro-
Skepticism and Paralysis of Will
- The skeptic is characterized by a fear of decisive action and a moral aversion to the definitive 'Yes' or 'No'.
- Skepticism is presented as a physiological condition of 'weak nerves' resulting from the rapid interbreeding of diverse races and classes.
- This biological mixing leads to a lack of internal balance and a center of gravity, causing virtues to inhibit rather than strengthen one another.
- The most profound symptom of this condition is the paralysis of the will and the loss of independence in decision-making.
- Modern European values like 'objectivity' and 'pure knowing' are often merely decorative masks for this underlying disease of the will.
- The intensity of this skepticism varies across Europe, appearing most dominant in long-established cultures and fading where 'barbarian' traits persist.
Paralysis of the will: where won’t you find this cripple today? And often how nicely dressed! How seductively dressed!
tection against “spirit” and its underground rumblings. “ Aren’t people’sears already filled with enough bad sounds?” the skeptic asks, being a
friend of peace and almost a type of security police: “This subterraneanNo is awful! Be quiet already , you pessimistic moles!” Which is to say: theskeptic, that gentle creature, is all too easily frightened. His consciencehas been trained to jump at every no, or even at a decisive and hardenedyes, and to feel it like a bite. Y es! and No! – this is contrary to morality , as
far as he is concerned. Conversely , he loves to treat his virtues to a feast ofnoble abstinence, when, for instance, he says, with Montaigne: “What do I
know?” Or with Socrates: “I know that I don’t know anything.” Or “I don’ttrust myself here, there aren’t any doors open to me.” Or: “Even if onewere open, why go in right away!” Or: “What good are rash hypotheses?It might very well be good taste not to formulate any hypotheses at all.When something is crooked, do you people really need to straighten itright away? or plug something into every hole? Isn’t there plenty of timefor that? Doesn’t time have plenty of time? Oh, you fiends, why can’t you
justwait a while? Even uncertainty has its charms, even the Sphinx is a
Circe, even Circe was a philosopher.” – This is how a skeptic comfortshimself; and it is true that he needs some comfort. Skepticism is the mostspiritual expression of a certain complex physiological condition which inlayman’s terms is called weak nerves or a sickly constitution. It originateswhenever races or classes that have been separated for a long time aresuddenly and decisively interbred. The different standards and values,as it were, get passed down through the bloodline to the next generationwhere everything is in a state of restlessness, disorder, doubt, experimen-tation. The best forces have inhibitory effects, the virtues themselves donot let each other strengthen and grow , both body and soul lack a cen-ter of balance, a center of gravity and the assurance of a pendulum. Butwhat is most profoundly sick and degenerate about such hybrids is thewill : they no longer have any sense of independence in decision-making,
or the bold feeling of pleasure in willing, – they doubt whether there is“freedom of will,” even in their dreams. Our contemporary Europe, thesite of an absurdly sudden experiment in the radical mixing of classes andconsequently of races, is therefore skeptical from its heights to its depths,
sometimes with that agile kind of skepticism that leaps impatiently and
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licentiously from one branch to another; at other times it is gloomy like
a cloud overloaded with question-marks – and often sick to death of itswill! Paralysis of the will: where won’t you find this cripple today? And
often how nicely dressed! How seductively dressed! This illness has theprettiest fancy-dress clothes and liar’s outfits. And most of what presentsitself in the shop windows these days as “objectivity ,” for instance, or
“scientificity ,” “ l’art pour l’art ,”
or “pure, will-less knowing,” is only
dressed-up skepticism and paralysis of the will, – I will vouch for thisdiagnosis of the European disease. – The disease of the will has spreadunevenly across Europe. It appears greatest and most varied where theculture has been at home for the longest period of time; and it becomesincreasingly faint to the extent that “the barbarian” still – or once again –
asserts his rights under the sagging robes of occidental cultivation. This
The Crisis of European Will
- France represents the peak of European skepticism and a 'sick' will, transforming its spiritual decline into a seductive cultural showcase.
- The strength of will varies across the continent, appearing stronger in Germany, England, and Spain, while Italy remains too young to define its desires.
- Russia possesses the most formidable and threatening store of will, currently waiting in a state of potential discharge between negation and affirmation.
- The author dismisses 'parliamentary nonsense' and democratic fragmentation as weaknesses that threaten to dissolve European power into petty provincialism.
- A call is made for a new ruling caste to emerge in Europe, possessing a 'long, terrible will' capable of setting goals that span millennia.
- The era of petty politics is ending, giving way to a century defined by a struggle for global domination and the necessity of 'great politics'.
The time for petty politics is over: the next century will bring the struggle for the domination of the earth – the compulsion to great politics.
is why the will is most sick in present-day France, a fact which can be
logically concluded as easily as it can be palpably felt. France has alwayshad the brilliant historical sense to turn even disastrous changes of itsspirit into something charming and seductive. Now , it clearly indicatesits culturally dominant position within Europe by being the school andshowcase for all the magic spells of skepticism. The strength to will and,in fact, a will to will at length, is somewhat more vigorous in Germany ,and stronger in the north of Germany than in the center. It is consider-ably stronger in England, Spain, and Corsica; in one place it is bound upwith apathy , in another, with hard heads, – not to mention Italy , which
is too young to know what it wants, and which first needs to prove thatitcan will –. But it is the strongest of all and the most amazing in that
vast intermediary zone where Europe, as it were, flows back into Asia: inRussia. There, the strength to will has been laid aside and stored up overa long time; there, the will is waiting threateningly (uncertain whether asa will of negation or of affirmation), to be discharged (to borrow a favoriteterm from today’s physicists). More than just Indian wars and Asian in-trigues might be needed to relieve Europe of its greatest danger – inner
rebellions might be needed as well, the dispersion of the empire into smallbodies, and, above all, the introduction of parliamentary nonsense, addedto which would be the requirement that every man read his newspaperover breakfast. This is not something I am hoping for. I would preferthe opposite, – I mean the sort of increase in the threat Russia poses that
“ Art for art’s sake.”
Beyond Good and Evil
would force Europe into choosing to become equally threatening and,
specifically , to acquire a single will by means of a new caste that would
rule over Europe, a long, terrible will of its own, that could give itselfmillennia-long goals: – so that the long, spun-out comedy of Europe’spetty provincialism and its dynastic as well as democratic fragmentationof the will could finally come to an end. The time for petty politics isover: the next century will bring the struggle for the domination of theearth – the compulsion to great politics.
The extent to which the new , warlike age that we Europeans have obvi-
ously entered into may , perhaps, also be favorable to the development ofanother, stronger type of skepticism – for the time being, I would like torestrict my remarks on this matter to a parable that the friends of Germanhistory will already understand. That completely unscrupulous devoteeof tall, handsome grenadiers who, as king of Prussia, brought a militaryand skeptical genius into being (and with it, fundamentally , that new typeof German which is only now approaching in triumph), the questionable,mad father of Frederick the Great,
had the grasp and lucky claw of a
The Masculine German Skepticism
- Frederick William I feared his son lacked the 'manhood' required for leadership, mistaking Frederick the Great's early intellectualism for a weak, French-influenced skepticism.
- A new, more dangerous form of skepticism emerged in Frederick the Great: a 'bold masculinity' that undermines and appropriates rather than simply doubting.
- This 'Frederickian' skepticism is characterized by a severe heart and a dangerous freedom of spirit, closely linked to a genius for war and conquest.
- German philologists and historians have used this masculine skepticism to place Europe under the dominion of the German spirit through critical and historical mistrust.
- This evolution has replaced the old image of Germans as 'weak-willed, poetic fools' with a fatalistic and ironical spirit that even surprised Napoleon.
- The German spirit is now defined by an intrepid gaze and a 'tenacious will to dangerous voyages of discovery' in the spiritual and intellectual realms.
He saw that enormous bloodsucker, the spider of skepticism, in the background, and he suspected the incurable misery of a heart that was no longer hard enough for evil or for good.
genius too, although on one point only: he knew what was missing inGermany in those days, and which lack was a hundred times more urgentand anxiety-provoking than the lack of something like education or socialdecorum, – his dislike for young Frederick came from the anguish of a
profound instinct. Men were lacking ; and he suspected, to his most bit-
ter distress, that his own son was not man enough. He was wrong aboutthis, but who wouldn’t have been wrong in his place? He saw his sonfalling prey to atheism, esprit , and the entertaining, happy-go-lucky spirit
of clever Frenchmen: he saw that enormous bloodsucker, the spider ofskepticism, in the background, and he suspected the incurable misery of aheart that was no longer hard enough for evil or for good, of a shattered willthat no longer commanded, that was no longer able to command. Mean-
while, however, a harsher and more dangerous new type of skepticism wasgrowing in his son (and who knows how much it was encouraged preciselybyhis father’s hatred and the icy melancholy of an isolated will?) – the
Frederick William I.
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skepticism of a bold masculinity , which is most closely related to the genius
for war and conquest, and which first entered Germany in the shape ofthe great Frederick. This skepticism despises and nevertheless appropri-ates; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe but does notdie out on this account; it gives the spirit a dangerous freedom, but issevere on the heart. The German form of skepticism (being a continued
Frederickianism that has been intensified to the most spiritual degree)has put Europe under the dominion of German spirit with its critical andhistorical mistrust for a long time. Thanks to the unyielding strengthand tenacity in the masculine character of the great German philologistsand critical historians (seen properly , they were also all artists of decay and
destruction), and in spite of all the romanticism in music and philosophy ,
anew concept of the German spirit is gradually emerging, and it clearly
tends towards a masculine skepticism: it might be the intrepidity of thegaze, the courage and severity of the dissecting hand, or the tenacious willto dangerous voyages of discovery , to spiritualized North Pole expeditionsunder desolate and dangerous skies. Warm-blooded and superficial hu-manitarians may have good reasons for crossing themselves in front ofthis spirit; cet esprit fataliste, ironique, m´ ephistoph´ elique
as Michelet calls
it, not without a shudder. But this “man” in the German spirit, whichhas awoken Europe from its “dogmatic slumber,”
– if you want to un-
derstand how distinctive the fear of this “man” really is, just rememberthe earlier conception that this one had to overcome, – and how it wasnot so long ago that a masculinized woman
could dare, with boundless
presumption, to commend the Germans to European sympathies as gen-
tle, good-hearted, weak-willed, poetic fools. Y ou can really understandNapoleon’s surprise when he got to see Goethe:
it showed what people
had understood by the term “German spirit” for centuries. “ Voil`au n
homme! ” – which was to say: “Now there’s a man ! And I’d only expected a
German!” –
“This fatalistic, ironical, Mephistophelian spirit.”
An allusion to Kant’s claim in the Prolegomena zu einer jeden k¨ unftigen Metaphysik (Prolegomena
to any Future Metaphysics )( ) that Hume’s empiricism awoke him from the dogmatic slumber
of rationalism.
Madame de Sta ¨el in her De l’Allemagne (On Germany )( ).
See Goethe’s Unterredung mit Napoleon (Discussion with Napoleon )(October ).
Beyond Good and Evil
The Philosophers of the Future
- Future philosophers will transcend mere skepticism by embracing the role of the critic and the experimenter.
- These thinkers will possess a 'level-headed cruelty' and the ability to dissect ideas even when the process is painful.
- They reject the democratic and sentimental notion that truth must be elevating, inspiring, or pleasing to the heart.
- A sharp distinction is drawn between the critic, who is a tool of philosophy, and the philosopher, who is the master.
- The text critiques Immanuel Kant, referred to as the 'great Chinaman of Königsberg,' as being merely a great critic rather than a true philosopher.
- The coming philosophers will demand a rigorous spiritual cleanliness and a solitary, responsible stance against modern conciliatory trends.
In fact, these philosophers admit to taking pleasure in saying no, in dissecting, and in a certain level-headed cruelty that knows how to guide a knife with assurance and subtlety, even when the heart is bleeding.
So, if something in the image of future philosophers makes us suspect that
they will, perhaps, be skeptics (in the sense just mentioned), then it wouldonly indicate some aspect of them and notwho they themselves really are.
They could be called critics with equal justification; and they will certainlybe engaged in experiments. I have already laid particular emphasis on the
notions of tempting, attempting, and the joy of experimenting in the namethat I have dared to christen them with: is this because, as critics in body
and soul, they love to experiment in a new , perhaps broader, perhaps moredangerous sense? In their passion for knowledge, won’t they need to gofurther, with bold and painful experiments, than the faint-hearted, pam-pered taste of a democratic century can think proper? – Without a doubt:these coming philosophers will be least able to dispense with the qualitiesthat distinguish the critic from the skeptic – qualities that are rather seri-ous and by no means harmless. I mean: the certainty of value standards, theconscious implementation of a unity of method, a sly courage, a solitarystance, and capacity for responsibility . In fact, these philosophers admitto taking pleasure in saying no, in dissecting, and in a certain level-headed
cruelty that knows how to guide a knife with assurance and subtlety , evenwhen the heart is bleeding. They will be more severe (and perhaps not
always with themselves alone) than humane people might wish them tobe. They will not engage with “truth” in such a way that it “pleases” or“elevates” or “inspires” them; they will hardly believe that the truth ,o f
all things, would keep the feelings this amused. These severe spirits willsmile when they hear someone say: “This thought elevates me: how couldit fail to be true?” Or: “This work charms me: how could it fail to be beau-
tiful?” Or: “That artist ennobles me: how could he fail to be noble?” – they
might be ready not just with a smile but with a genuine disgust for all theseover-enthusiasms, idealisms, femininities, hermaphrodisms. And anyonewho knows how to follow these spirits down into the secret chambers oftheir heart is not likely to discover any intention to reconcile “Christianfeelings” with “ancient taste” or with anything like “modern parliamen-
tarianism” (although these sorts of conciliatory overtures are said to takeplace in our very uncertain and consequently very conciliatory century ,even among philosophers). These philosophers of the future will demand(and not only of themselves) critical discipline and every habit that leads tocleanliness and rigor in matters of the spirit. They might even wear these
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like a type of jewel they have on display , – nevertheless, they still do not
want to be called critics. They think it is no small disgrace for philosophythese days, when people are so happy to announce: “Philosophy itself iscriticism and critical science – and nothing else whatsoever!” H owever
much all the French and German positivists might approve of this eval-uation of philosophy (– and it might even have flattered Kant’s heart and
taste: just think of the titles of his major works –), our new philosopherswill nevertheless say: critics are tools of philosophy and that is preciselywhy , being tools, they are so far from being philosophers! Even the greatChinaman of K ¨onigsberg
was only a great critic. –
I am going to insist that people finally stop mistaking philosophical la-
The Philosopher as Legislator
- A distinction is drawn between 'philosophical laborers' who organize existing values and 'true philosophers' who create new ones.
- The genuine philosopher must experience many roles—skeptic, poet, and historian—as preconditions to gain a comprehensive perspective on human values.
- While figures like Kant and Hegel systematize the past, true philosophers act as commanders who dictate the future direction of humanity.
- The act of philosophical knowing is redefined as a creative act of legislation and an expression of the 'will to power.'
- Philosophers are inherently 'people of tomorrow' who must act as the 'bad conscience' of their current age by critiquing its dominant virtues.
- The philosopher's task involves a 'vivisecting' of contemporary morality to uncover hidden hypocrisy and chart new paths to human greatness.
True philosophers reach for the future with a creative hand and everything that is and was becomes a means, a tool, a hammer for them.
borers and scientific men in general for philosophers, – that here, of all
places, people be strict about giving “each his due” and not too much tothe one, and much too little to the other. In the course of his education,the genuine philosopher might have been required to stand on each of thesteps where his servants, the philosophical scientific laborers, have cometo a stop, – have had to come to a stop. Perhaps the philosopher has had
to be a critic and a skeptic and a dogmatist and historian and, moreover,a poet and collector and traveler and guesser of riddles and moralist andseer and “free spirit” and practically everything, in order to run through
the range of human values and value feelings and be able to gaze with
many eyes and consciences from the heights into every distance, from thedepths up to every height, from the corner onto every expanse. But allthese are only preconditions for his task: the task itself has another will, –it calls for him to create values . The project for philosophical laborers on
the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to establish some large class of givenvalues (which is to say: values that were once posited and created but have
come to dominate and have been called “truths” for a long time) and press
it into formulas, whether in the realm of logic orpolitics (morality) or art.
It is up to these researchers to make everything that has happened or beenvalued so far look clear, obvious, comprehensible, and manageable, to ab-breviate everything long, even “time” itself, and to overwhelm the entire
past. This is an enormous and wonderful task, in whose service any subtle
An allusion to Kant, who spent his life in K ¨onigsberg.
Beyond Good and Evil
pride or tough will can certainly find satisfaction. But true philosophers are
commanders and legislators : they say “That is how it should be!” they are
the ones who first determine the “where to?” and “what for?” of people,
which puts at their disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical la-borers, all those who overwhelm the past. True philosophers reach forthe future with a creative hand and everything that is and was becomesa means, a tool, a hammer for them. Their “knowing” is creating , their
creating is a legislating, their will to truth is – will to power . – Are there
philosophers like this today? Have there ever been philosophers like this?W on’t there h a v et ob e philosophers like this? ...
It seems increasingly clear to me that the philosopher, being necessarily a
person of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow , has, in every age, beenand has needed to be at odds with his today: his enemy has always been
the ideal of today . So far, all these extraordinary patrons of humanity whoare called philosophers (and who have seldom felt like friends of wisdom,but like disagreeable fools and dangerous question-marks instead –) havefound that their task, their harsh, unwanted, undeniable task (though inthe end, the greatness of their task) lay in being the bad conscience of their
age. In applying a vivisecting knife directly to the chest of the virtues of the
age, they gave away their own secret: to know a new greatness in humanity ,
a new , untraveled path to human greatness. Every time they have donethis, they have shown how much hypocrisy and laziness, how much lettingyourself go and letting go of yourself, how many lies are hidden beneaththe most highly honored type of their present-day morality , and how much
virtue is out of date . Every time, they have said: “W e need to go there, out
there, out where you feel least at home today .” When encountering a world
of “modern ideas” which would gladly banish everyone into a corner and
The Concept of Greatness
- The philosopher defines greatness through the scope and variety of humanity, emphasizing unity within multiplicity and the capacity for immense responsibility.
- In an era of weakened will and diluted virtues, greatness requires hardness, strength of will, and the ability to maintain long-term resolutions.
- Historical ideals of greatness shift in response to the age; where Socrates used irony against tired instincts, the modern age requires a defense of the rare and privileged.
- Modern greatness is defined by being noble, solitary, and different, standing alone against the 'herd animal' mentality of equal rights.
- The ultimate ideal is the person who is 'beyond good and evil,' possessing an abundance of will and the ability to be as multiple as they are whole.
- True philosophy cannot be taught but must be known through experience, yet it is frequently misunderstood by popular opinion and superficial scholarship.
Greatest of all is the one who can be the most solitary, the most hidden, the most different, the person beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the one with an abundance of will.
“specialization,” a philosopher (if there could be philosophers today)would be compelled to locate the greatness of humanity , the conceptof “greatness,” in the very scope and variety of humanity , in its unityin multiplicity . He would determine even value and rank according tohow much and how many things someone could carry and take uponhimself, how farsomeone could stretch his responsibility . Today , the will
is weakened and diluted by the tastes and virtues of the times, and nothingis as timely as weakness of will: this is why precisely strength of will and
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the hardness and capacity for long-term resolutions must belong to the
concept of “greatness,” in the philosopher’s ideal. With equal justice,the opposite doctrine and the ideal of a stupid, self-abnegating, humble,selfless humanity was suited to an opposite age, to an age like the sixteenthcentury that suffered from its accumulated energy of the will and fromthe most savage floods and storm tides of egoism. In the age of Socrates,among honest people with tired instincts, among conservatives of ancientAthens who let themselves go – “toward happiness,” as they put it, toward
pleasure, as they did it – and who kept mouthing old, magnificent words(words that they had absolutely no right to use any more, given the livesthey were leading), – here, perhaps, irony was needed for greatness of
soul, that malicious, Socratic certainty of the old physician and man of
the rabble who cut brutally into his own flesh like he cut into the flesh and
heart of the “noble,” with a glance that spoke clearly enough: “Don’t actsome part in front of me! Here – we are equals!” These days, by contrast,when only the herd animal gets and gives honor in Europe, when “equalrights” could all too easily end up as equal wrongs (I mean, in waging ajoint war on everything rare, strange, privileged, on the higher man, highersoul, higher duty , higher responsibility , on creative power and mastery) –these days, the concept of “greatness” will include: being noble, wantingto be for yourself, the ability to be different, standing alone and needing tolive by your own fists. And the philosopher will be revealing something ofhis own ideal when he proposes: “Greatest of all is the one who can be themost solitary , the most hidden, the most different, the person beyond goodand evil, the master of his virtues, the one with an abundance of will. Onlythis should be called greatness : the ability to be just as multiple as whole,
just as wide as full.” And to ask once again: is greatness possible today?
It is difficult to learn what a philosopher is, because it cannot be taught:
you have to “know” by experience, – or you should be proud that you
donot know it at all. But nowadays everyone talks about things that they
cannot experience, and most especially (and most terribly) when it comes
to philosophers and philosophical matters. Hardly anyone knows aboutthem or is allowed to know , and all popular opinions about them are false.So, for instance, the genuinely philosophical compatibility between a boldand lively spirituality that runs along at a presto , and a dialectical rigor and
Beyond Good and Evil
The Aristocracy of Thought
- Most scholars view thinking as a laborious, sluggish toil, failing to recognize the divine lightness and dance inherent in true necessity.
- Artists understand that the peak of creative freedom is reached only when action becomes necessary rather than voluntary, merging will and fate.
- Higher philosophical problems are protected by primordial laws that repel ordinary minds, regardless of their ambition or effort.
- Access to the highest realms of philosophy is determined by ancestry and the accumulated virtues of many generations rather than mere study.
- Modern virtues are no longer the simple, muscular traits of the past but are complex, disguised, and intertwined with our secret propensities.
- The search for one's own virtues within the labyrinth of the modern soul is a beautiful act of self-belief.
Not in their wildest dreams would they think of it as light, divine, and closely related to dance and high spirits!
necessity that does not take a single false step – this is an experience most
thinkers and scholars would find unfamiliar and, if someone were to men-tion it, unbelievable. They think of every necessity as a need, a painstakinghaving-to-follow and being-forced; and they consider thinking itself assomething slow and sluggish, almost a toil and often enough “worth thesweat of the noble.” Not in their wildest dreams would they think of it
as light, divine, and closely related to dance and high spirits! “Thinking”and “treating an issue seriously ,” “with gravity” – these belong together,according to most thinkers and scholars: that is the only way they have“experienced” it –. Artists might have a better sense of smell even in this
matter: they are the ones who know only too well that their feeling offreedom, finesse and authority , of creation, formation, and control only
reaches its apex when they have stopped doing anything “voluntarily”
and instead do everything necessarily , – in short, they know that insidethemselves necessity and “freedom of the will” have become one. In the
last analysis, there is a rank order of psychic states which corresponds tothe rank order of problems; and the highest problems will ruthlessly repelanyone who dares to get close without being predestined by sheer statureand power of spirituality to reach a solution. What good is it if, as happensso often these days, agile, ordinary minds or clumsy , worthy mechanistsand empiricists throng with their plebeian ambition to these problemsand into, as it were, the “inner courtyard”! But crude feet would never beallowed on a carpet like this: this has already been provided for in the pri-mordial laws of things. The door will stay barred against these intruders,however much they push or pound their heads against it! Y ou need to havebeen born for any higher world; to say it more clearly , you need to havebeen bred for it: only your descent, your ancestry can give you a right to
philosophy – taking that word in its highest sense. Even here, “bloodline”is decisive. The preparatory labor of many generations is needed for aphilosopher to come about; each of his virtues needs to have been indi-vidually acquired, cared for, passed down, and incorporated: and not onlythe bright, light, gentle gait and course of his thoughts, but above all theeagerness for great responsibilities, the sovereignty of his ruling gazes anddownward gazes, the feeling of separation from the crowd with its dutiesand virtues, the genial protection and defense of anything misunderstoodand slandered, whether it is god or devil, the pleasure and practice ingreat justice, the art of command, the expanse of the will, the slow eyethat hardly ever admires, hardly ever looks up, hardly ever loves ...
Part Our virtues
Our virtues? – W e probably still have our virtues too, although of course
they will not be those trusting and muscular virtues for which we hold ourgrandfathers in honor – but also slightly at arm’s length. W e Europeansfrom the day after tomorrow , we firstborn of the twentieth century , – withall of our dangerous curiosity , our diversity and art of disguises, our worn-out and, as it were, saccharine cruelty in sense and in spirit, – ifwe happen
to have virtues, they will presumably only be the ones that have learnedbest how to get along with our most secret and heartfelt propensities, withour most fervent desires. So let us look for them in our labyrinths! where,as we know , so many things lose their way , so many things get entirely lost.And is there anything more beautiful than looking for your own virtues?
Doesn’t this almost mean: believing in your own virtue? But this “believ-
The Complexity of Modern Morality
- Modern Europeans still carry the 'pigtail' of their grandfathers' good conscience, though the nature of virtue is rapidly shifting.
- The modern individual is influenced by multiple moral systems simultaneously, leading to 'multi-colored' and ambiguous actions.
- Contemporary morality has moved away from public posturing and solemn formulas toward a more private, unconscious, and subtle expression.
- Those who pride themselves on moral tact are often the most dangerous when they err, as they cannot forgive those who witness their mistakes.
- The struggle between the 'rule' of the mediocre middle class and the 'exception' of higher spirits provides a profound field for psychological study.
- Instinct is identified as a form of intelligence far more subtle and effective than conscious taste or understanding.
Just as in the celestial realm, the track of one planet will sometimes be determined by two suns; just as, in certain cases, suns of different colors will shine on a single planet with red light one moment and green light the next.
ing in your own virtue” – isn’t this basically what people used to call their“good conscience,” that venerable, long-haired pigtail of a concept thathung on the back of our grandfathers’ heads, and often enough behindtheir intellects too? And so it seems that however up-to-date and unwor-thy of grandfatherly honor we might otherwise appear, there is neverthe-less one respect in which we are the worthy grandchildren of thesegrandfathers, we last Europeans with a good conscience: we still weartheir pigtail. – Oh! If you knew how soon, so soon now – things will bedifferent! ...
Beyond Good and Evil
Just as in the celestial realm, the track of one planet will sometimes be
determined by two suns; just as, in certain cases, suns of different colorswill shine on a single planet with red light one moment and green lightthe next, and then strike it again, inundating it with many colors all atonce: in the same way , thanks to the complex mechanics of our “starry
skies,” we modern men are determined by a diversity of morals; our actions
shine with different colors in turn, they are rarely unambiguous, – and ithappens often enough that we perform multi-colored actions.
To love your enemies? I think this has been learned quite well: it happens
thousands of times these days, in large and small ways; in fact, somethingeven higher and more sublime happens every once in a while – we learn to
despise when we love and precisely when we love the most. But all of this
is unconscious, noiseless, lacking in pomp or pageantry but possessingthat shame and concealed goodness which forbids the mouth from usingany solemn words or virtuous formulas. Morality as posturing – offendsour taste these days. This is progress too, just as it was progress for ourfathers when religion as posturing finally offended their taste, including
the hostility and V oltairean bitterness towards religion (and everythingthat used to belong to the sign language of free spirits). No puritan litany ,moral homily , or petty bourgeois respectability wants to resonate with themusic in our conscience and the dance in our spirit.
Watch out for people who put a high value on being credited with moraltact and with subtlety in making moral distinctions! They will neverforgive us if they ever make a mistake in front of us (or especially about
us), – they will inevitably become our instinctive slanderers and detractors,
even if they still remain our “friends.” Blessed are the forgetful: for theywill “have done” with their stupidities too.
The French psychologists – and where else are there still psychologists
today? – have never grown tired of their bitter and manifold delight in
Our virtues
thebˆetise bourgeoise ,somewhat as if ...enough, this reveals something
about them. For instance, Flaubert, the good citizen of Rouen, ultimatelystopped seeing, hearing, or tasting anything else: this was his brand ofself-torture and subtler cruelty . Now – because this is getting boring – Irecommend another source of amusement for a change: the unconsciouscunning that all good, fat, well-behaved, mediocre spirits have shown to-wards higher spirits and their tasks, that subtle, intricate, Jesuitical cun-ning that is a thousand times more subtle than any taste or understandingevinced by this middle class in its best moments – it is even more subtle
than its victims’ understanding (which is on-going proof that “instinct”
is the most intelligent type of intelligence discovered so far). In short, youpsychologists should study the philosophy of the “rule” in its struggleagainst the “exception”: there you will see drama good enough for godsand divine malice! Or, to be even more up to date: vivisect the “goodman,” the “ homo bonae voluntatis ”
...yourselves !
Moral judgment and condemnation is the favorite revenge of the spiritu-
The Illusion of Disinterest
- Malice serves as a spiritualizing force for those slighted by nature, allowing them to claim equality through moral standards.
- The belief in God and universal equality is often a defensive mechanism used by the 'merely moral' to suppress higher spirituality.
- The concept of 'disinterested' action is a misunderstanding by the common man of what truly interests higher natures.
- Every supposedly unegoistic act, including love and self-sacrifice, is actually an exchange where the individual seeks to become 'more.'
- True virtue is dependent on the rank of the individual; self-denial in a natural commander is a waste rather than a merit.
- Truth is personified as a woman who grows bored when forced to answer the tedious questions of common morality.
But anyone who has really made sacrifices knows that he wanted and got something in return, – perhaps something of himself in return for something of himself – that he gave up here in order to have more there.
ally limited on those who are less so, as well as a type of compensation forhaving been slighted by nature, and an opportunity to finally acquire spiritandbecome refined: – malice spiritualizes. It warms the bottom of their
hearts for there to be a standard that makes them the equal of even peoplewho are teeming with all the qualities and privileges of spirit: – they fight
for the “equality of all before God” and almost need to believe in God for
this reason alone. Among them are the strongest opponents of atheism.If anyone were to tell them that “a high spirituality is beyond comparisonwith any sort of good behavior or worthiness of a merely moral man,” they
would be livid: – I certainly would not do it. I would rather flatter them by
claiming that a high spirituality is itself only the final, monstrous productof moral qualities; that it is a synthesis of all the states attributed to the“merely moral” men after they had been acquired individually , through
long discipline and practice, perhaps through whole series of generations;that high spirituality is just the spiritualization of justice and a benevo-lent severity that knows how to charge itself with the preservation of the
Bourgeois stupidity .
“Man of goodwill.”
Beyond Good and Evil
order of rank in the world among things themselves – and not just among
people.
Given the popularity of the term “disinterested” in praising people thesedays, we need to be aware (although this might prove dangerous) of what it
is that really interests the people and what sorts of things the common mancares truly and deeply about (including educated people and even scholarsand, unless I am badly mistaken, the philosophers as well). The fact thenemerges that the overwhelming majority of things that interest and ap-peal to the more refined and discriminating tastes, to every higher nature,will strike the average person as utterly “uninteresting.” If he notices adevotion to it anyway , then he calls it “ d´esint´eress´e” and wonders how it is
possible to act in a “disinterested” fashion. There have been philosopherswho have even known how to express this popular perplexity in a seductiveand mystico-otherworldly way (– perhaps because they did not have first-
hand knowledge of higher natures?) – instead of laying down the nakedand fully proper truth that a “disinterested” action is a very interesting
and interested action, provided ...“ And love?” – What? Even an action
done out of love is supposed to be “unegoistic”? But you fool s–!“ A n d
praise for the self-sacrificing?” But anyone who has really made sacrificesknows that he wanted and got something in return, – perhaps somethingof himself in return for something of himself – that he gave up here in
order to have more there, perhaps in order to be more in general, or justto feel like “more.” But this is a realm of questions and answers in whicha more discriminating spirit will not want to stay for very long: the truthis already desperate to keep herself from yawning when she is required torespond. In the end, she is a woman: we should not do violence to her.
“It sometimes happens,” said a moralistic pedant and stickler for detail,“that I honor and esteem an altruistic person. Not because he is altruistic,however, but because it seems to me that he has the right to help anotherperson at his own expense. Enough, it is always a question of who heis and
who that other is. For instance, in a person who was made and determined
for command, self-denial and modest retreat would not be a virtue but
Our virtues
The Masquerade of Modernity
- Universal morality is criticized as a 'waste of virtue' that ignores the natural rank and order between individuals.
- The modern preaching of pity is diagnosed as a masked form of self-hatred and a symptom of Europe's growing ugliness.
- Modern Europeans are described as 'hybrid mixed men' who lack a distinct identity and must borrow styles from history.
- The nineteenth century is characterized by a rapid, desperate changing of 'costumes' in morals, art, and faith.
- The historical spirit finds its ultimate expression in a 'carnival in the grand style,' where parody becomes the only remaining form of originality.
- Laughter and world-mockery are suggested as the only elements of the current age that might possess a future.
The man of 'modern ideas,' this proud ape, is exceedingly unhappy with himself: this is clear. He suffers: and his vanity would have it that he only pities...
the waste of a virtue: that is how it seems to me. Every unegoistic morality
that considers itself unconditional and is directed toward everyone doesnot just sin against taste: it is a provocation to sins of omission, and onemore temptation under a mask of benevolence – a temptation and injury to
precisely the higher, the rarer, the privileged. Morals must be compelledfrom the very start to bow before rank order , their presumptuousness must
be forced onto their conscience, – until they are finally in agreement witheach other that it is immoral to say: ‘What’s right for the one is fair for the
other.’ ” – So says my moralistic pedant and bonhomme :
does he really
deserve to be laughed at for urging morals to morality in this way? Butyou should not be too right if you want to get a laugh; a kernel of wrongbelongs to even a good taste.
Wherever pity is preached these days – and if you are listening properly , noother religion is preached any more – let the psychologist open up his ears.
Through all the vanity , through all the noise that this preacher (like allpreachers) intrinsically possesses, the psychologist will hear the genuine,rasping, groaning sound of self-hatred . This self-hatred belongs to the
darkening and increasing ugliness of Europe, which have been growing fora hundred years now (and whose first symptoms were already documentedin Galiani’s thought-provoking letter to Madame d’Epinay): if it is not
the cause! The man of “modern ideas,” this proud ape, is exceedingly
unhappy with himself: this is clear. He suffers: and his vanity would haveit that he only pities ...
The hybrid mixed man of Europe – a fairly ugly plebeian, all in all –
absolutely must have a costume: he needs history as a storage closet ofcostumes. Of course, he notices that nothing really looks right on him, –he keeps changing. Just look at these rapid preferences and changes in themasquerade of styles over the course of the nineteenth century; and at themoments of despair over the fact that “nothing suits” us –. It is pointless to
Good man.
In German: mit leidet (literally: “suffers with”). Here as elsewhere, Nietzsche is playing on the
similarities between the terms leiden (to suffer) and Mitleid (pity).
Beyond Good and Evil
dress up as romantic or classical or Christian or Florentine or Baroque or
“national,” in moribus et artibus :it “doesn’t look good”! But the “spirit,”
and particularly the “historical spirit,” finds that even this despair is to
its own advantage: again and again, a new piece of prehistory or foreigncountry will be tried out, turned over, filed away , packed up, and above allstudied . W e are the first age to be educated in puncto
of “costumes,” I mean
of morals, articles of faith, artistic tastes, and religions, and prepared as noage has ever been for a carnival in the grand style, for the most spirituallycarnivalesque laughter and high spirits, for the transcendental heights ofthe highest inanity and Aristophanean world mockery . Perhaps it’s thatwe still discover a realm of our invention here, a realm where we can
still be original too, as parodists of world history or buffoons of God, orsomething like that, – perhaps it’s that, when nothing else from today hasa future, our laughter is the one thing that does!
The Historical Sixth Sense
- The historical sense is defined as a divinatory instinct for understanding the hierarchy of values and forces that have governed past societies.
- Europeans have developed this sense as a direct result of the democratic mixing of classes and races, which Nietzsche describes as a form of half-barbarism.
- Modern souls have become a type of chaos, containing the remnants of every past form of life and culture within their own instincts.
- This internal chaos provides secret access to the labyrinths of unfinished cultures that noble, more unified ages could never understand.
- The historical sense is ultimately an ignoble trait because it implies a taste for everything, lacking the exclusionary refinement of a truly noble culture.
Because of the half-barbarism in our bodies and desires, we have secret entrances everywhere, like no noble age has ever had, and, above all, access to the labyrinths of unfinished cultures.
The historical sense (or the ability quickly to guess the rank order of the val-
uations that a people, a society , an individual has lived by , the “divinatoryinstinct” for the connections between these valuations, for the relationshipbetween the authority of values and the authority of effective forces): thishistorical sense that we Europeans claim as our distinguishing character-istic comes to us as a result of that enchanting and crazy half-barbarism into
which Europe has been plunged through the democratic mixing of classesand races, – only the nineteenth century sees this sense as its sixth sense.Thanks to this mixture, the past of every form and way of life, of culturesthat used to lie side by side or on top of each other, radiates into us, we“modern souls.” At this point, our instincts are running back everywhereand we ourselves are a type of chaos –. “Spirit,” as I have said, eventually
finds that this is to its own advantage. Because of the half-barbarism inour bodies and desires, we have secret entrances everywhere, like no nobleage has ever had, and, above all, access to the labyrinths of unfinished cul-tures and to every half-barbarism that has ever existed on earth. And sincethe most considerable part of human culture to date has been just suchhalf-barbarism, the “historical sense” practically amounts to a sense and
In customs and arts.
With respect to.
Our virtues
instinct for everything, a taste and tongue for everything: by which it im-
mediately shows itself to be an ignoble sense. For instance, we are enjoying
Homer again: knowing how to taste Homer might be our greatest advan-tage, one that people from a noble culture (such as seventeenth-centuryFrenchmen, like Saint-Evremond, who reproached Homer for an esprit
vaste ,
The Historical Sense and Taste
- Noble cultures are defined by a precise 'Yes and No' and a ready disgust for the foreign, which prevents them from appreciating anything outside their own property.
- Modern man possesses a 'historical sense' characterized by a plebeian curiosity that allows for the enjoyment of diverse, even crude, artistic syntheses like Shakespeare.
- This historical sense is a form of self-overcoming and modesty, yet it is fundamentally at odds with the 'good taste' of perfected, self-sufficient cultures.
- We struggle to appreciate the 'halcyon self-sufficiency' and 'gold and coldness' of works that have reached a state of finished perfection.
- Our modern thrill is found in the infinite and the unmeasured, preferring the danger of the 'half-barbarian' to the moderation of classical ideals.
- Philosophies like hedonism and utilitarianism are dismissed as naive foreground thinking because they measure value only through the lens of pleasure and pain.
Like the rider on a steed snorting to go further onward, we let the reins drop before the infinite, we modern men, we half-barbarians – and we feel supremely happy only when we are in the most – danger.
and even V oltaire, their concluding note) do not and did not find
very easy to acquire – and one that they would hardly allow themselvesto enjoy . The very precise Y es and No of their palate, their ready disgust,their hesitant reserve about everything strange or exotic, their fear of thepoor taste of even a lively curiosity , and in general that unwillingness seen
in every noble and self-sufficient culture to admit to itself a new lust, a
dissatisfaction with its own, an admiration of something foreign: all thisprejudices a noble culture and puts it at odds with even the best thingsin the world, if they are not its property and could not become its spoils.
And no sense is more incomprehensible to such people than preciselythis historical sense with its obsequious plebeian curiosity . It is no differ-ent with Shakespeare, that amazing Spanish-Moorish-Saxon synthesis oftastes that would have almost killed one of Aeschylus’ ancient Athenianfriends with either rage or laughter: but we – accept precisely this wildburst of colors, this confusion of the most delicate, the crudest, and themost artificial with a secret familiarity and warmth. W e enjoy him as theartistic refinement that has been reserved just for us, and meanwhile wedo not let ourselves be bothered by the noxious fumes and the proximityof the English rabble in which Shakespeare’s art and taste lives, any morethan we do on the Chiaja of Naples, for instance: where we go on our waywith all of our senses, enchanted and willing, however much the sewersof the rabble districts are in the air. W e men of “historical sense,” we dohave our virtues – this cannot be denied. W e are unassuming, selfless,modest, brave, full of self-overcoming, full of dedication, very grateful,very patient, very accommodating: – but for all that we are, perhaps, notvery “tasteful.” Finally , let us admit to ourselves: what we men of “his-
torical sense” find the most difficult to grasp, to feel, to taste again and
love again, what we are fundamentally biased against and almost hostiletowards, is just that perfected and newly ripened aspect of every art andculture, the genuinely noble element in works and people, their momentof smooth seas and halcyon self-sufficiency , the gold and the coldness
Enormous spirit.
Beyond Good and Evil
seen in all things that have perfected themselves. Perhaps our great virtue
of historical sense is necessarily opposed to good taste, at least to the very
best taste, and it is only poorly and haltingly , only with effort that we areable to reproduce in ourselves the trivial as well as greatest serendipitiesand transfigurations of human life as they light up every now and then:those moments and marvels when a great force stands voluntarily still infront of the boundless and limitless –, the enjoyment of an abundance ofsubtle pleasure in suddenly harnessing and fossilizing, in settling downand establishing yourself on ground that is still shaking. Moderation is
foreign to us, let us admit this to ourselves; our thrill is precisely the thrillof the infinite, the unmeasured. Like the rider on a steed snorting to gofurther onward, we let the reins drop before the infinite, we modern men,we half-barbarians – and wefeel supremely happy only when we are in
the most – danger .
Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, eudamonianism: these are all ways
of thinking that measure the value of things according to pleasure andpain ,
which is to say according to incidental states and trivialities. They are allforeground ways of thinking and naivet ´es, and nobody who is conscious of
both formative powers and an artist’s conscience will fail to regard them
The Discipline of Suffering
- The author distinguishes between a common pity for social distress and a 'higher' pity that mourns the shrinking of human greatness.
- Suffering is presented as the essential discipline that has caused every enhancement and strengthening of the human soul throughout history.
- Humanity is described as a dual entity consisting of both 'creature' (the raw material that must be broken) and 'creator' (the hammer that molds).
- The pursuit of mere well-being is criticized as an 'end' that renders people ridiculous and leads to spiritual decline.
- The 'free spirits' or 'immoralists' embrace a secret world of subtle command and duty, acting as the 'last of the Stoics' in an aging culture.
- True honesty is embraced as the final remaining virtue, to be perfected with both love and malice as a form of mockery against modern seriousness.
In human beings, creature and creator are combined: in humans there is material, fragments, abundance, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in humans there is also creator, maker, hammer-hardness, spectator-divinity and seventh day.
with scorn as well as pity . Pity for you! That is certainly not pity as you
understand it: it is not pity for social “distress,” for “society” with itssick and injured, for people depraved and destroyed from the beginningas they lie around us on the ground; even less is it pity for the grum-bling, dejected, rebellious slave strata who strive for dominance – theycall it “freedom.” Our pity is a higher, more far-sighted pity: – we see
how humanity is becoming smaller, how you are making it smaller! – and
there are moments when we look on your pity with indescribable alarm,
when we fight this pity –, when we find your seriousness more dangerousthan any sort of thoughtlessness. Y ou want, if possible (and no “if possi-ble” is crazier) to abolish suffering . And us? – it looks as though wewould
prefer it to be heightened and made even worse than it has ever been!W ell-being as you understand it – that is no goal; it looks to us like anend ! – a condition that immediately renders people ridiculous and despi-
cable – that makes their decline into something desirable ! The discipline
of suffering, of great suffering – don’t you know that this discipline has
Our virtues
been the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so far? The ten-
sion that breeds strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight ofgreat destruction, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving,interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness, and whatever depth, secrecy ,
whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it has been given: – weren’t
these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great suffering? In humanbeings, creature and creator are combined: in humans there is material,
fragments, abundance, clay , dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in humans thereis also creator, maker, hammer-hardness, spectator-divinity and seventhday: – do you understand this contrast? And that your pity is aimed at
the “creature in humans,” at what needs to be molded, broken, forged,
torn, burnt, seared and purified, – at what necessarily needs to suffer and
should suffer? And our pity – don’t you realize who our inverted pity is
aimed at when it fights against your pity as the worst of all pamperingand weaknesses? – Pity against pity , then! – But to say it again: there are
problems that are higher than any problems of pleasure, pain, or pity; andany philosophy that stops with these is a piece of naivet ´e. –
We immoralists! – This world as it concerns us, in which weneed to love
and be afraid, this almost invisible, inaudible world of subtle command,subtle obedience, a world of the “almost” in every respect, twisted, tricky ,barbed, and loving: yes, it is well defended against clumsy spectators andfriendly curiosity! W e have been woven into a strong net and shirt ofduties, and cannot get out of it –, in this sense we are “people of duty ,” –
even us! It is true that we sometimes dance quite well in our “chains” andbetween our “swords”; it is no less true that more often we grind our teeth
and feel impatient at all the secret harshness of our fate. But we can do aswe please: fools and appearances will speak up against us, claiming “thoseare people without duties” – fools and appearances are always against us!
Genuine honesty ,assuming that this is our virtue and we cannot get rid
of it, we free spirits – well then, we will want to work on it with all the
In German: Redlichkeit .
Beyond Good and Evil
love and malice at our disposal, and not get tired of “perfecting” ourselves
inour virtue, the only one we have left: may its glory come to rest like
a gilded, blue evening glow of mockery over this aging culture and itsdull and dismal seriousness! And if our genuine honesty nevertheless getstired one day and sighs and stretches its limbs and finds us too harsh andwould rather things were better, easier, gentler, like an agreeable vice: wewill stay harsh , we, who are the last of the Stoics! And we will help it
The Danger of Honesty
- The author advocates for a 'genuine honesty' that embraces devilishness, curiosity, and the spiritual will to power rather than traditional holiness.
- There is a warning that even the virtue of honesty can lead to vanity, stupidity, and a tedious saintliness if not handled with care.
- Moral philosophy is criticized as a soporific and boring field, which the author suggests is actually useful for keeping the masses from thinking too deeply.
- The text identifies a lack of awareness in Europe regarding the potentially dangerous and seductive nature of moral deliberation.
- English utilitarians are mocked for their lack of original thought and for disguising their local 'English happiness' as a universal scientific morality.
Isn’t a moralist the opposite of a Puritan? A thinker, that is, who treats morality as something questionable, question-mark-able, in short, as a problem? Shouldn’t moralists be – immoral?
out with whatever devilishness we have – our disgust at clumsiness and
approximation, our “ nitimur in vetitum ,”
our adventurer’s courage, our
sly and discriminating curiosity , our subtlest, most hidden, most spiritualwill to power and world-overcoming which greedily rambles and ravesover every realm of the future, – we will bring all of our “devils” to
help out our “god”! People will probably misjudge us and misconstrueus on account of this: so what! People will say: “this ‘genuine honesty’ –this is devilishness and absolutely nothing else! ” So what! And even if
they were right! Haven’t all gods so far been devils like this, who havebecame holy and been re-baptized? And, ultimately , what do we knowabout ourselves? And what the spirit that leads us wants to be called ? (It is
a question of names.) And how many spirits we are hiding? Our genuinehonesty , we free spirits, – let us make sure that it does not become our
vanity , our pomp and finery , our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtuetends towards stupidity , every stupidity towards virtue; “stupid to thepoint of holiness” they say in Russia, – let us make sure we do not endup becoming saints or tedious bores out of genuine honesty! Isn’t life ahundred times too short to be bored? Y ou would have to believe in eternallife in order to ...
Y ou will have to forgive me for having discovered that all moral philosophy
so far has been boring and should be classified as a soporific – and that
nothing has done more to spoil “virtue” for my ears than this tediousness
of its advocates; although I would not want to underestimate their generalutility . It is quite important that as few people as possible think aboutmorality – consequently , it is really quite important for morality not to
somehow turn interesting one of these days! But there is no need to worry!
“W e strive for the forbidden” from Ovid’s Amores, III,,.
Our virtues
Things today are the same as they have always been: I don’t see anyone
in Europe who has (or conveys ) any idea that moral deliberation could
be dangerous, insidious, seductive – that it could be disastrous ! Just look
at the indefatigable, unavoidable English utilitarians, for example, howawkwardly and honorably they walk in Bentham’s footsteps, wanderingto, wandering fro (a Homeric simile says it better), just as he himself hadwalked in the footsteps of the honorable Helv ´etius (no, this was not a
dangerous man, this Helv ´etius!). No new thoughts, no sign of any subtle
change or fold in an old thought, not even a real history of the earlierthought: an impossible literature on the whole, unless you know how to
sour it with some malice. That old English vice called cant ,
which is
a piece of moral tartufferie , has insinuated itself into these moralists too
(who have to be read with ulterior motives, if they have to be read atall –), hidden this time under a new form: science. And there is no lackof secret defenses against all the bites of conscience that will af flict a race
of former Puritans whenever they deal with morality on a scientific level.
(Isn’t a moralist the opposite of a Puritan? A thinker, that is, who treatsmorality as something questionable, question-mark-able, in short, as aproblem? Shouldn’t moralists be – immoral?) Ultimately , they all wantEnglish morality to be given its dues: since it is best for humanity , for the
“general utility” or “the happiness of the majority” – no! the happinessofEngland . They want, with all the strength they can muster, to prove to
themselves that striving for English happiness, I mean for comfort andfashion
The Spiritualization of Cruelty
- Nietzsche critiques the 'utilitarian Englishmen' for promoting a mediocre, universal morality that ignores the natural order of rank between individuals.
- He argues that the concept of 'general welfare' is not a noble ideal but an emetic that harms the development of higher men.
- The text suggests that modern humanity's pride in its own civility is actually rooted in a superstitious fear of the 'wild beast' within.
- Higher culture is redefined as the spiritualization and deepening of cruelty, rather than its eradication.
- Tragedy, the sublime, and even religious self-denial are presented as forms of cruelty turned inward or refined into aesthetic pleasure.
- The author calls for a rejection of past psychology which viewed cruelty only as the enjoyment of another's pain, highlighting the pleasure found in self-suffering.
This is my claim: almost everything we call “higher culture” is based on the spiritualization and deepening of cruelty.
(and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament), is the proper
path to virtue as well, and, in fact, that whatever virtue has existed inthe world so far has involved just this sort of striving. Not one of theseclumsy , conscience-stricken herd animals (who set out to treat egoism asa matter of general welfare –) wants to know or smell anything of thefact that “general welfare” is no ideal, no goal, not a concept that cansomehow be grasped, but only an emetic; – that what is right for someone
absolutely cannot be right for someone else; that the requirement that
there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to the highermen; in short, that there is an order of rank between people, and between
moralities as well. They are a modest and thoroughly mediocre type ofperson, these utilitarian Englishmen, but, as I have said: to the extent
Nietzsche uses the English word.
Nietzsche uses the English words “comfort” and “fashion.”
Beyond Good and Evil
that they are boring, we cannot think highly enough of their utility .
They should even be encouraged : as the following rhymes try , in part,
to do.
Good barrow pushers, we salute you,
“More is best” will always suit you,Always stiff in head and knee,Lacking spirit, humor too,Mediocre through and through,Sans genie et sans esprit !
Mature epochs that have the right to be proud of their humanity are still
so full of fear, so full of superstitious fear of the “cruel and wild beast”
(although the pride these more humane ages feel is actually caused bytheir mastery of this beast), that even obvious truths remain unspokenfor centuries, as if by agreement, because they have the appearance of
helping bring the wild beast back to life after it had finally been killed
off. Perhaps I am taking a risk in allowing a truth like this to escape: letother people recapture it and make it drink the “milk of pious reflection”
until it lies quiet and forgotten in its old corner. – People should rethink
their ideas about cruelty and open up their eyes; they should finally learnimpatience, so that big, fat, presumptuous mistakes like this will stopwandering virtuously and audaciously about. An example of this is themistaken ideas about tragedy that have been nurtured by both ancientand modern philosophers. This is my claim: almost everything we call“higher culture” is based on the spiritualization and deepening of cruelty .
The “wild animal” has not been killed off at all; it is alive and well, it
has just – become divine. Cruelty is what constitutes the painful sensu-ality of tragedy . And what pleases us in so-called tragic pity as well as ineverything sublime, up to the highest and most delicate of metaphysicaltremblings, derives its sweetness exclusively from the intervening com-ponent of cruelty . Consider the Roman in the arena, Christ in the raptureof the cross, the Spaniard at the sight of the stake or the bullfight, thepresent-day Japanese flocking to tragedies, the Parisian suburban laborerwho is homesick for bloody revolutions, the Wagnerienne who unfastens
“Without genius and without spirit.”
Our virtues
her will and lets Tristan und Isolde “wash over her” – what they all enjoy
and crave with a mysterious thirst to pour down their throats is “cruelty ,”the spiced drink of the great Circe. W e clearly need to drive out the sillypsychology of the past; the only thing this psychology was able to teachabout cruelty was that it originated from the sight of another ’ssuffering.
But there is abundant, overabundant pleasure in your own suffering too,in making yourself suffer, – and wherever anyone lets himself be talkedinto self-denial in the religious sense, or self-mutilation (as the Phoenicians
or ascetics did), or into desensitization, disembowelment or remorse ingeneral, or into puritanical penitential spasms, vivisections of conscienceor a Pascalian sacrifizio dell’intelletto
– wherever this is the case, he is
The Cruelty of Knowledge
- The pursuit of deep knowledge is described as a form of transfigured cruelty that forces the spirit to act against its natural inclinations.
- The fundamental will of the spirit is to dominate and simplify its surroundings, assimilating the new into the old to feel a sense of growth.
- Spirit functions like a stomach, possessing a digestive force that selectively incorporates or rejects information to maintain its own power.
- Ignorance and the closing of horizons are necessary defensive states that allow the spirit to manage the complexity of the external world.
- The spirit takes pleasure in masks, deception, and surfaces, using them as protective arts to conceal its true nature.
- A tension exists between the spirit's desire for simplification and the knower's drive to violate those surfaces through profound inquiry.
Even treating something in a profound or thorough manner is a violation, a wanting-to-hurt the fundamental will of the spirit, which constantly tends towards semblances and surfaces, – there is a drop of cruelty even in every wanting-to-know.
secretly being tempted and urged on by his cruelty , by that dangerousthrill of self-directed cruelty . Finally , people should bear in mind that
even the knower, by forcing his spirit to know against its own inclina-
tion and, often enough, against the wishes of his heart (in other words,
to say “no” when he would like to affirm, love, worship), this knowerwill prevail as an artist of cruelty and the agent of its transfiguration.Even treating something in a profound or thorough manner is a violation,a wanting-to-hurt the fundamental will of the spirit, which constantlytends towards semblances and surfaces, – there is a drop of cruelty evenin every wanting-to-know .
Perhaps people will not immediately understand what I have said hereabout a “fundamental will of the spirit”: let me explain. – The com-manding element (whatever it is) that is generally called “spirit” wants todominate itself and its surroundings, and to feel its domination: it willssimplicity out of multiplicity , it is a binding, subduing, domineering, andtruly masterful will. Its needs and abilities are the same ones that physi-ologists have established for everything that lives, grows, and propagates.The power of spirit to appropriate foreign elements manifests itself in astrong tendency to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold,to disregard or push aside utter inconsistencies: just as it will arbitrarilyselect certain aspects or outlines of the foreign, of any piece of the “externalworld,” for stronger emphasis, stress, or falsification in its own interest. Its
Sacrifice of the intellect.
Beyond Good and Evil
intention here is to incorporate new “experiences,” to classify new things
into old classes, – which is to say: it aims at growth, or, more particularly ,thefeeling of growth, the feeling of increasing strength. This same will
is served by an apparently opposite drive of spirit, a suddenly emergingresolution in favor of ignorance and arbitrary termination, a closing of itswindows, an inner nay-saying to something or other, a come-no-closer, atype of defensive state against many knowable things, a contentment withdarkness, with closing horizons, a yea-saying and approval of ignorance:all of which are necessary in proportion to the degree of its appropriatingforce, its “digestive force,” to speak metaphorically – and really , “spirit”
resembles a stomach more than anything. The spirit’s occasional will to bedeceived belongs here too, perhaps with a playful hunch that things are not
one way or the other, that people just accept things as one way or the other,a sense of pleasure in every uncertainty and ambiguity , a joyful self-delightat the arbitrary narrowness and secrecy of a corner, at the all-too-close,the foreground, at things made bigger, smaller, later, better, a self-delightat the sheer caprice in all these expressions of power. Finally , the spirit’snot quite harmless willingness to deceive other spirits and to act a part infront of them belongs here too, that constant stress and strain of a creative,productive, mutable force. What the spirit enjoys here is its multiplicityof masks and its artfulness, and it also enjoys the feeling of security theseprovide, – after all, its Protean arts are the very things that protect and
conceal it the best! – This will to appearances, to simplification, to masks,
to cloaks, in short, to surfaces – since every surface is a cloak – meets
resistance from that sublime tendency of the knower, who treats and wants
The Cruelty of Intellectual Honesty
- The intellectual conscience requires a form of cruelty to treat subjects with profound and thorough scrutiny rather than moral sentimentality.
- The author rejects 'festive words' like heroism and love of truth as vanity, viewing them as decorative masks for the raw reality of human nature.
- The ultimate task of the thinker is to translate humanity back into nature, stripping away the metaphysical interpretations that claim humans are 'higher' or 'different.'
- Knowledge is not merely preservative but transformative, yet it eventually hits a 'brick wall' of predetermined spiritual fate that cannot be altered.
- Deep-seated convictions are described as signposts to the 'great stupidity' or immutable essence at the core of an individual's identity.
- The author prefaces his upcoming views on women by framing them as personal, unchangeable truths rooted in his own 'spiritual fatum.'
To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far.
to treat things in a profound, multiple, thorough manner. This is a type ofcruelty on the part of the intellectual conscience and taste, and one thatany brave thinker will acknowledge in himself, assuming that he has spentas long as he should in hardening and sharpening his eye for himself, andthat he is used to strict discipline as well as strict words. He will say “Thereis something cruel in the tendency of my spirit”: – just let kind and vir-tuous people try to talk him out of it! In fact, it would sound more politeif, instead of cruelty , people were to accuse, mutter about and praise us ashaving a sort of “wild honesty” – free, very free spirits that we are: – and
perhaps this is what our reputation will really be – posthumously? In the
meantime – because this won’t be happening for a while – we are the least
likely to dress ourselves up with these sorts of moral baubles and beads:all the work we have done so far has spoiled our taste for precisely this sort
Our virtues
of bright opulence. These are beautiful, twinkling, tinkling, festive words:
genuine honesty , love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, theheroism of truthfulness, – there is something about them that makes you
swell with pride. But we hermits and marmots, we convinced ourselvesa long time ago and in all the secrecy of a hermit’s conscience that eventhis dignified verbal pageantry belongs among the false old finery , debris,and gold dust of unconscious human vanity , and that the terrible basictext of homo natura
must be recognized even underneath these fawning
colors and painted surfaces. To translate humanity back into nature; togain control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidentalmeanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic textofhomo natura so far; to make sure that, from now on, the human being
will stand before the human being, just as he already stands before the rest
of nature today , hardened by the discipline of science, – with courageousOedipus eyes and sealed up Odysseus ears, deaf to the lures of the oldmetaphysical bird catchers who have been whistling to him for far too
long: “Y ou are more! Y ou are higher! Y ou have a different origin!” – This
may be a strange and insane task, but it is a task – who would deny it!
Why do we choose it, this insane task? Or to ask it differently: “Whyknowledge at all?” – Everyone will be asking us this. And we who have
been prodded so much, we who have asked ourselves the same question ahundred times already , we have not found and are not finding any betteranswers ...
Learning transforms us, it acts like all other forms of nourishment that do
not just “preserve” –: as physiologists know . But at our foundation, “at the
very bottom,” there is clearly something that will not learn, a brick wall
of spiritual fatum ,of predetermined decisions and answers to selected,
predetermined questions. In any cardinal problem, an immutable “that isme” speaks up. When it comes to men and women, for instance, a thinkercannot change his views but only reinforce them, only finish discoveringwhat, to his mind, “is established.” In time, certain solutions are foundto problems that inspire our strong beliefs in particular; perhaps they will
Natural man.
Fate.
Beyond Good and Evil
start to be called “convictions.” Later – they come to be seen as only
footsteps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problems that we are, – or,
more accurately , to the great stupidity that we are, to our spiritual fatum ,
to that thing “at the very bottom” that will not learn . – On account of
the abundant civility that I have just extended to myself, I will perhapsbe more readily allowed to pronounce a few truths about the “womanan sich ”:
assuming that people now know from the outset the extent to
which these are only – my truths. –
W omen want to become independent, so they are beginning to enlighten
The Critique of Female Enlightenment
- The author views the movement toward female scientific inquiry and self-disclosure as a symptom of Europe's increasing 'ugliness.'
- He argues that women's natural 'art' lies in grace, play, and the management of appearances rather than the pursuit of objective truth.
- The text suggests that the 'fear of men' previously served as a civilizing force that restrained what the author describes as the pedantic and arrogant aspects of the female character.
- He posits that women do not actually desire truth, but rather use intellectualism as a 'new piece of finery' or a tool to inspire fear and achieve dominance.
- The author claims that women are historically their own harshest critics and that male-imposed silence (in church or politics) was actually a form of protection.
- Prominent intellectual women like Madame de Staël and George Sand are dismissed as 'comical' counter-arguments against the cause of female emancipation.
Nothing is so utterly foreign, unfavorable, hostile for women from the very start than truth, – their great art is in lying, their highest concern is appearance and beauty.
men about the “woman an sich ”–this is one of the worst developments
in Europe’s general trend towards increasing ugliness . Just imagine what
these clumsy attempts at female scientificity and self-disclosure will bringto light! W omen have so much cause for shame; they contain so much thatis pedantic, superficial, and schoolmarmish as well as narrowmindedlyarrogant, presumptuous, and lacking in restraint (just think about theirinteractions with children!), all of which has been most successfully re-strained and kept under control by their fear of men. Look out when the
“eternal tedium of woman” (which they all have in abundance!) first daresto emerge! When, on principle, they start completely forgetting their dis-cretion and their art – of grace, play , chasing-all-cares-away , of makingthings easier and taking them lightly , as well as their subtle skill at pleas-ant desires! Even now , female voices are becoming heard which – holy
Aristophanes! – are terrifying, and threaten with medicinal clarity what,in the first and last instance, women want from men. Isn’t it in the very
worst taste when women prepare to be scientific like this? Fortunately ,enlightenment had been a man’s business, a man’s talent until now – assuch, we could remain “among ourselves.” And with respect to everythingthat women write about “woman,” we can ultimately reserve a healthydoubt as to whether women really want – and are able to want – to provide
enlightenment about themselves ...If this is not really all about some
woman trying to find a new piece of finery for herself (and isn’t dressing
up a part of the Eternal Feminine?), well then, she wants to inspire fear of
In German: das “Weib an sich .” The term “ an sich ” means “in itself,” as in Kant’s Ding an sich
(thing in itself). I have left the term in German because any English rendering is clumsy , and theGerman retains both the gender neutrality and the philosophical connotations of the term.
Our virtues
herself: – perhaps in order to dominate. But she does not want truth: what
does truth matter for a woman! Nothing is so utterly foreign, unfavorable,hostile for women from the very start than truth, – their great art is in ly-ing, their highest concern is appearance and beauty . Let us admit that wemen love and honor precisely this art and this instinct in women: we have
a rough time of it, and gladly seek relief by attaching ourselves to a beingin whose hands, eyes, and gentle stupidities our seriousness, our gravity ,and profundity look almost stupid to us. Finally , I will pose the question:has a woman herself ever acknowledged a female mind as profound or afemale heart as just? And isn’t it true that, judging overall, “woman” has
historically been most despised by women themselves – and not by us atall? – W e men wish that women would stop compromising themselves
through enlightenment: just as male care and protection of women wereat work when the church decreed: mulier taceat in ecclesia !
It was for
women’s own good, when Napoleon gave the all-too-eloquent Madamede Sta ¨el to understand: mulier taceat in politicis !
– and I think that it is a
true friend of the ladies who calls to them today: mulier taceat de muliere !
It shows corruption of the instincts – even apart from the fact that it
shows bad taste – when a woman refers specifically to Madame Roland orMadame de Sta ¨el or Monsieur Georges Sand, as if that proved something
infavor of the “woman an sich .” Men consider these the three comical
women an sich – nothing else! – and precisely the best involuntary counter-
arguments against emancipation and female self-determination.
Stupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the spine-chilling thoughtless-
Nietzsche on Woman and Instinct
- The author criticizes the historical role of women in the kitchen, arguing that a lack of physiological reason in cooking has hindered human development.
- He contrasts the romanticized 'Eternal Feminine' of Dante and Goethe with a more cynical view of gendered virtues and social masks.
- A series of maxims characterizes women through themes of vanity, aging, and the strategic use of silence or fashion to project wisdom.
- The text posits that men have historically treated women as exotic, fragile birds that must be caged to prevent them from flying away.
- The author rejects the concept of equal rights, viewing the denial of 'eternally hostile tension' between the sexes as a sign of a shallow mind.
- He advocates for an 'oriental' perspective where woman is understood as a possession or property, citing Greek and Asian instincts as superior models.
So far, men have been treating women like birds that have lost their way and flown down to them from some height or another: like something finer, more vulnerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, more soulful, – but also like something that has to be locked up to keep it from flying away.
ness in the feeding of the family and the head of the house! W omen donot understand what food means : and yet want to cook! If woman were a
thoughtful creature, then the fact that she has been the cook for thousandsof years would surely have led her to discover the greatest physiologicalfacts, and at the same time make the art of medicine her own! Bad cooking
“W oman should be silent in church.”
“W oman should be silent about politics.”
“W oman should be silent about woman.”
Beyond Good and Evil
and the complete absence of reason in the kitchen have caused the longest
delays and the worst damage to the development of humanity: even today ,things are hardly any better. A speech for young ladies.
There are phrases and masterstrokes of the spirit, there are aphorisms,
a small handful of words, in which an entire culture, an entire society issuddenly crystallized. Madame de Lambert’s occasional remark to her
son is one of them: “ Mon ami, ne vous permettez jamais que de folies qui
vous feront grand plaisir ”:
– which, by the way , is the most motherly and
astute remark that has ever been addressed to a son.
What Dante and Goethe believed about women – the former when hesang “ ella guardava suso, ed io in lei ,”
the latter when he translated it as
“the Eternal Feminine draws us upward ”– :I have no doubt that any
noble woman will object to this belief, since this is just what she believes
about the Eternal Masculine.
Seven little maxims about women
Suddenly we’re bored no more when a man crawls through the door!
∗∗
Age, alas! and science too gives weaker virtues strength anew .
∗∗
Black gowns and a silent guise make any woman look quite – wise.
∗∗
Who to thank for my success? God – and my own tailoress.
∗∗
“My friend, only allow yourself the follies that will give you great pleasure.”
“She looked up, and I at her.” From Dante’s Divina Commedia: Paradiso , II,.
From Goethe’s Faust II, line f.
Our virtues
In youth: a flower-covered lair. In age: a dragon stirs in there.
∗∗
His name is good, his figure’s fine, a man as well – if only mine!
∗∗
When words are few but always sound – a she-mule walks on dangerous
ground!
So far, men have been treating women like birds that have lost their wayand flown down to them from some height or another: like somethingfiner, more vulnerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, more soulful, – but also
like something that has to be locked up to keep it from flying away .
To be wrong about the fundamental problem of “man and woman”; on
the one hand, to deny the most abysmal antagonism and the necessityof an eternally hostile tension; and, on the other hand, to dream, per-haps, of equal rights, equal education, equal entitlements and obligations:t h a ti sa typical sign of a shallow mind, and a thinker who has proven to
be shallow in this dangerous area – shallow in instinct! –, can be gen-erally regarded as suspicious, or, even more, as shown up for what heis, as exposed. He will probably be too “short” for all the fundamen-
tal questions of life, including future life, and unable to get down tothem in any depth. On the other hand, someone who has the same depth
in his spirit as he does in his desires, and also that depth of goodwillwhich is capable of harshness and strictness and is easily mistaken forthem – that sort of man will only ever be able to think about woman in
anoriental manner. He needs to understand the woman as a possession,
as property that can be locked up, as something predestined for servitudeand fulfilled by it. In this he has to adopt the position of Asia’s enor-mous rationality , Asia’s superiority of instinct, just as the Greeks oncedid (being Asia’s best heirs and students); we know that, from Homerup to the times of Pericles, while their culture was growing and their
strength expanding, the Greeks were gradually becoming stricter with
The Regression of Modern Women
- Nietzsche argues that the democratic trend of treating women with increased respect has led to a misuse of that respect and a loss of feminine shame.
- The author posits that as women abandon their fear of men, they simultaneously abandon their most essential feminine instincts.
- Modern society's industrial spirit encourages women to seek economic and legal independence, which Nietzsche characterizes as the 'woman as clerk.'
- The text claims a paradoxical decline in actual female influence in Europe since the French Revolution, despite the acquisition of more legal rights.
- The movement for emancipation is described as a symptom of the weakening of feminine instincts and a form of 'masculine stupidity.'
- Nietzsche criticizes women for abandoning their traditional 'military arts' of subtle, cunning humility in favor of competing directly with men.
Ever since the French Revolution, the influence of women in Europe has decreased proportionately as they have gained rights and entitlements.
women too – in short, more oriental. How necessary , how logical – in
Beyond Good and Evil
fact, how humanly desirable all this has been: just think about it for a
while!
The men of our epoch treat the weaker sex with more respect than anyepoch has ever done – this is part of the democratic tendency and fun-
damental taste, as is a lack of respect for age –: is it any wonder thatthis respect is immediately misused? People want more, people learn tomake demands, people ultimately find this respect tax almost hurtful,people would prefer to compete for rights or, in all seriousness, wage war:enough, woman loses her shame. Let us immediately add that she alsoloses her taste. She forgets her fear of man: but the woman who “forgets
fear” abandons her most feminine instincts. It is fair enough and alsounderstandable enough for women to dare to emerge when fear of menis no longer inculcated, or, to be more exact, when the man in men is
no longer wanted and cultivated; what is more difficult to understand isthat in the process – women degenerate. This is happening today , makeno mistake about it! Wherever the industrial spirit has won out over themilitary and aristocratic spirit, women are now striving for the economicand legal independence of a clerk: “the woman as clerk” is written on thegateway to the developing, modern society . While women are seizing newrights in this manner, trying to become “master” and writing “progress”for women on their flags and pennants, the opposite is taking place withterrifying clarity: woman are regressing . Ever since the French Revolution,
the influence of women in Europe has decreased proportionately as they
have gained rights and entitlements. Accordingly , the “emancipation ofwomen,” to the extent that it has been demanded and called for by womenthemselves (and not just by shallow-minded masculine dolts), turns outto be a strange symptom of the increased weakening and softening of themost feminine instincts of all. The stupidity in this movement, an almost
masculine stupidity , is enough to make any woman who has turned outwell (which always means a clever woman) thoroughly ashamed. To loseyour sense for which ground best insures your victory; to neglect prac-tice of your own military arts; to lose control of yourself in front of men,perhaps even “to the point of writing books,” where you used to act with
discipline and subtle, cunning humility; to work with virtuous courageagainst men’s belief in any veiled , fundamentally different ideal in women,
Our virtues
in any sort of Eternal or Necessary Feminine; to dissuade men, emphat-
The Defeminization of Europe
- The author argues that modern social movements are causing a 'crumbling away' of feminine instincts by encouraging women to adopt male habits like politics and journalism.
- He asserts that the 'cultivation' of women through general education actually weakens the strength of the will, which he believes is the true source of female power.
- The text suggests that the essential nature of woman is 'predatory' and 'untrainable,' likened to a beautiful but dangerous cat with 'tiger's claws inside their glove.'
- The author views the 'demystification' of women as a tragedy that replaces profound fear and pity with a tedious, modern mediocrity.
- He warns that Europe is being carried away by 'modern ideas' that ignore the historical reality that slavery and hierarchy are conditions of higher culture.
What inspires respect and, often enough, fear of women is their nature, their truly predatory and cunning agility, their tiger’s claws inside their glove, the naiveté of their egoism, their inner wildness and inability to be trained.
ically and at length, from thinking that women must by kept, cared for,protected, and looked after like gentle, strangely wild and often pleasanthouse pets; to collect together, in an inept and indignant manner, every-thing slavish and serflike that was and still is intrinsic to the position ofwomen in the present social order (as if slavery were a counter-argumentand not rather a condition of any higher culture, any elevation of cul-ture): – what does all this mean except a crumbling away of feminineinstincts, a defeminization? Of course, there are plenty of idiotic friendsand corrupters of women among the scholarly asses of the male sex whorecommend that women defeminize themselves like this and copy all thestupidities that the “man” in Europe, that European “manliness” suffersfrom, – who would like to bring women down to the level of “generaleducation,” and maybe even of reading the newspapers and taking partin politics. Every now and then, people even want to make free spiritsand literati out of women: as if a woman without piety were anything
other than absolutely repugnant or ludicrous to a profound and godlessman –. Almost everywhere, women’s nerves are being ruined by the mostpathological and dangerous of all types of music (our most recent Germanmusic) and women are being made more hysterical by the day , and lesscapable of performing their first and last profession, the bearing of strongchildren. People want women to be more “cultivated” in general and want,as they say , to make the “weaker sex” strong through culture: as if history
did not teach as vividly as possible that “cultivating” human beings andweakening – in particular, weakening, dissipating, afflicting the strength
of the will – have always kept pace with each other, and that the most
powerful and influential women in the world (recently even Napoleon’smother) owed their power and their dominance over men precisely to thestrength of their will – and not to schoolteachers! What inspires respectand, often enough, fear of women is their nature (which is “more nat-
ural” than that of men), their truly predatory and cunning agility , theirtiger’s claws inside their glove, the naivet ´e of their egoism, their inner
wildness and inability to be trained, the incomprehensibility , expanse,and rambling character of their desires and virtues ...What inspires pity ,
in spite of all the fear, for this dangerous and beautiful cat “woman” is
that she seems to suffer more, be more vulnerable, need more love, andbe condemned to more disappointments than any animal. Fear and pity:these are the feelings with which men have stood before women so far,
Beyond Good and Evil
always with one foot in tragedy which tears you apart even as it delights
you –. What? And that brings it to an end? The demystification of women
is in progress? W omen’s tediousness comes slowly into view? Oh Europe,Europe! W e are familiar with the horned animal that you always foundthe most attractive, who kept threatening you with more danger!
Y our
old fable could become “history” once more, – once more an enormousstupidity could come to dominate you and carry you away! And there isno god hidden inside, no! only an “idea,” a “modern idea”! ...
An allusion to the Greek myth in which Zeus, in the form of a bull, abducts Europa, daughter of
the royal house of Phoenicia.
Part Peoples and fatherlands
Wagner and the German Soul
- Wagner's Meistersinger overture is characterized as a magnificent but heavy late art that requires a deep historical musical context to be understood.
- The music embodies a series of contradictions, appearing simultaneously old-fashioned and alien, capricious and conventional, and coarse yet fiery.
- The composition lacks southern grace, logic, and dance, opting instead for a 'capriciously barbaric' and solemn German awkwardness.
- Nietzsche views the work as an emblem of the German soul: a complex mixture of power and decline that is both obsolete and overflowing with future potential.
- The music reflects a specific German temporal displacement, suggesting the nation belongs to the past and the future but lacks a definitive 'today'.
This type of music best expresses what I think about the Germans: they are from the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow, – they still have no today.
I heard it again for the first time – Richard Wagner’s overture to Meis-
tersinger : it is magnificent, ornate, heavy , late art that takes pride in
presupposing two hundred years of music as still living in order to becomprehensible: – it is a credit to the Germans that this sort of prideis not mistaken! What strengths and life forces, what seasons and ter-ritories are not combined here! One moment the work will strike us as
old-fashioned, and the next as alien, harsh, and overly young. It is justas capricious as it is pompously conventional, it is not infrequently mis-chievous, and more often coarse and uncouth – it has fire and courageand at the same time the loose, drab skin of fruit that ripens too late. Itflows in a full and expansive manner: and then suddenly a moment of in-explicable hesitation, like a gap that springs up between cause and effect,a dream-inducing pressure, practically a nightmare – , but, even then, theold stream of contentment spreads far and wide once again, that streamof the most varied contentment, of fortunes old and new which very much
include the artist’s happiness with himself (a happiness he does not wantto hide), his astonished, joyful part in knowing he has mastered the de-vices he employs here – new , newly acquired, untried artistic devices, ashe seems to reveal to us. All told, no beauty , nothing of the south, none ofthe fine, southern, brilliant skies, no gracefulness or dance, barely a will tologic; a certain awkwardness, in fact, which is even emphasized, as if theartist wanted to tell us: “I meant to do that”; an unwieldy guise, some-thing capriciously barbaric and solemn, a flurry of erudite and venerabledelicacies and lace; something German in the best and the worst senses
Beyond Good and Evil
of the word, something multiple, informal and inexhaustible in a German
way; a certain German powerfulness and overfullness of the soul that isnot afraid to hide behind the refinements of decline (and perhaps thisis where it feels best); a fair and fitting emblem of the German soul thatis simultaneously young and obsolete, over-done and still overflowing withfuture. This type of music best expresses what I think about the Germans:they are from the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow , – they
still have no today .
The Trap of Fatherlandishness
- The author contrasts 'good Europeans' with those who succumb to atavistic fits of nationalism and patriotic outbursts.
- Nationalism is described as a slow-moving 'metabolic' failure where duller spirits take decades to return to the reason of cosmopolitanism.
- A dialogue between two patriots explores the definition of a 'great' statesman, questioning if building massive empires justifies the sacrifice of a people's spiritual virtues.
- The text criticizes leaders who force 'great politics' upon a people, narrowing their conscience and making their tastes nationalistic for the sake of power.
- The author observes that the spiritual leveling or mediocrity of one nation often leads to the deepening and strengthening of another.
- A broader physiological process is identified behind the labels of civilization and democracy, moving Europe toward a new collective identity.
Suppose that a statesman puts his people in the position of needing to do ‘great politics’ in the future, although they are ill equipped and ill prepared by nature for this task, so that they need to sacrifice their old and reliable virtues for the sake of a new and dubious mediocrity.
W e “good Europeans”: even we have hours when we allow ourselves a
robust fatherlandishness, a slip and backslide into old loves and confines(I have just given a sample of this), hours of national outbursts, patriotictrepidations, and all sorts of other antiquated floods of affect. But thingsthat run their course in us in a matter of hours might take clumsier spiritslonger periods of time to get over, a good half a year in some cases and halfa lifetime in others, according to the speed and strength of their digestionand metabolism. In fact, I could imagine dull and hesitant races who wouldneed half a century even in our speedy Europe to overcome such atavisticfits of fatherlandishness, to unglue themselves from the soil and returnto reason, by which I mean “good Europeanism.” And while digressingon this possibility , it so happens that I’m becoming an ear-witness to aconversation between two old “patriots,” both obviously hard of hearing,and so speaking that much louder. “ He thinks and knows as much about
philosophy as a peasant or a fraternity student,” said the one –: “He’s stillinnocent. But who cares these days? This is the age of the masses: they lieprostrate in front of anything massive. And the same in politicis too. They
call a statesman ‘great’ if he builds them a new tower of Babel or some sortof monstrosity of empire and power – who cares if we are more cautiousand circumspect and keep holding on to our old belief that it takes a greatthought to make a cause or action great. Suppose that a statesman putshis people in the position of needing to do ‘great politics’ in the future,although they are ill equipped and ill prepared by nature for this task, sothat they need to sacrifice their old and reliable virtues for the sake of anew and dubious mediocrity , – suppose that such a statesman condemnshis people to any ‘political activity’ at all, when in fact they have had better
things to do and to think about until now , and at the bottom of their souls
Peoples and fatherlands
they hadn’t got rid of a cautious disgust at the agitation, emptiness, and
riotous brawling of truly politicized peoples: – suppose that a statesman
like this incites the dormant passions and greed of his people, makes aflaw out of their former shyness and the way they enjoyed staying tothe side, makes a fault out of their cosmopolitanism and secret infinity ,devalues their most heart-felt tendencies, turns their conscience around,makes their spirit narrow and their taste ‘national,’ – what! A statesmanwho would do all that, whose people would have to serve him like a prisonsentence for all the future (if they even had a future); this sort of a statesmanisgreat ?” “Without a doubt!” answered the other old patriot vehemently ,
“Otherwise he wouldn’t have been able to do it! Perhaps it was crazy to
want something like this? But perhaps everything great started out assimply crazy!” – “That’s an abuse of language!” shouted the first speakerin reply: “– strong! strong! strong and crazy! Not great!” – The old men
had grown visibly heated as they yelled their “truths” into each other’s
faces like this; but me, in my happiness and my beyond, I considered howsoon the strong come to be dominated by the stronger; and also that thespiritual leveling of one people is compensated for in the deepening ofanother. –
Whatever term is used these days to try to mark what is distinctiveabout the European, whether it is “civilization” or “humanization” or“progress” (or whether, without implying praise or censure, it is simplylabeled Europe’s democratic movement); behind all the moral and political
foregrounds that are indicated by formulas like these, an immense physio-
logical process is taking place and constantly gaining ground – the process
The Breeding of Tyrants
- The homogenization of Europeans is creating a supra-national, nomadic type characterized by a high capacity for physiological adaptation.
- While modern democratization leads to a leveling of humanity into a 'herd animal' state, it simultaneously creates the conditions for exceptional, dangerous individuals to emerge.
- The future European is predicted to be an industrious but weak worker who requires masters and commanders as a fundamental necessity.
- Democratization acts as an involuntary breeding ground for a new class of tyrants, both in a political and a spiritual sense.
- The German soul is described as multiple and fragmented, lacking a cohesive construction due to its diverse and 'piled up' origins.
What I’m trying to say is: the democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary exercise in the breeding of tyrants – understanding that word in every sense, including the most spiritual.
of increasing similarity between Europeans, their growing detachmentfrom the conditions under which climate- or class-bound races origi-nate, their increasing independence from that determinate milieu where
for centuries the same demands would be inscribed on the soul and thebody – and so the slow approach of an essentially supra-national andnomadic type of person who, physiologically speaking, is typified by amaximal degree of the art and force of adaptation. This process of theEuropean in a state of becoming can be slowed down in tempo through
large-scale relapses (although this might be the very thing that makesit gain and grow in vehemence and depth). The still-raging storm and
Beyond Good and Evil
stress of “national feeling” belongs here, as does the anarchism that is only
just approaching. This process will probably end up with results that itsnaive supporters and eulogists, the apostles of “modern ideas,” have least
expected. The same new conditions that generally lead to a leveling andmediocritization of man – a useful, industrious, abundantly serviceable,
and able herd animal man – are to the highest degree suitable for givingrise to exceptional people who possess the most dangerous and attractivequalities. Considering the fact that every adaptive force which system-atically tests an ever-changing set of conditions (starting over with eachgeneration, practically with each decade) does not make the powerfulness
of the type even remotely possible; considering the fact that the over-
all impression of such future Europeans will probably be of exceedingly
garrulous, impotent and eminently employable workers who need masters
and commanders like they need their daily bread; and, finally , consideringthe fact that Europe’s democratization amounts to the creation of a typeprepared for slavery in the most subtle sense: taking all this into account,
thestrong person will need, in particular and exceptional cases, to get
stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been so far, – thanks to a lackof prejudice in his schooling, thanks to an enormous diversity in practice,art, and masks. What I’m trying to say is: the democratization of Europeis at the same time an involuntary exercise in the breeding of tyrants –
understanding that word in every sense, including the most spiritual.
I’m glad to hear that our sun is moving rapidly towards the constellationofHercules , and I hope that the people of this earth will act like the sun.
With us in front, we good Europeans! –
There was a time when it was customary to call the Germans “pro-found,” as a term of distinction. Now that the most successful type of newGermanism desires a completely different sort of honor and has, perhaps,come to regret the absence of a certain “elan” in everything profound, itis almost timely and patriotic to ask whether people have not been fool-ing themselves with this praise; in short, whether German profundityis not something fundamentally different and worse – and something we
Peoples and fatherlands
are about to get rid of, thank God. So: to try to change our ideas about
German profundity , all we need is a little vivisection of the German soul. –More than anything else, the German soul is multiple, it originates in dif-ferent places and is more piled up and pieced together than actually con-structed: this is due to its origin. A German with the audacity to claim “twosouls, alas, are dwelling in my breast”
would be abusing the truth quite
The Incomprehensible German Soul
- The German identity is defined by its resistance to definition, characterized by a complex, contradictory, and unpredictable nature that eludes foreign understanding.
- A central feature of the German people is their perpetual self-questioning and the ongoing search for what it truly means to be German.
- Goethe's subtle silence and skepticism toward German nationalism highlight a historical tension between intellectual depth and patriotic fervor.
- The German soul is described as a labyrinth of 'secret paths to chaos,' where uncertainty and the process of 'becoming' are valued over fixed states of being.
- The concept of 'development' is identified as a uniquely German philosophical discovery that, alongside their music and culture, seeks to influence all of Europe.
- The German character is marked by a paradoxical mix of 'good-natured and spiteful' traits, combining scholarly ponderousness with an inner, daring boldness.
The German soul has passages going this way and that, it has caves, hiding places and dungeons; its disorder has much of the charm of the mysterious; the German is an expert on the secret paths to chaos.
badly , or to be more accurate, would fall quite a few souls short of the truth.As a people composed of the most enormous assortment and combinationof races (perhaps even with a preponderance of the pre-Aryan element), asa “people of the middle” in every sense, the Germans are more incompre-
hensible, comprehensive, contradictory , unfamiliar, unpredictable, sur-prising, and even frightening than other peoples are to themselves: – they
escape definition which by itself makes them the despair of the French. It is
characteristic of the Germans that the question “what is German?” neverdies out with them. Kotzebue certainly knew his Germans well enough:“W e are known” they called out to him in joy , – but Sand claimed to know
them too. Jean Paul knew what he was doing when he came out furiouslyagainst Fichte’s dishonest but patriotic flattery and exaggerations
–b u t
Goethe probably felt differently from Jean Paul about the Germans, eventhough he thought Jean Paul was right about Fichte. What didGoethe re-
ally think about the Germans? – But Goethe never did speak plainly aboutmany of the things around him, and was an expert at subtle silence all hislife: – he probably had his reasons. It is clear that the “Wars of Liberation”did not raise his level of enthusiasm any more than the French Revolutionhad done; the event that made him rethink his Faust – and indeed the
whole problem of “man” – was the appearance of Napoleon. There are
sayings where Goethe speaks as if from abroad, disputing with impatienthardness just what Germans take pride in. He once defined the famousGerman Gem¨ ut
as “tolerance towards others’ weaknesses as well as your
own.” Was he wrong? It is characteristic of the Germans that people arerarely completely wrong about them. The German soul has passages go-ing this way and that, it has caves, hiding places and dungeons; its disorderhas much of the charm of the mysterious; the German is an expert on
Goethe’s Faust I, line .
Reference to Jean Paul’s review of Fichte’s Reden an die Deutsche Nation (Speeches to the German
Nation ), in Heidelberger Jahrb¨ ucher ( ).
This term is difficult to translate, but suggests a soulful quality or warm-hearted disposition.
Beyond Good and Evil
the secret paths to chaos. And just as everything loves its likeness, the
German loves clouds and everything unclear, becoming, nebulous, dampand overcast: he feels that uncertainty , disorganization, displacement,and growth of every type are “profound.” The German himself isnot,
hebecomes , he “develops.” “Development,” then, is the truly German
discovery and sensation in the great realm of philosophical formulas: – a
governing concept that, in conjunction with German beer and Germanmusic, is working to Germanize all of Europe. Foreigners stand amazedand enthralled before the riddles posed to them by the contradictory na-ture at the base of the German soul (which Hegel brought into a systemand Richard Wagner finally set to music). “Good-natured and spiteful” –a juxtaposition like this, which would be absurd in reference to any otherpeople, is all too often justified in Germany (unfortunately: just live withSwabians for a while!). The ponderousness of German scholars, theirsocial fatuousness, is frighteningly consistent with an inner high-wire actand easy boldness in the face of which all gods have learned fear by now .If you want a demonstration of the German soul ad oculos ,
just look at
German Profundity and Musical Transitions
- The German psyche is characterized by a 'boorish indifference' to taste, where the noble and the base coexist in a disorderly, poorly digested economy of experience.
- German honesty and 'openness' are described as a clever, Mephistophelean disguise that allows them to appear harmless while remaining deceptive.
- Mozart represents the final expression of a centuries-old, refined European taste that is now fading into the past.
- Beethoven is viewed as a transitional figure between a decaying old soul and a wild, future-oriented hope, mirroring the political shifts from Rousseau to Napoleon.
- Romantic music, including the works of Weber and early Wagner, is dismissed as second-rate, theatrical, and lacking the nobility of true music.
- The author suggests that the reputation for being 'profound' and 'honest' is a strategic mask for the German people, who are etymologically linked to deception.
The German lets himself go, looks out with true, blue, empty German eyes, – and foreigners immediately mistake him for his nightshirt!
German taste, German arts and customs: what a boorish indifference to“taste”! How the noblest stands right next to the most base! How disor-derly and rich this whole psychic economy really is! The German lugs
his soul around, he lugs around everything he experiences. He digests hisevents badly , he is never “finished” with them; German profundity is oftenjust a weak and sluggish “digestion.” And just as everyone who is chron-
ically ill (all dyspeptics) tends toward comfortable things, the Germanslove “openness” and everything “upright.”
How comfortable it is to be
open and upright! Today , the Germans are expert at what is perhaps thehappiest and most dangerous disguise, that trusting, accommodating, all-cards-on-the-table attitude of genuine German honesty : this is their truly
Mephistophelean art, and with it they can “still go far”!
The German
lets himself go, looks out with true, blue, empty German eyes, – and for-eigners immediately mistake him for his nightshirt! – What I am tryingto say is: let “German profundity” be what it will (and just between us,
perhaps, we will allow ourselves a laugh at its expense?), we would dowell to honor its appearance and good name in the future as well, and
Before the eyes.
In German: Biederkeit .
From Goethe’s Faust part I, line .
Peoples and fatherlands
not to trade in our old reputation as people of profundity too cheaply for
Prussian “elan” or Berliner wit and sand. It is clever of a people to pass
themselves off – to letthemselves pass – for profound, undiplomatic, good-
natured, honest and un-clever: it could even be – profound! Finally: peopleshould live up to their name, – and it’s not for nothing that the Germans
[die Deutsche ] are called the “ tiusche ” people, the “ T¨ausche ” (deceptive)
people ...
The “good old days” are over – they sang themselves out in Mozart.
How lucky for usthat his Rococo still speaks to us, that his “good com-
pany ,” his tender enthusiasms, his childish pleasure in Chinoiserie and
fancy flourishes, his courtesy of the heart, his longing for the delicate andthe amorous, for dancing and tearful moments of bliss, his faith in thesouth, might still appeal to some vestige in us! Oh, some day all this will be
gone! – but who can doubt that the understanding and taste for Beethovenwill be gone even sooner! – although he was only the finale of a transi-tional style and stylistic discontinuity and not, like Mozart, the finale of acenturies-old, great European taste. Beethoven falls somewhere betweena brittle old soul that is constantly coming apart and an overly young,future-oriented soul that is constantly on its way . A dusk of eternal loss
and eternal, wild hope lies over his music – the same light that lay across
Europe when it dreamed with Rousseau, danced around the freedom treeof the Revolution and ended up practically worshipping Napoleon. Buthow quickly this very feeling is now fading, how difficult it is to even know
about this feeling these days – how foreign the language of this Rousseau,Schiller, Shelley , and Byron sounds to our ear, these men in whom, collec-
tively , the same European destiny which in Beethoven knew how to sing,
found its way into words! – What became of German music afterwardsbelongs in romanticism, which is to say in a movement that was (calcu-lated historically), even briefer, more fleeting and more superficial than
that great entr’acte , that European transition from Rousseau to Napoleon
and the rise of democracy . W eber: but what are Freisch¨ utz andOberon tous
these days! Or Marschner’s Hans Heiling andVampyr ! Or even Wagner’s
Tannh¨ auser ! This music is gone, if not yet forgotten. At any rate, the
whole music of romanticism was not noble enough, not music enough tohave rights anywhere except in the theater and in front of crowds; it was
Beyond Good and Evil
second-rate music from the very start, and real musicians took little notice
German Music and Prose
- Felix Mendelssohn is characterized as a 'halcyon master' whose light and pure soul led to quick fame followed by rapid obsolescence.
- Robert Schumann is critiqued as a 'merely German event' whose romanticism lacked the European breadth of Mozart or Beethoven.
- Schumann's music is described as a retreat into 'fatherlandishness,' marked by a dangerous tendency toward small-scale lyricism and drunken feeling.
- The German language and its books are criticized as a 'quagmire of toneless tones' lacking the rhythmic dance found in superior literature.
- German readers are accused of being 'lazy' and 'deaf' to the subtle artistry, tempo, and rhythmic precision required to truly understand a sentence.
- The author distinguishes between two styles of prose: one that drips like water in a damp cave and another that cuts like a supple, over-sharpened rapier.
How reluctantly he stands by the slowly revolving quagmire of toneless tones and rhythms without dance that the Germans call a 'book'!
of it. Things were different with Felix Mendelssohn, that halcyon masterwho, thanks to his easier, purer, happier soul, was quickly honored andjust as quickly forgotten, as a lovely incident in German music. But when
it comes to Robert Schumann, who took things seriously and was fromthe start taken seriously himself (he is the last to have founded a school):don’t we think of it today as a stroke of luck, a relief, a liberation thatjust this Schumannian romanticism has been overcome? Schumann, flee-ing into the “Saxon Switzerland” of his soul, half W erther-ish, half Jean
Paul-ine by nature, certainly not Beethoven-esque! certainly not Byronic!HisManfred music is a mistake and a misunderstanding to the point of
injustice –; Schumann with his taste, which was fundamentally a small
taste (being a dangerous tendency towards calm lyricism and a drunk-enness of feeling, which is twice as dangerous among Germans), goingconstantly to the side, timidly excusing himself and retreating, a noble,tender creature, who reveled in nothing but anonymous happiness andpain, a type of little girl and noli me tangere
from the start: this Schumann
was already a merely German event in music, no longer a European event
like Beethoven, or, to a still more comprehensive extent, like Mozart.With Schumann, German music was threatened with its greatest dan-ger, that of losing the voice of the European soul and descending to a mere
fatherlandishness. –
– What torture German books are for anyone with a third ear! How re-
luctantly he stands by the slowly revolving quagmire of toneless tonesand rhythms without dance that the Germans call a “book”! And theGermans who read books! How lazily , how grudgingly , how badly they
read! How many Germans know (and require themselves to know) that
there is artin every good sentence! Art that wants to be discerned to the
extent that the sentence wants to be understood! A misunderstandingabout its tempo, for instance, and the sentence itself is misunderstood! Tohave no doubts as to the rhythmically decisive syllables, to feel breaks inthe most stringent of symmetries as deliberate and attractive, to extend
a subtle and patient ear to every staccato and every rubato , guessing the
Do not touch me.
Peoples and fatherlands
meaning of the order of vowels and diphthongs and how tenderly and
richly they can change color and change it again when put next to eachother – who among book-reading Germans is well-meaning enough toacknowledge duties and demands like these and to listen for so much art
and intent in language? In the end, people just do not have “the ear forit,” and so the strongest contrasts in style go unheard and the most subtleartistry is wasted as if on the deaf. – These were my thoughts as I noticed
two masters in the art of prose being crudely and thoughtlessly mistakenfor each other, the one whose words drip down with coldness and hesi-tation, as if from the roof of a damp cave (he counts on their dull soundand resonance) and another who handles his language like a supple rapierand, from his fingers to his toes, feels the dangerous joy of the quivering,
over-sharpened sword that wants to bite, sizzle, cut. –
Rhetoric and National Genius
- German prose suffers because it is written for the eye rather than the ear, lacking the physiological vitality of ancient rhetoric.
- Ancient style was governed by the physical capacity of the lungs and larynx, creating 'periods' that were single-breath units of performance.
- The German pulpit provided the only historical space for artistic rhetoric, making Luther's Bible the definitive masterpiece of German prose.
- Nietzsche distinguishes between 'masculine' peoples who impregnate new orders of life and 'feminine' peoples who refine and bring them to completion.
- National virtues are often just 'tartufferies' or hypocrisies that a people uses to mask its true nature from itself.
We have no real right to the great period, we who are modern, we who are short-winded in every sense!
How little the German style has to do with tones and with ears is shown by
the fact that it is precisely our good musicians who write poorly . Germansdo not read aloud, they do not read for the ear but only with the eye, keep-ing their ears in a drawer in the meantime. When ancient people read, ifthey read at all (it happened seldom enough), it was aloud to themselves,and moreover in a loud voice. People were surprised by someone readingquietly , and secretly wondered why . In a loud voice: that means with allthe swells, inflections, sudden changes in tone, and shifts in tempo that theancient, public world took pleasure in. At that time, the rules for written
style were the same as those for spoken style, and those rules dependedin part on the astonishing development and subtle requirements of theear and larynx, and also, in part, on the strength, endurance, and powerof the ancient lung. What the ancients meant by a period is primarily aphysiological unit insofar as it is combined in a single breath. Periods likethe ones that occur in Demosthenes and Cicero – swelling up twice and
twice sinking down and all within a single breath – those were a delight for
people of antiquity who knew from their own training to value the virtue
of the rarity and difficulty involved in performing periods like these. We
have no real right to the great period, we who are modern, we who are
short-winded in every sense! On the whole, these ancients were them-
selves dilettantes in rhetoric, and therefore authorities, and consequentlycritics – this is how they drove their rhetoricians to extremes. Similarly ,
Beyond Good and Evil
in the previous century , when all the men and women of Italy knew how
to sing, virtuosity in song (and with it the art of melody too –) reached ahigh point. But in Germany there was (until very recently , when a sort ofgrandstand verbosity shyly and awkwardly stirred its young wings) reallyonly one species of public and vaguely artistic rhetoric, and that came
from the pulpit. In Germany , only the preachers knew the weight of aword or syllable, the extent to which a sentence stumbled, sprang, rang,ran, or ran away . They were the only ones with a conscience in their ears,which was often enough an evil conscience: because there was no short-age of reasons why a German of all people should achieve competencein rhetoric infrequently and almost always too late. This is why the mas-
terpiece of German prose is by all rights the masterpiece of its greatest
preacher: the Bible has been the best German book to date. Compared to
Luther’s Bible, almost everything else is merely “literature” – somethingthat had not grown in Germany and for that reason did not grow and isnot growing into German hearts like the Bible did.
There are two types of genius: one that fundamentally begets and wantsto beget, and another that is happy to be impregnated and give birth.Similarly with peoples of genius, there are those who inherit the femaleproblem of pregnancy and the secret task of forming, ripening, and bring-ing to completion – the Greeks, for instance, were this type of people aswell as the French –; and others who need to impregnate and be the causeof new orders of life, – like the Jews, the Romans, and, to pose a modest
question, the Germans? – peoples tortured and delighted by unknownfevers who irresistibly leave themselves, loving and lusting after foreignraces (after ones who “let themselves be impregnated” –) and also domi-
neering, like everything that knows itself to be full of creative forces andconsequently knows of “God’s grace.” These two types of genius look
for each other like men and women; but they also misunderstand eachother, – like men and women.
Every people has its own tartufferies, and calls them its virtues. Y ou donot know – you cannot know – what is best about yourself.
Peoples and fatherlands
The Jewish Influence on Europe
- Europe owes its 'grand style in morality' and the sublime romanticism of moral questioning to the Jewish tradition.
- The author critiques contemporary German nationalism as a series of 'small fits of stupefaction' and 'political infections.'
- Anti-Semitism in Germany is characterized as a reaction of a 'weak and indeterminate' national type that fears being obliterated by a stronger race.
- The Jewish people are described as the strongest and most tenacious race in Europe, possessing a 'resolute faith' that withstands modern ideas.
- Future European political sketches must treat the Jews and Russians as the most certain and probable factors in the coming struggle of forces.
- European nations are currently 'young' and 'in a state of becoming,' lacking the enduring, historical permanence of the Jewish type.
What Europe owes to the Jews? Many things both good and bad, but mainly one thing that is both best and worst: the grand style in morality, the horror and majesty of infinite demands, infinite meanings, the whole romanticism and sublimity of the morally questionable.
What Europe owes to the Jews? Many things both good and bad, but
mainly one thing that is both best and worst: the grand style in moral-ity , the horror and majesty of infinite demands, infinite meanings, thewhole romanticism and sublimity of the morally questionable – and, con-sequently , precisely the most appealing, insidious, and exceptional aspect
of those plays of colors and seductions to life in whose afterglow the sky ofour present European culture, its evening sky , glows away – perhaps goes
away . This is why , among the spectators and philosophers, artists like usregard the Jews with – gratitude.
W e have to accept the fact that all sorts of clouds and disturbances (basi-cally , small fits of stupefaction) drift over the spirit of a people who suffer s
andwants to suffer from national nervous fevers and political ambition.
With today’s Germans, for instance, there is the anti-French stupidityone moment and the anti-Jewish stupidity the next, now the anti-Polishstupidity , now the Christian-Romantic, the Wagnerian, the Teutonic, thePrussian (just look at these poor historians, these Sybels and Treitschkeswith their thickly bandaged heads –), or whatever else they might becalled, these little stupors of the German spirit and conscience. Pleaseforgive the fact that, during a short and risky stay in a badly infectedregion, I did not completely escape this illness either, and like everyoneelse started worrying about things that were none of my business: the firstsign of political infection. About the Jews, for instance: just listen. – I
have yet to meet a German who was well disposed towards Jews. And
however unconditional the rejection of genuine anti-Semitism might be
on the part of every prudent or political person, such prudence and poli-tics are not really aimed at anti-Semitic sentiment in general, but insteadat its dangerous excess, and especially at the outrageous and disgrace-ful expression of this excessive sentiment – this cannot be denied. ThatGermany has ample quantities of Jews, that the German stomach and
the German blood have difficulty (and will continue for a long time tohave difficulty) coping with even this number of “Jews” – as the Italians,the French, the British have coped, due to a stronger digestion –: thisis the clear statement and language of a universal instinct that needs to
Beyond Good and Evil
be listened to and acted on. “Don’t let in any more Jews! And lock the
doors to the east in particular (even to Austria)!” – so commands theinstinct of a people whose type is still weak and indeterminate enoughto blur easily and be easily obliterated by a stronger race. But the Jewsare without a doubt the strongest, purest, most tenacious race living inEurope today . They know how to thrive in even the worst conditions (andactually do better than in favorable ones) due to some virtues that peopletoday would like to see labeled as vices, – above all, thanks to a resolutefaith that does not need to feel ashamed in the face of “modern ideas.”
The Jews change, ifthey change, only in the way the Russian empire
makes its conquests (being an empire that has time and was not made
yesterday): namely , according to the fundamental principle “as slowly as
possible!” A thinker who has Europe’s future on his conscience will, in
every sketch he draws of this future, consider the Jews, like the Russians,to be the most certain and probable factors at present in the great playand struggle of forces. What gets called a “nation” in Europe today (and
is really more a res facta than nata
– every once in a while a res ficta et
pictawill look exactly the same –) is, in any case, something young, easily
changed, and in a state of becoming, not yet a race let alone the sort of aere
perenniusthat the Jewish type is: these “nations” should be on a careful
European Breeding and English Spirit
- The author argues that Jews possess the potential for European dominance but instead desire assimilation and an end to their nomadic existence.
- A proposal is made to integrate Jewish intellect and fortitude with the Prussian military tradition to breed a new ruling caste for Europe.
- The English are characterized as a fundamentally unphilosophical race whose thinkers like Locke and Hume have degraded the concept of philosophy.
- German philosophy, represented by Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, is framed as a necessary rebellion against English mechanistic worldviews.
- Christianity serves as a vital disciplinary tool for the English to manage their inherent brutality, gloominess, and sensuality.
- The author views the 'European problem' as a matter of selective breeding to create a spiritualized and powerful new aristocracy.
To subtler nostrils, even this English Christianity bears the genuinely English odor of the very spleen and alcoholic dissipation against which it is rightly used as a remedy , – the subtler poison treating the cruder.
lookout for any hotheaded rivalry and hostility! The fact that the Jews, ifthey wanted (or if they were forced, as the anti-Semites seem to want),could already be dominant, or indeed could quite literally have control
over present-day Europe – this is established. The fact that they are not
working and making plans to this end is likewise established. Meanwhile,what they wish and want instead, with a unified assertiveness even, is tobe absorbed and assimilated into Europe; they thirst for some place wherethey can be settled, permitted, respected at last and where they can putan end to the nomadic life, the “wandering Jew” –; and this urge andimpulse (which in itself perhaps already reveals a slackening of the Jewishinstincts) should be carefully noted and accommodated – in which caseit might be practical and appropriate to throw the anti-Semitic hooligansout of the country . Approached selectively and with all due caution, theway it is done by the English nobility . It would clearly be unproblematic
Res facta means “something made”; res nata means “something born.”
Something fictitious and unreal.
More enduring than bronze.
Peoples and fatherlands
for the stronger and more strongly delineated types of new Germanism
(the officers of noble rank from the Mark,for instance) to get involved
with them: and it would be very interesting to see whether the genius offortune and fortitude (and above all some spirit and spiritedness, whichare in very short supply in the place just mentioned –) could not be addedinto, bred into, the hereditary art of commanding and obeying – both of
which are classic features of the Mark these days. But I should really breakoff my cheerful speeches and hyper-Germania here, since I am alreadytouching on something I take seriously , on the “European problem” as I
understand it, on the breeding of a new caste to rule Europe. –
This is not a philosophical race – these Englishmen. Bacon signified an
attack on the philosophical spirit in general; Hobbes, Hume, and Locke
indicated a degradation and a depreciation in value of the concept “philo-
sopher” for more than a century . Kant rose up and rebelled against Hume;
and it was Locke about whom Schelling was able to say “ je m´eprise Locke .”
Hegel and Schopenhauer were of one mind (along with Goethe) in the
struggle against the English-mechanistic world-stupidification; those twohostile brother geniuses in philosophy who divided along the opposingpoles of the German spirit and, in the process, wronged each other as onlybrothers can. That fatuous dolt, Carlyle, knew well enough what Englandlacks and has always lacked; Carlyle, that half-actor and rhetorician whotried to conceal under impassioned grimaces what he knew about himself:namely , what he lacked – real power of intellect, real profundity of spiritual
vision, in short: philosophy . It is characteristic of an unphilosophicalrace like this to firmly support Christianity: they need its discipline to be
“moralized” and in some sense humanized. It is just because the Englishare gloomier, stronger-willed, more sensuous, and more brutal than theGermans that they , as the baser of the two, are the more pious as well:they need Christianity that much more. To subtler nostrils, even this
English Christianity bears the genuinely English odor of the very spleenand alcoholic dissipation against which it is rightly used as a remedy , – the
subtler poison treating the cruder. In fact, a subtler poisoning is a sign of
The Mark Brandenburg, the region around Berlin.
“I despise Locke.”
Beyond Good and Evil
progress in crude peoples; it is a step towards spiritualization. The English
The English Spirit and Mediocrity
- The English character is defined by a profound lack of 'music' or rhythm in both soul and body, manifesting as a crude, ungraceful seriousness.
- Mediocre minds like Darwin, Mill, and Spencer are uniquely suited to discovering certain truths because their narrowness allows for diligent, painstaking data collection.
- Higher, creative spirits are ill-equipped for scientific rule-finding because their purpose is to be something new and establish new values rather than just knowing facts.
- The 'modern ideas' of the eighteenth century, often attributed to the French, are actually English in origin and represent a 'total depression' of the European spirit.
- France is credited with inventing European nobility of taste and feeling, while England is blamed for the rise of plebeianism and 'modern' baseness.
The chasm between knowing something and being able to do it is perhaps even greater and more uncanny than it is generally thought to be: people who can do things in the grand style, the creators, might need to be ignorant.
crudeness and peasant-like seriousness is most tolerably disguised (orbetter: explained and reinterpreted) by Christian gestures, prayers, andpsalm-singing. And for that herd of drunken and dissipated cows whoin the past learned to grunt morally under the influence of Methodismand again more recently as a “salvation army ,” – for them, a penitentialspasm just might be the highest level of “humanity” that they can attain:that much you can allow . But what is offensive in even the most humaneEnglishman is his lack of music, speaking metaphorically (and withoutmetaphors –): there is no dance or timing in the movement of his soul andhis body , not even a desire for dance or timing ,f o r “music.” Just listen to
him speak; just watch the most beautiful Englishwomen walk – no other
country on earth has more beautiful doves or swans, – finally , listen tothem sing! But I am asking too much ...
There are truths best known by mediocre minds, because they are best
suited to mediocre minds; there are truths that have a charm and se-ductive allure only for mediocre spirits. W e are coming up against thisperhaps unpleasant proposition right now , since the spirit of worthy butmediocre Englishmen – I mean Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and HerbertSpencer – is starting to come to prominence in the middle regions of
European taste. In fact, who would doubt the utility of having spiritslike these prevail for the time being? It would be a mistake to think that
far-flying spirits of the highest type would be particularly adept at de-tecting, collecting, and drawing conclusions from lots of common littlefacts: – rather, being exceptions, they are not well situated with respectto the “rule.” Ultimately , they have more to do than just to know – theyhave to besomething new , mean something new , and present new values!
The chasm between knowing something and being able to do it is per-haps even greater and more uncanny than it is generally thought to be:people who can do things in the grand style, the creators, might need tobe ignorant. On the other hand, when it comes to scientific discoveries ofa Darwinian type, a certain narrowness, aridity , and diligent, painstakingcare – in short, something English – is not a bad thing to have at your
disposal. – Finally , let us not forget that the English have caused a to-tal depression of the European spirit once already with their profound
Peoples and fatherlands
ordinariness. What people call “modern ideas” or “eighteenth-century
ideas” or even “French ideas” – in other words, what the German spirit
rebelled against in profound disgust –, was English in origin, there is nodoubt about it. The French were just the apes and actors (as well as the bestsoldiers) of these ideas, and unfortunately their first and most thoroughvictims too, since the ˆame fran¸ caise
ended up so sparse and emaciated
from the damned Anglomania of “modern ideas” that people these dayslook back at its sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its profound impas-sioned strength, and its inventive nobility , with something bordering ondisbelief. But we have to hold on to this statement of historical fairnesswith our teeth and defend it against the moment and appearances: theEuropean noblesse (of feeling, of taste, of manner – in short, taking the
word in all its higher senses) – is France’s work and invention; European
baseness, the plebeianism of modern ideas – is England’s .–
The France of Taste
- France remains the center of spiritual and sophisticated culture in Europe, though this 'France of taste' is hidden from the public eye and the democratic bourgeoisie.
- The French elite struggle with an involuntary 'Germanization' of their spirit, as seen in the profound influence of Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Wagner on their modern thinkers and musicians.
- Despite external influences, France maintains superiority through its devotion to 'form' and the concept of 'art for art's sake,' fostering a unique literary chamber music.
- A second pillar of French excellence is its deep-rooted culture of moralism, which produces a psychological sensitivity and curiosity that other nations, particularly Germany, lack.
- Henri Beyle (Stendhal) is highlighted as the ultimate French psychologist and pathfinder who explored the complexities of the European soul long before his contemporaries.
Anyone calling the Germans “naive” on this account is dressing up a deficiency as a compliment.
France is still the seat of the most spiritual and sophisticated culture in
Europe today , and the preeminent school of taste: but you have to knowhow to find this “France of taste.” People belonging to it keep themselveswell hidden: – there might be only a small number of people in whichit loves and lives, people who might not have the sturdiest legs to standon, some of them fatalists, somber and ill, some of them pampered andover the top, people who have the ambition to hide themselves. There is
something they all have in common: they shut their ears to the raging stu-pidity and the noisy jabbering of the democratic bourgeoisie. In fact, it isa coarsened and stultified France that thrashes around in the foregroundthese days, – it recently celebrated a real orgy of bad taste combined withself-admiration at Victor Hugo’s funeral.
They have something else in
common too: the goodwill to ward off spiritual Germanization – and aneven better inability to do it! Perhaps Schopenhauer is more at home andsettled now in this France of the spirit (which is also a France of pes-simism) than he ever was in Germany; not to mention Heinrich Heine,who has been in the flesh and blood of the subtler and more promisinglyric poets of Paris for a while now; or Hegel who, in the form of Taine
French soul.
In .
Beyond Good and Evil
(which is to say: in the form of the foremost living historian), exerts an
almost tyrannical influence these days. But as far as Wagner goes, themore French music learns to develop according to the real needs of the
ˆame moderne ,
the more “Wagnerianized” it becomes; this can be pre-
dicted, – it is already happening now! Nevertheless, there are three thingsthat, even today , the French can proudly exhibit as their heir and theirown and an enduring mark of an old cultural superiority over Europe,in spite of any voluntary or involuntary Germaniza tion or vulgarization
of taste. One is the capacity for artistic passions and devotion to “form,”
for which the phrase l’art pour l’art
(along with a thousand others) was
invented. Things like this have not been absent from France for the lastthree hundred years and, thanks to a reverence for “small numbers,” keepmaking possible a type of literary chamber music that is not to be foundanywhere else in Europe –. The second point on which France can basea claim to superiority over Europe is its old, diverse culture of moralism ,
which means that even among little romanciers
of newspapers and chance
boulevardiers de Parisyou will find, on average, a psychological sensitiv-
ity and curiosity that people in Germany , for instance, have no conceptof (much less the thing itself !). For this, the Germans would need a fewhundred years of moralism which, as I have said, France had not spareditself. Anyone calling the Germans “naive” on this account is dressing upa deficiency as a compliment. (As a contrast to the German inexperienceand innocence in voluptate psychologica
– which is not at all unrelated to
the tedium of German company –, and as the most successful expressionof a genuinely French curiosity and inventiveness in this realm of delicatetremblings, we can name Henri Beyle. This remarkable, anticipatory fore-runner ran with a Napoleonic tempo through hisEurope, through several
centuries of the European soul, as a pathfinder and discoverer of this soul.It took two generations to somehow catch up with him, to guess some of
the riddles that tormented and delighted him, this strange Epicureanand question-mark of a man who was France’s last great psychologist –.)
Modern soul.
Art for art’s sake.
Novelists.
People on the Parisian boulevards.
Taking pleasure in psychology .
Peoples and fatherlands
The Music of Good Europeans
- The French identity represents a unique synthesis of northern and southern temperaments, allowing for a creative range that surpasses the 'anemic' German intellect.
- The 'Good European' is defined as a far-ranging individual who transcends nationalist boundaries and seeks a cultural home beyond their specific fatherland.
- German music is criticized as a sickly, northern phenomenon that pales and fades when confronted with the vitality and 'voluptuous blue' of the Mediterranean.
- A new 'supra-European' music is envisioned—one that is redeemed from northern gloom and remains powerful even in the presence of the desert and beasts of prey.
- This future music would exist beyond the moral categories of good and evil, acting as a hospitable refuge for the fading colors of a dying moral world.
- Nationalist politics are dismissed as a pathological 'nonsense' and a temporary 'entr’acte' that obscures the inevitable movement toward European unity.
I could imagine a music whose rarest magic consisted in no longer knowing anything of good and evil.
There is, in addition, a third claim to superiority: at the core of the
French there is a half-successful synthesis of north and south which letsthem conceive many things and do many others that will never occur to anEnglishman. Using a temperament that is turned periodically towards andaway from the south, and whose Provenc ¸al and Ligurian blood bubbles
over from time to time, the French fortify themselves against the awfulnorthern gray on gray , the sunless concept-ghostliness and anemia, – ourGerman disease of the taste, against whose excess people at the moment
are strongly resolved to prescribe blood and iron:
I mean “great politics”
(following a dangerous medical practice that teaches me to wait and waitbut not, so far, to hope –). And in France there is still a predispositionto understand and accommodate those rarer and rarely satisfied peoplewho are too far-ranging to find satisfaction in any fatherlandishness, andknow how to love the south in the north and the north in the south, –the born Mediterraneans,
the “good Europeans.” – It was for them
that Bizet made music, this last genius to have seen a new beauty and
seduction, – who discovered a piece of the southernness of music .
I recommend taking a number of precautions against German music.
Suppose that someone loves the south like I do, as an immense schoolfor convalescence of both the most spiritual and the most sensual kind,as an unbridled, sun-drenched, sun-transfiguration that spreads across ahigh-handed, self-assured existence: such a person will learn to be some-what careful with German music, because, along with ruining his taste,it will ruin his health again too. If someone like this (who is southernnot by descent but by belief ) dreams about the future of music, he will
also have to dream about music being redeemed from the north, and havethe prelude to a more profound and powerful, perhaps more evil andmysterious music in his ears, a supra-German music that does not fade,yellow , or pale at the sight of the voluptuous blue sea or the luminousMediterranean sky , which is what happens with all German music; asupra-European music that still stands its ground before the brown sun-sets of the desert, whose soul is related to the palm tree, and that knows
Bismarck’s famous phrase.
In German: Mittell¨ andler (literally: people whose country is in the middle).
Beyond Good and Evil
how to wander and to be at home among huge, beautiful, lonely beasts
of prey ...I could imagine a music whose rarest magic consisted in no
longer knowing anything of good and evil – although, perhaps, somesailor’s homesickness, some golden shadow and delicate weakness mightrun across it every now and then: an art that would see colors flyingtowards it from a setting moral world – a distant world that had be-
come almost incomprehensible – and would be hospitable and profoundenough to receive such late refugees. –
Thanks to the pathological manner in which nationalist nonsense hasalienated and continues to alienate the peoples of Europe from eachother; thanks as well to the short-sighted and swift-handed politicianswho have risen to the top with the help of this nonsense , and have no idea
of the extent to which the politics of dissolution that they practice canonly be entr’acte politics, – thanks to all this and to some things that are
strictly unmentionable today , the most unambiguous signs declaring thatEurope wants to be one are either overlooked or willfully and mendaciously
reinterpreted. The mysterious labor in the souls of all the more profoundand far-ranging people of this century has actually been focused on prepar-ing the path to this new synthesis and on experimentally
anticipating the
The Supra-European Higher Men
- Nietzsche identifies a class of 'higher men' like Napoleon, Goethe, and Wagner who transcend nationalistic 'fatherland' identities in favor of a European soul.
- These figures are characterized as 'fanatics of expression' who prioritize effect, showmanship, and the sublime over logic and straight lines.
- Despite their genius, these artists are described as 'Tantaluses of the will'—restless, unconstrained workers who lack the capacity for a noble, slow tempo.
- The text argues that Richard Wagner is fundamentally linked to French romanticism, suggesting his art is supra-German rather than purely nationalistic.
- Ultimately, these great seekers are seen as collapsing before the Christian cross, lacking the profound originality required for a truly antichristian philosophy.
They were all fanatics of expression “at any cost” (I emphasize Delacroix, Wagner’s next of kin), all of them great discoverers in the realm of the sublime as well as the repugnant and repulsive.
Europeans of the future. Only in their foregrounds or in hours of weakness(like old age) were they “fatherlanders,” – they only became “patriots”when they were resting from themselves. I am thinking about people likeNapoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, Schopenhauer:and do not blame me for including Richard Wagner as well; we should notlet his own self-misunderstanding lead us astray – geniuses of his type donot often have the right to understand themselves. Although, admittedly ,it is not so apparent given the rude clamor with which Wagner is resistedand opposed in France today , it nonetheless remains the case that late
French romanticism of the ’ s and Richard Wagner belong most closely
and intimately together. They are related, fundamentally related, in all theheights and depths of their needs: it is the soul of Europe, the one Europe,that presses and yearns upwards and outwards through their multiple and
In German: versuchsweise (see note ,p .above).
Peoples and fatherlands
tumultuous art – towards what? towards a new light? a new sun? But
who could really express something that all these masters of new meansof language did not know how to express clearly? What is certain is thatthe same storm and stress tormented them, that they searched in the same
way , these last great seekers! They were all dominated by literature, up totheir eyes and ears – the first artists with an education in world literature.
For the most part, they were themselves writers, poets, go-betweens andmixers of the arts and the senses (as a musician, Wagner belongs amongpainters, as a poet, among musicians, as an artist in general, among actors);they were all fanatics of expression “at any cost” (I emphasize Delacroix,
Wagner’s next of kin), all of them great discoverers in the realm of thesublime as well as the repugnant and repulsive, even greater discoverers ineffects, in showmanship, in the art of window displays; they were all talentsfar above their genius –, virtuosos through and through, with uncannyaccess to everything tempting, seductive, compelling, and subversive, bornenemies of logic and straight lines, longing for the foreign, the exotic, themonstrous, the crooked, the self-contradictory . As humans, Tantalusesof the will, plebeians on the rise who knew that they were incapableof a noble tempo, a lento , in their life or work (just consider Balzac,
for instance), unconstrained workers, almost destroying themselves withwork: antinomians and agitators when it came to customs, ambitiousand insatiable without equilibrium or enjoyment; and in the end theyall crumbled and sank down in front of the Christian cross (and withcomplete justification: which one of them would have been profoundand original enough for a philosophy of the Antichrist ? –); on the whole,
an adventurously daring, splendidly violent, high-flying, high-ascendingtype of higher men, who first taught their century – and it is the century of
themasses ! – the concept “higher man” ...Let Richard Wagner’s German
friends decide whether there is something purely German about Wagner’sart, or whether it is not distinguished precisely by its derivation fromsupra-German sources and drives; the extent to which Paris in particular
was indispensable for the cultivation of Wagner’s type should not beunderestimated (the profundity of his instincts called him to Paris at thedecisive moment); nor should the extent to which his whole manner andself-apostolate required the model of the French socialists. Perhaps closercomparison will reveal, to the credit of Richard Wagner’s German nature,that he did everything in a stronger, bolder, harder, and higher way thana Frenchman of the nineteenth century could do, – thanks to the fact
Beyond Good and Evil
Nobility and Wagnerian Decay
- Nietzsche contrasts the 'free' and 'anti-romantic' figure of Siegfried with the later, 'priestly' and 'Catholic' turn of Wagner's Parsifal.
- The author critiques Wagner's final works as a 'murky howling' and a betrayal of German strength in favor of Roman religious sentiment.
- Every significant enhancement of the human type has historically been the product of an aristocratic society that believes in a hierarchy of rank.
- The 'pathos of distance'—the gap between a ruling caste and its subjects—is essential for the internal development of higher, more complex states of soul.
- Higher cultures invariably begin with 'barbarians' or 'predatory people' who use their superior strength of will to conquer weaker, more civilized races.
- The noble caste is defined not merely by physical force, but by being 'more complete people,' which Nietzsche equates to being 'more complete beasts.'
The noble caste always started out as the barbarian caste. Their supremacy was in psychic, not physical strength, – they were more complete people (which at any level amounts to saying “more complete beasts” –).
that we Germans are still closer to barbarism than the French are. The
strangest thing that Richard Wagner created might even be inaccessible,incomprehensible, and inimitable to the entire, late, Latinate race, foreverand not just for now: the figure of Siegfried,
thatvery free man, who may
in fact be far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too healthy , too anti-Catholic
for the taste of old and worn-out cultures. He might even have been asin against romanticism, this anti-romantic Siegfried – although Wagnerthoroughly atoned for this sin in his sad old age, when (anticipating a taste
that has since become political) he began preaching, if not traveling, the
way to Rome with a religious vehemence peculiar to himself. – So that
you do not misunderstand these final words of mine, I want to use a fewstrong rhymes; and then even less subtle ears will guess what I want, – whatIh a v e against the “final Wagner” and his Parsifal music.
– Is this still German? –
It’s from a German heart, this murky howling?From German flesh this self-aimed disemboweling?It’s German then, this type of priestly feel,This incense-scented sensuous appeal?This broken, falling, swaggered swaying?This unassured singsong-saying?This nun-eyed Ave -chiming leavening,
This falsely raptured heaven-overheavening?– Is this still German? –Just think! Y ou’re standing there, the doorway’s near,It’s Rome! Rome’s faith without the text, you hear .
Siegfried is the heroic figure of Wagner’s mythological Ring der Nibelungen opera cycle. In his
final opera, Parsifal , Wagner emphasized more explicitly Christian themes.
Part What is noble?
Every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the work of an
aristocratic society – and that is how it will be, again and again, since thissort of society believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctionsbetween men, and in some sense needs slavery . Without the pathos of
distance as it grows out of the ingrained differences between stations, out
of the way the ruling caste maintains an overview and keeps looking downon subservient types and tools, and out of this caste’s equally continuousexercise in obeying and commanding, in keeping away and below – withoutthis pathos, that other , more mysterious pathos could not have grown at
all, that demand for new expansions of distance within the soul itself,the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautlydrawn and comprehensive, and in short, the enhancement of the type“man,” the constant “self-overcoming of man” (to use a moral formula ina supra-moral sense). Of course, you cannot entertain any humanitarianillusions about how an aristocratic society originates (and any elevationof the type “man” will presuppose an aristocratic society –): the truth isharsh. Let us not be deceived about how every higher culture on earthhasbegun ! Men whose nature was still natural, barbarians in every terrible
sense of the word, predatory people who still possessed an unbrokenstrength of will and lust for power threw themselves on weaker, morecivilized, more peaceful races of tradesmen perhaps, or cattle breeders;or on old and mellow cultures in which the very last life-force was flaringup in brilliant fireworks of spirit and corruption. The noble caste alwaysstarted out as the barbarian caste. Their supremacy was in psychic, not
Beyond Good and Evil
physical strength, – they were more complete people (which at any level
amounts to saying “more complete beasts” –).
The Nature of Aristocracy
- Corruption is defined as the internal anarchy of instincts where the foundation of life is shaken.
- The French aristocracy's sacrifice of privileges was not a moral triumph but the final act of a long-term corruption and loss of authority.
- A healthy aristocracy views itself as the ultimate justification for society rather than a functional part of it.
- Social structures exist primarily as a framework to elevate an exceptional type of being to a higher state of existence.
- The aristocracy must accept the sacrifice of others as tools or substructures for its own growth and elevation.
- The principle of mutual non-violence is only applicable between individuals of equal force and cannot serve as a universal social foundation.
Its fundamental belief must always be that society cannot exist for the sake of society, but only as the substructure and framework for raising an exceptional type of being up to its higher duty and to a higher state of being.
Corruption, as an expression of the fact that anarchy threatens inside theinstincts and that the foundation of the affects, which we call “life,” hasbeen shaken: corruption means fundamentally different things, depend-ing on the life-form in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, anaristocracy like that in France at the beginning of the Revolution throws
away its privileges with a sublime disgust and sacrifices itself to an excess
of its moral feeling, then this is corruption. It was really just the final
act of that centuries-long corruption in which the aristocracy graduallyrelinquished its dominant authority and was reduced to a mere function
of the kingdom (and, in the end, to its trinket and showpiece). But theessential feature of a good, healthy aristocracy is that it does not feel that
it is a function (whether of the kingdom or of the community) but insteadfeels itself to be the meaning and highest justification (of the kingdom or
community), – and, consequently , that it accepts in good conscience the
sacrifice of countless people who have to be pushed down and shrunk intoincomplete human beings, into slaves, into tools, all for the sake of the aris-
tocracy . Its fundamental belief must always be that society cannot exist for
the sake of society , but only as the substructure and framework for raisingan exceptional type of being up to its higher duty and to a higher stateofbeing . In the same way , the sun-seeking, Javanese climbing plant called
thesipo matador will wrap its arms around an oak tree so often and for
such a long time that finally , high above the oak, although still supportedby it, the plant will be able to unfold its highest crown of foliage and showits happiness in the full, clear light.
Mutually refraining from injury , violence, and exploitation, placing yourwill on par with the other’s: in a certain, crude sense, these practicescan become good manners between individuals when the right conditionsare present (namely , that the individuals have genuinely similar quanti-ties of force and measures of value, and belong together within a singlebody). But as soon as this principle is taken any further, and maybe even
What is noble?
held to be the fundamental principle of society, it immediately shows it-
Life as Will to Power
- Life is fundamentally defined by appropriation, injury, and the overpowering of the weak and alien.
- Exploitation is not a societal defect but an essential organic function and a primal fact of history.
- A healthy aristocracy treats its members as equals but must act with dominance toward external bodies to remain alive.
- Modern European consciousness mistakenly seeks a future society that eliminates exploitation, which is as impossible as life without organic functions.
- Moralities can be categorized into two recurring types: master morality and slave morality, which often coexist within the same culture or individual.
It will have to be the embodiment of will to power, it will want to grow, spread, grab, win dominance, – not out of any morality or immorality, but because it is alive, and because life is precisely will to power.
self for what it is: the will to negate life, the principle of disintegration
and decay. Here we must think things through thoroughly , and ward offany sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially a process of appropriat-
ing, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, beingharsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least,exploiting, – but what is the point of always using words that have been
stamped with slanderous intentions from time immemorial? Even a bodywithin which (as we presupposed earlier) particular individuals treat eachother as equal (which happens in every healthy aristocracy): if this bodyis living and not dying, it will have to treat other bodies in just thoseways that the individuals it contains refrain from treating each other. It
will have to be the embodiment of will to power, it will want to grow ,spread, grab, win dominance, – not out of any morality or immorality , butbecause it is alive , and because life isprecisely will to power. But there
is no issue on which the base European consciousness is less willing tobe instructed than this; these days, people everywhere are lost in raptur-ous enthusiasms, even in scientific disguise, about a future state of societywhere “the exploitative character” will fall away: – to my ears, that soundsas if someone is promising to invent a life that dispenses with all organicfunctions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupted or imperfect,
primitive society: it belongs to the essence of being alive as a fundamental
organic function; it is a result of genuine will to power, which is just thewill of life. – Although this is an innovation at the level of theory , – at thelevel of reality , it is the primal fact of all history . Let us be honest with
ourselves to this extent at least! –
As I was wandering through the many subtle and crude moralities thathave been dominant or that still dominate over the face of the earth, I foundcertain traits regularly recurring together and linked to each other. Inthe end, two basic types became apparent to me and a fundamental dis-tinction leapt out. There is a master morality and a slave morality ; – I will
immediately add that in all higher and more mixed cultures, attempts tonegotiate between these moralities also appear, although more frequentlythe two are confused and there are mutual misunderstandings. In fact, yousometimes find them sharply juxtaposed – inside the same person even,
Beyond Good and Evil
within a single soul. Moral value distinctions have arisen within either a
The Origin of Noble Morality
- Noble morality originates from a ruling class that defines 'good' as the elevated, proud states of soul found within themselves.
- The primary contrast in this value system is between 'noble' and 'despicable' rather than the later religious concept of 'good' versus 'evil'.
- Aristocratic values prioritize self-glorification, power, and truthfulness, while despising cowardice, narrow utility, and dishonesty.
- Moral judgments were historically applied first to types of people and only derivatively to specific actions.
- The noble person creates values and determines what is honorable based on an over-abundance of power rather than a need for approval.
- This morality rejects pity and disinterestedness, favoring a 'hard heart' and the joyful exercise of severity over oneself.
The noble type of person feels that he determines value, he does not need anyone’s approval, he judges that 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself,' he knows that he is the one who gives honor to things in the first place, he creates values.
dominating type that, with a feeling of well-being, was conscious of thedifference between itself and those who were dominated – or alterna-tively , these distinctions arose among the dominated people themselves,the slaves and dependants of every rank. In the first case, when domi-nating people determine the concept of “good,” it is the elevated, proud
states of soul that are perceived as distinctive and as determining rankorder. The noble person separates himself off from creatures in which theopposite of such elevated, proud states is expressed: he despises them. Itis immediately apparent that, in this first type of morality , the contrastbetween “good” and “bad” amounts to one between “noble” and “despi-
cable” (the contrast between “good” and “ evil ” has a different lineage).
People who were cowardly , apprehensive, and petty , people who thoughtnarrowly in terms of utility – these were the ones despised. But the samecan be said about distrustful people with their uneasy glances, about grov-elers, about dog-like types of people who let themselves be mistreated,about begging flatterers and, above all, about liars: – it is a basic belief ofaristocrats that base peoples are liars. “W e who are truthful” – that is whatthe nobility of ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that moralexpressions everywhere were first applied to people and then, only later
and derivatively , to actions (which is why it is a tremendous mistake when
historians of morality take their point of departure from questions suchas “why do acts of pity get praised?”). The noble type of person feels that
hedetermines value, he does not need anyone’s approval, he judges that
“what is harmful to me is harmful in itself,” he knows that he is the onewho gives honor to things in the first place, he creates values .H eh o n o r s
everything he sees in himself: this sort of morality is self-glorifying. Inthe foreground, there is the feeling of fullness, of power that wants tooverflow , the happiness associated with a high state of tension, the con-sciousness of a wealth that wants to make gifts and give away . The nobleperson helps the unfortunate too, although not (or hardly ever) out ofpity , but rather more out of an impulse generated by the over-abundanceof power. In honoring himself, the noble man honors the powerful as wellas those who have power over themselves, who know how to speak andbe silent, who joyfully exercise severity and harshness over themselves,and have respect for all forms of severity and harshness. “W otan has put
a hard heart in my breast,” reads a line from an old Scandinavian saga:this rightly comes from the soul of a proud Viking. This sort of a man
What is noble?
is even proud of not being made for pity: which is why the hero of the
saga adds, by way of warning, “If your heart is not hard when you areyoung, it will never be hard.” The noble and brave types of people whothink this way are the furthest removed from a morality that sees preciselypity , actions for others, and d´esint´eressement
as emblematic of morality . A
Master and Slave Morality
- Noble morality is characterized by self-pride, a reverence for ancestry, and a fundamental hostility toward the concept of selflessness.
- The powerful believe they owe duties only to their equals, viewing those of 'lower rank' as subjects for pity or indifference who exist beyond their moral scope.
- Noble types utilize enemies as necessary outlets for emotions like jealousy and arrogance, which ultimately allows them to be better friends to their peers.
- Slave morality arises from the oppressed and is defined by a pessimistic suspicion of humanity and a focus on qualities that alleviate suffering, such as pity and humility.
- In slave morality, 'evil' is defined by power and danger, whereas 'good' is associated with being unthreatening, harmless, and even slightly stupid.
- The tension between these systems reveals that 'good' in one framework is often what the other framework finds contemptible or weak.
Wherever slave morality holds sway, language shows a tendency for the words “good” and “stupid” to come closer together.
faith in yourself, pride in yourself, and a fundamental hostility and ironywith respect to “selflessness” belong to a noble morality just as certainlyas does a slight disdain and caution towards sympathetic feelings and“warm hearts.” – The powerful are the ones who know how to honor; it
is their art, their realm of invention. A profound reverence for age andorigins – the whole notion of justice is based on this doub le reverence –, a
faith and a prejudice in favor of forefathers and against future generationsis typical of the morality of the powerful. And when, conversely , peoplewith “modern ideas” believe almost instinctively in “progress” and “thefuture,” and show a decreasing respect for age, this gives sufficient evi-
dence of the ignoble origin of these “ideas.” But, most of all, the moralityof dominating types is foreign and painful to contemporary taste due toits stern axiom that people have duties only towards their own kind; thatwhen it comes to creatures of a lower rank, to everything alien, people areallowed to act as they see fit or “from the heart,” and in any event, “beyondgood and evil” –: things like pity might have a place here. The capacityand duty to experience extended gratitude and vengefulness – both onlyamong your own kind –, subtlety in retaliation, refinement in concepts
of friendship, a certain need to have enemies (as flue holes, as it were,for the affects of jealousy , irascibility , arrogance, – basically , in order to
be a good friend ): all these are characteristic features of noble morality
which, as I have suggested, is not the morality of “modern ideas,” and
this makes it difficult for us to relate to, and also difficult for us to digit up and lay it open. – It is different with the second type of morality ,slave morality . What if people who were violated, oppressed, suffering,
unfree, exhausted, and unsure of themselves were to moralize: what typeof moral valuations would they have? A pessimistic suspicion of the wholecondition of humanity would probably find expression, perhaps a con-demnation of humanity along with its condition. The slave’s gaze resentsthe virtues of the powerful. It is skeptical and distrustful, it has a subtle
mistrust of all the “good” that is honored there –, it wants to convince
Disinterestedness.
Beyond Good and Evil
itself that even happiness is not genuine there. Conversely , qualities that
serve to alleviate existence for suffering people are pulled out and floodedwith light: pity , the obliging, helpful hand, the warm heart, patience, in-dustriousness, humility , and friendliness receive full honors here –, sincethese are the most useful qualities and practically the only way of holdingup under the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially a moral-ity of utility . Here we have the point of origin for that famous oppositionbetween “good” and “ evil.” Evil is perceived as something powerful and
dangerous; it is felt to contain a certain awesome quality , a subtlety andstrength that block any incipient contempt. According to the slave moral-ity then, “evil” inspires fear; but according to the master morality ,i ti s
“good ” that inspires and wants to inspire fear, while the “bad” man is seen
as contemptible. The opposition comes to a head when, following the logicof slave morality , a hint of contempt (however slight and well disposed)finally comes to be associated with even its idea of “good,” because withinthe terms of slave morality , the good man must always be unthreatening :h e
is good-natured, easy to deceive, maybe a bit stupid, un bonhomme .
Wher-
ever slave morality holds sway , language shows a tendency for the words“good” and “stupid” to come closer together. – A final fundamental dis-
tinction: the desire for freedom , the instinct for happiness, and subtleties
The Origin of Vanity
- Love as passion is identified as a noble invention originating from the knightly poetry of Provence and the 'gai saber.'
- Noble individuals find vanity difficult to comprehend because they struggle to imagine seeking validation for qualities they do not believe they possess.
- The noble person derives value from within, whereas the 'base' or dependent person historically only exists as what they are considered to be by others.
- Vanity is defined as a submissive instinct where an individual defers to the opinions of others to determine their own self-worth.
- The democratic mixing of 'master' and 'slave' blood has spread the noble urge for self-defined value, yet the ancient instinct of vanity remains a dominant force.
- Vanity is distinct from arrogance or modesty; it is a specific lack of self-respect where one believes a good opinion they have not earned.
The vain take pleasure in every good opinion they hear about themselves (abstracted entirely from the point of view of utility, and just as much removed from truth or falsity), just as they suffer from every bad opinion.
in the feeling of freedom necessarily belong to slave morals and morality ,just as an artistry and enthusiasm in respect and devotion are invariantsymptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and valuing. – This clearlyshows why love as passion (our European specialty) must have had a purely
noble descent: it is known to have been invented in the knightly poetry ofProvence, by those magnificent, inventive men of the “ gai saber .”
Europe
is indebted to these men for so many things, almost for itself.
Vanity is perhaps one of the most difficult things for a noble person tocomprehend: he will be tempted to keep denying it when a different typeof man will almost be able to feel it in his hands. He has difficulty imag-ining creatures who would try to inspire good opinions about themselvesthat they themselves do not hold – and consequently do not “deserve”
A good simple fellow .
Gay science.
What is noble?
either –, and who would then end up believing these good opinions. For one
thing, this strikes the noble as being so tasteless and showing such a lack ofself-respect, and, for another thing, it seems so baroque and unreasonableto him, that he would gladly see vanity as an exception and stay skeptical inmost of the cases where it is brought up. For example, he will say: “I can bewrong about my own worth and still insist that other people acknowledgeit to be what I say it is, – but that is not vanity (instead, it is arrogance or,
more frequently , it is what they call ‘humility’ or ‘modesty’).” Or alter-
natively: “There are many reasons why I can enjoy other people’s goodopinions, perhaps because I love and honor them and rejoice in each oftheir joys, and perhaps also because their good opinions confirm and re-
inforce my faith in my own good opinion of myself, perhaps because otherpeople’s good opinions are useful or look as though they could be usefulto me, even when I don’t agree with them, – but none of that is vanity .”
It is only when forced (namely with the help of history) that the nobleperson realizes that from time immemorial, in all strata of people who arein some way dependent, base people were only what they were considered
to be : – not being at all accustomed to positing values, the only value the
base person attributes to himself is the one his masters have attributed tohim (creating values is the true right of masters ). W e can see it as the result
of a tremendous atavism that, to this day , ordinary people still wait for an
opinion to be pronounced about themselves before instinctively deferringto it. And this is by no means only the case with “good” opinions – they
defer to bad and unfair ones as well (for instance, just think about most ofthe self-estimations and self-underestimations that devout women acceptfrom their father confessors and, in general, that devout Christians acceptfrom their church). As a matter of fact, in keeping with the slow approachof a democratic order of things (and its cause, the mixing of blood be-tween masters and slaves), the originally rare and noble urge to ascribe toyourself a value that comes from yourself, and to “think well” of yourself
is now increasingly widespread and encouraged. But in every age it isopposed by an older, broader, and more thoroughly ingrained tendency , –and in the phenomenon of “vanity ,” this older tendency gains mastery
over the younger. The vain take pleasure in every good opinion they hear
about themselves (abstracted entirely from the point of view of utility ,and just as much removed from truth or falsity), just as they suffer fromevery bad opinion. This is because they submit – they feel submissive – to
both good and bad opinions out of that oldest instinct of submissiveness
Beyond Good and Evil
The Breeding of Noble Types
- Vanity is described as an atavistic remnant of the slave mentality, where one seeks to seduce others into holding a good opinion of them.
- A species or type becomes sturdy and strong only through a long struggle with constant unfavorable conditions.
- Aristocratic communities function as breeding organizations that prioritize hardness, uniformity, and simplicity to ensure survival.
- Virtue in these societies is defined strictly as the qualities that have allowed the group to prevail against its neighbors and the oppressed.
- Intolerance is viewed as a virtue and a form of justice within aristocratic moralities to prevent the erosion of the type.
- When a society achieves abundance and safety, the tension relaxes, leading to a sudden explosion of variation, individuality, and monstrosity.
The species needs itself to be a species, to be something that, by virtue of its very hardness, uniformity, and simplicity of form, can succeed and make itself persevere in constant struggle with its neighbors.
which erupts within them. – This is “the slave” in the blood of the vain,
a remnant of the mischief of the slave – and how much “slave” is still left
over in women, for instance! –, they try to seduce people into having good
opinions of them. By the same token, it is the slave who submits to theseopinions immediately afterwards, as if he were not the one who had justcalled for them. – And to say it again: vanity is an atavism.
Aspeciesoriginates, a type grows sturdy and strong, in the long struggle
with essentially constant unfavorable conditions. Conversely , people know
from the experience of breeders that species with overabundant diets and,in general, more than their share of protection and care, will immediatelyshow a striking tendency towards variations of the type, and will be rich inwonders and monstrosities (including monstrous vices). Y ou only need tosee an aristocratic community (such as V enice or an ancient Greek polis
)
as an organization that has been established, whether voluntarily or in-voluntarily , for the sake of breeding : the people living there together are
self-reliant and want to see their species succeed, mainly because if theydo not succeed they run a horrible risk of being eradicated. Here there
are none of the advantages, excesses, and protections that are favorableto variation. The species needs itself to be a species, to be somethingthat, by virtue of its very hardness, uniformity , and simplicity of form,can succeed and make itself persevere in constant struggle with its neigh-bors or with the oppressed who are or threaten to become rebellious. Atremendous range of experiences teaches it which qualities are primarilyresponsible for the fact that, despite all gods and men, it still exists, itkeeps prevailing. It calls these qualities virtues, and these are the onlyvirtues it fosters. It does so with harshness; in fact, it desires harshness.Every aristocratic morality is intolerant about the education of the young,disposal over women, marriage customs, relations between old and youngand penal laws (which only concern deviants): – it considers intolerance
itself to be a virtue, under the rubric of “justice.” A type whose traits
are few in number but very strong, a species of people who are strict,warlike, clever, and silent, close to each other and closed up (which gives
In German: Art. In this section, Art is translated as “species” and Typus as “type.”
City-state.
What is noble?
them the most subtle feeling for the charms and nuances of association)
will, in this way , establish itself (as a species) over and above the changeof generations. The continuous struggle with constant unfavorable con-
ditions is, as I have said, what causes a type to become sturdy and hard.But, eventually , a fortunate state will arise and the enormous tension willrelax; perhaps none of the neighbors are enemies anymore, and the meansof life, even of enjoying life, exist in abundance. With a single stroke,the bonds and constraints of the old discipline are torn: it does not seemto be necessary any more, to be a condition of existence, – if it wantedto continue, it could do so only as a form of luxury , as an archaic taste .
Variation, whether as deviation (into something higher, finer, rarer) or
as degeneration and monstrosity , suddenly comes onto the scene in the
greatest abundance and splendor; the individual dares to be individual
The Crisis of Individual Sovereignty
- Historical turning points are characterized by a 'tropical tempo' of growth where explosive egoisms compete for dominance without the constraints of traditional morality.
- The old morality is described as a tensioned bow that has finally been outlived, leaving the individual to create their own laws and methods of self-preservation.
- In this era of decay and new beginnings, the only group with a clear future is the 'hopelessly mediocre,' who survive by propagating a morality of moderation.
- The morality of mediocrity must disguise itself behind concepts like duty and dignity to hide its true nature and inherent irony.
- A soul's true value and rank are revealed through its 'instinct for respect' and its ability to recognize greatness without the protection of social authority.
- The investigation of souls relies on observing how an individual reacts to things of the first rank, especially when those things are disguised or unmarked.
The dangerous and uncanny point has been reached when the greatest, most diverse, most comprehensive life lives past the old morality.
and different. At these turning points of history , a magnificent, diverse,jungle-like growth and upward striving, a kind of tropical tempo in the
competition to grow will appear alongside (and often mixed up and tan-gled together with) an immense destruction and self-destruction. This isdue to the wild egoisms that are turned explosively against each other,that wrestle each other “for sun and light,” and can no longer derive any
limitation, restraint, or refuge from morality as it has existed so far. Itwas this very morality that accumulated the tremendous amount of forceto put such a threatening tension into the bow: – and now it is, now itis being “outlived.” The dangerous and uncanny point has been reachedwhen the greatest, most diverse, most comprehensive life lives past the
old morality . The “individual” is left standing there, forced to give him-self laws, forced to rely on his own arts and wiles of self-preservation,self-enhancement, self-redemption. There is nothing but new whys andhows; there are no longer any shared formulas; misunderstanding is al-lied with disregard; decay , ruin, and the highest desires are horribly en-twined; the genius of the race overflows from every cornucopia of goodand bad; there is a disastrous simultaneity of spring and autumn, filledwith new charms and veils that are well suited to the young, still unex-hausted, still indefatigable corruption. Danger has returned, the motherof morals, great danger, displaced onto the individual this time, ontothe neighbor or friend, onto the street, onto your own child, onto yourown heart, onto all of your own-most, secret-most wishes and wills: andthe moral philosophers emerging at this time – what will they have topreach? These sharp observers and layabouts discover that everything
Beyond Good and Evil
is rapidly coming to an end, that everything around them is ruined and
creates ruin, that nothing lasts as long as the day after tomorrow exceptone species of person, the hopelessly mediocre . Only the mediocre have
prospects for continuing on, for propagating – they are the people ofthe future, the only survivors: “Be like them! Be mediocre!” is the onlymorality that still makes sense, that still finds ears. But this morality ofmediocrity is difficult to preach! It can never admit what it is and whatit wants! It has to talk about moderation and dignity and duty and lovingyour neighbors, – it will have a hard time hiding its irony! –
There is an instinct for rank that, more than anything else, is itself the sign
of ahigh rank; there is a pleasure in nuances of respect that indicates a noble
origin and noble habits. The subtlety , quality , and stature of a soul is putdangerously to the test when something of the first rank passes by beforethe shudders of authority are there to protect it from intrusive clutchesand crudeness: something that goes on its way like a living touchstone,undiscovered, unmarked, and experimenting, perhaps voluntarily cov-ered and disguised. Anyone whose task and exercise is the investigationof souls will use this very art, in a variety of forms, to establish the ultimatevalue of a soul, the unalterable, inborn order of rank it belongs to: thissort of investigator will test out the soul’s instinct for respect .Diff´erence
engendre haine :
many natures have a baseness that suddenly bursts out,
Inheritance and the Noble Soul
- The preservation of the Bible in Europe represents a triumph of discipline, teaching the masses that certain holy experiences must remain untouched by 'dirty hands.'
- Modern scholars and the educated 'demimonde' are criticized for a lack of shame and a vulgar impudence that seeks to touch and taste everything without respect.
- A person's character is an inescapable biological bequest from their ancestors, reflecting their forefathers' habits, virtues, and social standing.
- The 'vulgar' type is defined by a combination of harmful immoderation, petty jealousy, and a clumsy insistence on always being right.
- In a vulgar age, modern education and culture serve primarily as tools of deception to mask one's inherited lineage and spiritual commonness.
It is utterly impossible that a person might fail to have the qualities and propensities of his elders and ancestors in his body: however much appearances might speak against it.
like dirty water, when any sort of holy vessel, any sort of treasure from aclosed shrine, any sort of book that bears the mark of a great destiny iscarried past. On the other hand, there is an involuntary hush, a hesitationof the eye and a quieting of every gesture, all of which indicate that thesoul feels the presence of something deserving the highest honors. The
way in which respect for the Bible has, on the whole, been maintained in
Europe might be the best piece of discipline and refinement in mannersthat Europe owes to Christianity . Books with this sort of profundity andultimate meaning need the protection of an externally imposed tyrannyof authority; this way , they can last through the millennia that are needed
to use them up and figure them out. It is a great achievement when the
“Difference engenders hatred.”
What is noble?
masses (people of all kinds who lack depth or have speedy bowels) have
finally had the feeling bred into them that they cannot touch everything,that there are holy experiences which require them to take off their shoesand keep their dirty hands away , – and this is pretty much as high a levelof humanity as they will ever reach. Conversely , what is perhaps the mostdisgusting thing about so-called scholars, the devout believers in “mod-ern ideas,” is their lack of shame, the careless impudence of their eyes and
hands that touch, taste, and feel everything. And there might still be agreater relative nobility of taste and tactfulness of respect within a people
these days, within a lower sort of people, namely within the peasantry ,than among the newspaper-reading demimonde of the spirit, the educated.
What a man’s forefathers liked doing the most, and the most often, cannot
be wiped from his soul: whether they were diligent savers and accessories
of some writing desk or cash box, modest and middle-class in their wants
and modest in their virtues as well; or whether they lived their lives givingorders from morning to night, fond of rough pleasures and perhaps ofeven rougher duties and responsibilities; or whether they finally sacrificedold privileges of birth and belongings in order to live entirely for theirfaith – their “god” –, being people of a tender and unyielding conscience,
embarrassed by any compromise. It is utterly impossible that a personmight fail to have the qualities and propensities of his elders and ancestors
in his body: however much appearances might speak against it. This isthe problem of race. If you know anything about the ancestors, you candraw conclusions about the child. Some sort of harmful immoderation,some sort of corner jealousy , a clumsy insistence on always being right –together, these three elements have constituted the true “vulgar” type inevery age. And something like this will be passed on to the child just ascertainly as contaminated blood. With the help of the best education andculture, people will only just reach the point of being able to lieabout a
bequest like this. And what else are education and culture for these days! Inour very popular, which is to say vulgar age, “education” and “culture”essentially have to be the art of deception – to deceive about lineage,
about the inherited vulgarity in body and soul. An educator who preachestruthfulness above all else these days and constantly calls for his studentsto “be true! be natural! be what you are!” – after a while, even a virtuous and
Beyond Good and Evil
trusting ass like this will learn to reach for that furca of Horace, in order to
naturam expellere : and with what success? “The vulgar” usque recurret .–
At the risk of annoying innocent ears I will propose this: egoism belongs
The Nature of Nobility
- The noble soul operates on a fundamental belief that subordinate beings must naturally sacrifice themselves to higher types.
- This inherent egoism is not viewed as cruelty or caprice, but as a manifestation of the primordial law of justice.
- Among equals, the noble soul practices a 'celestial mechanics' of mutual reverence and self-limitation, treating others as extensions of its own honor.
- Concepts like mercy are considered senseless among equals, as the noble soul functions through a strict instinct of retribution and exchange.
- The noble soul avoids looking 'upwards,' preferring a horizontal or downward gaze that acknowledges its own high rank.
- Modern European civilization is characterized by a 'self-belittlement' or 'making the heart small' that would offend the sensibilities of ancient Greeks.
As soon as it is clear about this question of rank, it will move among these equals and “equally righted” with an assured modesty and a gentle reverence equal to how it treats itself, in accordance with an inborn, celestial mechanics that all stars know so well.
to the essence of the noble soul. I mean that firm belief that other beingswill, by nature, have to be subordinate to a being “like us” and will have to
sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism withoutany question-mark, and also without feeling any harshness, compulsion,or caprice in it, but rather as something that may well be grounded inthe primordial law of things. If the noble soul were to try to name thisphenomenon, it would call it “justice itself.” It admits to itself, under
certain circumstances (that at first give it pause), that there are otherswith rights equal to its own. As soon as it is clear about this questionof rank, it will move among these equals and “equally righted” with anassured modesty and a gentle reverence equal to how it treats itself, inaccordance with an inborn, celestial mechanics that all stars know so well.This is just another piece of its egoism, this finesse and self-limitation in
dealing with equals – every star is an egoist of this sort. And the noble
soul honors itself in them and in the rights that it gives them; it has no
doubt that the exchange of rights and honors belongs to the natural stateof things too, as the essence of all interaction. The noble soul gives as it
takes, out of the passionate and sensitive instinct of retribution that is sofundamental to it. The concept of “mercy” is senseless and noisome inter
pares ;
there might be a sublime way of letting gifts fall down on you from
above, as it were, and lapping them up like raindrops; but the noble soulhas no talent for this art and conduct. Its egoism gets in the way: it doesnot generally like looking “upwards,” – but rather ahead , horizontally and
slowly , or downwards: – it knows that it is high up .–
“One can only truly admire those who do not seek themselves.” – Goethe
to Rat Schlosser.
“Try expelling nature with a pitchfork and it keeps coming back,” from Horace’s Epistolae ,I ,,
.
Between equals.
What is noble?
The Chinese have an expression that even mothers teach their children:
siao-sin , “make your heart small !” This is the true, basic tendency of late
civilizations: I have no doubt that this sort of self-belittlement would bethe first thing an ancient Greek would notice in us Europeans of today , –and this alone would already “offend his taste.” –
The Commonality of Language
- Words function as acoustic signs for concepts derived from shared groups of sensations and recurring experiences.
- True understanding requires a shared experiential base, which is why communities formed under similar conditions develop a collective identity.
- Language evolves as a process of abbreviation to facilitate rapid agreement, especially under conditions of danger or necessity.
- The need for easy communicability favors the average and the ordinary, as unique or refined experiences are harder to translate into common signs.
- The 'eternal misunderstanding' acts as a protective barrier in relationships where individuals use the same words but possess different inner realities.
- The historical pressure for communication has led to a 'progressus in simile,' where humanity becomes increasingly herd-like and base.
The greater the danger, the greater the need to agree quickly and easily about necessities.
What, in the end, is base?– W ords are acoustic signs for concepts; con-
cepts, though, are more or less determinate pictorial signs for sensationsthat occur together and recur frequently , for groups of sensations. Usingthe same words is not enough to get people to understand each other: theyhave to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences too;ultimately , people have to have the same experience base . This is why a
people in a community will understand each other better than they under-stand people belonging to other groups, even when they all use the samelanguage. Or rather, when individuals have lived together for a long timeunder similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, necessities, work), therearises something that “understands itself ” – a people. In all souls, an equal
number of frequently recurring experiences have gained an upper handover ones that occur less frequently: understanding takes place faster andfaster on this basis (the history of language is the history of a process ofabbreviation); and people join closer and closer together on the basis ofthis understanding. The greater the danger, the greater the need to agreequickly and easily about necessities. Not to misunderstand each other
when there is danger: people require this in order to interact with eachother. In every friendship or relationship, people still put this principleto the test: nothing will last once the discovery is made that one of thetwo feels, means, senses, wishes, fears something different from the otherwhen using the same words. (Fear of the “eternal misunderstanding”:
this is the benevolent genius that so often keeps people of the oppositesex from rushing into relationships at the insistence of their hearts andsenses – and not some Schopenhauerian “genius of the species” –!) What
In German: Gemeinheit . Another possible translation is “common,” which captures the sense of
the word (and the point of the passage) according to which base qualities are found among commonpeople, or are what people have in common. I have chosen to translate gemein as base (both here
and throughout the text) since it captures more of the derogatory connotations of the term.
Beyond Good and Evil
group of sensations in a soul will be the first to wake up, start speaking,
and making demands is decisive for the whole rank order of its values, andwill ultimately determine its table of goods. A person’s valuations revealsomething about the structure of his soul and what the soul sees as its
conditions of life, its genuine needs. Now , assuming that needs have onlyever brought people together when they could somehow indicate similarrequirements and similar experiences with similar signs, then it follows,on the whole, that the easy communicability of needs (which ultimatelymeans having only average and base experiences) must have been the most
forceful of the forces that have controlled people so far. People who aremore alike and ordinary have always been at an advantage; while peo-ple who are more exceptional, refined, rare, and difficult to understand
will easily remain alone, prone to accidents in their isolation and rarely
propagating. Immense countervailing forces will have to be called uponin order to cross this natural, all-too-natural progressus in simile ,
people
becoming increasingly similar, ordinary , average, herd-like, – increasingly
base !
The more a psychologist – a born, inevitable psychologist and unriddler
The Psychologist's Heavy Burden
- The psychologist faces a constant risk of being overwhelmed by pity as they witness the inevitable ruin of 'higher' or exceptional souls.
- To survive their own insights, psychologists often seek refuge in the company of 'normal' people as a form of escape and forgetting.
- There is a profound disconnect between the public's worship of 'great men' and the psychologist's perception of them as suffering, 'sacrificial animals.'
- Historical greatness is often a counterfeit narrative; the 'work' created by an artist or statesman serves as a mask that hides their inner corruption and cracks.
- Exceptional creators like Byron or Poe are described as 'men of the moment' who use their art to take revenge for internal failures or to seek forgetfulness.
- Women often perceive the suffering of these higher men and offer a devoted pity that the masses misunderstand and that ultimately overestimates the power of love.
Success has always been the greatest liar, – and the “work” itself is a success.
of souls – turns to exceptional cases and people, the greater the danger
that he will be choked with pity: he needs hardness and cheerfulness more
than anyone else. The ruin, the destruction of higher people, of strangelyconstituted souls, is the rule: it is horrible always to have a rule like thisin front of your eyes. The manifold torment of the psychologist whodiscovered this destruction, who first discovered and then kept rediscov-ering (in almost every case) the whole inner “hopelessness” of the higher
person, the eternal “too late!” in every sense, throughout the entirety of
history , – this torment might make him turn bitterly against his own lotone day and try to destroy himself, – to “ruin” himself. In almost ev-
ery psychologist, you find a telling inclination and preference for dealingwith normal, well-ordered people. This reveals that the psychologist isin constant need of a cure, of a type of forgetting and escape from thethings that make his insight and incisiveness, that make his “craft” weighheavily on his conscience. It is characteristic of him to be afraid of his
Continuation of the same thing.
What is noble?
memory . He is easily silenced by other people’s judgments: he listens
with an unmoved face to how they honor, admire, love, and transfigurewhat he has seen , – or he keeps his silence hidden by expressly agree-
ing with some foreground opinion. Perhaps the paradox of his conditionbecomes so horrible that the masses, the educated, the enthusiasts, de-velop a profound admiration for the very things he has learned to regardwith profound pity and contempt, – they admire the “great men” and
prodigies who inspire people to bless and honor the fatherland, the earth,the dignity of humanity , and themselves, “great men” who are pointedout to young people for their edification ...And who knows if this is not
just what has happened in all great cases so far: the masses worshiped aGod, – and that “God” was only a poor sacrificial animal! Success has
always been the greatest liar, – and the “work” itself is a success. The greatstatesman, the conqueror, the discoverer – each one is disguised by hiscreations to the point of being unrecognizable. The “work” of the artist,of the philosopher, is what invents whoever has created it, whoever wassupposed to have created it. “Great men,” as they are honored, are minor
pieces of bad literature, invented after the fact; in the world of historicalvalues, counterfeit rules . These great authors, for example, this Byron,
Musset, Poe, Leopardi, Kleist, Gogol, – they are, and perhaps have tobe men of the moment, excited, sensual, and childish, thoughtless andsudden in trust and mistrust; with souls that generally hide some sortof crack; often taking revenge in their work for some inner corruption,often flying off in search of forgetfulness for an all-too-faithful memory ,often getting lost in the mud and almost falling in love with it until theybecome like the will-o’-the-wisps around swamps and pretend to be stars
(then people might call them idealists), often fighting a prolonged disgust,a recurring specter of unbelief that makes them cold and forces them topine for gloria
and to feed on “faith in itself ” from the hands of drunken
flatterers. What torture these great artists and higher people in general are
for anyone who has ever guessed what they really are! It is easy to imaginethat these men will soon be subject to eruptions of boundless and most
devoted pity from women in particular (who are clairvoyant in the world
of suffering and whose desires to help and save far exceed their ability toactually do so). The masses, the adoring masses, above all, do not under-stand this pity , and they pile all sorts of nosy and smug interpretations
Fame.
Beyond Good and Evil
on it. This pity is continually deceived as to its own strength; women
would like to believe that love makes all things possible, – this is their true
The Masks of Noble Suffering
- The text suggests that even the deepest human love is often impoverished and more likely to destroy than to rescue.
- Jesus is interpreted as a martyr of love who, being insatiable and unsatisfied, invented a God of total love to compensate for human poverty.
- Profound suffering creates a spiritual hierarchy and a sense of 'noble' separation from those who have not experienced equal pain.
- Sufferers often employ masks—such as cheerfulness, science, or even stupidity—to protect their inner shattered state from intrusive pity.
- A refined humanity respects these masks and avoids the vulgarity of psychological curiosity in the wrong places.
- The highest instinct of cleanliness and the rejection of human 'filth' creates a dangerous solitude that defines the nature of holiness.
There are 'cheerful people' who use cheerfulness because it lets them be misunderstood: – they want to be misunderstood.
faith . Oh, those who know hearts can guess how impoverished, stupid,
helpless, presumptuous, and mistaken even the best and deepest love re-ally is – how much more likely it is to destroy than to rescue! – It ispossible that one of the most painful cases of the martyrdom of knowl-
edge about love lies hidden under the holy fable and disguise of the life
of Jesus: the martyrdom of the most innocent and wishful of hearts, whonever had enough of human love, who asked for nothing other than tolove and be loved, but who asked it with harshness, with madness, withhorrible outbursts against anyone refusing to love him; the story of apoor man who was unsatisfied and insatiable in love, who had to inventhell for there to be somewhere to send people who did not want to love
him, – and who, in the end, having learned about human love, had toinvent a God who was all love and all ability to love, – who had mercy on
human love for being so desperately poor and ignorant! – Anyone whofeels this way , anyone who knows this about love – will look for death. –
But why give yourself up to such painful things? Assuming you do nothave to. –
The spiritual arrogance and disgust of anyone who has suffered deeply(order of rank is almost determined by just how deeply people can suf-
fer), the trembling certainty that saturates and colors him entirely , a cer-tainty that his sufferings have given him a greater knowledge than the
cleverest and wisest can have, that he knows his way around and wasonce “at home” in many distant and terrifying worlds that “ you don’t
know anything about!” ...this spiritual, silent arrogance of the sufferer,
this pride of knowledge’s chosen one, its “initiate,” almost its martyr,needs all kinds of disguises to protect itself from the touch of intru-sive and pitying hands, and in general from everyone who is not itsequal in pain. Profound suffering makes you noble; it separates. Oneof the most refined forms of disguise is Epicureanism, and a certainshowy courage of taste that accepts suffering without a second thoughtand resists everything sad and profound. There are “cheerful people”who use cheerfulness because it lets them be misunderstood: – theywant to be misunderstood. There are “scientific people” who use science
What is noble?
because it gives a cheerful appearance, and because being scientific implies
that a person is superficial: – they want to encourage this false inference.
There are free, impudent spirits who would like to hide and deny that theyare shattered, proud, incurable hearts; and sometimes even stupidity isthe mask for an ill-fated, all-too-certain knowing. – From which it followsthat a more refined humanity will have great respect for “masks,” and will
not indulge in psychology and curiosity in the wrong place.
The thing that separates two people the most is a difference in theirsense and degree of cleanliness. All the good behavior, mutual utility , andgoodwill in the world will not help: what matters, in the end, is that they“can’t stand the smell of each other!” The highest instinct of cleanlinessputs someone afflicted with it into the strangest and most dangeroussolitude, in the form of a holy saint: because this is what holiness is – thehighest spiritualization of this instinct. Some sort of shared knowledge ofan indescribable abundance of joy in bathing, some sort of lust and cravingthat constantly drives the soul out of the night and into the morning, outof dullness and gloom into light, radiance, profundity , finesse –: h owever
much a tendency like this characterizes somebody (it is a noble tendency),
itseparates him out as well. – The pity of the saint is a pity for the filth of
the human, all-too-human. And there are degrees and heights where hefeels even pity as a form of pollution, as filth ...
Signs of nobility: never thinking about debasing our duties into duties
The Tragedy of Higher Souls
- The individual striving for greatness views others primarily as tools, obstacles, or temporary resting places, leading to a profound and poisonous solitude.
- Higher individuals often fail to act because they require a rare confluence of luck and timing to 'explode' into action before their strength is depleted by waiting.
- Genius may not be rare, but the specific external conditions and 'five hundred hands' required to seize the right moment are exceptionally scarce.
- Noble souls are more vulnerable than lower souls; their complexity makes them more prone to irreparable damage and destruction compared to cruder, more resilient natures.
- The 'melancholy of everything finished' arises from the realization that the wisdom required for a task is often only gained through the process of completing it too late.
- Deeply sorrowful people handle happiness with a desperate, suffocating grip, driven by the constant fear that it will inevitably escape them.
And every once in a while, the alarm call will come too late, the chance event that gives them “permission” to act, – just when the prime of youth and strength for action has already been depleted by sitting still.
for everyone, not wanting to relinquish, not wanting to share your ownresponsibility; considering privileges and the exercise of these privilegesas aduty .
Someone who strives for greatness will regard everyone he comes across as
either a means or a delay and obstacle – or as a temporary resting place. Hisdistinctive and superior graciousness towards his fellow creatures is only
possible when he is at his best, at his height, and dominating. Impatience
Beyond Good and Evil
and his awareness of being condemned to comedy until then (since even
war is a comedy and concealment, just as every means conceals the end)ruins all company for him. This type of person knows solitude and whatis most poisonous about it.
The problem of those who wait . Strokes of luck and many unpredictable
factors are needed for a higher person, who contains the dormant solutionto a problem, to go into action at the right time, “into explosion” you mightsay . This does not usually happen, and in every corner of the earth people
sit waiting, hardly knowing how much they are waiting, much less thatthey are waiting in vain. And every once in a while, the alarm call willcome too late, the chance event that gives them “permission” to act, – justwhen the prime of youth and strength for action has already been depletedby sitting still. And how many people have realized in horror, just as they“jump up,” that their limbs have gone to sleep and their spirit is alreadytoo heavy! “It’s too late” – they say , having lost faith in themselves andbeing useless from this point on. – What if in the realm of genius, the“Raphael without hands”
(taking that phrase in the broadest sense) is
not the exception but, perhaps, the rule? Perhaps genius is not rare atall: what is rare is the five hundred hands that it needs to tyrannize the
και/rho1 ´oς, “the right time,” in order to seize hold of chance!
People who do not want to see someone’s height will look all the more
closely at everything about him that is low and in the foreground – in sodoing, they show themselves for what they really are.
With every type of wound and loss, the lower, cruder soul is better offthan the nobler soul. The dangers for the nobler soul must be greater;the likelihood that it will get into an accident and be destroyed is trulyenormous, given the diversity of its conditions of life. – When a lizard
loses a finger, it grows back: not so with people. –
This phrase from Lessing’s Emilia Galotti , act I, scene .
What is noble?
– Bad enough! The same old story! When you have finished building
your house, you suddenly notice that you have learned something in theprocess that you absolutely needed to know before you started build-
ing. The eternal, tiresome “too late!” – The melancholy of everything
finished !...
– Wanderer, who are you? I watch you go on your way , without scorn,
without love, with impenetrable eyes – damp and downhearted, like aplumb line that returns unsatisfied from every depth back into the light(what was it looking for down there?), with a breast that does not sigh, withlips that hide their disgust, with a hand that only grips slowly: who are you?What have you done? Take a rest here, this spot is hospitable to everyone, –relax! And whoever you may be: what would you like now? What do youfind relaxing? Just name it: I’ll give you whatever I have! – “Relaxing?Relaxing? How inquisitive you are! What are you saying! But please, giveme – –” What? What? Just say it! – “ Another mask! A second mask!” ...
People with deep sorrows reveal this fact about themselves when they are
happy: they have a way of grasping hold of happiness, as if they wantedto crush or suffocate it, out of jealousy . Oh, they know only too well thatit will run away from them!
“Too bad! What? Isn’t he going – backwards?” – Y es! But you understandhim badly if you complain about it. He is going backwards like someonewho wants to take a great leap. – –
The Noble Soul's Solitude
- The author expresses a profound distrust in the possibility of self-knowledge, viewing the concept of immediate self-knowledge as a logical contradiction.
- A high and discriminating soul faces the constant danger of 'after-dinner nausea' when forced to consume the vulgarity of a noisy age.
- Noble self-control is demonstrated by praising things one disagrees with, thereby avoiding the bad taste of self-praise.
- The 'asinine inference' that praise implies agreement attracts unwanted company, forcing the hermit to seek more subtle environments.
- True nobility involves maintaining a proud composure and treating one's own emotions and affects as tools to be used at will.
- Solitude is characterized as a sublime virtue and a necessary impulse for cleanliness, as social contact is viewed as inherently debasing.
Thrown into a noisy, vulgar age and not wanting to eat out of a single one of its bowls, he can easily die of hunger and thirst, or, if he finally 'digs in' anyway, he can be destroyed – by sudden nausea.
– “Will anyone believe me? But I insist on being believed: I have neverbeen good at thinking about myself, and do so only on very rare occasions,only when forced, without any desire to pursue ‘the matter,’ ready to
Beyond Good and Evil
digress away from ‘me,’ never with any faith in the results, all due to an
unconquerable distrust in the possibility of self-knowledge that has led me
to the point where I sense a contradictio in adjectoin even the concept
of ‘immediate knowledge’ that is permitted by theoreticians. This wholestate of affairs might be the most certain thing I doknow about myself.
I must have a kind of revulsion against believing anything definite about
myself. Could there be a riddle here? Probably; but fortunately not oneformy teeth. – Could this reveal what species I belong to? – But not to
me: which is just how I want it to be. –”
“But what happened to you?” – “I don’t know ,” he said hesitantly; “maybethe harpies flew over the table at me.” – Every once in a while these days,a mild, moderate, restrained person will fly into a sudden fury , smashdishes, knock over tables, scream, throw fits, insult everyone – and finallygo off, ashamed, furious at himself, – but where? And why? To starve faraway? To choke on his memory? – The danger will always be considerablefor someone with the desires of a high and discriminating soul, who rarelyfinds his table set and his food ready: today , however, the danger will beextraordinary . Thrown into a noisy , vulgar age and not wanting to eat outof a single one of its bowls, he can easily die of hunger and thirst, or, if hefinally “digs in” anyway , he can be destroyed – by sudden nausea. – W e
have probably all sat at tables where we did not belong; and the most spir-itual among us (who are also the most difficult to feed), are familiar withthat dangerous dyspepsia that comes from a sudden insight into and disap-pointment over our food and dining companions, – the after-dinner nausea .
It shows both subtle and noble self-control when you reserve your praise
(assuming you want to give praise at all) for things you disagree with: –
otherwise you would certainly be praising yourself, which offends goodtaste. Of course, this type of self-control offers people a handy opportunityand excuse for constantly misunderstanding you. In order to allow yourself
this real luxury of taste and morality , you cannot live with fools of the spirit;you have to live among people whose misunderstandings and mistakes
Contradiction in terms.
What is noble?
are subtle, and for that reason still amusing – or else you will have to
pay dearly for it! – “He praises me: that’s why he agrees with me” – this
asinine inference ruins the better part of life for us hermits, because itbrings asses into our neighborhood and friendship.
To live with immense and proud composure; always beyond –. To freelyhave or not have your affects, your pros and cons, to condescend to themfor a few hours; to seat yourself on them like you would on a horse or
often like you would on an ass: – since you need to know how to use yourstupidity as well as you know how to use your fire. To keep your threehundred foregrounds, and your dark glasses too: because there are timeswhen nobody can look into our eyes, or even less into our “grounds.” Andto choose for company that mischievous and cheerful vice, politeness.And to keep control over your four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy ,solitude. Because solitude is a virtue for us, since it is a sublime inclina-tion and impulse to cleanliness which shows that contact between people(“society”) inevitably makes things unclean. Somewhere, sometime, everycommunity makes people – “base.”
The greatest events and thoughts – but the greatest thoughts are the
The Nature of Nobility
- Great events and profound spirits are often invisible to their contemporaries, much like the delayed light from distant stars.
- Nobility is not defined by actions or works, which are inherently ambiguous and unfathomable, but by an internal state of being.
- The defining characteristic of a noble soul is a fundamental certainty and a deep-seated reverence for itself.
- Spirit is often something people attempt to hide, sometimes using enthusiasm or virtue as a mask to appear more common.
- The hermit-philosopher uses writing as a means of concealment rather than revelation, suggesting that every expressed opinion is merely a foreground.
- True depth implies an infinite regression of 'caves' or layers, where every foundation hides a deeper abyss beneath it.
The hermit does not believe that a philosopher – given that a philosopher was always a hermit first – has ever expressed his actual and final opinions in books: don’t people write books precisely to keep what they hide to themselves?
greatest events – are the last to be comprehended: generations that aretheir contemporaries do not experience these sorts of events, – they live
right past them. The same thing happens here as happens in the realmof stars. The light from the furthest stars is the last to come to people;and until it has arrived, people will deny that there are – stars out there.
“How many centuries does it take for a spirit to be comprehended?” – this
standard is also used to create the rank order and etiquette needed – byboth spirit and star. –
“The vision is free here and the spirit elevated.”– But there is an inverse
type of person who is also at a height and also has a free vision – but wholooks down .
Cf. Goethe’s Faust II, line f.
Beyond Good and Evil
– What is noble? What does the word “noble” still mean to us today? How
do noble people reveal who they are, how can they be recognized underthis heavy , overcast sky of incipient mob rule that makes everything leadenand opaque? – There are no actions that prove who they are, – actionsare always ambiguous, always unfathomable –; and there are no “works”
either. Among artists and scholars these days, you will find plenty ofpeople whose works reveal them to be driven by a deep desire for nobility .But this very need fornobility is fundamentally different from the needs
ofthe noble soul itself, and almost serves as an eloquent and dangerous
testimony to the absence of such needs. It is not works, it is faith that is
decisive here, faith that establishes rank order (this old, religious formulanow acquires a new and deeper meaning): some fundamental certaintythat a noble soul has about itself, something that cannot be looked for,cannot be found, and perhaps cannot be lost either. – The noble soul has
reverence for itself .–
There are people who cannot avoid the fact that they have spirit, how-
ever much they might turn and twist, holding up their hands to preventtheir eyes from giving them away (– as if their hands did not betraythem too! –): in the end, they are always shown to be hiding something,namely spirit. One of the most subtle ways of deceiving people (at leastfor as long as this is possible), and successfully pretending to be morestupid than you really are (a skill that is as handy as an umbrella, inday-to-day life), is enthusiasm : including what belongs to it – virtue, for
instance. Because, as Galiani said, and he must have known –: vertu est
enthousiasme .
In a hermit’s writings, you can always hear something of the echo of the
desert, something of the whisper and the timid sideways glance of solitude.A new and more dangerous type of silence, of concealment, rings out inhis strongest words, even in his cries. Anyone who has sat alone with
“Virtue is enthusiasm” from Galiani’s Letter to Madame d’Epinay , II, p. .
What is noble?
his soul in intimate dispute and dialogue, year in, and year out, day and
night, anyone who has become a cave bear or treasure hunter or treasureguard and dragon in his cave (which might be a labyrinth but also a goldmine): his very concepts will come to acquire their own twilight color, thesmell of depth just as much as of mildew , something uncommunicativeand reluctant that blows a chill on everything going past. The hermitdoes not believe that a philosopher – given that a philosopher was alwaysa hermit first – has ever expressed his actual and final opinions in books:don’t people write books precisely to keep what they hide to themselves?In fact, he will doubt whether a philosopher could even have “final and
actual” opinions, whether for a philosopher every cave does not have,must not have, an even deeper cave behind it – a more extensive, stranger,
richer world above the surface, an abyss behind every ground, under every
“groundwork.”
Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy – that is
a hermit’s judgment: “There is something arbitrary in hisstopping here,
Masks, Philosophers, and Golden Laughter
- Every philosophy and opinion serves as a mask or hiding place, suggesting that profound thinkers fear being truly understood more than being misunderstood.
- Human morality is described as a 'brave and lengthy falsification' that allows humans to view their complex, opaque souls with pleasure and simplicity.
- A true philosopher is defined as a fatal being who experiences thoughts as external lightning bolts and is constantly fleeing from yet returning to themselves.
- Nietzsche distinguishes between the valuable pity of a 'natural master' and the morbid, unmanly 'cult of suffering' prevalent in modern European sentimentality.
- A hierarchy of philosophers can be established based on the quality of their laughter, culminating in a 'golden laughter' that even gods use to mock the serious.
Every philosophy conceals a philosophy too: every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is also a mask.
looking back, looking around, in his not digging any deeper here , and
putting his spade away – there is also something suspicious about it.”Every philosophy conceals a philosophy too: every opinion is also a hiding
place, every word is also a mask.
Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of beingmisunderstood. The latter might hurt his vanity; but the former hurts hisheart and his sympathy which always says: “Oh, why do you want thingsto be as hard for you as they are for me?”
The human being is a diverse, hypocritical, artificial, and opaque animal,
uncanny to other animals more because of his cunning and cleverness thanhis strength; the human being invented good conscience so that he couldenjoy his soul as something simple , for once; and the whole of morality is
a brave and lengthy falsification that makes it possible to look at the soulwith anything like pleasure. Perhaps this point of view involves a muchbroader conception of “art” than people are used to.
In German: ein Abgrund hinter jedem Grunde, unter jeder “Begr¨ undung.”
Beyond Good and Evil
A philosopher: this is a person who constantly experiences, sees, hears,
suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by hisown thoughts as if from outside, from above and below , as if by histype
of events and lightning bolts; who is perhaps a storm himself, pregnantwith new lightning; a fatal person in whose vicinity things are always
rumbling, growling, gaping, and acting in uncanny ways. A philosopher:oh, a being who is frequently running away from himself, frequently afraid
of himself, – but too curious not to always come back to himself ...
A man who says: “I like that, I’ll take it for my own and protect it and
defend it against everyone”; a man who can conduct business, carry outa resolution, be faithful to a thought, hold on to a woman, punish anddefeat someone for being insolent; a man who has his anger and his sword,and whom the weak, the suffering, the distressed, and even the animalslike to come to and, by nature, belong to; in short, a man who is naturallymaster , – if a man like this has pity , well then! this pity is worth something!
But what good is the pity of the sufferer!
Or particularly , the pity of
those who preach it! Almost everywhere in Europe today , there is a morbidover-sensitivity and susceptibility to pain, as well as an excessive amountof complaining and an increased tenderness that wants to dress itself up assomething higher, using religion as well as bits and pieces of philosophy , –there is a real cult of suffering. The unmanliness of what is christened “pity”
in the circles of these enthusiasts is always, I think, the first thing thatstrikes your eye. – This latest type of bad taste needs to be forcefully andthoroughly exorcized; and ultimately , I would like people to put the goodamulet of “ gai saber ” around their hearts and necks to fight it off, – “gay
science,” to make it germane to Germans.
The Olympian vice. – In spite of that philosopher who, being a true
Englishman, tried to give laughter a bad reputation among all thoughtful
Nietzsche is again playing on the similarity between Mitleiden (pity) and leiden (to suffer).
In German: um es den Deutschen zu verdeutlichen (literally: to clarify it to Germans).
What is noble?
people –, “laughter is a terrible infirmity of human nature, and one that
every thinking mind will endeavor to overcome” (Hobbes) –, I would go
so far as to allow myself a rank order of philosophers based on the rankof their laughter – right up to those who are capable of golden laughter.
And given that even gods philosophize (a conclusion I have been drawnto many times –), I do not doubt that they know a new and super-humanway of laughing – at the expense of everything serious! Gods like to makefun of things: it seems as if they cannot stop laughing, even during holyrites.
The Genius of the Heart
- The 'genius of the heart' is described as a seductive force that compels souls to listen, smoothing out rough spirits and awakening new desires.
- This force acts as a divining rod, uncovering hidden goodness and spiritual treasures buried beneath layers of dullness and 'mud.'
- Contact with this spirit does not provide simple happiness, but instead leaves the individual 'broken open' and enriched with unnamed hopes and new wills.
- The author identifies this mysterious tempter god as Dionysus, claiming to be the last disciple and initiate of his secret philosophy.
- A provocative claim is made that Dionysus is a philosopher, suggesting that even gods engage in the dangerous and uncanny act of philosophizing.
- The philosophy of Dionysus is characterized by undertones and secrets that are foreign, strange, and potentially threatening to the status quo.
Even the fact that Dionysus is a philosopher and that, consequently, even gods philosophize, seems to me like something new and not without its dangers, something that might arouse suspicion.
The genius of the heart, as it is possessed by that great hidden one, thetempter god
and born pied piper of consciences, whose voice knows
how to descend into the underworld of every soul, whose every word
and every glance conveys both consideration and a wrinkle of temptation,
whose mastery includes an understanding of how to seem – not like whathe is but rather like one more compulsion for his followers to keep pressing
closer to him, to keep following him more inwardly and thoroughly: – thegenius of the heart, that makes everything loud and complacent fall silentand learn to listen, that smoothes out rough souls and gives them thetaste of a new desire, – to lie still, like a mirror that the deep sky canmirror itself upon –; the genius of the heart, that teaches the foolish andover-hasty hand to hesitate and reach out more delicately; that guesses thehidden and forgotten treasure, the drop of goodness and sweet spiritualityunder thick, dull ice, and is a divining rod for every speck of gold that haslong been buried in a prison of mud and sand; the genius of the heart,that enriches everyone who has come into contact with it, not makingthem blessed or surprised, or leaving them feeling as if they have beengladdened or saddened by external goods; rather, they are made richer inthemselves, newer than before, broken open, blown on, and sounded outby a thawing wind, perhaps less certain, more gentle, fragile, and broken,but full of hopes that do not have names yet, full of new wills and currents,full of new indignations and countercurrents ...but what am I doing, my
friends? Who am I talking about? Have I forgotten myself so much that Ihaven’t even told you his name? Unless you have already guessed on your
In German: Versucher-Gott . This could also mean the “experimenting god.”
Beyond Good and Evil
own who this questionable spirit and god is, who wants to be praised in
this way?
Like everyone who, from childhood, has constantly been underway
and abroad, I have had many strange and not unthreatening spirits runacross my path, but especially the one I have just been talking about, whohas crossed my path again and again – in other words, nobody less than
the god Dionysus , that great ambiguity and tempter god, to whom, as
you know , I once offered my firstborn
in all secrecy and reverence. I
seem to be the last one to have offered him a sacrifice : because I have not
found anyone who understood what I was doing then. In the meantime,I have learned much, all too much more about the philosophy of thisgod, passed on, as I said, from mouth to mouth – I, the last discipleand initiate of the god Dionysus: and can I, at last, start to give you,my friends, a small taste of this philosophy , as far as I am permitted? Inundertones, which would be best, since it concerns many things that aresecret, new , foreign, strange, uncanny . Even the fact that Dionysus is a
philosopher and that, consequently , even gods philosophize, seems to me
like something new and not without its dangers, something that might
The Tempter God's Smile
- The narrator recounts a dialogue with a 'tempter god' who rejects human notions of virtue and shame, preferring a raw and naked honesty.
- This divinity, identified as Dionysus, expresses a paradoxical love for humans as inventive animals that navigate the labyrinths of existence.
- The god's goal for humanity is to make them 'stronger, more evil, and more profound,' suggesting that true nobility lies beyond conventional morality.
- The author reflects on the limitations of writing, lamenting that once thoughts are captured on paper, they lose their vital, 'wicked' spark and become boring truths.
- The text concludes with a transition to a celebratory 'Aftersong,' shifting from philosophical isolation to a longing for the arrival of friends at the 'noon of life.'
“I think humans are pleasant, brave, inventive animals that have no equal on earth, they find their way around any labyrinth.”
arouse mistrust precisely among philosophers, – among you, my friends,it has less opposition, unless it comes too late and at the wrong time: I havebeen told that you do not like believing in God and gods these days. Andperhaps in recounting my story , I will have to take frankness further thanwill always be agreeable to the strict habits of your ears? Certainly , thegod in question went further in dialogues like this, much, much further,and was always many steps ahead of me ...In fact, if it were permissible
to follow human custom in ascribing beautiful, solemn names of splendorand virtue to him, I would have to offer many praises for his explorer’s,discoverer’s heart, for his daring and genuine honesty , his truthfulnessand his love of wisdom. But a god like this will have no use at all for thishonorable rubbish and splendor. “Keep this for yourself,” he would say ,“and for those like you and anyone else who needs it! I – have no reasonfor covering my nakedness!” – Y ou can guess: this type of divinity andphilosopher is, perhaps, lacking in shame? – He once said: “I love humans
under certain circumstances” – meaning Ariadne, who was present –:“I think humans are pleasant, brave, inventive animals that have no equalon earth, they find their way around any labyrinth. I am very fond of
AreferencetoNietzsche’sfirstpublished book, DieGeburt derTrag¨ odie (TheBirthof Tragedy )( ).
What is noble?
them: I think about how I can help them advance and make them stronger,
more evil and more profound than they are.” – “Stronger, more evil, andmore profound?” I asked, startled. – “Y es,” he said again, “stronger, more
evil, and more profound; and more beautiful” – and at that, the temptergod smiled his halcyon smile, as if he had just paid a charming compliment.Y ou can see: this divinity lacks more than just shame –; but you can alsosee that there are good reasons for supposing that the gods could learn athing or two from us humans. W e humans are – more human
...
Oh, what are you anyway , my written and painted thoughts! It was notlong ago that you were still so colorful, young and malicious, so full ofthorns and secret spices that you made me sneeze and laugh – and now?Y ou have already lost your novelty , and I am afraid that some of you areready to turn into truths: they already look so immortal, so patheticallydecent and upright, so boring! And was it ever any different? So, whatsubjects do we copy out and paint, we mandarins with Chinese brushes,we immortalizers of things that letthemselves be written – what are the
only things we can paint? Oh, only ever things that are about to wilt
and lose their smell! Only ever storms that have exhausted themselvesand are moving off, and feelings that are yellowed and late! Only everbirds that have flown and flown astray until they are tired and can becaught by hand, – by our hand! W e only immortalize things that cannot
live and fly for much longer, only tired and worn-out things! And I onlyhave colors for your afternoon , my written and painted thoughts, perhaps
many colors, many colorful affections and fifty yellows and browns andgreens and reds: – but nobody will guess from this how you looked inyour morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you, myold, beloved – – wicked thoughts!
∗∗
∗
In German: menschlicher . This could also mean “more humane.”
FROM HIGH MOUNTAINS
Aftersong
∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗∗∗
Oh noon of life! Oh summer garden site
For celebr ating!
There’s restless joy in standing watch and waiting!I wait for friends, I’m ready day and nightWhere are you, friends? Do come! The time is right!
For you, the glacier clothes its old gray hue
In rose attire,The rivers seek you, running with desire,The winds and clouds climb high into the blue,As high as birds – to keep their watch for you.
My table waits for you with each delight: –
The Noon of Life
- The speaker reflects on a profound transformation that has rendered him unrecognizable to his former companions.
- Isolation in the 'distant ice-filled rocky height' is depicted as a necessary condition for a new, predatory strength.
- Old friendships are discarded as 'wilted words' because they represent a past self that has been overcome.
- The text celebrates the 'noon of life,' a state of restless joy and readiness for new, more compatible allies.
- The arrival of Zarathustra marks a symbolic wedding of light and dark, signaling a triumphant end to longing.
A wrestler beaten by himself alone, And wounded by a victory of his own?
Such lonely ledgesAre home to few , save stars and chasms’ edges.My realm – its bounds reach past the range of sight,My honey too – who dreams they’ll taste the like? ...
– Oh friends, you’re there ! But – what grave ill portends? –
AmIa stranger?
Y ou pause; your wonder wounds far worse than anger!Iam no more? – In face, or stride or hands?
Butam I not what I am for you, friends?
So was I once another? Self-unknown?
I’ve left my own source?A strength too often set against its own force?A wrestler beaten by himself alone,And wounded by a victory of his own?
Nietzsche follows a very strict rhyme and rhythmic scheme in this poem; the rhyme is ABBAA
throughout, and the meter follows a classical ode form (both are preserved in this translation).
From high mountains: Aftersong
I’ve looked where sharpest winds blow frozen air?
I’ve made my home here,On glaciers where no other soul dares roam near,Forgot both man and god, both curse and prayer?Became a ghost who walked with polar bears?
– Old friends! See here! Y our faces have gone white,
With love – and pain too!Just leave in peace: there’s nothing to detain you:
Here in the distant ice-filled rocky height –This realm belongs to hunters, born to fight!
I’m now a wicked huntsman! Look – my bow
Is stiff and stock straight!The strong alone can pull back such a taut weight – –:Take care! My arrow’s speed is far from slow ,
The danger’s great – so flee to safety! go! ...
Y ou’re turning back? – Oh heart, this blow hits hard,
But hope must stay fast:Hold open doors as new friends make their way past!
Old friends must be left back! Old memories barred!Y ou once were young – now , youth has been restored!
W e shared one hope – that was our common band, –
Now – who reads these signsThat love had once inscribed, such faded half-lines?They look just like a parchment that the handisloath to touch, – they’re just browned and tanned.
What are they called? – since friendship’s at an end –
Just ghostly brothers!Who rattle nightly on my heart and shutters,Who look at me and say: “you were my friend” –
– Those wilted words once bore a rosebud scent!
Oh youthful longing; how you failed to see
Dashed expectations!Those friends turned family , seeming close relations,– How they grew old, and turned their heels to flee:
For only those who change keep ties with me.
Beyond Good and Evil
Oh noon of life! Oh summer garden bright!
Oh youth returning!There’s restless joy in waiting, watching, yearning!I wait for friends, I’m ready day and nightThe new friends now! Do come! The time is right!
∗∗
∗
This song is gone, – the longing cries are through,
Their sweet sounds ended.The work of a magician I’d befriended,The friend of noon-time – but – no! don’t ask who –It was at noon, when one turned into two ...
Now we can feast, with triumph in the air,
The fest of all fests:Friend Zara thustra came, the guest of all guests!
The world can laugh, the gruesome curtain tear,The we dding day of light and dark was here ...
∗∗∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗
Glossary of names
Aeschylus ( c. – B.C.) Athenian dramatist
Alcibiades ( c. – B.C.) Athenian statesman and general
Ariadne Greek mythological figureAristophanes ( c. – B.C.) Athenian author of comedies
Athena Greek goddess of war and wisdomAugustinus, Aurelius ( – ) Roman philosopher
Bacon, Francis, viscount of V erulam ( – ) English philosopher
Balzac, Honor ´ed e( – ) French novelist
Bayle, Pierre ( – ) French philosopher
Beethoven, Ludwig van ( – ) German composer
Bentham, Jeremy ( – ) English philosopher
Berkeley , George ( – ) Irish philosopher
Beyle, Henri seeStendhal
Bizet, Georges ( –) French composer
Borgia, Cesare ( – ) Florentine nobleman
Boscovich, Ruggiero Giuseppe ( –) Dalmatian mathematician
and philosopher
Bruno, Giordano ( – ) Italian philosopher
Glossary of Historical Figures
- The text provides a comprehensive glossary of names spanning from ancient Greek and Roman figures to 19th-century European thinkers.
- It includes a diverse array of professions such as philosophers, poets, statesmen, scientists, and composers.
- The list features major intellectual giants like Kant, Hegel, and Descartes alongside mythological figures like Circe and Dionysus.
- The entries often highlight specific seminal works, such as Machiavelli's 'The Prince' and Goethe's 'Faust'.
- The geographical scope is broad, covering influential figures from England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and ancient Greece.
Mephistopheles devil in Goethe’s Faust
Byron, George Noel Gordon, Lord ( – ) English poet, author
ofManfred
Caesar, Gaius Julius ( –B.C.) Roman statesman and general
Cagliostro, Alessandro, Count (Balsamo, Giuseppe) ( –) Italian
adventurer
Carlyle, Thomas ( – ) Scottish philosopher and historian
Glossary of names
Catilina, Lucius Sergius ( c. –B.C.) Roman nobleman
Cicero, Marcus Tullius ( –B.C.) Roman philosopher and
politician
Circe Greek mythological figureComte, Auguste ( – ) French philosopher
Copernicus, Nicholas ( – ) Polish astronomer
Cromwell, Oliver ( – ) English statesman
Dante Alighieri ( – ) Italian poet, author of La Divina
Commedia
Darwin, Charles Robert ( –) English biologist
Delacroix, Ferdinand Victor Eug `ene ( – ) French painter
Demosthenes ( – B.C.) Greek orator and statesman
Descartes, Ren ´e( – ) French philosopher
Diderot, Denis ( –) French philosopher
Dionysus Greek godD¨uhring, Karl Eugen ( – ) German philosopher, author of
Der Werth des Lebens andWirklichkeitsphilosophie
Empedocles (fifth century B.C.) Presocratic philosopher and
statesman
Epicurus ( – B.C.) Greek philosopher
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb ( – ) German philosopher, author of
Speeches to the German Nation
Flaubert, Gustave ( –) French novelist
Frederick II (the Great) ( –) king of Prussia
Frederick II of Hohenstaufen ( – ) German emperor
Frederick William I ( – ) king of Prussia
Galiani, Ferdinando ( –) Italian economist, author of Lettres ` a
Mme d’Epinay
Goethe, Johann W olfgang von ( – ) German poet, novelist,
and statesman, author of Faust andDie Leiden des jungen Werther
Gogol, Nikolaj Vassilevic ( –) Russian novelist
Guyon, Jeanne Marie de ( – ) French writer
Hafiz (Mohammed Schams od-Din) ( c. –) Persian poet
Hartmann, Eduard von ( – ) German philosopher
Glossary of names
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich ( – ) German philosopher
Heine, Heinrich ( – ) German poet
Helv ´etius, Claude Adrien ( –) French philosopher
Heraclitus ( c. – B.C.) Presocratic philosopher
Hercules Greek mythological figureHobbes, Thomas ( – ) English philosopher
H¨olderlin, Friedrich ( – ) German poet
Homer Greek poetHorace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) ( –B.C.) Roman poet, author
ofEpistolae
Hugo, Victor ( –) French novelist
Hume, David ( –) Scottish philosopher
Jean Paul (Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich) ( – ) German
novelist
Kant, Immanuel ( – ) German philosopher, author of Critique
of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and Groundwork to theMetaphysic of Morals
Kleist, Heinrich von ( – ) German dramatist and
novelist
Kotzebue, August Friedrich Ferdinand von ( – ) German
dramatist
Kundry Germanic mythological figure
Lambert, Anne Th ´er`ese de Marguenat de Courcelles, marquise de
( – ) French writer
La Rochefoucauld, Franc ¸ois de ( –) French moralist
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm ( – ) German philosopher
Leonardo da Vinci ( – ) Florentine painter
Leopardi, Giacomo ( – ) Italian poet
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim ( –) German dramatist and critic,
author of Emilia Galotti
Locke, John ( – ) English philosopher
Luther, Martin ( – ) German theologian, leader of the
Protestant Reformation
Machiavelli, Niccol `o( – ) Italian politician, theorist, and
statesman, author of The Prince
Glossary of names
Marschner, Heinrich ( – ) German composer of operas,
among them Hans Heiling andVampyr
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy , Felix ( –) German composer
Mephistopheles devil in Goethe’s Faust
Michelet, Jules ( – ) French historian
Mill, John Stuart ( –) English philosopher
Glossary and Index of Names
- The text provides a comprehensive glossary of historical, literary, and mythological figures ranging from Ancient Greece to the 19th century.
- Prominent European thinkers such as Nietzschean influences like Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Napoleon are cataloged with brief biographical details.
- The list blends real historical figures like Napoleon and Shakespeare with mythological entities like the Minotaur, Odysseus, and Wotan.
- A significant portion of the glossary focuses on French and German philosophers, writers, and composers, reflecting a specific cultural and intellectual canon.
- The index section categorizes abstract concepts and themes such as 'anarchism', 'anti-Semitism', 'aristocracy', and 'atheism', indicating the analytical scope of the primary work.
Sand, Karl Ludwig ( – ) murderer of Kotzebue
Minotaur Greek mythological figureMoli `ere (Poqulin, Jean-Baptiste) ( –) French dramatist, author
ofTartuffe andLe malade imaginaire
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de ( –) French essayist and
philosopher
Mozart, W olfgang Amadeus ( –) Austrian composer
M¨unchhausen, Karl Friedrich Hieronymus, Freiherr von ( –)
German nobleman
Musset, Alfred de ( –) French writer
Napoleon Bonaparte ( – ) French emperor
Nausicaa Greek mythological figure
Odysseus Greek mythological figure
Oedipus Greek mythological figure
Pascal, Blaise ( –) French philosopher
Pericles ( c. – B.C.) Athenian statesman
Petronius Arbiter (d. A.D . ) Roman writer
Plato ( c. – B.C.) Greek philosopher, author of The Laws
Poe, Edgar Allen ( –) American poet and writer
Proteus Greek mythological figure
Raphael (Raffaelo Santi) ( – ) Italian painter
Renan, Ernest ( –) French historian and philosopher
Roland de la Plati `ere, Jeanne Marie ( –) French writer
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ( –) French philosopher
Sacchetti, Franco ( c. – ) Italian writer, author of Trecento
Novelle
Sainte-Beuve, Charles-Augustin de ( –) French
writer
Saint-Evremond, Charles de Marguetel de Saint-Denis, seigneur de
( – ) French writer
Glossary of names
Sand, George (Dudevant, Armandine-Aurore-Lucie, baronne de)
( –) French writer
Sand, Karl Ludwig ( – ) murderer of Kotzebue
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph ( – ) German
philosopher, author of Of the I as Principle of Philosophy
Schiller, Friedrich ( – ) German poet and writer
Schlosser, Johann Georg ( –) brother-in-law of Goethe
Schopenhauer, Arthur ( – ) German philosopher, author of
The World as Will and Idea andThe Two Fundamental Problems of
Ethics
Schumann, Robert ( –) German composer of the opera
Manfred
Shakespeare, William ( – ) English poet and dramatist, author
ofHamlet
Shelley , Percy Bysshe ( – ) English poet
Siegfried Germanic mythological figureSocrates ( – B.C.) Athenian philosopher
Spencer, Herbert ( – ) English philosopher
Spinoza, Baruch ( –) Dutch philosopher, author of Ethics
Sta¨el-Holstein, Anne-Louise-Germaine de ( – ) French writer
Stendhal (Beyle, Henri) ( – ) French novelist
Sybel, Heinrich von ( –) German historian and politician
Tacitus, Publius Cornelius ( c.– ) Roman historian, author of
Historiae
Taine, Hippolyte ( –) French historian and art historian
Tiberius Claudius Nero ( B.C. – A.D ) Roman emperor
Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von ( –) German historian
V oltaire (Arouet, Franc ¸ois-Marie) ( – ) French novelist
Wagner, Richard ( –) German composer of operas, among them
Tannh¨ auser, Die Meistersinger von N¨ urnberg, Tristan und Isolde, Der
Ring der Nibelungen andParsifal
W eber, Carl Maria von ( – ) German composer of operas,
among them Der Freisch¨ utz andOberon
W otan Scandinavian mythological figure
Zarathustra Persian prophet and priest
Index
abstinence, ,,
action, , , ,
activity , –
adaptation,
Aeschylus,
affect, ,,,,,, ,
age, –,
agility , ,
Alcibiades,
anarchism/anarchists/anarchy , ,, ,
ancestors, , ;see also forefathers
animals, –
Antichrist, xiii,
anti-Semitism, –
appearance, ,,,,,, , ,
, ,
arguments, xix, xx
Ariadne,
aristocracy , –
Aristophanes, –, ,
Aristotle/Aristotelianism, ,
arrogance, ,
art/artifice/artists, xvii, ,,,,,
,,, , , , , ,
, –, , , , ,
Aryans,
Asia, ,
astrology , ,,
atheism, ,, ,
Athena,
Athens/Athenians, ,,
atomism, ,
Augustine, Aurelius, St, ,
Austria,
Index of Philosophical Themes
- The text is an extensive index from a philosophical work, listing key figures ranging from Francis Bacon and Beethoven to Cesare Borgia and Napoleon.
- It categorizes major philosophical concepts such as being vs. becoming, causation, dogmatism, and the nature of consciousness.
- A significant portion of the entries focuses on moral and social dichotomies, including good vs. evil, breeding vs. barbarism, and democracy vs. caste.
- The index highlights cultural and national critiques, specifically referencing the English, Europeans, and the influence of Christianity.
- Recurring psychological and physiological motifs are present, linking abstract ideas like 'conscience' and 'will' to physical states like 'digestion' and 'bloodline'.
command/commanders, –,,–, ,,, , , , , , ; see also government, rule
awareness, xxvii, Bacon, Francis, viscount of V erulam,
bad, xviii, ,,,,,,,,,
,
Balzac, Honor ´ed e , ,
barbarian/barbarism, , ,
baseness, , –,
Basle University , x
Bayle, Pierre,
beauty , ,, , ,
becoming, xxvi
Beethoven, Ludwig van, , ,
being, xxvi
beliefs, ,,
Bentham, Jeremy ,
Berkeley , George, xxi,
Beyle, Henri seeStendhal
Bible, –, ,
birth, , , ,
Bizet, Georges,
bloodline,
body , ,,
books, , –,
Borgia, Cesare,
Boscovich, Ruggiero Giuseppe,
bourgeoisie, viii, ,
Brahmins,
breeding, ,,, ,
British, the,
Buddha/Buddhism, ,,
Byron, George Noel Gordon, Lord, –,
Caesar, Gaius Julius, ,
Cagliostro, Alessandro, Count (Balsamo,
Giuseppe), ,
calm, ,
Index
Carlyle, Thomas,
caste,
Catholicism, ,
Catilina, Lucius Sergius,
causa prima, see cause
causa sui ,seecause
causation, ,
cause, ,,
Celts,
certainty/certainties, ,
immediate, ,,
Cervantes, Miguel de, n.
chance, ,,,
chaos, xvi,
character, ,
Chiaja of Naples,
children, ,
Chimaera,
China,
Christ,
Christianity/Christians, xv , ,,,,,
,,–,,,,,,, ,
, , ,
church, ,,,,,
Cicero, Marcus Tullius,
Circe, ,
claims, ,–
class, , ,
cleanliness, , , ,
coldness, ,
command/commanders, –,,–,
,,, , , , , , ;
see also government, rule
communities/community , –,,,
compulsion, ,,
Comte, Auguste,
concealment, ,
concepts, –,
conscience, ,,,,,,,,,,
,–, , , , , , ,
, , ;see also science
consciousness, ,
consequences, ,
consideration, ,
contempt, ,, ,
contentment, ,
context, xiv , xxii, xxiii
cooking, –
Copernicus, Nicholas,
corruption, –, ,
Corsica,
courage, , ,
creation, xxv , creator/creature, , ,
critics, –
Cromwell, Oliver,
cruelty , ,, , –,
culture, xi, xiv , , –, , , ,
cunning, ,, ,
curiosity , ,
customs, ,
Cyclops,
cynics/cynicism, –
dance, ,, , , ,
danger, ,,, ,
Dante Alighieri,
daring, ,
Darwin, Charles Robert, ,
decay , xxiv , xxv ,
deception, , ,
decisions, , ,
degenerates/degeneration, xxiv , ,
Delacroix, Ferdinand Victor Eug `ene,
democracy , xxiv , ,, , , ,
Demosthenes,
depth, ,
Descartes, Ren ´e,,
desires, ,
destiny , xiii,
destruction, ,
development, human, ,
devil, the, ,,,
Diderot, Denis,
digestion, ,
Dionysus, ,
discipline, , , ,
discovery , ,;see also invention
distance, xiv , xxvi–xxvii,
diversity , ,
dogmatism, –,
dominance/domination, ,, , , ,
, , , , , , ,
doubt, ,
dreaming/dreams, ,
drives, ,,,,,,,,–
D¨uhring, Karl Eugen,
duties/duty , , , , ,
education, ,, , , , ,
effect, ,,,
egoism, , ,
emancipation, ,
Empedocles,
empiricism/empiricists, ,
England/English, the, , , , –
Index
enlightenment, ,, –
enthusiasm, , ,
entitlements, ,
Epicurus/Epicureanism, –,,,, ,
epistemology , xxi,
equality , xxiv , ,,,, ,
Eros,
erroneousness, seefalseness
essence, xxvi, ,,,
Europe/Europeans, –, –, –, ,
, , , , , ,
evidence, visual, ,,
evil, xviii, ,,,,,,,,,,
, , , ;see also bad
Index of Philosophical Themes
- The text is a detailed index from a philosophical work, likely Friedrich Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil', listing key concepts and historical figures.
- Major philosophical categories include existentialism, free will, morality, and the tension between the individual and the 'herd' instinct.
- The index highlights a preoccupation with national identities, specifically comparing German, French, and Jewish cultural influences.
- Significant historical and literary figures such as Kant, Goethe, Flaubert, and Frederick the Great are cross-referenced with abstract concepts like 'greatness' and 'honesty'.
- Recurring motifs include the psychological states of fear, gratitude, and hatred, alongside metaphysical inquiries into the nature of God and 'the good'.
herd, ,–,–,, , ,
existence, ,, ,
existentialism, xxi
experience, xx n. , xxi–xxii, ,,,,,
, ,
experiment, ,
exploitation, –
eyes, ,
faculties, –
faith, xxiv , ,,,–, , , , ,
–, ,
falseness, ,,
fasting, ,
fate/ fatum ,, –
fatherland, , , , , ,
fear, xxiv , ,,,–, , , , ,
feelings, ,,,
femininity , xFichte, Johann Gottlieb,
filth, ,
finery , ,
finesse, ,
Flaubert, Gustave,
Florence,
flying, –
food, –
force/forces, ,,, ,
forefathers, , ;see also ancestors
forgetfulness/forgetting, ,
form, ,
France, , , , , , , , –,
,
Frederick II (the Great), king of Prussia, –
Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, German
emperor,
Frederick William I, king of Prussia,
freedom, ,,,, , , , ;
see also un-freedomfree spirits, –,,,–, –, ,
free will, –,,,,
Frenchmen, seeFrance
French Revolution, ,,, , , ,
friendliness/friends/friendship, , ,
future, , ,
Galiani, Ferdinando, , ,
genius, ,, ,
Germany/Germans, viii, –,,,,
–, , –, –
God, ,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,,,–,, , ,
, ,
gods, , , ,
Goethe, Johann W olfgang von, ,, , ,
, , ,
Gogol, Nikolaj Vassilevic,
good, the/goodness, xviii, ,,,,,,
,,,–,,, , , ,
, ,
goodwill, ,,– ,
government, ;see also command, rule
grammar, ,,
gratitude, ,
greatness, –, ,
Greece/Greeks, xvii, ,,, , ,
grounds, ,,
growth, ,
Guyon, Jeanne Marie de,
Hafiz (Mohammed Schams od-Din),
half-barbarism, –
Hamlet ,
happiness, ,,,,,,, , ,
, , ,
hardness, , , , ,
harshness, ,,, , , , , ,
Hartmann, Eduard von,
hate/hatred, ,,,,,
heart, , , , , , , ,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, , , ,
,
Heine, Heinrich, ,
hell, ,
help, xxiv , ,
Helv ´etius, Claude Adrien,
Heraclitus,
Hercules,
herd, ,–,–,, , ,
heredity ,
Index
hermits, , , ,
historians/history , ,, –, –,
historical sense, –
Hobbes, Thomas, ,
H¨olderlin, Friedrich, n.
Homer, , ,
honesty , ,,,, –, –, ,
honor/dishonor, ,, , , , ,
hope, ,,
Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus),
Hugo, Victor,
humans/humanity , xv , ,,,,–,
–, , , , , ,
,
Hume, David, n.,
humility , –
hunger, ,
hypotheses, ,
I,,,,
idealism/idealists, ,
ideals, ,,
ideas, –,
modern, , , , , , ,
ignorance, ,
images, ,
immoralists/immorality , ,, ,
impatience, –
independence, ,,,
India/Indians, ,
indifference, ,
individual, ,
industry/industriousness, –,,
“in itself ”, seeessence
inspiration, ,
instinct, ,,–,,, , –, ,
, , ;see also herd
interest, ,
interpretation, ,–,
invention, ,;see also discovery
irony , ,
it,–,
Italians/Italy , x, , ,
jealousy , ,
Jean Paul (Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich), ,
Jesuitism/Jesuits, ,,,
Jesus, ,
Jews/Judaism, ,,, , –
judgment, ,, ,
synthetic a priori ,,
justice, ,,, , , ,
justification, ,,Kant, Immanuel, ix, xxi, ,,,,,,
n., ,
Kleist, Heinrich von,
Index of Philosophical Themes
- The text is a detailed index from a scholarly edition of Friedrich Nietzsche's work, listing key philosophical concepts and historical figures.
- Major recurring themes include knowledge, morality, life, and the tension between masters and the masses.
- It highlights Nietzsche's engagement with diverse fields such as music, philology, physiology, and physics.
- Significant historical and literary figures mentioned include Napoleon, Machiavelli, Mozart, and various Greek mythological characters.
- The index tracks specific Nietzschean terminology like 'pathos of distance,' 'perspectivism,' and the 'new philosopher.'
“perhapses,” dangerous, xix,
knowledge, vii, xi, xxi, xxvii, ,–,–,,
,,,,,–,,,,,,
–, , –, , –,
Kotzebue, August Friedrich Ferdinand von,
Kundry ,
“laisser-aller ”,–
Lambert, Anne Th ´er`ese de Marguenat de
Courcelles, marquise de,
language, ,–, –,
Latins,
laughter, , –
law/laws, ,,,,, –
primordial, ,
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm,
Leonardo da Vinci,
Leopardi, Giacomo,
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim,
levelers/leveling, ,
lies/lying, ,,,, ,
life/living, xv–xvii, xxv , ,,,,–,,
,–,,,, –
lineage, ,
Locke, John, ,
logic/logicians, ,–, ,
loss, ,
love, ,,,,,,,,, , ,
, –
neighbor, ,
of enemies,
of God, ,
of man, xxiv , ,,,
sexual,
Luther, Martin, ,,
Machiavelli, Niccol `o,
madness, ,
malice, ,
man, xxvii, ,,,,,,,, ,
, ,
scientific, , ,
Mark Brandenburg,
marriage, ,,
Marschner, Heinrich,
masks, –, , , , ,
masses, , , ,
masters, ,, , , ,
matter, ,
means, –
mediocrity , , , , ,
Index
memory , ,, ,
men, ,, , ,
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy , Felix,
Mephistopheles,
mercy , , ,
metaphysics/metaphysicians, xi, xxvi, ,,
method, ,
Methodism,
methodology , xxiii
Michelet, Jules,
Mill, John Stuart,
Minotaur,
mistrust, ,,, , ,
misunderstanding, , , , , ,
Mithras,
moderation, , ,
modernity , xi, xvi, xxivmodesty , , ,
Moli `ere ( Jean-Baptiste Poquelin),
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de,
moralism/moralist, ,
morals/morality , vii, xi, xiv , xv , xvi, ,,,,
–,,,,,,,,,–,
–,,–, , –, –,
–, , –, , , , ;
see also faculties, science
motion, ,
motivation/motives, ,
Mozart, W olfgang Amadeus,
multiplicity , ,
M¨unchhausen, Karl Friedrich Hieronymus,
Freiherr von,
music, ,,, , , , , , ,
German, –, –
Muslims,
Musset, Alfred de,
name/names, , ,
Napoleon Bonaparte, French emperor, , ,
, , , ,
nation, xviii, –, ,
nature, xxv , xxvi, ,,–,–
Nausicaa,
necessity , ,,
need, , ,
negation, –
neighbor, ,,,–;see also fear, love
newspapers, , , ,
Nietzsche, Friedrich
life of, ix–x
works:The Birth of Tragedy, x, n.
Ecce Homo , xi, xiiiThe Genealogy of Morals , xvi
Thus Spoke Zarathustra , xi–xiii, xv , xxv
nihilism, ,
nobility/ noblesse , vii, xxvi–xxvii, ,, ,
, , ,
numbers, ,
obedience, –,,,,,, ,
objectivity , ix, xxviii, –,
Odysseus, ,
Oedipus, ,
opinion, , –,
origins, –,–,
Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso), n.
pain, , –, ,
Paris, , , ,
parliament, , ,
Pascal, Blaise, ,,,
passions, ,,
past, the, , –
“pathos of distance,” seedistance
patience, ,
peace, ,
perfection, –
“perhapses,” dangerous, xix,
Pericles,
Persia/Persians,
perspectivism, vii, xiv , xx, ,,,
socio-hermeneutical dimension of, xx–xxiii
pessimism, ,,,,, ,
Petronius Arbiter, –
Pharisaism,
philologists/philology , ,,
philosophy/philosophers, vii, xvii, xix, xxiv , ,
,,,,,,,,–, ,
–, , , , , , ,
German, –,
moral, ,
new , xix–xx, xxvi, ,–,–,
Phoenicianism,
physicians, ,
physics/physicists, ,,
physiology/physiologists, ,,, , ,
piety , xxiv , ,,,, ,
Index of Philosophical Concepts
- The text is a detailed index from a philosophical work, likely Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil', listing key themes such as pity, power, and rank.
- It highlights the 'will to power' as a central motif, connecting it to various sections on psychology, morality, and social hierarchy.
- The index contrasts historical figures and movements, ranging from Plato and Socrates to Romanticism and Positivism.
- Significant attention is given to the tension between 'slave' and 'noble' moralities, as evidenced by entries for slavery, rights, and rank.
- The entries reflect a deep preoccupation with the human soul, self-overcoming, and the critique of modern democratic or socialist ideals.
will to power, xiv , xv , xxiv–xxvi, ,,,,, ,,,, , , ,
pity , xxiv , ,,,,,,,, ,
–, , , –, , –, ,
Plato/Platonism, xv , ,–,–,,–,
pleasure, , –, ,
Poe, Edgar Allan,
Poland/Polish, the,
Index
politics, , , , , –, ,
Port-Royal,
positivism/positivists, ,,
power, xxv , ,,–,, , , , ,
will to, xiv , xv , xxiv–xxvi, ,,,,,
,,,, , , ,
praise, ,,,
preachers, ,
predestination, ,
prey , –
pride, ,, , ,
principles, ,
privilege, ,
process, ,
profundity , –, , ,
progress, xxiv , , , ,
Protestantism,
Proteus,
Provence,
proverbs, xv
Prussia/Prussians,
psychology/psychologists, xvi, –,–,
,, , , , ,
Puritanism, ,, , ,
purpose, ,
Pythagoras,
rabble, ,, ,
race, , , ,
randomness, xxiii
Raphael (Raffaelo Santi),
rank, xxvi, ,,, , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
reading, –
reality , viii, xxiv , xxv , xxvi, xxvii, ,–,,
–,
reason, ,,,,–,
reason-giving, xix n.
religion, vii, xi, xvi, xvii, xxiv , ,, , ,
religious people, ,
Renan, Ernest,
representation, ,
resentment ( ressentiment ), xx n.
respect, , , , ,
respectability , ,
responsibility , ,, , , ,
revenge, ,
reverence, ,
rights, ,,
equal, ,,–, , ,
Roland de la Plati `ere, Jeanne Marie,
Romans/Rome, ,, , ,Romanticism, , , –, , ,
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, ix,
ruin, ,
rule, , , , ;see also command,
government
Russia, , ,
Sacchetti, Franco,
sacrifice, ,
Sainte-Beuve, Charles-Augustin de,
Saint-Evremond, Charles de Marguetel de
Saint-Denis, seigneur de,
saintliness/saints, xv , –,,
Salvation Army ,
Samos,
Sand, George (Dudevant, Armandine-Aurore-
Lucie, baronne de),
Sand, Karl Ludwig,
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, ,
Schiller, Friedrich,
Schlosser, Johann Georg,
scholars, ,,,, , ,
Schopenhauer, Arthur, xvii, ,,,,,
,, , , ,
Schumann, Robert,
science, xvii, xxiv , ,–,,,,, ,
, ,
of morals, –;see also man, scientific
scientificity , ,
security , ,
self-control, ,
self-denial, ,
self-knowledge, ,,, ,
self-interest, ,
selflessness, ,
self-overcoming, xxvii, ,
self-preservation, ,
self-respect, ,
self-sacrifice, ,
sensations, ,
senses, ,,,
sensualism/sensuality/sensuousness, ,
–,,
severity , , ,
sex-drive, ,
sexuality , xv , ,;see also abstinence
Shakespeare, William,
shame, ,,,,, , , , ,
Shelley , Percy Bysshe,
Siegfried,
silence, ,
simplicity/simplification, –
sin,,
Index
skepticism/skeptics, xxi n. ,,,,
– , –
slavery/slaves, ,,,,, , , ,
, , , –
smell, ,
socialists, ,,
society , ,,
Socrates, xvii, ,,–,, ,
solitude, ,,,, –, ,
soul, xxvii, ,,,–,,,,,,
,,,,,,, , , ,
, , , , , , ,
European, ,
noble, , ,
Spain,
species, –
Spencer, Herbert,
Sphinx,
Spinoza, Baruch, xix n. ,,,,
spirit, ,,,,,,,,,,,
, , , , , , –, ,
, , , ,
spirituality , , , , , –,
Sta¨el-Holstein, Anne-Louise-Germaine de,
n.,
stars, ,
Stendhal (Beyle, Henri), , ,
Stoa,
Stoics/stoicism, ,,,,
Index of Philosophical Concepts
- The text provides a comprehensive index of philosophical and cultural terms ranging from 'strength' to 'youth'.
- Significant emphasis is placed on the concept of 'truth', with numerous sub-entries including the love of truth and the will to truth.
- The index highlights a focus on human values, morality, and the creation of value systems.
- Prominent historical and cultural figures such as Wagner, Voltaire, and Tacitus are cross-referenced with philosophical themes.
- The document concludes with a list of published titles in the 'Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy' series.
truth/truths/truthfulness, vii, xi, xiii, xiv , xx, xxi, xxii, xxiv , xxvii, xxviii, ,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,, , , , , , , , ,
strength, ,, , ,
stupidity , ,,, , , , , ,
, ,
style, , –
subjectivity , ix, xxi–xxii,
subtlety , ,
success, ,
suffering, xx n. ,,,,,, –,
, , , ,
Swabians,
Switzerland, x
Sybel, Heinrich von,
sympathy , , ,
Tacitus, Publius Cornelius,
tact, ,
Taine, Hippolyte, –
talent, ,
taste, ,,, –, , –, –,
, ,
ancient/archaic, ,
German, ,
tension, ,
theologians/theology , xvii, ,thinking/thought, xxvi, ,,–,,,
, , , , , , ,
Tiberius Claudius Nero, Roman emperor,
time, , , ,
timidity , ,
toleration, –
tools, , ,
tradition, vii
tragedy , ,,, –,
translation, –
Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von,
Truth/True, the, xiv , ,
truth/truths/truthfulness, vii, xi, xiii, xiv , xx,
xxi, xxii, xxiv , xxvii, xxviii, ,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,,,
, , , , , , , ,
love of, ,
theory of, xxii–xxiii
will to, ,,
T¨ubingen,
tyranny/tyrants, ,,,, ,
unbelief, ,
uncertainty , ,
understanding, ,
un-freedom, –,,
unity , ,
untruth, ,,,
utilitarians/utilitarianism, ,,, , ,
utility , , ,
value/values/valuations, xvii–xviii, xx n. ,
xxiv , –,,–,,,,,,,
,,–,, , , , , ,
, , , , –
creation of, , ,
distinctions, , ,
vanity , ,,,,,, –,
variation, –
V edanta, ,
V enice,
violence, ,,
virtue/virtues, ,,,, , , ,
, , , ,
vivisection, , , ,
V oltaire, (Arouet, Franc ¸ois-Marie), ,,,
,
Wagner, Richard, xi, , , , , ,
, , –
war, ,, ,
weakness, xxiv
Index
W eber, Carl Maria von,
Weiblichkeit ,seefemininity
“what if ” scenarios, xx
will/willing, –,,,, –, ,
, , –;see also free will,
goodwill; see also under :
power, truth
wisdom, ,, ,
wishful thinking, xxiv
woman, –,women, x, xv , xviii, ,,,,,,,,
–, , , , –
words, ,
work, ,
world, xxvi, ,,,,
negation of, ,
worth/worthiness, xxvi,
W otan,
youth, –,
Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
Titles published in the series thus farAristotle Nicomachean Ethics (edited by Roger Crisp)
Arnauld and Nicole Logic or the Art of Thinking (edited by Jill Vance
Buroker)
Bacon The New Organon (edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne)
Boyle A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (edited by
Edward B. Davis and Michael Hunter)
Bruno Cause, Principle and Unity andEssays on Magic (edited by Richard
Blackwell and Rober t de Lucca with an introduction by Alfonso Ingegno)
Cavendish Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (edited by Eileen O’Neill)
Cicero On Moral Ends (edited by Julia Annas, translated by Raphael W oolf )
Clarke A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings
(edited by Ezio Vailati)
Condillac Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (edited by Hans Aarsleff )
Conway The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (edited by
Allison P . Coudert and Taylor Corse)
Cudworth A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A
Treatise of Freewill (edited by Sarah Hutton)
Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy , with selections from the Objections
and Replies (edited by John Cottingham)
Descartes The World and Other Writings (edited by Stephen Gaukroger)
Fichte Foundations of Natural Right (edited by Frederick Neuhouser, translated
by Michael Baur)
Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (edited by V ere Chappell)
Philosophical Texts and Editions
- A comprehensive list of seminal philosophical works from the Enlightenment through the 19th century.
- Extensive coverage of Immanuel Kant's major critiques and metaphysical inquiries.
- A significant collection of Friedrich Nietzsche's primary texts including Beyond Good and Evil and The Gay Science.
- Inclusion of diverse thinkers such as Leibniz, Malebranche, Schopenhauer, and Voltaire.
- Emphasis on modern scholarly editions featuring specific editors and translators for academic study.
Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs)
Humboldt On Language (edited by Michael Losonsky , translated by Peter
Heath)
Kant Critique of Practical Reason (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction
by Andrews Reath)
Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (edited by Mary Gregor with an
introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard)
Kant The Metaphysics of Morals (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction
by Roger Sullivan)
Kant Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (edited by Gary Hatfield)
Kant Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings
(edited by Allen W ood and George di Giovanni with an introductionby Robert Merrihew Adams)
La Mettrie Machine Man and Other Writings (edited by Ann Thomson)
Leibniz New Essays on Human Understanding (edited by Peter Remnant
and Jonathan Bennett)
Malebranche Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (edited by Nicholas
Jolley and David Scott)
Malebranche The Search after Truth (edited by Thomas M. Lennon
and Paul J. Olscamp)
Melanchthon Orations on Philosophy and Education (edited by Sachiko
Kusukawa, tr anslated by Christine Salazar)
Mendelssohn Philosophical Writings (edited by Daniel O . Dahlstrom)
Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil (edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith
Norman)
Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (edited by Raymond Geuss
and Ronald Speirs)
Nietzsche Daybreak (edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, translated
by R. J. Hollingdale)
Nietzsche The Gay Science (edited by Bernard Williams, translated by Josefine
Nauckhoff )
Nietzsche Human, All Too Human (translated by R. J. Hollingdale with an
introduction by Richard Schacht)
Nietzsche Untimely Meditations (edited by Daniel Breazeale, translated by
R. J. Hollingdale)
Schleiermacher Hermeneutics and Criticism (edited by Andrew Bowie)
Schleiermacher On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (edited by
Richard Crouter)
Schopenhauer Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (edited by G ¨unter Z ¨oller)
Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Scepticism (edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan
Barnes)
Shaftesbury , Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (edited by
Lawrence Klein)
V oltaire Treatise on Tolerance and Other Writings (edited by Simon Harvey)