Dictatorships and Double Standards

• The Carter administration's foreign policy is characterized as a failure that has weakened the global standing of the United States.
• A significant shift in power has occurred, marked by a Soviet military buildup and expanding influence in Africa, Afghanistan, and the Caribbean.
• The U.S. government actively participated in the removal of moderate, pro-American autocratic leaders in Iran and Nicaragua.
• These moderate autocrats were replaced by extremist regimes that show little promise of establishing constitutional or peaceful governance.
• The author argues that the U.S. lacks a realistic strategy for supporting non-democratic allies facing Soviet-sponsored subversion.
• Without a policy change, the author predicts a continued pattern of strategic losses in countries ranging from Korea to Mexico.

The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.

• The U.S. administration struggled to acknowledge the strategic failure of its policies in Iran and Nicaragua despite the collapse of both regimes.
• While Iran held greater economic and strategic weight due to oil and geography, both nations were governed by traditional rulers of semi-traditional societies.
• Both the Shah and Somoza maintained power through personalist armies and the suppression of radical, violent opposition movements.
• The rulers were staunchly anti-Communist and consistently supported American interests, even at significant personal or political cost to themselves.
• Despite their authoritarian methods, both leaders were deeply integrated into Washington's social and political circles, fostering long-term alliances.
• Modernization efforts in both countries focused on technology and agriculture rather than the redistribution of power or social justice.

And, of course, the Shah was much better looking and altogether more dashing than Somoza; his private life was much more romantic, more interesting to the media, popular and otherwise.

• The U.S. historically supports friendly autocracies until they face violent internal opposition from hostile forces.
• American efforts to impose democratization on embattled regimes often inadvertently assist the rise of more repressive, anti-American governments.
• U.S. officials and media frequently minimize the Marxist ties of insurgent groups, framing their radicalism as a reaction to American policy.
• The U.S. government typically responds to crises by demanding the dilution of the autocrat's power through 'liberalizing' reforms.
• Diplomatic pressure and arms embargoes often force the collapse of existing regimes in favor of 'broadly based' coalitions that fail to maintain order.
• The resulting revolutionary regimes generally offer ordinary citizens fewer freedoms and less security than the autocracies they replaced.

The American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition not only failed, but actually assisted the coming to power of new regimes in which ordinary people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security than under the previous autocracy.

• The U.S. often undermines allied autocrats by demanding they yield power to 'moderate' replacements who lack actual leadership talent or popular support.
• This interventionist cycle typically results in the installation of regimes that are hostile to American interests and provide strategic advantages to adversaries.
• In Iran, the Carter administration's commitment to nonintervention and democratic self-determination led to the abandonment of the Shah despite strategic costs.
• The U.S. actively destabilized the Somoza regime in Nicaragua through sanctions and diplomatic snubs while ignoring the Sandinistas' clear ties to Cuba.
• Global allies perceive these actions as proof that American support is unreliable, while enemies view them as evidence that the U.S. cannot stop their momentum.

At worst the Soviets will have gained a new base. And everywhere our friends will have noted that the U.S. cannot be counted on in times of difficulty and our enemies will have observed that American support provides no security against the forward march of history.

• The U.S. government adopted an uncharacteristically rigid stance against Somoza, insisting that a sharp break from his regime was the only path to a solution.
• President Carter dismissed concerns about Cuban influence in the Sandinista movement, framing the revolution as a natural 'evolutionary change' toward self-determination.
• The administration operated under the flawed assumption that a viable democratic alternative existed and that any change was preferable to the status quo.
• American foreign policy is often driven by the belief that any government can be democratized at any time, despite historical evidence to the contrary.
• Establishing democracy requires complex social, cultural, and economic conditions, including a specific political culture and a population willing to fulfill civic duties.

No end to the crisis is possible that does not start with the departure of Somoza from power and the end of his regime.

• Representative government requires citizens to view themselves as active participants in decision-making rather than mere subjects of law.
• Political leaders must commit to legal means of power, eschewing violence and fraud while accepting the necessity of compromise and defeat.
• Strong voluntary and non-official institutions are essential to channel social conflict and translate popular demands into public policy.
• Democratic stability is typically the result of centuries of gradual development, as seen in the long historical trajectories of Britain, America, and France.
• While right-wing autocracies occasionally evolve into democracies under specific conditions, there is no historical precedent for the democratization of revolutionary communist societies.
• Modern American foreign policy often fails to understand that abruptly replacing autocrats with moderate coalitions can destabilize the existing social order.

Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits.

• Traditional autocracies rely on personal, non-transferable ties rather than universalistic public institutions.
• The removal of an autocrat often leads to a total collapse of social and military structures, similar to removing a keystone from an arch.
• U.S. policy frequently fails by overestimating the strength of democratic moderates within revolutionary oppositions.
• Washington consistently underestimates the intransigence and violent intent of radical groups like the FSLN or Iranian extremists.
• Imposing liberalized political practices on societies lacking the necessary cultural traditions often weakens rather than strengthens their authority.

Without him, the organized life of the society will collapse, like an arch from which the keystone has been removed.

• The Carter administration's foreign policy is criticized for mistakenly assuming that democratic alternatives can be easily imposed on incumbent autocracies.
• The author argues that U.S. intervention during times of domestic instability often inadvertently assists insurgents rather than stabilizing the nation.
• A core tenet of the administration's philosophy is the belief that the Cold War is over, shifting focus from national supremacy to global interdependence.
• The administration's approach is rooted in a 'rational humanism' that views international problems as human issues rather than political or military confrontations.
• This philosophy of history predicts a universal progression toward modernization, leading to a world community of developed, autonomous nations.

Vietnam presumably taught us that the United States could not serve as the world's policeman; it should also have taught us the dangers of trying to be the world's midwife to democracy when the birth is scheduled to take place under conditions of guerrilla war.

• The administration views the Third World through a lens of historical progress rather than traditional American national interest.
• Modernization is defined as a systemic transformation from traditional societies to those characterized by technology, secularism, and rational attitudes.
• The paradigm assumes that social change is global, irreversible, and follows a predictable, phased path toward convergence.
• Critics argue that while useful in social science, the modernization theory is a flawed framework for foreign policy.
• This deterministic perspective encourages government officials to act as 'midwives' to history rather than active shapers of events.
• The policy shift suggests abandoning traditional doctrines, like the Monroe Doctrine, in favor of recognizing global interdependence.

Its shortcomings as an analytical tool pale, however, when compared to its inadequacies as a framework for thinking about foreign policy, where its principal effects are to encourage the view that events are manifestations of deep historical forces which cannot be controlled and that the best any government can do is to serve as a 'midwife' to history.

• U.S. policy increasingly views global events through a lens of 'deep historical forces' rather than individual human agency or specific national interests.
• The administration identifies modernization as an inevitable moral and revolutionary process that shapes the destiny of developing nations.
• By attributing turmoil in Iran, Asia, and Africa to abstract social and economic factors, officials downplay the role of specific political actors and ideologies.
• This perspective mirrors Marxist historiography by prioritizing high-level abstractions over the actual motives and intentions of the people involved.
• The focus on 'inexorable' evolutionary change serves as a justification for American passivity and a dismissal of Soviet or Cuban influence as mere 'machinations.'
• The paradigm suggests that because events are driven by impersonal forces, the U.S. government has limited power to intervene or alter the course of history.

The motives and intentions of real persons are no more relevant to the modernization paradigm than they are to the Marxist view of history.

• The Carter administration adopted a deterministic view of global events, believing that historical forces are beyond the control of any government.
• This philosophy led to a policy of non-intervention, citing the failure of the Vietnam War as proof that military force offers only superficial solutions.
• U.S. officials like Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that the United States must align itself with the 'inevitable' processes of change rather than resisting them.
• The administration's refusal to use force was applied consistently across different regions, including the Iranian Revolution, Nicaragua, and Africa.
• A critical contradiction emerged where the U.S. commitment to 'constructive change' primarily benefited Soviet-backed insurgents challenging non-Communist autocracies.

The fact is that we can no more stop change than Canute could still the waters.

• The Carter administration applies the principles of self-determination and nonintervention selectively, favoring Communist regimes while pressuring right-wing allies.
• U.S. policy accepts the status quo and ideological differences in nations like China but demands radical internal reform in countries like South Africa and Nicaragua.
• The administration's approach inadvertently aligns American interests with Soviet clients and extremist leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini.
• There is a stark contradiction between the refusal to intervene in Southeast Asia and the aggressive pursuit of human rights 'costs' against Latin American autocracies.
• The author argues that the administration's ideology fails to explain reality and leads to the abandonment of economically successful allies like Taiwan.

Not only are there ideology and a double standard at work here, the ideology neither fits nor explains reality, and the double standard involves the administration in the wholesale contradiction of its own principles.

• The Carter administration's foreign policy is marked by a moralism that frequently conflicts with American strategic and economic interests.
• Traditional autocracies deeply offend American sensibilities because they prioritize kinship and stability over rational standards and progress.
• American cultural relativism often vanishes when confronted with the hereditary poverty and perceived moral dereliction of traditional rulers.
• Progressive revolutionaries are often viewed more favorably than traditional autocrats because they utilize the modern language of science, reason, and egalitarianism.
• The shared Enlightenment roots of liberalism and Marxist socialism lead many Americans to mistake totalitarian 'liberators' for democratic partisans.
• This symbolic affinity creates a recurring pattern where liberals and clerics are 'duped' into supporting movements that ultimately suppress freedom.

Confronted with them, our vaunted cultural relativism evaporates and we become as censorious as Cotton Mather confronting sin in New England.

• Jimmy Carter's foreign policy was driven by an egalitarian optimism that often conflated revolutionary change with moral progress.
• The administration prioritized supporting 'popular' movements over traditional strategic interests, even when those movements were anti-American.
• Carter sought to distance the U.S. from 'cold-war' perspectives, attempting to normalize relations with Marxist regimes in Vietnam and Cuba.
• The administration deliberately cooled relations with long-standing right-wing allies like South Korea and Nicaragua to align with the 'wrong side of history' narrative.
• Despite the brutal outcomes of 'progressive' triumphs in Cambodia and Vietnam, the administration maintained a double standard against right-wing autocrats.
• This ideological shift reduced the centrality of Soviet competition, viewing Marxist expansion as a superficial element of legitimate popular aspirations.

Carter is, par excellence, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism, change with progress, optimism with virtue.

• The author accuses the Carter administration of prioritizing public image over the strategic reality of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Caribbean.
• President Carter is criticized for framing the Nicaraguan revolution as an 'evolutionary change' rather than a military struggle involving foreign actors.
• The text argues that Carter's belief in a 'national referendum' in Nicaragua ignored the reality of armed insurgency and the U.S. role in disarming the Somoza regime.
• The administration is depicted as being captured by 'intellectual fashion,' preferring leftist challenges to rightist autocracies regardless of the consequences.
• The author warns that destabilizing friendly autocracies often leads to the rise of totalitarian Soviet client states or murderous regimes.
• The central failure of Carter's foreign policy is identified as a lack of realism regarding the differences between traditional and revolutionary autocracies.

But each, nevertheless, remains willing to 'destabilize' friendly or neutral autocracies without any assurance that they will not be replaced by reactionary totalitarian theocracies, totalitarian Soviet client states, or worst of all, by murderous fanatics of the Pol Pot variety.

• The author argues that traditional autocracies are less repressive and more compatible with U.S. interests than revolutionary Marxist regimes.
• Traditional autocrats generally preserve existing social structures, religious customs, and family patterns, making their hardships more bearable to the populace.
• Revolutionary Communist regimes claim jurisdiction over every aspect of life, forcing radical changes that violate internalized values and habits.
• A significant disparity exists in refugee numbers, with millions fleeing Marxist 'utopias' compared to relatively few leaving traditional right-wing autocracies.
• The displacement and dispossession of populations in Vietnam serve as a primary example of the systemic brutality inherent in revolutionary change.
• The text suggests that people find civil war or social inequality easier to endure than the totalizing demands of a Marxist state.

They gradually die for a number of reasons-diseases, the hard life. They also die of humiliation.

• Totalitarian regimes are historically less likely to undergo democratic transitions than traditional autocracies like those in Brazil or South Korea.
• U.S. policy should encourage gradual liberalization in autocracies rather than demanding 'perfect democracy overnight' during periods of violent instability.
• Violent Marxist insurgencies led by 'armed intellectuals' almost inevitably result in totalitarian tyranny rather than democratic socialism or agrarian reform.
• Authentic democratic revolutionaries believe in the immediate capacity of citizens for self-rule, whereas totalitarians seek to delay elections to 'cure' the public's consciousness.
• The United States should stop treating anti-American revolutionary groups as potential democratic allies and cease its posture of 'continuous self-abasement' toward the Third World.
• Liberal idealism must be reconciled with the national interest and the pragmatic use of force to counter military threats from ideological enemies.

Armed intellectuals citing Marx and supported by Soviet-bloc arms and advisers will almost surely not turn out to be agrarian reformers, or simple nationalists, or democratic socialists.

• The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) maintains an extensive catalog of publications covering global political struggles, economic theory, and domestic policy.
• The 'A Conversation with' series features diverse figures ranging from George Bush and Marion Barry to international dissidents like Vladimir Bukovsky.
• The AEI Associates Program seeks to broaden the distribution of scholarly research to policymakers, journalists, and the academic community.
• The institute focuses on the 'competition of ideas' across ten primary policy areas, including defense, energy, and government regulation.
• Recent reprints highlight a strong emphasis on the critique of federal regulation and the management of international monetary systems.

The American Enterprise Institute invites your participation in the competition of ideas through its AEI Associates Program.

• A collection of scholarly inquiries into the intersection of government policy and capital formation.
• Legal testimony regarding the constitutional implications of tuition tax credits.
• An analysis of international reserve control and its necessity in global finance.
• An exploration of the unique cultural and structural dynamics of the Japanese workforce.
• Technical evaluations of corporate tax integration methods and their economic motivations.

The Wondrous Working World of Japan, James D. Hodgson.

• The U.S. government helped remove moderate, pro-American autocrats in Iran and Nicaragua.
• Those moderate rulers were replaced by extremist regimes with little prospect for constitutional or peaceful governance.

The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.

• American efforts to impose democratization on embattled regimes often help bring more repressive, anti-American governments to power.
• The resulting revolutionary regimes generally give citizens less freedom and security than the autocracies they replaced.

The American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition not only failed, but actually assisted the coming to power of new regimes in which ordinary people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security than under the previous autocracy.

• Democratic stability usually develops over centuries, as in Britain, America, and France.
• There is no historical precedent for democratizing revolutionary communist societies.

Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits.

• The Carter administration adopted a deterministic view of world events, treating historical forces as beyond any government's control.
• Its commitment to 'constructive change' mainly benefited Soviet-backed insurgents against non-Communist autocracies.

The fact is that we can no more stop change than Canute could still the waters.

Carter is, par excellence, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism, change with progress, optimism with virtue.

• The Carter administration prioritized public image over the strategic reality of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Caribbean.
• Destabilizing friendly autocracies often leads to totalitarian Soviet client states or murderous regimes.

But each, nevertheless, remains willing to 'destabilize' friendly or neutral autocracies without any assurance that they will not be replaced by reactionary totalitarian theocracies, totalitarian Soviet client states, or worst of all, by murderous fanatics of the Pol Pot variety.

• Traditional autocracies are less repressive and more compatible with U.S. interests than revolutionary Marxist regimes.
• Revolutionary Communist regimes claim jurisdiction over every aspect of life, forcing radical changes that violate internalized values and habits.

They gradually die for a number of reasons-diseases, the hard life. They also die of humiliation.

• Violent Marxist insurgencies led by 'armed intellectuals' almost inevitably result in totalitarian tyranny, not democratic socialism.
• The United States should stop treating anti-American revolutionary groups as potential democratic allies and should use force against ideological enemies.

Armed intellectuals citing Marx and supported by Soviet-bloc arms and advisers will almost surely not turn out to be agrarian reformers, or simple nationalists, or democratic socialists.